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ABSTRACT 
Hidden Migration: Malawians in the City of Durban 
This thesis is an investigation into the undocumented migration of 
Malawians to the city of Durban, and the influences on their livelihoods, 
identities and continued links to Malawi. In this context the thesis raises the 
issue of migration and citizenship. In the past Malawians were involved in 
contract migration system tightly controlled by the mining industry and the 
state, and in which their freedom of movement and association was 
circumscribed. This thesis argues that there is anew, emerging new form of 
migration, which may be termed transnational migration that has taken root 
since the early 1990s. It involves a web of links and networks created by 
transmigrants between Malawi and Durban. For a variety of reasons this 
transnational migration pattern is less visible, and largely hidden from the 
official gaze of the state. 
The reasons for migrating to Durban are mainly, through not exclusively 
economic ones, that is, about creating a livelihood, or multiple livelihoods. 
Malawian migrants become enmeshed in a series of livelihood itineraries as 
part of the chain of migration from towns and villages en route to, and in 
Durban. In pursuing their livelihood itineraries they begin to use their 
networks and other resources such as their ethnic and religious identities, 
family and friendship ties, nationality, accumulated experiences, skills and 
entrepreneurship to insert themselves in the city, and in the process, seek, 
find or create work in both the formal and informal sectors of the local 
economy. In this context they develop a sense of belonging to and being 
part of the city and begin to institutionalise their presence, contributing in 
many ways, both socially and economically to the city. The thesis argues 
that their presence, practices, dispositions and accomplishments in the city 
of Durban, and continued links to Malawi raise pertinent issues around the 
question of citizenship and migration. 
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AFRICAN CONTINENTAL MIGRANTS IN THE CITY 
The most striking thing about African cities is the 
sheer amount of work people are doing in order 
to eat. They are not sitting by. There is 
something going on, efforts being made to come 
up with new ways of earning a living, of helping 
each other out, and trying to make city survival a 
collective effort. Abdou Malique Simone 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is entitled "Hidden migration: Livelihoods, Identities and Citizenship: Malawians 
in the City of Durban". It is a paradoxical title, and, perhaps, even ambiguous and 
contradictory, for claims to identities, citizenship and entitlements to making a living is a very 
public encounter, yet as foreign migrants in this country this must be hidden. It is unlike the 
formal contract migration that prevailed in the mining industry in the past. There is a new 
form of migration that is less visible to the public gaze. This migration is hidden for a number 
of reasons. It is hidden because most of this migration is undocumented, that is, migrants 
entering into this country has not been documented at official entry points or international 
border posts, or that having entered into the country on a tourist visa, it expires and they 
become overstayers. Overstayers are in violation of their visa conditions. As undocumented 
migrants by law they should not be in any kind of employment. Whatever employment they 
fmd, such migrants would prefer it to remain opaque to the gaze of officialdom. As foreign 
migrants they also prefer to be unobtrusive than to be victims, or potential victims, of 
xenophobic attacks and discrimination. For these reasons it is better to be hidden away from 
the state's gaze, and to pursue various livelihood strategies in an unobtrusive way. This thesis 
is about these undocumented migrants. It is not about legal immigrants or contract migrants. It 
is about the temporary sojourners who come to Durban, or eThekwini Municipality as the 
current metropolitan municipality is now called, to fmd and engage in a variety of livelihood 
projects. 
The subjects of this research are mainly undocumented migrants, yet they contribute in many 
ways as workers, entrepreneurs, as external agents of social change to the transformation of 
the country. They are here out of necessity, but many would prefer to be in the towns and 
villages of Malawi. If their national identity is revealed, they become targets of suspicion. 
Yet many would profess to be law abiding citizens, and offer deep respect for a country that 
has a functioning system of laws and independent judiciary. They act as citizens, yet are 
treated as outsiders. They participate through making a living for themselves in the city of 
Durban yet have no public voice. Indeed they cannot, and perforce have to remain hidden. It 
is these ambiguities of foreign migrants lives, as they go about making their living out of 
'temporary necessities,l that is explored in this thesis. 
1.2 A mSTORICAL SKETCH OF MIGRATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Migration of Africans into and within Southern Africa goes back centuries. This usually took 
the form of a search for new land for agricultural and pastoral purposes, as well as for trading. 
This kind of pre-colonial migration needs to be distinguished from migration that took place 
since colonial boundaries and states were created. At the very least immigration and migration 
in the modem era can be traced back at least 150 years to the beginning of diamond and gold 
mining.2 In this sense immigration and migration into South Africa is not a new phenomenon. 
South Africa's industrial revolution over the last 150 years has significantly benefited from 
migrants from all parts of the world. Indeed it might be argued that without the migration of 
all manner of people with a diverse range of skills - from the highly skilled engineers and 
miners to the manual and unskilled labourers, the level of the development of South Africa's 
economy may not be what is today. One may note in passing that if the quality of the low-
grade ore found in South Africa had been found in other colonial countries such as Canada, 
Australia or the United States it probably would have remained untapped, or mined at a very 
superficial level. It was the presence of a large unskilled workforce drawn from both within, 
and without the borders of modem day South Africa in a highly controlled way, and put to 
work under extreme exploitative conditions, that made a low-grade gold producing country 
I I borrow this tenn from Maxine Reitzes' 1998 study of cross border migrants in Gauteng and North-West-
Province. 
2 In the 19
th 
century there was no state known as Republic of South Africa with its current borders. There were 
B~tish colonies and Boer !epublics, ~d until the creation of the Union of South Africa in 1910, many African 
chiefdoms and states continued to eXIst as more or less autonomous political entities within the boundaries of 
these colonial states, or on their margins. An exception was Lesotho, which was never conquered but became a 
British protectorate. 
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into one of the world's largest producers3• Various scholars such as Legassick, Wolpe, and 
Johnstone have argued that it is the exploitation of cheap labour, a fundamental feature of 
South African's political economy, upon which the entire edifice of segregation and apartheid 
has been built. One fundamental element to the mining industry was the recruitment of 
foreign migrant labour from nearby countries - Malawi, Mozambique, Lesotho, and 
Swaziland. In the last few decades of the 20th century the mining industry began to see a 
decline. The demand for labour also fell, and hence too the need to recruit vast numbers 
foreign migrants from countries such as Malawi, Mozambique, and Lesotho. In any event as 
far as Malawian migration to the mines is concerned there was already a steady fall in demand 
for their labour since the early 1980s, and it had all but ceased in the late 1980s, hence the 
decline for foreign contract labour. But as we have already noted migration into South Africa 
has a long history of diverse forms. Migration and immigration into South Africa in the late 
19th and 20th centuries took many forms ranging from contract migration as formalised in the 
mining industry to informal undocumented migration. In recent times, according to the media, 
it would appear that informal undocumented migration has been on the increase to the 
detriment of South Africa's development needs and plans. 
But of course South Africa is a different place from the apartheid era. Its once tightly 
controlled borders are porous. There is no longer the controlled movement of labour through a 
battery of laws such as the Urban Areas Act, the Group Areas Act and the Population 
Registration Act, to name but a few. There is a constitution and a Bill of Human Rights that 
guarantee fundamental individual freedoms such as movement, association, free speech, and 
the right to own property. The momentous changes in South Africa as experienced in the last 
decade of the 20th century did not mean that migration suddenly ended. What then, is new 
about continental African migration to this new democratic South Africa? If one has to 
believe the media, some social scientists and certain pronouncements of politicians, it is that 
South Africa is swamped or flooded by foreigners coming from many more diverse countries 
as far afield as West Africa (e.g. Senegal, Ghana, Gabon, Cameroon, Nigeria, Mali etc), from 
East Africa (e.g. Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania), Central Africa (Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Rwanda, Burundi) and Southern Africa (e.g. Zambia, Malawi, Mozambique, 
Zimbabwe, Lesotho). In the public view, fuelled by most media reports, and questionable 
3 ~old was mined in what is now the eastern part of South Africa in Limpopo province, in the pre-colonial era. 
lIDs was long before the establishment of the Boer Republic of the Transvaal, and its subsequerit annexation by 
the British. 
assertions by politicians that all these migrants, immigrants and refugees are 'illegal aliens', 
'illegals', and 'aliens' and more often than not involved in crime, taking away jobs from 
locals and a drain on the social and welfare services of the country. The veracity of these 
contentions is highly questionable as there are no reliable statistics either as a headcount, or as 
to what exactly are continental African skills, occupations, professions, or what exactly they 
do in South Africa to make a living. Nor is there much exploration in the public discourse as 
to why they are here, except to assume that they are criminals, or if not engaged in criminal 
activity, then they are stealing local women and frustrating locals by taking away jobs. In 
short they are undermining the social and economic fabric of South Africa. In any case 
undocumented migration is not susceptible to social science counting procedures, and as shall 
be argued in chapter four, it is difficult to research as to what exactly they do to make a living. 
In any event the outcome of most of these pronouncements in the mass media and by 
politicians is that anyone with a dark or black skin complexion and/or speaks and dresses 
differently is an 'alien', and consequently there has been a significant rise in xenophobia and 
racism since the early 1990s. The use of xenophobic and racist terms to describe anyone 
suspected of being non-South African is a somewhat ironic development in the post-apartheid 
period. In chapter four these issues of counting migrants and immigrants, of defming who is 
migrant, immigrant, or not, and what is the purpose of them being here in South Africa is 
further explored. 
What is new about migration to South Africa is not just the decline in procurement of formal 
contract migrant labour for the mining industry by the Employment Bureau for Africa 
(TEBA), but that people arrive from all over Africa, and other parts of the world. That people 
from all over Africa come to South Africa is indicative of a number of macro processes 
underway that prompt these new waves of migration, such as flexible production _ 
unregulated international free movement of capital and goods - and globalisation. Although 
my focus in this thesis is not on flexible production or globalisation per se, aspects of 
globalisation as it influences migration streams will be reviewed. I suggest that what is being 
witnessed now is a new form of migration - that of transnational migration, which simply 
means that migrants do not simply cross from a point of origin to a point of destination, but 
maintain a constant flow and influence through the networks and institutions they set up 
between two of more countries. In chapter three various theories are reviewed to explain some 
of these new waves of migration, such as transnationalism. It will be shown that a number of 
conditions have been set in motion for these str~ams of migration from the rest of Africa to 
4 
South Africa. The fIrst sets of conditions are essentially push factors in the country or place of 
origin. Among this fIrst set of push factors is political instability, prompting a stream of 
refugees. These are mainly from the civil wars and political problems experienced in various 
parts of Africa, but mainly in the Great Lakes region encompassing the countries of Rwanda, 
Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo, but also from places such as Ethiopia, 
Somalia, Sudan, Nigeria and Ivory Coast. Unlike other countries, South Africa does not have 
refugee camps, and so refugees, once they have affIrmed their status with the Department of 
Home Affairs, are left very much on their own to fend for themselves. They may seek and 
accept employment or be self-employed within the confmes of the law. The refugees, despite 
their offIcial status, become like migrants - temporary sojourners seeking employment. In 
chapter four the issue of refugees as migrants is analysed. The second set of conditions is 
located in the myriad ways in which African economies have collapsed, either through 
structural adjustment programmes, or through inadequate or corrupt state administration and 
management, prompting a stream of people migrating to fInd new livelihood opportunities. 
This is not to suggest that every one in a particular country or state moves to seek new 
opportunities, but that there a suffIcient number who make the decision to migrate, often in 
association with families or friends. These are economic migrants. Many of these choose to 
come to South Africa because they have heard or been exposed to the media that portrays it as 
a powerful economy with plenty of opportunities. For some such migrants, South Africa is 
their second or third choice of destination after Europe or the United States of America, 
because of the tightened immigration laws in Europe and restrictive conditions for emigrating 
to the USA, and the sheer expense and trouble of getting into such places. A third set of 
conditions is that some migrants simply seek to explore what conditions exist in the new 
South Africa. The miracle of democratic transition and continuing stability exerts a powerful 
attraction for African adventurers, professionals and entrepreneurs to seek out opportunities 
ranging from post-secondary school education, investment and employment opportunities in 
sectors such as universities, professional services, retail and manufacturing to acting as 
consultants to industry and government. 
There is no doubt that there is a visible increase in continental migrants and immigrants in 
South Africa, particularly since the early 1990s, as will be shown in chapter four. This thesis 
is about those who come to South Africa not to work in the mines or to pursue their 
professional middle class careers and high flown entrepreneurial and investment visions but 
those migrants, who out of necessity and choice, come to South Africa, and in particular settle 
in the eThekwini municipality. These are the poor, the underclass, the disadvantaged, the ones 
struck down by economic or political circumstances in their places of origin, who seek to 
pursue their livelihoods in another country which by comparison to their own, has vastly more 
economic opportunities, in their view, for recreating their sense of well being for themselves 
and their families. The emphasis in this thesis is not on the numbers that have come to South 
African or the xenophobia per se, but on their relative freedom and capacity to pursue 
livelihood strategies in a diverse set of circumstances. Given the changing condition in 
Southern Africa, and the continent as a whole in relation to macro processes mentioned 
above, these migrants are not just undocumented but represent a new and different kind of 
migration, that of transnational migration. This represents not just a political problem of 
defming who is or is not an 'alien', or migrant, and the emotive political consideration this 
invokes, but also a broader question of who is a citizen, by what criteria, and what rights and 
entitlements does it inhere into the itineraries, agendas, social interactions and practices of the 
migrants. For the purposes of this thesis it locates them not in any specific industry (as would 
the older contract form of migration), but within an urban context - the metropolitan city of 
Durban, or as it is now known, the eThekwini municipality, and the research focuses on a 
particular group of migrants in the municipality, Malawians. 
1.3 THE CORE ISSUES 
The city, once symbolised as the pre-eminent icon of modernity, has in recent years been 
replaced by an image of a place of sprawling inner-city decay, crime and anonymity. Often, 
as in the South African context, the evidence proffered for this representation of the city is its 
abandonment by its former residents. Associated with this is a sense of loss of identity, 
community, and rights to urban space. Migrants (andlor poor, andlor black) are often the 
symbolic representation of all the negative. elements of the modem city. But a scientific 
assessment of the city lies not in these polar opposite ideal-types, but in the very ambiguities 
of the transitions of the 21 st century city life, the image captured so evocatively in the quote 
above by Abdou Malique Simone. It is true that there is inner-city decay, and a host of 
associated social and economic problems, and those migrants perpetrate and are victims of 
some of the worst excesses of city life. It also evident that migrants arrive in the city with 
hardly a clear idea of what it is they are going to do to make a living in the city, except that 
somehow it must be better than · what they left behind. Yet at the same time as they try to 
make a living in the city, incoming migrants appropriate it and change it, they bring new 
vitality to urban existence and pose new challenges to local and city authorities in spheres 
such as providing services, housing, employment, markets and other public spaces. Migrants 
challenge existing regimes of regulations, and in their everyday practice offer glimpses of 
new worlds of the possible, thus raising new theoretical and practical challenges as citizens 
within a highly differentiated urban population, and challenge conceptualising the city as a 
place of productive capacity and inclusiveness. 
The fact is that almost all Black people living in the city centre of Durban, and on its 
periphery are recent in-migrants, whether they are local migrants or foreign migrants. Given 
its history of white urban exclusivity until the abolition of apartheid legislation in the early 
1990s, all people of colour were not allowed to stay in the city centre except if they were 
employed and working as domestic servants or in the hotel, tourist, harbour and associated 
industries. Currently most local and foreign African migrants are marginalized and poor, 
struggling to survive and adapt to a new, different and rapidly changing environment, where 
new issues have become the focus of public debate. These new issues relate not only to black 
and white relations race relations, but also to poverty, lack of employment opportunities, 
income generating activities, residence and housing rights, among other issues that affect the 
metropolitan municipality. In the main, many continental African foreign migrants are found 
in city centres because it is the only place where there are better opportunities for making a 
living and where they have access to resources to ensure a measure of protection. But 
Malawian migrants, as regional (Southern Africa) citizens have an ambiguous relationship 
with the centre-city, and the city at large. The city centre occupies the middle ground in a 
sense in the socio-spatial hierarchy that structures the life trajectories of different groups of 
people, between the townships and informal settlements on the one hand and the former 
white-only suburbs on the periphery on the other. But the city centre is actively contested by 
large sections of the established population across the different 'race' groups, who tend to 
consider foreign migrants, poor people and informal users of the city as illegitimate residents, 
unqualified to reside in a 'modem' urban environment and responsible for the grime and very 
high level of criminality. Some Malawians have abandoned this contested spatial terrain for 
residence and work on the periphery of the city, namely Mariannhill. This is where a 
substantial portion of the research for this project has taken place. This does not mean that 
some of the eThekwini's municipality's economic development policies, which tend to lead 
to a contestation between targeting affluent international consumption such as International 
Conference Centre, tourism, and the north pier and waterfront developments, and various 
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affiuent 'gated communities', clashing with the presence of socio-economically marginalized 
groups of urban dwellers. It is just that those Malawians who have removed themselves or 
absented themselves from those contestations have found another way of making a living: 
hidden, but not absent from developments in the city. 
For many foreign migrants, be they economic migrants or refugees and asylum seekers, the 
idea of coming to South Africa was attractive, not least because of the promises of the new 
government to make provision for the citizenry. But xenophobia and limited opportunities, 
the difficulty of accumulating some capital in order to re-start their lives, both here and back 
home, or send back remittances are at fIrst a horrible shock. Expectations of plenitude, 
sympathy and solidarity, if ever present as is often the case with refugees/migrants having 
experienced other countries' refugee policies on the continent4 are rapidly removed from their 
consciousness. But many, rather than return empty handed to their places of origin or move 
on to other pastures, stay and exploit whatever opportunities do exist. But such opportunities 
are not a supermarket shelf of commodities to choose from. They exist, but in highly 
prescribed and socially conceptualised ways. It is in this context that this research must be 
located. 
1.4 THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
This thesis raises three major issues. 
1) The fIrst is that continental African migrants take whatever opportunity presents itself 
beyond the immediate needs of securing accommodation and some form of means of 
survival. Those, like many of the Malawians, who move beyond welfare dependency, 
and overcome barriers of 'race', xenophobia, and skill and regulation disadvantages, 
appear to find strategies that enable them to secure their residence and livelihoods , 
including: the use of networks for accessing fmance, information on jobs and other 
economic opportunities, mobilising social capital and family members to work in their 
enterprises, exploiting opportunities in state policies and procedures in areas like 
housing and utilities services provision, working for below legal minimum wages, 
4 For many refugees the camps that have been set up for them by the United Nations High Commission for 
Refugees ~CR) are cauIdr~ns of mal-administration, starvation, corruption, political infighting, boredom 
and death traps If you are perceIved to be the wrong ethnic group or political supporter. 
hard work (and long hours), overcoming xenophobia by employing local people in 
their enterprises, marrying local women and relying on religious solidarity to build 
links across race and ethnic lines. 
2) The second is that migrants do build up a stake in the city, as they exploit the 
opportunities that it offers. This is not to deny that links or networks of links tie them 
to their places of origin. In some cases maintaining links to their places of origin is 
important not just to maintain family or village contact and to remit any surplus 
capital for investment, but also to recruit 'unfree' wage labour, or more fmance, or 
both, and of course to maintain a sense of root and destination for their life. But while 
some migrants often see their initial situation as desperate and rely heavily on their 
networks and support of their fellow nationals, as well as welfare agencies and 
religious organisations to assist them in their needs, many migrants are forced to face 
the fact that they have to move beyond the expectation and dependency on handouts 
and welfare. 
3) The third issue is that of citizenship as it flows from the very participation and 
predicaments that migrants experience in the city of Durban. Citizenship is a key 
institution in exploring the issue of inclusion in city life, as at its heart is the 
identification of belonging to place in which there is an assumption of participation in 
governance. Formal citizenship conceived in conventional terms means having the 
right to vote, being treated equally before the law, and having an entitlement to certain 
benefits of government supplied services. It also entails certain obligations such as 
paying taxes and to obeying the laws of the land. While this conception implies 
inclusion, there are certain ambiguities that need to be highlighted and explored 
further in the context of migrants' productive role and contribution to the city. There 
is usually the formal exclusion of immigrants and foreign migrants as citizens. Yet 
immigrants contribute to the city as workers, tax payers, family members, employers 
etc. in a particular place, develop a sense of belonging, yet are denied full political 
participation rights and basic rights. In South Africa while the constitution covers all 
people, certain rights are granted only to citizens. Most foreign migrants are excluded 
from citizenship, and therefore cannot participate in the political sphere at any level: 
national, provincial or local government. In cities such as Durban this affects them 
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directly as at that formal level they have no public defence against any challenges to 
their human rights and participation in the local economy and society. 
These issues focus attention on the stake migrants carve out for themselves. This is the 
central point of analysis. It reduces the idea of 'victim' - temporary migrant sojourner, 
refugee, asylum seeker, retrenched worker or landless peasant - to the actual practices of 
migrants and the evolution of their particular strategies in response to overcoming the 
limitations and constraints in an urban environment to their advancing their livelihood 
strategies, and their claims to citizenship. 
1.5 HYPOTHESES 
This research problem may be put into a series of hypothesis. 
1. The presence of undocumented Malawian migrants m Durban displays the 
characteristics of transnational migratory patterns. 
2. The main push-pull factors in continental African migration to South Africa are not 
only economic, but are a complicated ensemble of economic and political 
circumstances. 
3. The decision to migrate is often made at an individual and household level with the 
general aims of improving their general welfare (primarily income), accumulating 
savings and returning home. 
4. Foreign migrants such as Malawians, despite the obstacles they face, fmd ways to 
create livelihood strategies. 
5. Although migrants see themselves as temporary sojourners, they build up a stake in 
the city. 
6. Participation in the social and economic life of the city entitles them to claim human 
and citizenship rights. 
7. Current policies of the state are exclusionary and offer little or no protection to the 
defence of their interests 
The significance of this study is that it approaches the study of undocumented foreign 
migrants in trying to unpack what it is that they actually do, and distinguish between macro 
economic and political events, which may be causal1y linked to migration patterns or streams, 
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and the actual lived empirical experience of migrants. Hence the study focuses very closely 
on how Malawian migrants experience the movement from the places of origin in towns and 
villages of Malawi to the streets of Durban and suburbs of eThekwini, and the implications 
this holds for concepts like citizenship. 
1.6 OUTLINE OF THE CHAPTERS 
In chapter two I outline the research methods used to collect the data. These methods are: the 
literature review, observation, informal interviews and conversations, in-depth semi-
structured interviews, and a social survey. I explain the social and political context in which 
the methods evolved, and emphasize the triangulation or multiple methods approach to 
collecting data. A primary consideration in collecting data was winning the trust of foreign 
African migrants, particularly those that are undocumented, in order to collect reliable data. 
In chapter three I undertake a review of the literature with the aim of showing how these 
theories apply in an international context, and within South Africa. The emphasis is to draw 
on the international experience of migrants in the ways in which they cope with a new social 
and political environment, the use various strategies to make a living, particularly the 
connections and networks established both within the new place of destination, and the 
continued links with their places of origin. Coping here needs to be understood, not as a 
strategy limited to the duration of a crisis such as food or fmancial shortage, but to a series of 
strategies, or multiple strategies to secure livelihoods for multiple goals or purposes. A 
further issue that is reviewed is that of citizenship as a consequence of participation in the 
economy and society of Durban. 
Chapter four reviews a selection of current literature on African continental migration to 
South Africa. The chapter analyses some of the debates on undocumented migration and 
immigration. A distinction is made between migrant and immigrant and the implication of 
this has for undocumented migrants in practice and in terms of current legislation. Other 
important issues considered are debates around how many such migrants there are, whether 
they displace local South Africans as regards employment prospects, and whether they see 
themselves as temporary or permanent migrant workers. This literature review covers some 
studies of foreign migrant informal street traders, and those in formal employment in the 
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construction and services sector of the economy, mostly in the city of Johannesburg, Gauteng 
and North-West provinces. 
Chapter five introduces the case study of Malawians by providing a detailed demographic 
and statistical analysis of a number of variables drawn from the survey conducted. Variables 
such as age, gender, educational levels, income, employment history, including informal 
work, family and household structures and remittances are analysed. It also elicited 
information on the reasons for coming to Durban, (rather than say Johannesburg), their 
itineraries or step migratory process from Malawi to Durban, and giving an indication of the 
kind of networks or connections with people that assisted in providing accommodation and 
work. The survey shows some of the differentiation that is taking place among the Malawians 
migrants themselves, and the degree of identification with their places of origin, and Durban 
as a city, and South Africa in general. 
The survey results are further analysed in chapter SiX m terms of the employment, 
unemployment and other work strategies that are pursued by the Malawians. The survey 
gives insights into the broad livelihood strategies and opportunities pursued, ranging from 
informal street trading, home based industries, such as tailoring, to trading in crafts and 
various commodities, and formal employment. The chapter also gives an insight into 
problems that they have or perceive to have such as xenophobia and lack of trading permits, 
and whether they will return to Malawi or not, and whether their return plans mayor may not 
have changed. 
Chapter seven provides a detailed analysis of the data collected from the in-depth interviews, 
and uses a number of individuals to illustrate the long historical connections that exist 
between Malawians and Durban, their contemporary relevance, and the specific ways in 
which the various individuals pursued their goals as a consequence of migrating to Durban. It 
also gives an indication of the use of multiple social identities that are used in the pursuit of 
these goals, and raises the issue of the permanence or temporary nature of their stay, their 
participation in the economy and society into which they have inserted themselves, and their 
sense of belonging and identification with local people across ethnic and race barriers. This 
chapter expands with greater depth, through the narratives of the various individuals the , 
sense of eThekwini (Durban) as a place of interactions and flows of human beings going 
about their daily lives as citizens or residents, and as transnational migrants. 
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Chapter eight takes up the question of citizenship through participation of the Malawians in 
the local economy of eThekwini and interest groups of which they are a part. This chapter 
revisits the concept of citizenship, outlines various models of citizenship, and its applicability 
to people who are involved in transnational migration. The chapter outlines the current legal 
and constitutional position of citizenship in South Africa, and identifies ambiguities with 
regard to citizenship and the bill of rights, and explores the tension between state centred 
territorialized based citizenship rights, and citizenship rights of migrants earned through 
participation, a sense of belonging and the defence ( or lack) of their localised interests. 
Chapter nine is the fmal chapter. This chapter provides a summary, synthesis and assessment 
of the fmdings. Its contribution to the study of migration in southern Africa, and to South 
Africa and Durban in particular, seeks to advance the debate on understanding continental 
African migration in an era of global transfonnation as it affects, and is influenced by 
developments in Southern African and the African continent as a whole. 
1.7 LIMITATIONS 
This is an empirical case study of a particular group of continental African migrants, 
Malawians, in the period mid 1999-2001. It is also by and large confmed to Malawians from . 
the south, mainly from the Mangochi district. As such it cannot claim to represent all foreign 
migrants in every respect. Yet the processes, events, itineraries, ways of insertion and making 
a living, while different from the way, for example refugees enter the country, also highlight 
similarities in the experiences of continental African migrants. Despite the limitations of 
studying a single group of African continental migrants, the ethnographic detail of this study, 
and the issues it raises should be seen as a contribution to the growing literature on 




This chapter describes the research methods that were employed to collect the data for 
this research project. It describes the context of the research and the reasons for 
employing the methods. The most appropriate way of describing the methods employed 
in collecting the data is that it involved a triangulation of methods, or multiple methods of 
data collecting. Except for the social survey, these methods by and large involve what 
anthropologists call ethnography, or ethnographic fieldwork. The methods may be 
broadly categorised as qualitative and quantitative, and involved the use of the following: 
• A literature review, including the use of secondary data and documents 
• Conversations and meetings with groups of respondents 
• Interviews, both formal and informal 
• A social survey, and 
• Participant and non-participation observation. 
In the following sections the context of the research will be described as well as the 
location of the field - the places in which the fieldwork took place. A review of the 
advantages and limitations of multiple methods, or the triangulation of methods follows. 
Each method will in turn be described, as well as its advantages and limitations in the 
context of this research project. 
2.2 THE CONTEXT OF THE RESEARCH 
This thesis flows out of a larger multi-national, multi-institutional research project, 
"Governance, Urban Dynamics, and Economic Development: A Comparative Analysis of 
the Metropoles of Durban, Abidjan and Marseille", funded largely by the Institut Fran~ais 
de Recherche pour Ie Development (IRD), Paris, and the National Research Foundation 
(NRF), Pretoria. The area of my concern in this project was migrants to the city of 
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Durban with particular reference to foreign migrants. Hence the subject of this thesis: 
Malawian migrants in the city of Durban. 
Conducting research among foreign migrants, particularly continental African migrants, 
many of whom are undocumented, is fraught with difficulties. The fIrst difficulty 
encountered was to allay the suspicions that migrants have of anyone who seemed 
interested in their lives. As it will be evident in the following chapters undocumented 
migrants or refugees, or asylum seekers, or simply legal immigrants in South African are 
very suspicious of researchers. This is not unreasonable given that they face many 
problems and difficulties ranging from fmding accommodation and jobs to xenophobic 
attacks and harassment by police and other state officials. Xenophobic attacks are well 
documented and these range from verbal abuse to physical attacks that have led to injury, 
destruction of property and homicide. Given this scenario, it is extremely difficult for an 
outsider, such as this researcher, simply to expect migrants to provide information to 
satisfy the data collecting queries of a local South African researcher. Hence the subjects 
of the research were very suspicious of the researcher fearing that either I was a spy from 
the Department of Home Affairs or a police agent trying to infIltrate their community. 
This is not an unreasonable assumption given that there is a widespread public view, fed 
by media reports and politicians pronouncements, that foreigners are involved in crime 
and/or are a drain on society and therefore are unwelcome. (For an analysis of the myths 
and realities of xenophobia, and media reports on xenophobia, see Danso and McDonald, 
and McDonald et. al. 2001.) Winning their confIdence took a considerable amount of 
time. In some cases six months and in others over a year. It required many meetings and 
conversations to reassure the migrants of my bona fides. During this time mainly 
informal discussions, informal interviews and observation (mainly non-participatory 
observation) was possible. While this 'entering the fIeld' period yielded insights, these 
had to be crosschecked when the formal interviews and social survey was conducted. It 
did provide the basis for an ongoing relationship of trust that was built up over time. 
The second problem that was encountered was the question of which research techniques 
to adopt as appropriate to the circumstances. There was no textbook approach that was 
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possible. Indeed as part of the larger project, some continental African migrants simply 
refused to participate in any form of social surveys, as was the case with the Senegalese 
and Congolese. Others would make appointments for interviews and not keep them, or 
simply say they were too busy to be interviewed. Re-scheduled interviews were often 
kept but at other times simply avoided. In the case of the Malawian migrants assurances 
of my bona fides was made easier by the fact that I was introduced by a colleague of 
Malawian descent from the University of Durban-Westville to the Malawian community 
among whom he lived. His attesting to my bona fides, and the fact that I was a Muslim 
and had a personal relationship with one or two local Islamic scholars greatly facilitated 
my entry into the world of the Malawian migrants. Yet there was hesitancy; the 
Malawians refused permission for any interview or conversation to be taped. 
Nevertheless this introduction by a colleague who came from the community assisted in 
beginning the process of formal interviews and conducting a survey much earlier than I 
anticipated (given the previous months experiences of the Senegalese, Congolese and 
local rural migrants). In the two years (mid-1999 to 2001) that the data collecting phase 
of this . research was conducted the methods of research had to be adapted to the 
circumstances constantly. 
A third issue was the location of the fieldwork research. The unquestioned assumption of 
fieldwork research is that it takes place in a defined bounded area, or among a clearly 
defined group of people. This research is not based on an understanding of research 
located in a particular spatially and territorially bounded area, such as a factory, or a 
block of apartments, a defined administrative neighbourhood or district, or a well defmed 
ethnic (presumably homogenous) community. This was not the case for this research. 
This is not an entirely new phenomenon in immigration research, partiCUlarly on those 
matters that relate to culture and its reproduction in a new place or point of destination. 
But what is new is that these migrants, the Malawians in this case, evince not the 
certainty of departure and/or return, or immigrating from point of origin to point of 
settlement, but to a curious mix of local and non-localised elements and of constant 
movement across boundaries, national and within a locality in relation to creating a 
livelihood, often stretching from Durban to a town or village in Malawi. It also entailed 
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the crossing of metaphysical and symbolic boundaries of social and cultural transitions 
and translations. As Appadurai has commented on the general problem that ethnography 
or fieldwork must face in a globalised world: 
As groups migrate, regroup in new locations, reconstruct their histories and 
reconfigure their ethnic projects, the ethno in ethnography takes on a slippery, 
non-localized quality ... The landscapes of group identity - the ethnoscapes -
around the world are no longer familiar anthropological objects, insofar as 
groups are no longer tightly controlled territorialized, spatially bounded, 
historically unselfconscious, or culturally homogenous (1996: 44). 
Such a view is apposite for this research. Nominally the research on the subject of 
Malawian migrants was located in three areas, namely, Mariannhill, Overport and the city 
centre. As critical life choices are made by migrants, the search for fixed points of 
reference can be frustrating, both for the subjects of research, and the researcher. Rather 
than only habitus, as Bourdieu puts it - the more or less tacitly reproduced ensemble of 
practices and arrangements to make sense of everyday life - there is space for conscious 
choice about what should or should not be done, what strategic relationships to 
undertake, create, and maintain, or tactics or stratagems to pursue in securing work or 
accommodation, and of course the justification, legitimation and representation regarding 
those choices. Methodologically this research used a variety of research techniques to 
capture this fluid quality of foreign migrants pursuing livelihood strategies in an urban 
area such as Durban. 
2.3 COLLECTING THE DATA: A TRIANGULATION OF METHODS, USING 
MULTIPLE RESEARCH METHODS 
2.3.1 Choosing the Research Tools 
As indicated above, it is/ was the circumstances, and social and political context of 
continental African migrants daily lives and the research problem that dictated the 
adoption of the research methods and techniques. As Burgees, quoting Wax states: 
Strict and rigid adherence to any method, technique or doctrinaire position 
may, for the fieldworker, become like confinement in a cage. Ifhe is lucky or 
a very cautious, a fieldworker may formulate a research problem so that he 
17 
will find all the answers he needs within his cage. But if he finds himself in a 
field situation where he is limited by a particular method, theory, or technique 
he will do well to slip thorough the bars and try to find out what is really 
going on (Wax, 1971, quoted in Burgess, 1984) 
This was certainly the case for this research. However, it still meant collecting data 
through a systematic use of a variety of techniques. Data may be conceived as any 
systematic collection of information to elucidate a particular research problem. Apart 
from the non-participatory observations and informal discussions and conversations, the 
primary techniques used were the literature review, including documents and legislation 
to sharpen the focus on the key issues and questions that needed to be addressed, and the 
use of interviews (in-depth formal and informal) and a social survey of the Malawian 
migrants. In short a combination of qualitative and quantitative research techniques were 
adopted for this research project. 
2.3.2 Qualitative and Quantitative Research: Triangulation 
As is evident from the above description of entry into the field, a number of research 
methods were adopted. These may be collectively and formally termed 'multiple research 
methods' (Burgess, 1984) or 'triangulation' (Bryman, n.d.; Gittins, n.d). Bryman defines 
triangulation as the 
Use of more than one approach to the investigation of a research problem in 
question in order to enhance confidence in the ensuing findings. Since much 
social research is founded on the use of a single research method and as such 
may suffer from the limitation associated with that method or from specific 
application of it, triangulation offers the prospect of enhanced -confidence. 
Triangulation is one of several rationales for multimethod research. (n.d: 1) 
The collections of such data may be conceived as falling within qualitative or quantitative 
methodological frameworks. Qualitative and quantitative research can be conceived as 
two distinct approaches to social research. 
Qualitative data is often associated with participant and non-participant observation and 
semi-structured and unstructured interviews (such as in ethnography); focus group 
interviews; language and discourse analysis; and detailed analysis of texts (e.g. Leach's 
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analysis of biblical texts, Foucault's use of historical documents). Qualitative research 
methods tend to approach the study of society through the 'thick-description' of social 
and cultural contexts (e.g. Geertz), the situated, constructed and contingent character of 
society as the outcome of individuals and groups in interaction with one another, or as an 
unfolding process. Quantitative data collection is more associated with social surveys, 
that is, structured interviewing and questionnaires; structured observation and 
experimentation; analysis of official statistics and other 'hard' data sources and content 
analysis. 
Both these approaches reveal different epistemological and theoretical positions. 
Quantitative research techniques reveal a concern with patterns, measurement, causality 
and generalisation, revealing its roots in positivist, natural science approaches to the 
study of society. Qualitative approaches, stated in very general and bald terms, reject the 
natural science model of society, and finds philosophical expression in, for example 
phenomenology, and theoretical positions in social science such as symbolic 
interactionalism, ethomethodology, transactionalism, interpretative, critical theory (e.g. 
Habermas), and F oucaultian approaches. 
It has been advocated that despite these very different philosophical and theoretical 
approaches, it is the very strengths and weaknesses of both quantitative and qualitative · 
techniques for data collection that can be fruitfully used (Bryman, 1995). It is their very 
limitations and strengths that make it possible for them to be integrated or interwoven to 
investigate particular research problems. Thus, for example, Bryman argues that 
quantitative data may reveal unexpected patterns, which may need to be followed by 
using in-depth interviewing of key informants, or to follow up initial survey research with 
detailed ethnographic studies. Conversely what appears to be specific and idiosyncratic in 
qualitative research may be part of wider and/or significant emerging patterns that may 
require further investigation to uncover the nature, extent and characteristics of the social 
phenomenon through the use of quantitative techniques. Such an approach also fits in 
with a grounded theory approach which moves back and forth between data collection 
and theory, although its emphasis is on building theoretical explanations in areas where 
19 
there is very little known of the topic, problem, or where new ideas can be tested (Gittins, 
n.d.6-7). 
2.3.3 Limitations and Advantages of Triangulation 
The attraction of such a triangulation of methodological techniques is that the validity of 
findings can be stated with greater confidence. While this may be the major attraction of 
the multiple methods approach, it cannot be assumed that such a combination of methods 
is without its problems such as fmdings contradicting one another. The approaches are 
different, both philosophically and theoretically, and therefore will yield different 
insights, but which may not be comparable. But then it suggests that further research is 
required. Thus a pre-structured social survey interview schedule is designed as an 
instrument to elicit information on a one-to-one basis between interviewer and 
interviewee and to measure and count statistically to reveal patterns, whereas in-depth 
interviewing and observation elucidates insider perspectives, process and contexts. The 
data that results from this kind of research may not be comparable to data obtained by 
observation of public events or group interviews in which some participants may 
dominate, or in which individuals may hold back in expressing the opinions. 
Yet as I have tried to show, there are advantages to using a combination of methods. The 
fmdings from one can be used to check the other, and adding richness and complexity to 
an inquiry (Bryman, n.d: 4). Qualitative data can be used to amplify the results of 
quantitative data. In this thesis the variable patterns of livelihood strategies of migrants in 
Durban drawn from the social survey is further amplified through illustrative case 
material drawn from in-depth interviews. Further more, the particular situation that a 
researcher finds himself, itself a product of particular social and political contexts, should 
not bind a researcher to a ruthless pursuit of a 'doomed to failure' research method. 
The methodology employed for this project is a mixture of qualitative and quantitative 
research. The reasons for reliance on this mixed methodology are the difficulties 
encountered in the field as alluded to above, but also to collect first hand accounts of the 
reasons and decision making involved in migrating in the first place, and their 
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experiences as individuals and their interactions both among themselves, and with 
different actors such as state agencies and local South Africans in securing their 
livelihoods and integrating or assimilating themselves into a host society, or indeed, 
returning home. Such data, particularly biographical details, can be collected only by 
conducting in-depth interviews with a number of respondents (Lawson, 2000: 173-189, 
McHugh, 2000: 71-89). The quantitative data was needed to give a clear indication of 
the basic variables involved in trying to assess their capacity to make a success, or 
failure, of the migratory process. Such variables as skills, educational levels, size of 
household and families, income earned and remitted are important not only to illustrate 
the social composition of the migrants themselves, but also towards assessing how these 
were used as part of their livelihood strategies. This basic data, together with their 
strategies at being 'good' workers, employees and petty entrepreneurs, is needed to 
enhance our understanding of the entrainment or flows of Malawian migrants to Durban, 
the construction of their multiple, and often ambivalent, identities, their situational 
responses to the strictures imposed upon them in setting up livelihoods and the 
implications this holds for different models of citizenship. 
Underlying such a research prbcedure is the assumption that migration is a flexible 
journey, and not the highly controlled contractual process as it was when thousands of 
Malawian migrants worked on the mines, and lived in tightly controlled compounds, 
during the apartheid period. Controlled migration by the state and mining industry 
migrant recruitment agency, TEBA (The Employment Bureau of Africa), circumscribed 
migrant's movements, and denied them their rights to freedom of movement and 
association. Those times are now past and very different circumstances prevail for 
foreign migrants. As a sub-set of residents in South Africa they were easily accounted for 
in surveys and census data in the past. As McHugh has argued, surveys, particularly 
census data, by their very nature circumscribe a class of human being termed 'migrants', 
but do not tell us much about the migration process, the circulation of migrants, nor do 
they reveal the 'lived experiences embedded within social-cultural' and political contexts. 
Following the example of Glick, Schiller et al (1994), among others, he advocates an 
ethnographic approach which seeks to capture migrations as a fluid process where 
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individuals and groups forge new connections, embracing networks of people across 
social fields and boundaries (2000: 72-3). 
2.3.4 The ethnographic approach 
Ethnography usually involves fieldwork among a people or institutions that are the 
subject of direct observation and participation in its or their activities over a period of 
time, usually a year. In its classic sense fieldwork involves living and working in a setting 
dissimilar from the researcher's on the assumption it aids in collecting data without prior 
assumptions and requires the suspension of prejudices and bias. Participation can be 
active or passive. Fieldwork involves obtaining data from observations, which lead to 
conversations, interviews (formal and informal/ structured, semi-structured and 
unstructured) with key informants. Ethnography does not eschew the collection of data 
through surveys or census type questionnaires, but this is considered as a part of the 
ensemble of methods that can be used in the fieldwork process. Nor does fieldwork 
exclude the use of documents or texts of various kinds ranging from religious texts to 
official statistics. 
2.3.5 Observations, Conversations and Informal Interviews 
Observation usually entails the ethnographer's gaze over the physical setting (the natural 
and built environment), the behaviour or social interaction of people, their particular 
activities as individuals or in groups, at work or at leisure as well as the symbolic 
manifestations of their behaviour. These observations are then discussed with the 
ethnographer's subjects or collaborators. All this provides crucial initial information on 
which questions are posed in the future. During this phase the emphasis is on gathering 
information through dialogue, rather than the extraction of data. This can then form the 
basis of semi-structured interviews with key informants and others, as well as inform the 
structure of a questionnaire based social survey. 
In the case of this research entry into the field was a difficult process, but had the virtue 
of giving this researcher a considerable amount of time to observe migrants in a variety 
of settings, their actions and social interactions with various people, in both their places 
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of work and accommodation. This period also allowed for many conversations and 
informal interviews on the basis of the initial observations. All of these observations, 
conversations and informal interviews formed the basis of the more formal semi-
structured and structured interviews. The last mentioned form of interviews constituted 
the social survey that was undertaken among the Malawian migrants. 
2.3.6 Semi-Structured In-depth Interviews 
As indicated above a number of informal interviews, conversations and observations 
were conducted throughout the two-year period of data collecting. This constituted part 
of the total database. However as indicated above not all of this could be used until it was 
tested against more formal interviews. Observations in itself can be a very rigid form of 
data. It is only when a question is asked about what is observed that it can meaningfully 
be said to constitute a relevant piece of information. During this time 13 formal 
interviews were conducted by this researcher with a range of Malawian migrants. This 
included interviews with key informants. Key informants are people who are said to 
have a particular insight or depth of knowledge of the topic under research. Key 
informants range from ordinary people to those who have specialist knowledge or people 
in power. These formal in-depth and key informant interviews usually lasted for between 
one and two hours. Some were longer, but only because there were constant interruptions 
during the interviews. These semi-structured interviews allowed for following up and 
exploring issues and problems at greater length than could be captured in a social survey. 
In certain cases, where it was possible, follow-up interviews were held between six 
months and a year later. These interviews form the basis of chapter 7. These interviews 
reveal the complex nature, not only of the decision to migrate but that of inserting oneself 
into a new society, finding accommodation and work, whether this is · of an 
entrepreneurial nature or simply working for someone else, as well as decisions about 
family matters such as bringing one's family to Durban, to marry someone locally and 
dealing with a myriad of daily minutiae and larger issues such as xenophobia and 
potential police harassment. 
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2.3.7 The Social Survey: 
These interviews, conversations and observations were complemented by a social survey 
of 119 Malawians living in Mariannhill, Overport and the city centre. A social survey is 
usually conducted in terms of a sample of a population, in this case the Malawian 
migrants living in Durban. Usually sampling techniques may be divided into probability 
and non-probability techniques. Probability techniques usually refer to the possibility of 
every element or characteristic of a population being included in the sample. It assumes a 
known clearly defined and bounded population. Conversely, non-probability sampling 
refers to the fact that some elements have little or no chance of being included in the 
sample. In the case of this research two important points must be noted. The total 
universe or population of Malawians living in Durban is unknown. Secondly, not every 
Malawian, even if they could be identified, is likely to submit to a process of 
interviewing. Therefore drawing a relevant and valid sample from the population was not 
possible. The sampling technique adopted for this research was based on snowballing, 
that is a non-probability technique. Hence no rigid method of selecting the probability of 
including every possible element or characteristic was possible. However, it is the view 
of this researcher that given the large number of respondents, from three different areas 
of the city, and that in terms of the actual sample a fair variety of age categories, incomes, 
skills, educational levels and types of occupations were uncovered, that a representative 
sample has been captured. Many of the results of this survey are consistent with the main 
characteristics of African or Asian migrants elsewhere, such as in Europe, evaluated in 
terms of variables such as age, the types of occupations engaged in, entrepreneurship and 
remittances (social capital). It is also possible to construe the results of the survey as 
confirming elements of the capital maximising and the 'myth ofretum' hypotheses. 
The snowballing technique was conducted in stages. First, a number of respondents who 
had already been introduced and were known to the researcher were interviewed as part 
of beginning the survey. This was largely conducted in the Mariannhill area. Thereafter, 
with the assistance of a Malawian migrant with a post-high school qualification, a 
number of other migrants were interviewed. Sixty respondents were interviewed. In the 
second stage the survey moved location to Overport and the city centre. Here two 
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research assistants and the researcher were involved in identifying and interviewing the 
migrants. Thus it came to be that 119 respondents were interviewed. However in this 
second stage, on several occasions between September 2000 and December 2001 in the 
Overport and the city centre areas the survey process was held up because there were 
police raids, or the threat of such raids, which caused disruptions to migrants own lives, 
and they in turn treated with suspicion the purpose of the survey, which both disrupted its 
implementation and delayed completing it. This was so despite the fact one of the 
interviewers was a Malawian, and that many respondents had agreed in advance to be 
interviewed. Thus it took a considerable amount of time and effort to complete the 
second stage of the social survey, particularly in the city centre and Overport areas. 
2.3.8 Administering the Questionnaire 
The questionnaire was used to obtain basic biographical data and to systematically 
uncover a range of data on the movement of migrants (for example, the routes they 
followed to Durban), the structure of households and families, occupations, other income 
generating activities and the use of income, including remittances. The questionnaire 
consisted of both open-ended and closed questions. 
The questionnaire was designed according to the objectives and hypotheses of the study, 
pre-tested and administered after the necessary corrections were completed. As 
mentioned above the questionnaire was administered by the researcher and two research 
assistants in face-to-face situations with the respondents. Interviews were conducted in 
English. All Malawian migrants speak good and in many cases very fluent English. No 
questionnaires were left to be filled-in by respondents themselves. Confidentiality of the 
information given by respondents was guaranteed, and this ensured that the respondents 
gave the appropriate answers and personal opinions of their experiences. 
2.4 ANALYSIS OF THE DATA 
Computer software programmes were used to handle all data. This ensured speed and 
accuracy of data analysis. In the case of the qualitative data the Nvivo software 
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programme was used. In the case of the quantitative data the software programmes SPSS 
and Microsoft Excel were used to produce a variety of descriptive statistics such as 
frequencies, percentages, averages, as well as cross-tabulations and graphs. 
2.5 PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED 
To achieve good quality data on foreign migration and immigration research in South 
Africa requires patience. No foreigner, especially from the continent of Africa, will 
readily submit to detailed questioning no matter how credible one's bona fides are. It is 
this that was the main problem encountered in the research - establishing bonafides, trust 
and guaranteeing anonymity in the reporting stage of the research. It is for this reason that 
all names of persons in this thesis are pseudonyms. 
2.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter provided a social and political context in which to locate the research and 
the results as reported in this thesis. This indicated the problems encountered, as well as 
the advantages and disadvantages of the chosen methods of collecting data. Both 
qualitative and quantitative methods were employed and it was shown that such methods 
are not inimical to ethnographic fieldwork. The social survey had to adopt a snowball 
technique for eliciting certain kinds of data, and in large measure this was confinned by 
an analysis of the data that was yielded from the semi-structured in-depth interviews that 
were also undertaken. The in-depth interviews revealed the greater complexity and 
richness of life as an African continental migrant in the city of Durban. It is this 
complexity of migrants lives that needs to be appreciated, located theoretically (the 
subject of the next two chapters) and as their story unfolds in the following chapters the 
extraordinary practices of the daily lives of migrants as it contributes in a multiplicity of 




A REVIEW OF LITERATURE ON MIGRATION 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The popular image of a migrant generally is a transient who comes only to work, 
whose stay is temporary and will eventually return home. The image of an immigrant 
is one who presents a permanent break, a physical and emotional rupture with his 
land or country of origin, and settles permanently in a new country. This distinction 
also fmds its way into legislation, sometimes as in the case of South Africa, 
privileging defmitions of immigrant, rather than migrantl. These terms as they are 
used in public and policy debates in the South African context are analysed in chapter 
four. Yet often these terms are used interchangeably, and sometimes do not reflect the 
reality. Migrants are the ones who are supposed to develop networks that extend from 
their village of towns of origin to their present places of settlement and work, while 
immigrants have a very loose (if not romanticised) connection to their places of 
origin. Today this might not be strictly true as immigrants who become permanent 
residents of another country retain their citizenship, and extend their contact and 
networks with their countries of origin, and play active roles in both their countries of 
origin and newly settled countries. Many a migrant may become a permanent 
resident, perhaps illegally, of the host country. All this suggests that perhaps the 
conceptions that we have inherited both historically and in the development of social 
SCIence need revision to describe a new reality in understanding movements of 
people, immigrants and migrants, who interact across national boundaries in a 
mUltiplicity of ways, shaped in part by processes of globalisation and their reactions, 
but also by trying to shape the terms in which their reactions, responses and 
interactions are situated. 
This review will not necessarily be a comprehensive overview, but a selective one 
which has as its main focus the following: the reasons for migration, what migrants 
do in the place of destination, including the process of incorporation or assimilation 
into host society, the emergence of a sense of belonging in their new environment and 
~ In ~hapter four I shall review the specific South African literature on this question of defining migrant and 
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their continuing links with the place of origin. In the fmal section of the chapter, 
consideration is given to the literature on migration and citizenship. In order to assess 
the literature the chapter is divided into different sections: the macro approaches to 
migration, the meso-level and micro-level approaches. This is done to distinguish 
between macro- or global level factors that affect migration, and the actual decision 
making about migration made by individuals, groups, or households and the 
migratory processes. 
3.2 mSTORICAL SKETCH Of EARLY MIGRATION THEORIES 
3.2.1 Ravenstein's Laws of Migration 
Ravenstein's laws of migration were first published in the last quarter of the 19th 
century. They were initially based on British, European and United States census 
data. He identified 11 major laws. These were as follows: 
• The majority of migrants only go a short distance. 
• Migration proceeds step by step. 
• Migrants going long distances generally go by preference to one of the great 
centres of commerce or industry. 
• Each current of migration produces a compensating counter current. 
• Females are more migratory than males within the kingdom of their birth, but 
males more frequently venture beyond. 
• Most migrants are adults: families rarely migrate out of their country of birth. 
• Large towns grow more by migration than natural increase. 
• Migration increases in volume as industries and commerce develop and 
transport improves. 
• The major direction of migration is from the agricultural areas to centres of 
industry and commerce. 
• The major causes of migration are economic. 
Excluding the fifth point, Boyle, Halfacree and Robinson (1998: 60) comment that 
these laws are more or less accurate empirical observations for the 19th century, and 
many still apply today. However, these laws might today be more accurately 
employed as hypothesis for empirical investigation. I shall have occasion to comment 
on the accuracy of some of Ravenstein' s observations during the course of this thesis. 
For now, it should be noted that these observation or laws do not in any great detail 
explain the economic causes, nor do they explain the impact of migrants on the place 
of destination except to observe that large towns grow more by migration than natural 
increase, and that such towns tend to be dominated by industry and commerce. While 
this links migration flows to distance, population size, and economic opportunities, it 
will be seen that there is much more to migration than these factors alone. 
Nevertheless, Ravenstein's idea of a city's growth, and by implication its importance, 
as a result of migration is also suggestive of the influence and impact of migrants 
beyond simply as a quantifiable size of migrant labour units. 
3.2.2 Migration: Pre-colonial, Colonial and Post-colonial 
Underlining Ravenstein' s laws of migration is a view that migration is a unilinear 
movement of people from one place to another, as in various people of European 
origin migrating to America. However, as Coquery-Vidrovitch suggests, one needs to 
be wary of imposing a Eurocentric conception of migration as in Africa mobility and 
long distance trade are 'two major phenomena' on the African continent, particularly 
in the pre-colonial period (1977: 79). These movements of people in Africa come to 
an end with colonial expansion and consolidation of the colonial state's boundaries. 
But whether the conceptions of these migrations and movements or trade are 
unilinear, or expansionist waves within and between regions or different parts of the 
African continent or the planet, in pre- or post-colonial periods, it is necessary to 
distinguish between the voluntary element in the movement of people and those that 
emanate from forced migration. Voluntary migration could be explained by orthodox 
economic explanations that labour and traders moved to where there was the 
possibility of jobs, a livelihood through trading opportunities and a new beginning. 
This theory could, for example, explain the movement of people from Europe to the 
colonies, particularly settler colonies such as America, South Africa, Kenya, Australia 
and New Zealand among others. It could possibly explain migrating Arab traders and 
Swahili settlements on the east coast of Africa, and trade with Asia, predating the 
Portuguese by a several centuries. Nevertheless, this migration as expansionist, 
colonial and voluntary must be distinguished from involuntary migration as a result of 
colonial conquest. 
Migration in these colonies is exhibited as internal forced or controlled migration 
(Freund, 1988: 14-18, Lacey, 1981; Zegeye and Ishemo, 1989). The classic case of 
internal forced migration is the apartheid state, but elements of forced labour and 
migration appeared in different parts of Africa (Zegeye and Ishemo, 1989). One of 
the most sustained debates over the effects and impacts of migration, positive and 
negative, both on rural and urban populations can be seen in a series of case studies 
by the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute in the 1930s and 1940s in Zambia. I shall have 
occasion later to analyse and comment on these studies as it applies to the central 
concerns of this thesis. Another central focus on forced or controlled migration has 
been South Africa. Until about the late 1980s migrants and migration was very much 
the focus of sustained empirical research beginning with the assumptions set out in 
series of seminal articles by Legassick (1974), Wolpe (1972), and among others (e.g. 
Johnstone, 1970, 1976, Jeeves, 1975). The theoretical framework of the new 
revisionist approach in Southern African studies dominated studies of migration in 
the 1970s and 1980s. The central thesis of these writers was that controlled, or forced, 
migration led to lower wages and hence super-exploitation of workers, and was key to 
understanding capitalist development and the entire edifice of segregation and 
apartheid, including the development of major cities such as Johannesburg, and 
Durban. (Swanson, 1964; Smith, 1992) 
The continued existence of migration patterns, albeit changing in the 1990s, seemed 
to receive considerably less independent academic attention. One needs to note here 
the studies of foreign migration by Lewis in relation to trade and skills development 
(n.d. Chapter 9 "Labour Migration" of the Commission to Investigate the 
Development of a Comprehensive Labour Market Policy), Cross on internal 
migration in Durban (n.d. The City as a Destination), and Gelderblom on how rural-
urban migration reinforces inequalities (2000). Indeed today, the public debate is less 
about migration per se, but about infra-structural development, housing and service 
provision. When migration is considered, it is framed in the context of illegal 
immigrants, refugees, street children, squatters and crime as social problems rather 
than the continued structural existence of migration patterns, both internally within 
the country and more recently of international migrants coming to the country. 
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Migration has changed from those early waves of migration from the old world to the 
new world, from the metropolitan countries to the colonies, and within the colonies. 
Today, with globalisation, there are whole new kinds of migration taking place, 
which require new kinds of research with different theoretical explanations of these 
new migratory patterns. Principally people move, not just from point A to point B, 
but also circulate and crossing many different kinds of boundaries. Such boundaries 
would include physical boundaries, border posts, cultural and political boundaries. 
This is not to suggest that such kinds or types of migratory patterns did not occur in 
the past, except that the volume of such migration today is probably more intense, but 
also uncertain by comparison with the past. Furthermore, the incorporation of these 
new migrants into the host society by the state is not uncontested and without social 
and political implications. The attempt by the state to control migration, especially 
illegal migration, is not just contested, but often has the unqualified and uncritical 
support of the host population on grounds of protecting employment, lack of 
resources and xenophobia. 
The main focus of the chapter will be to review some of the theoretical approaches to 
migration, which developed some of the insights of Ravenstein that placed an 
emphasis on the mobility of migrants and their underlining economic causes. These 
macro level structural theories initially were drawn from neo-classical economics 
(Boyle, Halfacree, and Vaughan, 1998: 61) that attached importance to employees 
responding to wage differentials. Structuralist approaches influenced by Marxism, are 
critical of neo-classical theories of migration. Structural Marxism sought to explain 
the larger political and economic context within which various classes of people, 
particularly workers, or segments of the working class, and peasants predisposed to 
move either because they are forced, for example as indentured labourers, refugees or 
asylum seekers, or because they have to follow the contours of capitalist investment 
trajectories to fmd and secure employment. 
More recent explanations of migration based on what Grosfoguel and Cordoso-
Guzman (1999) call the new sociology of international migration consider a number 
of approaches, namely (1) assimilationist, (2) pluralist, (3) the context of reception, 
(4) the social capital and (5) transnational approaches. These approaches will be 
outlined below with a view to consider the reasons for moving that are suggested 
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within their particular perspective, and what, in turn, it suggests migrants do when 
they arrive in their destinations and begin to unpack their experiences and skills to 
cope with the new social, economic and political environment they have to confront 
and interact with in order to survive. A central feature of these new approaches is not 
necessarily to eschew older structural approaches, but to build on those insights with 
new methodologies such as biographical perspectives and insights derived from a 
body of post-modernist and post-colonial writing. Although many of the fmer points 
of these theories draw from and are applicable to the United States and Europe, there 
are elements of these theories that may be considered useful to explore in the 
unfolding debate on migration in South Africa. More specifically, the debates about 
incoming migrants, undocumented and documented, illegal and legal migrants, 
immigrants, refugees and political asylum seekers from a host of countries beyond the 
immediate borders of South Africa needs to be broadened to focus more precisely on 
what do these migrants do when they arrive, and what implications does this have for 
both the migrants as bearers of human rights and citizens. The converse of this is 
what implications do these practices of migrants have for the host society specifically 
state policies. 
At an empirical level of individuals it is relatively simple to point to the reasons why 
people migrate - the desire to escape oppression, famine, or civil war, to seek new 
opportunities for wealth, education of children, family reunification, earning 
additional income for rural households, and so on. One can compile a list of push and 
pull factors and assign the appropriate percentages to each category of reasons. 
However, this does not explain patterns of movement such as return or circulatory 
migratory patterns, or the association of certain socio-economic or cultural/ethnic 
characteristics, which inform the particular identities that migrants have and use. Nor 
does it explain the emergence of associations, social networks and differentiated ways 
of incorporation or exclusion into the mainstream of the host society: in short the 
structural factors that explain a pattern of movement, or the diversity of movements 
over time. Furthermore, and what is central to this work, is the convergence of 
economic and political constraints with the strategies that migrants create to deal with 
and overcome them. Such issues need to be explained in structural and experiential 
terms, or what Wright (1995: 171) calls, drawing from the work of Giddens, 'the 
mutual dependency, rather than opposition, of human agency and social structure'. In 
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addition to such explanations, the implications of the experiences of migration and 
practices in the specific context and for larger societal issues such as citizenship and 
identity need to be explored. 
3.3 MACRO LEVEL APPROACHES: STRUCTURAL APPROACHES: 
EQUILffiRIUM, MODERNISATION AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT 
3.3.1 Classical and Neo-Liberal Theories. 
Most early theories of migration explained the movements observed by Ravenstein in 
terms of neo-classical economies. In conventional neo-classical terms the structural 
equilibrium model of migration is seen in supply and demand terms between different 
spatially defmed units. In principle, it is argued that migration restores the balance or 
equilibrium between spatially organised labour exporting and labour absorbing units. 
The stress was on seeing workers as responding in rational ways to new economic 
opportunities in terms of wage differentials from low-wage areas to high wage areas. 
Migration was simply a rational labour allocation mechanism responding and 
correcting an imbalance in wages. Over-supply in one area was corrected by offering 
high wages in another area of lower labour supply. In theory, the whole process 
begins once again when wages drop and workers move to other areas offering higher 
wages. In some cases this process of regulation is described as decreasing the 
pressure of population in low economic growth areas, and transferring popUlation to 
areas with high economic growth to satisfy both human and capital needs, thus 
restoring the balance between areas, zones, or regions. These areas, zones or regions 
may be defmed within a country or between different geographical areas on a larger 
scale such as nation states. In conventional economic terms migration is defmed as a 
self-regulating mechanism through which labour demand and labour supply adjust 
themselves. The emphasis in these theories is that the wage differentials between the 
labour exporting and labour importing, is the main cause of migration: higher wages 
are paid in urban areas, which stimulates migration out of low wage rural areas. 
While initially these high wages are the attraction, as the demand for labour is 
saturated, an over-abundance of labour, all things being equal, will lead to a rapid 
decline in wages. This in turn should stem the flow of rural-urban migration, as wages 
are no longer attractive compared to the benefits of subsistence in rural economy. 
However, this theory does not explain why some workers are constrained to move 
principle pull factor or inducement to migrate. This in turn allows capitalists to 
generate high profits leading to further capitalist investment and accumulation, thus 
drawing in more workers until the surplus rural labour is absorbed, and industrial 
production is entrenched. Although the Lewis model implicitly recognised an 
impoverished exploited rural economy, the theory still posits a principle that suggests 
smoothing out of the relationship between wages and labour supply (Gelderblom, 
2000: 12). However, Todaro (1969, 1976) applied neo-classical theory to developing 
economies, based on his work in East Africa where he extended the idea of wage 
differentials to include the possibility or probability of fmding work. This was 
recognition that the market in developing countries was not perfect between wages 
and labour supply as the original theory implied. This invoked the idea that wages are 
a poor determinant or indicator of migration, and that in fact the effect of migration is 
to increase the level of urban unemployment, because of the persistence of wage 
differentials between urban and rural areas (Gelderblom, 2000: 12-14). 
Within sociology the theory of migration has been explained in terms of 
modernisation. Western values and forms of consumption lead to new aspirations. In 
rural areas the realisation of these aspirations means that people have to move to the 
city. The city is the place where the prospect of modem lifestyles can be most 
concretely and consistently enjoyed. Modernisation, in its application to migration, 
thus accepts the split between a modernised urban city and the backward or 
traditional rural area. Migration settles the balance between those who want to be part 
of and accept the values of the advanced modem world, and those who stay behind in 
the tradition dominated rural areas. 
Within the context of South Africa, Houghton's work is an example of a neo-classical 
migration theory. As Wright summarises the argument: 'population movement 
migration is understood as a rational and individual response to the disparities in 
labour productivity and labour returns, between the subsistence economy of tribal 
areas which have failed to adapt and the mines and industries which form the core of 
the modem exchange economy of the nation' (1995: 773). Wright comments that 
Houghton acknowledges that there is no tendency towards labour productivity 
equilibrium because African urbanisation is not permanent, in that the migrant 
regularly returns to the rural areas. However, Houghton fails to mention the structural 
factors and legislative constraints that enforce oscillating migration patterns. He 
simply accepts as given the dual economy because of the distribution of existing 
resources, skills and attitudes, but does not examine its basis. Other factors such as 
expected and real incomes earned, expected benefits of moving to a city/town and 
remaining in a rural area, and the often differential treatment of migrants along 
national, ethnic and race lines through the implementation of migration policies by 
governments were not given consideration, all of which affected the process of 
incorporation and ability to make a living. Theorists of underdevelopment and world 
systems approaches take up the issues arising out of structural constraints. 
3.3.2 Marxist and World Systems Approaches 
The equilibrium theory of classical orthodox liberal economics has been subject to 
severe criticism. Magubane (1971) has, for instance, critiqued lifestyles as indices of 
modernisation and for failing to analyse social change as occurring in both urban and 
rural areas as part of a larger political economy. A large part of the criticism has 
focused not just on the destination, the urban metropole, but also on the origin of 
migratory populations, the periphery and its function in the service of capitalism. 
Rather than see the rural area as a backward zone of tradition and unchanging values, 
it was conceived as an area from which resources, both human and other physical, 
were siphoned off. The rural periphery, as it became characterised, is not a static 
entity but in fact is subject to a process of underdevelopment as surplus is drained off 
in a series of exploitative satellite-metropolis relationships (Frank 1969). Other 
writers such as Baran (1957), Furtado (1971), Amin (1976) argued that economic 
relationships between advanced and peripheral areas and countries did not inevitably 
lead to equilibrium between them, but rather to unequal exchange and subordination. 
While the surplus of the peripheral areas was constantly drained off to the advanced 
urban or metropolitan zones, the peripheral zones (including smaller towns and cities) 
stagnated (Frank, 1969), or grew at very marginal rates (Amin, 1976, 1977; Cardoso, 
1979). 
The insights developed by the dependency/underdevelopment school had its own 
counterpart in Southern Africa. Early revisionist writers such as Wolpe (1972), 
Legassick (1974) and Johnstone (1976) prob lematised the relationship between the 
capitalist sector and the so-called non-capitalist or rural and traditional sector, and 
shifted the analysis from race and nation to one based on the primacy of class. Labour 
migration is a consequence of the development of capitalism in South Africa, 
following the discovery of gold and diamonds and the need for cheap labour to ensure 
its extraction. In broad terms the argument put forward was that the migrant labour 
system developed as a result of state sponsored coercion, a direct system of forced 
labour, and indirectly induced though the constraints imposed by capitalism. Unlike 
Houghton's image of rational individuals exercising their free choice to migrate to the 
urban centres, these early revisionist studies explained migrant labour as a structural 
phenomenon, where migrant black labour functioned to serve the mainly white 
capitalist class in the urban centres. Rather what is offered is the 'cheap labour thesis'. 
Drawing on the work of the French anthropologist, Meillassoux (1972), it was further 
argued that the full reproductive costs of labour were not directly borne by the state or 
the employers, but by the subsistence economy of rural migrants. In other words, 
wages were calculated on the costs of maintaining a single worker in an urban area, 
rather than a family. It was in the interests of the state to maintain the agricultural 
base of migrants through the reserve and 'homelands' systems. To this end the 
continuation of elements of the pre-capitalist system, and a legislative framework that 
prevented permanent urbanisation, underscored the argument of the cheap labour 
contributing to the spectacular development of capitalism in South Africa. However, 
the end of apartheid did not see the end of the migrancy, although as a system 
enforced by the state it was officially abolished in 1986. Nor was this outcome unique 
to South Africa. Zegeye and Ishemo (1989) attest to the continuation of migration 
well after colonial rule and independence in other African states. They further 
suggest, notwithstanding the structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s, that in 
fact 'migrant labour and certain forms of unfree labour are in the process of being 
reproduced' in contemporary times despite decades of independence and attempts by 
independent African states to 'autocentric' [indigenise] their economies (1989: 26-27). 
Potts also points to the continued existence, or rather resurgence of migrant labour in 
Zimbabwe (2000), and recent work in South Africa by Murray (1999) and Cross 
(1998) also report the continued existence of migrant labour, albeit in new and 
differentiated forms. 
While the underdevelopment/unequal exchange thesis did present a coherent 
argument which incorporated the rural and urban areas as a single whole in an 
exploitative system, it was still premised on the notion that migration occurs between 
two distinct and spatially separate areas: one which is underdeveloped, exploited and 
exports labour, and the other which receives and exploits labour. This conception is 
still static: the primary flow of capital and labour is in one direction, although the 
periphery is included as part of the system. The theory indicates only the dependent 
and stagnant nature of the periphery, and therein lay the origins of migration. The 
problem, as O'Brien (1975: 24) has identified, is to overcome the circular argument 
that dependent countries lack autonomous development, which they lack because they 
are dependent. Migration merely perpetuates dependenci. 
Analysts such as Amin (1977), among others, have acknowledged the changed rural 
structure with new ruling elites emerging, albeit under certain conditions peculiar to 
their peripheral status in a world economy. Under such changed conditions in rural 
areas, migration to urban areas is not just about being locked into a stagnant 
dependency relationship. Portes (1978, 8-9) has argued that once capitalist techniques 
of production have penetrated into agricultural production, the point when migration 
begins is when population exceeds the productive carrying capacity of the land 
forcing surplus population to move or face pecuniary constraints. Similarly Amin 
(1977) points to rural capitalism changing relationships based on patronage, 
paternalism and labour tenancy to those of employer-employee relations. The change 
in social relationships, combined with mechanisation had the effect of displacing 
agricultural labour, who were then forced to leave the land and move to regional or 
national centres, and sometimes to emigrate to foreign countries. Thus, while 
capitalist agricultural production increased to supply the necessary food for the urban 
market, the increasing displaced population of rural areas was forced to move either 
to some other areas within the rural economy or move to the urban centres. In the 
case of South Africa under apartheid forced removal was to so-called homelands. For 
others in the developing world the move was to the shantytowns, bidonvilles and 
Javellas of the urban centres. 
Underdevelopment and dependency theory does not adequately grasp the implications 
of changed migratory practices, including continued links between urban and rural 
areas, return or circulatory migration, physically split families and changed gender 
2 There are other more general criticisms of underdevelopment theory, such as Laclau (1977) who has pointed 
out that dependency theory does not specify how surplus is produced and how the transfer takes place to the 
metropolis. He suggests that capitalism has developed in third world countries albeit in a uneven manner and 
often in an unfinished manner wherein elements of non-capitalist forms of production, such as communal land 
tenure persist, providing part of the livelihood for workers and other groups of people. Warren (1980) has 
suggested that rather than see the whole process as under or unequal development, it is merely a stage in the 
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relations. Furthermore it plays down the creation of new forms of stratification in 
rural areas, and hence multi-layered migrant populations with changing identities in 
urban centres. A focus on the comprador bourgeoisie dependent on international 
corporations and the state to the exclusion of what migrants actually do in urban 
settings fails to recognise that individuals and groups make, create and forge new ties 
in very different social fields across expanses of space and time. 
Thus within nation states rural-urban migration followed the flow of economic goods 
and resources to urban centres, reflecting the exploitation and decline of rural areas. 
In South Africa this migration was not free flowing and the pass system and migrant 
labour system ensured a controlled migratory process (as far as it could be controlled 
until the mid-1980s when it was abolished). For international migration the process 
was similar, except that migrants had greater difficulty in gaining access to, and being 
incorporated into the advanced industrialised countries, unless the policy of 
individual countries permitted relatively unrestricted entry as illegal and 
undocumented immigrants. For South Africans the experience of international 
migration is only beginning to be felt with the presence of migrants from Africa and 
other parts of the world. 
3.3.3 World Systems Theory and Migration 
As a general body of scientific literature and theoretical understanding of the world in 
the post-colonial period, world systems theory provides the broad generalised 
theoretical understanding of current debates on globalisation. It also provides, within 
its general perspective, a way of viewing the multiple sites and reasons for migration 
from peripheral areas to core areas. While Wallerstein (1974; 1979) emphasises 
unequal exchange between different units of the world capitalist system, the idea of a 
global world integrated by a single dominant mode of production might be more 
useful perspective in explaining both and the current division oflabour (Cohen, 1987; 
Portes, 1978) (rather than underdevelopment or dependency theories). Wallerstein's 
central expression of the division of the world is that of core - areas that dominate and 
profit from international divisions of labour, and periphery - areas of the world that 
are subordinated within the world system. Such a global level of analysis seems very 
similar to Frank's metaphorical sense of a single connected strand of exploitation 
development of capitalism, not dissimilar from that of comparable periods in Europe's own economic and social 
development. 
stretching from isolated rural hamlets to international centres of capital. However, it 
is possible to conceive of a core area as not just a European or American industrial 
area, city or state, but any area or site such as a rural village or town that has 
resources or factories which becomes in relation to its 'natural' rural constituency a 
core area (Wolf, 1992: 99-104). Although the relationship between core and 
periphery can be structured and graded in a variety of ways world systems theory 
tends to reduce migration to labour migration and immigrants to workers. It is this 
reduction of migrant mobility to labour units that needs to be challenged. 
The challenge is to build on the perspectives of world systems theory, as well as the 
subsequent critiques and clarifications of underdevelopment and dependency theories 
(Wallerstein, 1974; Laclau 1977; Warren, 1980). At first glance world systems theory 
does not appear to allow for the scrutiny of the particular impact such forces have on 
regions, colonies, countries/states on the periphery, cities, towns, villages, 
homesteads and households. Clarifications by Comaroff (1982), Worsley (1984) and 
Sharp (1985), among others, clearly demonstrated that world systems theory would 
be inadequate if not contextualised with reference to more particularistic impacts, 
interactions, outcomes, and influences at the local level. Thus, for example, Sharp 
(1987) has shown how the changing nature of the transport beginning in the early 
1980s, in particular the taxi industry, as well as the differentiated levels of investment 
by migrants in rural places of origin, have changed the reasons for migration and 
intensified stratification between places such as Qwa Qwa, a former homeland area, 
and the places of work in the industrial and mining heartland of the Witwatersrand. 
Gelderblom has shown how migration reinforces inequality, rather than reduces such 
disparities in rural areas (2000: 199-206). One may even add the spatial patterns of 
unequal but inextricably linked parts of the world system are equally important to 
take into account (Smith, 2000). Further afield, Wolf (1992) shows how rural 
industrialization in Java attracts female migrant workers from other areas. She then 
demonstrates the impact of such migrant workers in terms of gender and household 
dynamics. Wolfs work demonstrates that it is the subordinated areas, and rural areas 
in particular, that experience new kinds of capital penetration, particularly for the 
extraction of raw materials and manufacture of products for export in a new 
international division of labour and manufacturing. In contextualising the global level 
of analysis with partiCUlar histories, the movements of people in a specific period of 
time may be understood. Basch et al (1995: 11) argue that by adopting a new nuanced 
perspective, it is possible to link waves of migration to new forms of capital 
concentration and penetration, and to the particular actions of migrants. 
There are a number of implications that flow from this capitalist penetration of rural 
areas from a world systems perspective for studies on migration. Firstly the goods 
embodying the core-periphery relationship circulate around the world. Thus in 
peripheral areas of the world economy where the manufacture of commodities such 
sportswear (Nike, Reebok etc) or jewellery, watches and clothes take place, they 
become core areas to their hinterlands. Secondly, such sites of manufacture become 
simultaneously core and periphery, providing the attraction for possible employment 
from outside the local village. Thirdly, in making the forward linkages, the 
manufactured commodities from these peripheral areas of the developing world are 
appropriated by a variety of traders on a worldwide scale. Some of these traders at the 
end of the forward linked chain may well be itinerant migrants and immigrants 
peddling such commodities on streets and informal markets in the core areas of the 
world system, whether this is in Durban, Marseille, New York or Abidjan. Fourthly, 
the impact of such industrialisation and migration changes the social relationships at a 
variety of levels from personal to household, both in place of origin and the place of 
destination. It is the third and fourth points here that will be of some consideration 
when analysing the experiences and survival strategies of recently arrived migrants in 
the city of Durban. 
I do not want to suggest that this literature privileges rural societies. It is not an in-
depth analysis of capitalist penetration of rural economies, or the collapse of rural 
and/or agricultural sectors, and hence the migration of surplus labour. However, 
pointing to capitalist penetration of rural areas is not just to underscore insights that 
Laclau, Amin or Warren have offered, but to note that changes in the rural society 
and resultant migration of people are not the result of a single factor of either a 'push' 
or 'pull'. At this point it is important to highlight commodity exchange as the central 
mechanism embedded in push-pull factors, but not to derive from this structural 
feature a model that homogenises migrant experiences into a single structural pattern, 
into which reality must be forced. It suggests a level of analysis below that of the 
macro perspectives of some underdevelopment, dependency or world systems 
theorists. 
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3.4. MESO-LEVEL PERSPECTIVES: BEYOND STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 
One possible way of avoiding the pitfalls of homogenising migrant experiences into a 
structural pattern without paying attention to their individual biographies is to go 
beyond understanding the migrant within the confmes of the nation state, and to take 
the world system as a globalising phenomenon seriously. Within this system it is 
possible to identify the diverse transmigration experiences as internal, local, regional 
and worldwide, rather than simply as bi-national or urban-rural dichotomous modes 
of existence. 
Analysing the internal reasons for the success or failure of various individual 
migrants is a legitimate research concern. Portes (1978) has argued that the social 
relationships that encompass the economic lives of migrants are an important, and 
often a neglected aspect of migration studies, particularly when applied to the 
informal sector. Using migration or rather case studies of immigrants to illustrate the 
embeddedness of the economic in social relationships is not difficult to understand. 
Migrants, lacking the skills in a new country's labour market and not confident in the 
language of the host society, tend to tum inwards to their own migrant communities 
for economic, fmancial and social well-being. Rotating credit schemes and setting up 
networks of and for employment are examples of embeddedness. What this specifies 
is the context, or the range of 'contextual factors' that underlie individual economic 
actions. 
3.4.1 Embeddedness and Social Capital 
Drawing on the work of Mark Granovetter (1985) and Karl Polanyi, Portes and 
Sensenbrenner (1993) develop the concept of social capital as a specific manifestation 
of embeddedness. They argue that previous uses of the term were vague and subject 
to an instrumentalist view suggesting that social relationships or social structures 
facilitate rational economic motives and actions. They defme social capital as 
"expectations for action within a collectivity that affect economic goals and goal 
seeking behaviours, even if these expectations are not orientated towards the 
economic sphere" (1993: 1323). What they seek to emphasize is that social capital 
may have both negative and positive outcomes; it can both promote and constrain 
economic behaviour. Grosfoguel and Cordero-Guzman (1999) argue that much of the 
literature has focussed on how social capital has been mobilised to produce a 
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successful outcome. In particular the focus has been on the micro-networks of 
migrants, that is, on the internal dynamics that give rise to successful entrepreneurs 
and incorporation into the main stream of host society. This may be contrasted with 
internal social relationships that limit integration into the mainstream of formal 
economic life. The implication here is that some social capital is positive, whereas in 
other cases it is negative. For Grosfoguel and Cordero-Guzman (1999: 355) this 
assumes an unproblematic wider environment without legal or discriminatory 
impediments to full participation in the economic life of a society. The problem with 
this kind of research focus is that it assumes that micro-networks are divorced from 
broader social structures that constrain or enable access to capital, information and 
resources by a community's micro-networks. In other words 'discrimination', 
'marginalisation' and exclusion are not related to broader social, economic and 
political forces that shape and structure the micro-networks. Part of this thesis is to 
specify those broader social-economic and political forces in which diverse ranges of 
migrants have set up their social capital networks. The success or failure of these 
networks does not depend only on their internal mobilisation of resources, but also 
the external environment in which they operate. 
3.4.2 Migration in Africa: Colonial Contexts 
While Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993) and Grosfoguel and Cordero-Guzman (1998) 
appear to point to new approaches within the context of America, elements of such 
approaches have been attempted within the Southern African context. Social 
anthropologists working in Zambia and in South Africa in the 1950s and 1960s were 
among the flIst social scientists to investigate the question of labour migration and 
social and cultural relations. The theoretical paradigm of structural functionalism and 
the disciplinary perspectives and methods of social anthropology tended to see them 
grouped into studies of rural decline, rather than as complex set of intersection and 
exchanges. This anthropological work gave the impression that the research focussed 
on a rural perspective, on the necessity of migration to urban centres, or to studies of 
the consequence of migration for rural areas. There is also the oft mentioned colonial 
imperative of such research that colonial governments not only sponsored such 
research but were concerned to understand the migration process in order to keep it 
going (Moore, 1994: 20-21). However, from the 1950s onwards questions about 
'urbanism' in Africa, and in partiCUlar in Southern Africa began to make an 
appearance within the anthropological literature. An important problem that these 
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anthropologists raised was concerned with how migrants' consciousness of tribal 
origins affected their new lives in the urban area (Moore, 1994: 51; 55). This was 
originally posed as a question of'detribalisation' or how much of the tribal culture 
was imported into the urban setting? Or put another way, how much of the new ideas 
learnt and encountered in the colonial situation replaced tribal customs, and ideas
3
• 
The approaches to the question of 'detribalisation' is of some importance as it links to 
the question of embeddedness and social capital raised by Portes and Sensenbrenner 
in the sense of carrying and unpacking cultural baggage into a new setting, and 
reliance on one's own ethnic group and networks to cope, survive and, if possible, 
prosper. There is also an implicit question about the differentiated way in which 
migrants fmd their way into a host society. Grosfoguel and Cordero-Guzman have 
pointed out that a shortcoming of emphasizing the cultural logic of migrants' 
behaviour, without linking it to wider political and economic issues, does not fully 
explain migrant behaviour. With this in mind it will be useful to examine, briefly, the 
debate on 'detribalisation'. 
Monica and Geoffrey Wilson made an early approach to this problem in their book 
The Analysis of Social Change (1945). They argue that there were two kinds of 
societies, the tribal or primitive society, and the industrial or civilised society, each 
being internally coherent under ideal circumstances. Once tribal societies came into 
contact with industrial societies destabilisation ensues, where the old was not yet fully 
given up, while new becomes adopted. This process was referred to a detribalisation. 
The Wilson's were careful to point out the these uneven changes were as a result of 
systematic connections between circulatory movements of labour, impoverishment of 
rural areas, the demographic shifts between rural and urban areas and industrial 
(capitalist) developments in urban areas. However, inherent in their work is the idea 
of two societies in tension with one another and that these tensions are most evident 
in the urban centres where the pressures of colonial domination and resistance to it, 
3 This issue addressed by social anthropologists - what happens to the 'culture' of people, once it becomes 
disconnected from its original rural environment, and how is it re-constructed to accommodate itself in a new 
urban environment - can be placed in a wider theoretical debate about the adequacy of Durkheimian structural-
functional models. As the anthropologists posed it, this question was a continuation of both the field research 
bias (rural areas), as it was of the Durkheimian structural-functional model of cohesion in tribal and industrial 
societies. Social anthropologists were able to demonstrate, contra to Durkheim's postulation of simple cultural 
h?mogeneity, that the cohesion of rural societies depended on an articulation of a number of kinship groups, 
~ll~~es and networks ~f individuals engaged in ~tricate system of exchange (and by implication a complex 
dIVISIon oflabour). This approach was the theoretical parallel to Durkheim's occupational division oflabour in 
industrial society. The assumptions underlying this approach were carried over into the early studies of migrants 
in urban areas. (See Moore, 1994: 51-55) 
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particularly by African labour, was most keenly felt. This often exploded into riots, 
marches and strikes. The link between the explosive anger and detribalisation was 
felt, but not systematically explored or explained. 
The Mayer's in their study of Xhosa of East London, accept the dual model of the 
Wilson's, but continue to pursue the issue of 'tribal survivals' in an urban setting. 
They draw the distinction between 'school' and 'red' Xhosa people. According to the 
Mayer's 'school' people are quite happy to engage with new or 'European' institutions 
and ideas, e.g. educational and religious institutions of modem civilised society. The 
'red' people on the other hand are reticent to get 'mixed-up' in things that obscure the 
distinction between real Xhosa and foreigners (primitive, tribal society). 'School' 
people on the other hand don't make the distinction. 'Red' people, in an urban setting 
try to retain as much of their rural traditions as possible. In other words they 
unpacked their urban behaviour in accordance with a reconstructed version of the 
rural setting of cultural patterns of behaviour. What is revealing about the 
ethnographic work is not so much the fact that these two ideological positions exist 
among the Xhosa of East London, but the model that the Mayer's are working with. 
'School' people make choices from an array of offerings in a modem society, whereas 
'red' people work within a system of ascribed statuses and given modes of behaviour 
of a tribal society. There is no doubt that in fact both 'school' and 'red' people are 
making choices, but the Mayer's work reflects as if these choices are made freely. In 
fact, much of their ethnographic data can be read in opposition to this perspective. It 
can be argued that the choices made by either 'red' or 'school' people was within a 
highly controlled migrant labour system within a larger system of economic, political 
and legal determinants. These determinants are constraints, which allow 'school' 
people certain limited choices, and made the red people, i.e. the migrants, all the more 
dependent on their rural ties and hence the reason for maintaining strong cultural 
traditions in the urban areas. Thus the social relationships such as homeboys, 
networks, ties of kinship and village in East London strongly reflect their rural origins 
and dependency. 
There was an entirely different way of looking at the issue. Rather than focussing on 
survivals among migrants, Gluckman, and his colleagues Watson, Mitchell and others 
at the Institute for Social and Economic Research in Lusaka, Zambia, eschewed the 
idea of culture loss and conflicting cultural systems approach. Rather they saw rural 
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and urban settings as part of one system, in which Africans, including migrants, are 
learning, experiencing and discovering new knowledge and new skills, in addition to 
those they already have. Watson argued that the notion of detribalisation implied 
Africans must choose between two systems. In fact his work among the Mambwe 
showed that people participate in both the modem and the traditional 'conjointly'. 
Young Mambwe men when in need of cash would migrate to urban centres to earn 
such an income, and return once the task was accomplished. Mitchell in an important 
monograph The Kalela Dance made the point that urban centres are not necessarily 
ethnically homogenous, because of the multiplicity of people migrating to the copper 
belt. Mitchell argued that while African people did interact on the basis of ethnicity, 
the ethnic reference categories were of broad politically dominant areas or spaces, 
rather than fme distinctions or specific places that different ethnic groups or tribes 
occupy. In fact ethnic identity became exaggerated in a heterogeneous urban setting, 
rather than as a taken for granted quality of social relationships in rural areas. 
However, he pointed out that in Black-White relations ethnicity seemed to be less 
important than the industrial system. It was the industrial system that formed the basis 
of trade union activity in the copper belt mines, and targeted for abolition the 
ethnically based employees' representative system set up by the mine management. 
Mitchell pointed to the very different uses of tribalism in urban and rural settings. In 
an urban area, belonging to a tribe, however defmed, depended on various situations. 
This situational logic of tribalism revealed only one aspect of a very complex urban 
identity. Moore (1994: 65) comments "Mitchell did not treat tribal connections and 
categories as a form of conservatism, a traditionalism in which fragments of the past 
were retained in a rapidly changing milieu". Rather migrants were part of a wider 
social system, in which he, and others, began to highlight different and new forms of 
social relationships. This gave rise to a whole new research agenda on migrants, 
workers and social order (see for example, Eades, 1987)4 An important aspect that 
was inspired by the work of Mitchell was the study of networks, social situations and 
transactions (Kapferer, 1972). Networks focussed on the chain of friends and friends 
of friends, and the content of each social situation and the specific transactions that 
4 Some other specific areas of research were: migrant identity (Hart, 1971); on fonnal voluntary associations, 
like tr~e unions, were studied as to how they were fonned, and how they operated, (peace, 1979); specific 
categones of workers, such as railway men (Grillo, 1973) domestic workers (Hansen, 1989), or miners and 
compounds (Gordon, 1977). For reviews of urban anthropology and developments in the field oflabour see 
Freund, B The African Worker (1988) Sanjeck, (1990) 'Urban Anthropology in the 1980s: a World View' 
Annual Review of Anthropology; Coquery-Vidrovitch, (1991)' The Process of Urbanization in Africa' African 
Studies Review, vol 34 and Moore, AnthrOPOlogy and Africa (994). 
individuals engaged in for economic or non-economic ends. Portes (1978) has also 
called for closer attention to networks in migrant research. In Portes' and 
Sensenbrenner's (1993) work, networks within ethnic groups became part of the 
social capital that either assists or constrains endeavours of individuals and groups. 
It is possible to re-read the early anthropological work on migrants and networks 
through the lens of the social capital approach. While Mayer's work took norms, 
values and customs as the primary driving force informing migrants' 'conservative' 
behaviour in the town, Mitchell and his colleagues' work began to focus on agency, 
on individuals, on the way in which cultural ideas and urban exigencies were in a 
constant process of negotiations, where people's lives were constantly constructed and 
re-structured within a broader complex of social, political and economic 
circumstances. Crucially from a migrant labourer's perspective, making decisions 
based on a network of people supplying information on where they could fmd the best 
areas to work in for the cash they needed, not just as remittances, but for possible 
entrepreneurial activities funded in part by cash wages (Kapferer, 1972: Peace, 1979). 
In those circumstances where coercion and control was a necessary corollary to 
migration, research on the place of work, such as on the mining compounds, was a 
logical progression (Gordon, 1977; Moodie, 1983). Here the activities of migrants 
had to be understood in terms of the formal and informal organisation of work and 
leisure activities which allowed migrants the space to be involved in a network of 
various intense money making and other activities (Gordon, 1977). Moodie analysed 
other aspects such as sexual activities among men in the compounds as subversive of 
the official authority structures of the mine (1983, 1988). Retention of links to the 
rural areas could be interpreted as a defence (or resistance) against full 
proletarianisation, or maintaining a link to rural livelihood strategies, the politics of 
rural elites and their entrepreneurial activities (Sharp, 1986). However, these works 
tended to locate migration both within territorial colonial and post-colonial state 
boundaries, and as a function of those states' economies. It has not considered these 
migration patterns as part of broader pattern of international migration. 
Given these insights into the multiple cultural dimensions of migrancy, it is possible 
for this earlier work to be reinterpreted, or new insights and hypotheses to be 
developed. The thick descriptive quality of their ethnographic work makes it possible 
to reinterpret the issue of migrants within a broader political economy with all the 
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constraints and possibilities inherent in state control of urbanisation, but also the 
embeddedness of migrant labour in the social relationships that stretches from rural to 
urban areas. 'Tribal survivals' become a resource (rather than an aspect of ascribed 
behaviour), the social capital (cf Portes and Sensenbrenner) that sustains a social field 
of relationships across the divide between rural and urban areas. On the other hand 
too close a focus on the micro-networks approach that Mitchell and his colleagues 
developed, with its close attention to individual choice might equally undermine the 
crucial insight that the Wilson's drew attention to: that migrant labour is embedded in 
a wider, uneven and ever changing capitalist system, from which capitalists benefited 
immensely having to pay only the immediate subsistence costs of an individual 
worker (Murray, quoted in Wright, 1995). 
In more recent times rural-urban migration, and inter-regional, cross-border migration 
in Southern Africa as a consequence of, for example structural adjustment 
programmes, or political instability, have began to be examined. The wider impact of, 
for example, compulsory deferred payments as part of the system of remittances of 
foreign based migrants to neighbouring countries have been examined (Crush, J. 
Contract Migration to South Africa: Past, Present and Future: 5). The impact of 
foreign migrants being retrenched from the mining industry and seeking alternative 
means of employment have been analysed by Chirwa (1997: 628-654). He analysed 
the survival strategies that emerged in Malawi after miners were retrenched in South 
Africa. Potts (2000) has raised the issue of urban links to the rural areas as providing 
the means of survival from the impact of structural adjustment programmes, directly 
as a consequence of declining urban-based employment possibilities. But these 
studies looked at the result of the decline or ending of highly structured and 
institutionalised systems of migration instituted by employers and recognised by the 
state, or as a result of the implementation of state driven economic policies. The 
'voluntary' immigrant or refugee migration of African continental people to South 
Africa, and their survival strategies in South Africa, and the continuing links to places 
of orgin has had a less systematic focus in empirical and theoretical terms. This 
cross-border, or transnational migration, is the subject of much of the rest of the 
thesis. In the next chapter some of the literature on this topic is reviewed. Below I 
review some central concepts that have been used to describe and analyse the new 
forms of international migration. 
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One such theory that offers a new explanation has been labelled transnational 
migration. It is defmed principally by the fact that people cross two or more 
boundaries, and who do not necessarily lose touch with their countries of origin. In 
many cases migrants make frequent return trips. The principal work upon which this 
is based is that of Basch, Schiller and Szanton-Blanc (1994). They defme 
transnationalism in the following terms: 
We defme "transnationalism" as the process by which immigrants forge and 
sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of 
origin and settlement. We call these processes transnationalism to emphasize 
that many immigrants today build social fields that cross geographic, cultural 
and political borders. Immigrants who develop and maintain multiple 
relationships - familial, economic, social, organisational, religious and political 
- that span borders we call transmigrants. An essential element of 
transnationalism is the multiplicity of involvements that transmigrants sustain 
in both home and host societies... . . . Transmigrants take actions, make 
decisions, and develop subjectivities and identities embedded in networks of 
relationships that connect them simultaneously to two or more nation-states. 
1994:7) 
There are several implications of the defmition that I shall list below. Only some of 
these are important for this work, and will be analysed. 
Firstly, the focus and analysis is on the lived experience of individuals, especially the 
fluidity of their 'travelling' experiences. These experiences reflect transnational 
processes, although individuals and communities may not speak of transnationalism. 
Secondly, their identities are not tied solely to the location they come from or fmd 
themselves in. Although identity is often tied up to place or geographical setting, as 
home (family), homeland, or home community, migrants are 'travelling', in terms of 
the defmition above, identity becomes relational and dislodged from a distinct 
position (Appadurai, 2000: 231). Thus while identities are defmed in relation to 
borders and boundaries, the identities cannot be taken for granted as fixed. Where, 
who and what you are is not only defmed by the others such as a state or in relation to 
the formal criteria of national citizenship or in relation to social interaction with local 
citizens, but is also made explicitly conscious by oneself. Identities can become 
markers for inclusion or exclusion, not just for belonging to particular groups and 
places, but also for access (or denial) to resources. Thirdly, national identities, or the 
nation state identity still functions. The nation state still functions to represent 
identity, even though the idea of nationality is being undermined by the emergence of 
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post-national or post-colonial identity. But as Basch et al. point out some national 
states, such as the Haitian Republic, have used or rather re-constructed the arena of 
their operation beyond the formal boundaries of the state. By appealing to Haitian 
migrants in the United States as citizens to contribute to the development and 
progress of their country of origin, the idea of an identity circumscribed by fixed 
territorial boundaries is undermined (1994: 210-221). The South African government 
has also attempted, although not in any consistent manner, to recruit the South 
African diaspora of skilled and professional people to contribute to the development 
of the country, albeit from a distance, and not necessarily by returning to the country 
permanently. Fourthly, the concept of transnationality calls into question the tied 
notion of nation-state and citizenship. On this last point I shall expand later in the 
section on citizenship and in chapter eight. Fifth, the social networks or multi-
stranded relationships imply connections to people in multiple places, looking both 
backward and forwards simultaneously. The fluidity of such social relationships 
postulates that the future may be uncertain, that economic opportunities are not 
guaranteed, and that a migrant or refugee from a world turned upside down is not left 
behind by the act of migration. Indeed the social capital embodied in such 
relationships needs to be constantly created, recreated and retained in the case of 
catastrophes or disasters. In some cases the social capital is the foundation upon 
which their success, or indeed the very act of survival in the modern world becomes 
possible (Portes and Borocz, 1989; Portes, 1997). Today migrants can remain 
connected through networks, organisations, e-mails, fax, phone, radio and 
remittances. This is an implied critique of earlier assimilation migration theories that 
postulated a successful, mainly unproblematic linear incorporation of migrants from a 
rural traditional background into a modern urban society, albeit with a variety of 
obstacles and constraints that immigrants face. 
Other writers have used migration, in particular transnational migration, to 
problematise concepts of culture, nation, citizen and identity (Clifford, 1988; Bhabha, 
1990; Chambers, 1994; Appadurai, A. 1996). Clifford in fact goes one step further to 
argue that migration patterns or diasporic spaces in a globalising world might even be 
considered emancipatory because mobility induces ambivalent and mUltiple 
identities, which the very presence of such migrants acts or represents a form of 
critique of postcolonial nationalism. However, Fabricant (1998: 25-52) has 
questioned the emancipatory intent of transnationalism. While there may be an 
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opaque idea of emancipation buried within the actions and experiences of 
international migrants, she fmds the idea of migration as a symbol or metaphor 
embodying a homogenous and undifferentiated quest for cosmopolitanism less than 
warranted. Instead she has proposed that a distinction be made between a 'highly 
literate and sophisticated audience of travellers ... that inhabit a world seemingly 
without constraints' [hotel bookings, airline tickets and credit cards in one hand and 
laptop in the other] and those 'immigrants who experience poverty and hardship when 
they leave their native lands ostensibly in pursuit of freedom and opportunity' (1998: 
29-31). It is this latter category of migrants that this thesis explores. The idea of 
people becoming mobile in 'pursuit of freedom and opportunity' suggests what 
Marshall Berman calls the 'vital experience of modernity shared by all men and 
women all over the world'. To be modem, he says 'is to fmd ourselves in an 
environment that promises us adventure, power, joy, growth and transformation of 
ourselves and the world - and at the same time ... threatens to destroy everything we 
have, everything we know, everything we are ... a maelstrom of perpetual 
disintegration and renewal, of struggle and contradiction, of ambiguity and anguish' 
(1981 :15). Thus even for migrants who leave their homelands in pursuit of freedom 
and opportunity, theirs is a response to modernity's endless transformations, 'fighting 
to make ourselves at home in this world' (1981: 348). Migrancy in such a perspective 
is not an end point upon arrival, because arrival can also mean the start of another 
journey beyond the physical act of moving. The point is that the mobility of such 
migrants can only have meaning in a particular political-economic context, or rather 
in a series of political and economic contexts, each of which requires unpacking one's 
social and cultural baggage and accommodating to, and learning from new 
environments. The fIrst context is always that which produced the migrations, and 
the discourse surrounding it, and, secondly, most importantly for this study, the 
complex experiences of individual incorporation, exclusion, resistance and struggle to 
belong in a particular place, locality, group, or community in making a home in this 
world. The most concrete expression of making a home is by making a living. 
Making a living implies a place, a location to settle, in order to fmd employment or 
engage in business or the informal sector, or indeed a combination of employment 
and informal business activities. However, it should not imply that home and making 
a living needs to be necessarily in the same place. In the case of South Africa under 
apartheid, migration meant that making a home and making a living did not occupy 
the same spaces. And to some extent this continues to be the practice. Following 
Zegeye's and Isemo's argument above concerning the entrenchment of migration in 
Africa during the post colonial period, what once appeared to be South African 
exceptionalism may prove to be the norm. This second context thus may have as 
many empirical referents as there are places in which migrants have struggled and 
continue to struggle to make their home, to make a living, to confront the J anus-face 
of modernity. Thus a migrant - a refugee, asylum seeker, employment seeker, 
traveller or businessman - moving from Central Africa to Durban, may fmd many 
places en-route to settle temporarily, and from which he/she has to, or chooses to, 
move in order to meet the requisites of 'making a home in the world'. It is to this 
question of 'betweeness', the fluidity and ambiguity of being a migrant that we now 
turn. This 'betweeness' refers to a sense of belonging (in a place within a network of 
social relations composed of kin, friends, townsmen or fellow nationals) and being 
excluded (ethnic status, income, nationality or xenophobia), of being marginal 
(unemployed, low income jobs and neighbourhoods) and formally affiliated 
(officially required permits, tenancy, employment contracts) 
With regard to the complex expenences of migrants, Lawson (2000: 174) has 
suggested that research into transnational migration highlights processes of 
belonging, exclusion and affiliation. By exploring the processes of belonging, 
exclusion and affiliation through the ways in which migrants create their survival and 
livelihood strategies issues and questions about their incorporation into a society, 
processes of assimilation and marginalisation can be posed simultaneously. It also 
poses, as I suggest later the very vital question of linking a sense of belonging to 
citizenship. 
3.5 MICRO-LEVEL PERSPECTIVES: BETWEEN STRUCTURE AND 
DECISION MAKING. 
Many of the studies that shed light on the processes of insertion, belonging, survival 
strategies, and exclusion still contain the limitation that all migration is about 
movement from one point (origin) to a point of destination. For example, the original 
assumptions of world systems theory tends to reduce migration to labour migration 
and immigrants to workers, thus playing down any discussion and theoretical 
reflections on racial, ethnic or national identities which shape their consciousness, 
actions and habitual practices. The classical liberal approach shares similar 
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assumptions, but argues that such identities become erased or reduced as migrants 
and immigrants become incorporated into the mainstream of the host society. They 
become assimilated over time. To all intents and purposes migrants become 
facsimiles of the host population: they lose their origin identities. A variant of this 
approach argues that ethnic identity is not necessarily erased, but modified. This 
variant has been called the culturalist pluralist approach. What is of interest is the 
creation and use of ethnic identities among immigrant and migrant groups for 
securing livelihoods and upward mobility. 
3.5.1 Migration and Identities 
The culturalist pluralist approach argues that while migrant ethnic groups lose their 
language and customs, their ethnic identity continues in a new form in a new context. 
In the American context it becomes a hyphenated identity: Irish-Americans, African-
Americans, Jewish-Americans, Cuban-Americans, Hispanic-Americans, etc. It is 
suggested that these ethnic identities serve other functions such becoming internally 
organised for economic support and upward mobility, and acting as lobby and 
pressure groups within the wider political system at both a national and local level. 
They are able to engage in such activity because they have legal citizen status. This 
approach argues that ethnic identity is grounded in the internal workings - the micro-
networks - of a bounded ethnic community that establishes the social capital for 
overcoming the adversity of being poor immigrants or, perversely, constraining 
access to resources. Ultimately such ethnic identities are conceived as positive assets 
assisting in the assimilation of migrants/immigrants as citizens into the dominant 
values of the host society. For the purposes of this thesis, there are two important 
opposing perspectives to consider which inhibit the progress of ethnic immigrant and 
migrant groups. The first is that it might be argued that cultural practices of ethnic 
groups that constrain access to resources or limit assimilation constitutes a socially 
constructed 'culture of poverty' (Grosfoguel and Cordero-Guzman, 1998: 353-54). 
This means that certain ethnic groups pull back their members from taking advantage 
of opportunities to advance beyond their current status, and hence all members of the 
ethnic group have relatively the same standard of living. While not denying the 
existence of such a sociological levelling phenomenon, labelling the effect 'culture of 
poverty' is, in effect, to blame the 'victim' for their own lack of assimilation, success 
and open acceptance of the values and norms of the host society. It suggests that the 
host society, in particular the state as the agency of rules and regulations regarding 
migrants, is benign. The second perspective is that the micro-networks and internal 
dynamics of ethnic communities cannot be fully understood without linking them to 
meso- and macro-level mediating structures and social relationships that shape the 
labour market for incorporating such ethnic groups (Grosfoguel and Cordero-
Guzman, 1998: 355). For example, racial discrimination or xenophobia, which may 
not be legally sanctioned; can act as mechanisms of exclusion from incorporation into 
the society, and perpetuates migrants' marginal status. In countries that do not legally 
or constitutionally endorse racial, ethnic or religious discrimination, such barriers to 
incorporation induces a focus on other reasons that inhibit migrants' participation in 
the mainstream. In the next sub-section I examine this proposition, and question the 
state's response to immigration and migration as benign. 
3.5.2 The Context of Reception Approach 
Thus far this exposition has focussed on the migrants themselves. One crucial aspect 
of migration is the actions and policies of the state, particularly their regimes of 
incorporation of migrants and immigrants (Soysal, 1994, 29-40, Freeman, 2003). 
Grosfoguel and Cordero-Guzman (1998: 357-58) broaden the discourse on policy and 
institutional aspects of migration to include: 
• Reactions and to and perceptions of immigrants by public opinion; and 
• Presence or absence of an established ethnic community to receive immigrants. 
This approach, called the context of reception approach, provides the framework 
within which a diverse set of modes of incorporation of immigrants takes place, 
especially within the labour market. Such a state policy also rests on a unilinear 
conception of migration. It assumes a point of departure and a point of arrival, and 
designs policy to accommodate, control or reverse such trends. 
For international migrants, reception refers to the formal aspects such as the official 
process of documenting the arrival and reason for migrants entering the country _ 
whether people are refugees, asylum seekers, work seekers, students, researchers, and 
business people. Reception also refers to the state policies of incorporating migrants 
into the host society, such as providing information on how to fmd accommodation 
and work, or in the case of refugees and political asylum seekers, initial assistance 
with accommodation, work, or the means to fmd work, language services (if there are 
language barriers) and social and welfare services. State reception policies and 
actions may also refer to implementation, or simply the lack of provision of any 
services at all beyond the documentation of migrants. Reaction to and perceptions of 
migrants by the public can take their cue from government policies and actions. 
While a government may have humane policies regarding migrants, their actual 
implementation, or lack of proper implementation, may be the result of the dialectic 
of local citizens' perceptions and pressure to limit foreign incoming migrants, and 
government action, or more likely inaction, to carry out their policy commitments. 
Thus, for example, official commitment to treat refugees with compassion and dignity 
may well be undermined by actions, official, unofficial, formal or informal, which 
treat foreigners as less than welcome, thus inciting and exacerbating xenophobic 
attitudes and condoning ill-treatment of foreign migrants by the state's population. 
The comparison and analyses of state policies on immigration and migration is useful 
in understanding the way the state receives migrants, how their responsibilities are 
meet, or how they absolve themselves from such responsibilities (Kobayashi, n.d: 9; 
Freeman, 2003: 6-8). In the case where the state absolves or delegates, or deflects its 
responsibilities, there usually already exists a substantial ethnic or national groups 
which takes responsibility for assisting newly arrived migrants. The ethnic 
community becomes the conveyor belt of reception. Indeed part of the reception and 
incorporation of migrants into the urban centres is to introduce them to the network of 
people from the same ethnic group or sympathisers who will assist and advise on a 
range of issues, principally on matters of accommodation and making a living. In this 
sense they carry out the responsibilities of the state in terms of the initial provision of 
welfare services, accommodation and perhaps employment as well. At this point the 
context of reception approach begins to appear more like the social capital approach. 
However, as Grosfoguel and Cordero-Guzman (1998: 358) have pointed out, the 
state's interest in receiving migrants may be biased in favour of some groups over 
others for economic and/or geo-political reasons. Such an instrumental view or policy 
is often silent on complex circulatory dynamics, including global patterns of 
migration. Such circulatory and global patterns of migrations cannot easily be 
reduced to simple push-pull economic or instrumental factors. The way the state 
responds to such issues also raises questions about its policy on migration, 
immigration and citizenship. The question of citizenship as a concept is introduced 
later in this chapter. The issue of the link between citizenship and migration as a 
theoretical and policy issue is analysed in chapters four, seven and eight. 
3.5.3 Biographical Approaches to Migration 
While there is a need to understand state policies and their implementation and their 
articulation with new complex patterns of migration, there is also a need to 
understand how migrants react, anticipate, circumvent, or indeed use state policy to 
their advantage. Such a perspective which recognises the limitations and constraints 
on migrants but which incorporates individual responses to overcome the constraints, 
or to engage with those structural limitations has been termed biographical 
approaches (Boyle, Halfacree, and Robinson, 1998: 80). Methodologically the focus 
is on the biography of individual migrant's story - its narrative structure - drawn 
from in-depth interviews. There are three important elements of the biographical 
approach. Firstly, migration is seen as action in time, in that the decision to migrate is 
not about the instant that the decision made, but about the build up to that moment, 
which involves both the migrants' past and anticipated future. Secondly, the specific 
migrations involve multiple reasons and causes for moving, and thirdly, it is 
embedded within the individual's wider social, economic and cultural relationships 
(Boyle, Halfacree, and Robinson, 1998: 80-81). 
The biographical approach is not antithetical to a transnational approach as outlined 
by Basch et. al. It allows for identifying those critical variables in the transnational 
approach, namely 
~ Crossing of boundaries and regions 
~ Establishing and maintaining social relationships across national boundaries 
~ Developing networks 
~ Engaging in activities/practices with people who span the generations and spatial 
divide 
~ Developing multiple identities and ideologies 
~ Investing in particular patterns of living - accommodation, work leisure activities 
A focus on these variables suggests the following. Firstly, a primary element of 
transmigration is the multiple relationships between place of origin and place of 
settlement involving a network of family, friends and business associates through 
which remittances; information, capital and commodities are passed. It implies 
communication to be more than merely personal contact, but also supporting business 
initiatives, or building homes, acquiring land, being consulted on the use of 
remittances, and other resources. Secondly, there is the issue of boundaries. While it 
is fairly clear when migrants cross international or nation-state boundaries, there are 
other boundaries to consider. The transnational experience consists of much more 
than a simple crossing of legal-political boundary. Once people have made those legal 
national state crossings, a diverse set of experiences of incorporation bring with them 
a diverse set of practices informed by different ideological and cultural experiences, 
commodity exchange, remittances, and movement back and forth from places of 
origin and destination. Hence it would be misleading to emphasise cultural 
assimilation as the main means of incorporation into a host society, as it would be to 
emphasize economic or capitalist intentions as the primary push or pull factors for 
migration. Migrants bring with them a diverse set of practices, but all these take place 
within a set of structural conditions in the context of core-periphery relations. The 
analytical value of recognising transnational migration, and within that biographical 
approaches, is that it enables distinctions to be made among patterns of migration 
within and between nation-state boundaries, and more to the point, migrants' 
experiences as socially constructed and situated in particular political-economic and 
sociocultural contexts. 
There are two critical aspects of these contexts that are implicit in much of the 
concepts and theoretical positions reviewed here. The fIrst is that the actions of 
individual migrants, the networks that they belong to, and the locality or localities in 
which they operate become a set of well established and accepted set of practices. In 
undertaking the activities they do, to make a living for example, it leads them to 
become incorporated as part of the broader social structure. The second point is that 
as a result of their actions, migrants develop a sense of belonging to a particular 
locality through their participation in its economic and social life. Belonging, even as 
a transnational migrant, imagines a place as part of their sense of being there. 
Belonging within a locality, here defmed as the place of destination, implicitly raises 
the question of citizenship as the right to participate and contribute to its social and 
economic life. It is to this question that I now briefly turn to introduction the link 
between citizenship and migration. I shall in chapter seven give an extended 
discussion on citizenship as it relates to Malawian migrants in Durban. 
3.6 CITIZENSIDP AND PARTICIPATION 
Until recently migration and citizenship, and their inclusion and exclusion from 
participation in a society have been treated as separate and discrete topics. In recent times 
the link between migration and immigration has been made, usually in the context of 
discussing xenophobia, race relations, multi-culturalism, and identities, (Castles and 
Spoonley, 1997; Giddens, 1982; Benmayor and Skotnes, 1994). Citizenship as a 
mechanism of inclusion and exclusion has also been raised (Tilly, 1996; Kabeer, 2002). 
This issue has been highlighted in Europe where questions about immigration, minorities 
and citizenship in the context of the European Union, and the influx of migrants from 
within the European Union, and outside of it from central and eastern Europe, Africa, the 
Middle East and parts of Asia. It is now high on the political and policy agendas of 
European countries (Brubock, 1997; Solomos and Schuster, 2001: 1). The most explicit 
and sustained arguments for the link between citizenship and migration have been by 
Soysal (1994), Castles (1997), as well as by Klusmeyer (2000). More recently citizenship 
as part of the process of globalisation has received attention (Urry, 1999; United Nations 
Research Institute for Social Development 1996; Giddens, 1998; Falk, 2003; Hindness, 
1998). 
Underlining this burgeoning scholarship is the understanding that citizenship as 
represented by an individual with a singular identity and membership of a nation state is 
no longer adequate. In the past, citizenship within the nation state with a democratic 
system was easily understood as having the right to vote, equality before the law, and 
entitlements to certain welfare and social rights, and the discharge of certain obligations 
and responsibilities such as to pay taxes and obey the laws of the nation state. But this 
commonplace understanding is not without its limitations. The classic version of the mid-
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century theory on citizenship is that of T. H. Marshall's "Class, Citizenship and 
Social Development". Although Marshall's theory is distilled from the British experience, 
his argument is that there are three dimensions of citizenship rights: civil, political and 
social, which manifest themselves at different stages in human development towards 
achieving full equal citizenship. Civil refers to liberty of the individual, freedom of 
speech and religion, to own property, and to be treated equally before the law. Political 
rights refers to the those rights which create the opportunity to participate in the exercise 
of political power, and social rights refers to economic and social security measures to 
ensure living a life in accordance with the prevailing nonns or standards at a given time. 
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Drawing from 19th century liberal philosophy, Marshall attempts to address a central 
weakness identified by 1.S. Mill as the 'incompatibility between the claims of equal 
human development and the existing class inequalities of power and wealth' 
(Macpherson, 1977: 49). Marshall acknowledges that there are class and other forms of 
discrimination and inequalities that hinder the full enjoyment of citizenship as equality of 
rights and treatment by the state and ruling classes. In addressing this contradiction, 
Marshall argues that the expansion of rights of citizenship takes place in social and class 
struggle, albeit mediated through a parliamentary or representative democracy. This has 
the effect of flattening or blunting class divisions, but does not necessarily reduce 
inequality. However this classic conception of citizenship has been called into question, 
by showing the multiple dimensions of citizenship. Giddens has criticised Marshall's 
theory of citizenship on the grounds that each dimension or bundle of rights is a 
precondition for the next bundle of rights, giving the impression of a linear model of 
progression in the development of human rights (1982:171-3 ; 1985: 204-5). Furthermore 
such a developmentalist conception plays down the role of contestation and conflict, 
without problematising the relationship between the state and its citizens (Giddens, 1982: 
176; 1985: 205). 
While class struggle in the Marshallian viewpoint is the crucible in which rights are 
forged, Turner has pointed to the different groups and class interests that civil and 
political rights represent. Liberal rights to freedom of speech, religion, movement and 
ownership of property as won through bourgeois struggles are not the same as political 
and social rights fought and won in the main by the workers movement (Turner, 1990: 
192). Giddens has gone further to insist that civil rights, including freedom of movement, 
need to be separated from industrial rights, rather than be treated as successive stages in 
the expansion of rights of citizens (1982: 172-3). In South African history, civil rights 
and political rights did not coalesce and nor did they follow sequentially as bundles of 
rights. For the most part of the 20th century these civil and political rights were 
differentiated and mediated though state-imposed racial and ethnic categories. For 
example, during the 1980s, while workers in South Africa were stamping their own 
identity on the issue of industrial rights, outside the workers' movement, in the anti-
apartheid struggle demands for social rights were termed community struggles. These 
struggles were based on the principle of local community activism and democratic 
participation. The principle feature of such community activism in the 1980s and early 
1990s was cast in a language of resistance to the state and critique of existing society. In 
the post-apartheid era this strand of libertarianism and dissent of community struggles 
against the state has been grafted into the new government policies that conceives of, or 
imagines, the 'community' as a set of self-identifying individuals who are to be active 
subjects or co-partners in governance. 
This does raise the question of the state as an actor in the citizenship and rights debate 
rather than as the only interpreter of rights, implementer of regulations and policies. 
Turner (1990: 197-180) argues that there are three critical aspects of modern citizenship: 
Firstly, the way the state subordinates ethnic minorities and/or natives of a country in the 
construction of citizenship. Secondly, the ways in which culture or tradition, such as 
religious or moral precepts, provide the discourse for the tenns of participation in social, 
economic and state matters. Thirdly, citizenship as a consequence of social struggles over 
resources. Citizen rights are the outcome of struggles over disproportionately distributed 
resources (see also Kabeer, 2000). Such action in the creation, assertion or defence of 
their rights to resources may be related to the degree that people actively or passively 
accept the outcome of their claims as citizens. This implies that the relationship of 
citizens to the state is a complex one, which should not be coloured by preconceptions of 
the state as an institution that either guarantees or dispenses citizenship rights, and that 
dissent is a legitimate characteristic of citizenship. Many theorists have highlighted class, 
or more specifically the labour movement, as the single most important variable around 
which action against the state is precipitated or on the basis of which public participation 
and 'emancipatory politics' takes place. However, Giddens (1990:158-163) has pointed 
out that it is also social movements incorporating a diverse range of supporters from 
women and environmental pressure groups to peace activists that contribute to an 
expansion of social rights. The heterogeneity of social movements, of groups fonning and 
individuals taking action, illustrate that citizenship is not a unitary phenomenon. Based 
on a variety of contingent factors, social groupings and individuals may be either active 
or passive, engaged or disengaged in the practice of citizenship. However this does not 
mean that active or passive dimensions of citizenship are an "either/ or" situation. Indeed 
mixtures of activity and passivity, engagement and disengagement, and militancy and 
accommodation produce the conditions for exploiting differences in approach that may 
challenge and unsettle dominant fonns of governance. The very ambiguity and possible 
contradictions that are inherent in the interactions and combinations of interactions 
emphasize the mUltiple dimensions of citizenship. 
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This citizenship-state debate, particularly as it is premised on an expansion of democratic 
participation within a nation-state, is still fundamentally about rights that exist, or are 
constitutionally guaranteed. But as pointed out above, the ambiguities of citizenship have 
become more pronounced in recent times, and have begun to undermine the idea that the 
state is the sole guarantor of citizenship rights. At the same time, as Urry (1999: 311-2) 
points out, globalisation as a process of flows of information, commodities and people 
across national borders at an increased pace began to challenge the understanding of 
citizenship as bounded within a territory and state. Migrants, particularly transnational 
migrants, and their mUltiple lives in countries of origin and destination are a growing 
index of the ambiguities of citizenship. Their lives highlight that the dynamic of 
economic life transcends those boundaries, and political events at a distance from one's 
place of origin can impinge and influence local politics. The assumption that the state can 
regulate both economic and political participation within a territorial space has been 
ruptured. Because of the flow of people across boundaries, both national and symbolic, 
there are now collectivities of people with mUltiple identities claiming entitlements based 
on ethnicity, religion, gender, locality and sexual preference such that the state cannot act 
as if is the sole arbiter of what constitutes the culture of a nation. 
The rupture of the links between citizenship, rights and the state has prompted new 
perspectives on the citizenship, particularly that of post-national citizenship. Writers such 
as Soysal (1994) argue for non-territorial citizenship rights based on universal notions of 
human rights guaranteed by multi-lateral international institutions such as the United 
Nations. Another perspective is to argue for citizenship identities based nq.t on state-given 
rights, but on relational (Tilly, 1996) and agonistic (Tully, 1999) perspectives. I shall be 
discussing these in greater detail in chapters seven and eight. Suffice to say that Tilly 
argues for citizenship identity as relational interaction and practice in which the single 
most important attribute of citizenship is that it is the outcome of 'a set of mutual, 
contested claims between agents of the state and members of socially constructed 
categories such as race, gender, nationalities and others'. It is public and interactional in 
that it locates citizenship identity in a network of individuals and groups, based on a 
shared sense of understanding of whom they are, where they come from, and to represent 
themselves. In this Tilly echoes Turner and Giddens by insisting that ideas or 
representations of citizenship identities are contested, but he argues that strategic 
interactions do not guarantee an anticipated outcome particularly in relation to the state. 
Tully (1999), on ~e other hand, has argued that citizenship is not generated by the 
possession of rights, justice principles, constitutional safeguards, shared values, norms, or 
understanding of differences in national of cultural or religious identities, or any process 
that gives validation to these principles, but by participation of citizens in ways in which 
their conduct is conditioned by the exercise of power in any system or governance 
practice. Their conduct in the form of participation involves dialogue, negotiating, and 
contestation, including having a say, presenting petitions, conducting referenda, meeting 
and discussing issues, and civil disobedience such as engaging in marches, boycotts, 
withdrawal of support. It asserts the right to dissent with whoever has power, and over 
how that power is exercised. It is this participation in the process of who exercises power 
and how it is exercised that promotes the identity of citizenship. Both Tilly and Tully 
shift the focus from an exclusive focus on the formal legal and constitutional defmition of 
citizenship as the possession of rights, to a perspective of how participation in economic 
and political processes informs the sense of belonging. Agonistic participation, as Tully 
insists, in whatever form, underlines the sense and identity of citizenship. Such a notion 
of citizenship does not tie down citizenship to rights alone, nor does it depend on 
territorially defmed concepts, but rather to practice within a context of governance and 
holds out the possibility of co-participation in governmental decision making. The image 
is not one of democratic institutional triumphal ism, but rather of minimal recognition of 
actors and stakeholders as participants, and acceptance of forms of interaction, including 
conflict and negotiation. The implications of such perspectives for the debate on 
migrants and citizenship is explored through the actions, forms of livelihood practices 
and the sense of belonging that Malawian migrants build up in the city of Durban. 
3.7. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has two aims. The fIrst is to review various theories of migration, or 
theories in which elements of migration theory appear. The second is, in reviewing 
these theories, to place the actions, practices and behaviours of migrants as 
individuals and groups within a broad context. Although a distinction between the 
incidence of migration (individuals ' decisions to migrate, and act in ways that 
indicate their migrant status) and the patterns of migrations was implicitly drawn, it 
was argued that these indices and patterns occur within a social-political and 
economic context. It was further argued that this context is never static, and interacts 
with, and is influenced by a range of political, economic and social factors as well as 
the actions and practices of migrants themselves. 
The chapter critically analyses a number of approaches to the question of migrancy. It 
begins with a critique of structuralist approaches. This includes perspectives on 
migration inspired by liberal economic orthodox paradigms, as well as radical 
perspectives based on critical conceptual approaches such as underdevelopment, 
dependency and uneven development. The common theme for all of these 
structuralist accounts is that they conceive of migration as a series of steps from a 
place of origin to a place of destination. When radical approaches do deal with 
migrants in the city there is a tendency to see them as reflective images playing a role 
in a linked chain of satellite-metropolitan exploitative relationships. Indeed, the 
actions and practices of migrants are seen as no more than set pieces in a series of 
primarily economic exploitative relationships. What migrants actually do to change, 
challenge, reinforce, or ameliorate their conditions of existence is hardly ever 
addressed as a central concern, and the whole migration process is conceived as 
moving from a place of origin to urban settlements, that is, a one-way trip. Neither 
does it distinguish between different categories of migrants such as nationality, 
ethnicity, refugee, political asylum seeker, or economic migrant. Nor is there a 
precise differentiation along lines of class, income, mode of survivals and strategies. 
The chapter goes on to argue that a global perspective such as world systems theory 
has greater potential as a theoretical framework. The central concept of core-
periphery in world systems theory is not confmed to the notion that exploitative and 
dependent relationships exist only as a chain of metropolitan-satellite ties from which 
surplus is extracted. Originally world systems approaches conceived of migration as a 
movement from one place to another, and migrants as nothing more than labour units 
in the service of global capitalism. However, re-conceptualising cores and peripheries 
as existing simultaneously and in a variety of ways has led to new ways of 
understanding migration. It becomes possible to think of migration as not confmed to 
a movement from core to periphery, but as involving the crossing of many cores and 
peripheries, or just many peripheries. The implication of movement or mobility 
inherent in such a conception allows for a more differentiated view of migrants, as 
more than just labour units. Recent theories of migration, such as transnationalism, 
sought to interrogate and incorporate an explanation of the new patterns and multiple 
movements of migrants on a world scale. While world systems theory gives a 
conceptual global structure to these patterns and multiple movements, it also offers a 
context for migrants' experiences, desires, identities, and everyday struggles to make 
a home in the world. 'Making a home' means that migrants have to make sense and 
structure the place and spaces they occupy as meaningful to them in terms of 
residence and working for a living. Such processes reveal practices of belonging, 
exclusion, inclusion and affiliation to specific places in which they settle and 
associations that migrants form of which they are members, and in which their 
identities are formed, re-formed and negotiated. The way in which migrants engage 
and interact in these spheres have implications for citizenship and governance. 
In order to explore these issues - the context of migrants' experiential dilemmas and 
their concrete practices - a number of recent theories of migration are analysed. Each 
of these theories - social capital, context of reception and transnational approaches 
were analysed in terms of the particular perspective adopted, and what limitations and 
positive contributions to they add to the debate on migration. The social capital 
approach highlights the resources available to migrants from within their network of 
friends and relatives, including the national or ethnic group they belong to. In 
chapters five and six this is analysed. While the making of social capital can be 
instrumentalist in its application, it does highlight the dependence of migrants on a 
limited network of people, and implicitly the relative success or failure of migrants 
practices in an urban area. However, social capital in itself abstracted from the 
broader socio-economic and political context fails to underscore the external 
environment in which migrants have to operate. The context of reception approach is 
useful in that it specifies the political and legal dynamics that surround the migrants' 
lives, and the framework within which migrants have to unpack their social and 
cultural baggage and the likely impact it may have on the host society. In chapter four 
this general framework - the rules, regulations and implementation of policies - is 
reviewed as to its influence on migrants' actions. This is taken further in chapter 
seven where these actions are related to citizenship 
Migrants unpacking their social and cultural baggage is not without its own 
ambiguities. In some ways resorting to reliance on the social capital of one's own 
ethnic or national group may be construed as a defence and coping mechanism 
against the challenges of a new environment defmed by the regulations of a state. Yet 
while power relations and dominance, particularly that of the state, underline the 
context of reception approach, they do not preclude migrants from creating their own 
ways of seeing the world. The human practices of migrants, that is, the collection of 
thought, imaginations and actions, daily activities, habits, and representations, can 
lead to the creation of their own ideology and identification, which may implicitly 
challenge the hegemony of the state. Such challenges may not necessarily be open 
and publicly voiced, yet are significant for they elicit responses from the state and 
local people. It is the transnational approach, which widens the terrain within which 
migrants operate allowing for an exploration of issues leading directly to questions of 
citizenship. Firstly, the transnational approach operates on a wider social field. Such 
an approach transcends nation-state boundaries, without necessarily dismissing them. 
For the purposes of this study, this is an important consideration where the state' s 
responses to migrants are not reduced to unsubstantiated notions of a primordial, 
national or ethnic character. Secondly, other boundaries relating to social, political 
and cultural spheres become problematised, rather than accepted as such. In short, the 
contestation of boundaries becomes embedded in a swirl of social, cultural, political, 
and identity issues that constantly shifts the boundaries of affiliation. Thirdly, this in 
tum can lead to questions of social differentiation within and between migrant 
groups, and of issues of inclusion and exclusion, and rights, responsibilities and 
obligations. 
These questions of membership and association raise one of the fundamental issues of 
this study, that is, of citizenship, because it defmes who belongs and who does not, to 
organisations, localities and places in the city (and, by extension, to the nation-state as 
a whole). Before analysing and discussing the empirical da~ I present, in the next 
chapter, the issue of defining migrants and immigrants, the use of official and 
unofficial terms to refer to such actors, and the counting procedures to enumerate 
undocumented migrants. In a review of some of the literature on refugees and 
migrants, I offer an alternative perspective on what migrants and refugees actually do 
in the country, and lay the broad framework of regulations that migrants operate in. 
This review sets the context of how migrants relate to their own ethnic and national 
groups, to local people and the state, and the parameters for the substantial discussion 
of the research data in chapters five, six, and seven. 
CHAPTER 4 
IMMIGRANTS, MIGRANTS, FOREIGNERS, ALIENS AND ILLEGALS: 
COUNTING WHO IS WHO IN SOUTH AFRICA, OR WHO IS DOING WHAT 
TO SURVIVE. 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the last chapter I argued that defining who are migrants and immigrants is important to 
clarify ambiguities and to know which set of actors are the subjects of this research. It is 
also important because of the way in which regulations are used, and misused, and the 
way the public debate, driven by the media and politicians, is conducted on the issue of 
immigrants and migrants. Furthermore, as I pointed out in chapter two, undocumented 
migrants are not easily susceptible to conventional enumeration techniques. I suggested 
that counting is perhaps not as important as discovering and documenting what migrants 
actually do, what possible impact they might have on the host society, and the 
implications this has for their continued participation in the social and economic spheres 
and as citizens. 
The central proposition of this chapter is that it is more meaningful to debate and discuss 
what foreign migrants and immigrants actually do, what their practices are, particularly 
with regard to their economic well-being or livelihoods and raise issues about the impact 
such activities might have on local economic and political activity, and ultimately about 
questions of rights and citizenship in terms of these concrete practices of migrants and 
immigrants. This chapter will, firstly, analyse some of the definitions of the terms used, 
and show the confusion of the use of terms such as 'migrant', 'alien', ' illegal alien', 
'foreigner' and 'immigrant' interchangeably in official and public discourse, thus 
rendering any meaningful and helpful debate misleading and ultimately useless. 
Secondly, it will subject to a critique the notion that counting or enumerating migrants is 
a real possibility. Undocumented workers, by their very nature do not make themselves 
available for enumeration. Counting who is an immigrant, migrant, foreigner, alien and 
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illegal or undocumented migrant, refugee or displaced person in the 1990s in South 
Africa is a business fraught with difficulty. Even today, in the early 2000s with the last 
official census data still largely unpublished, it is difficult to say with what reliability or 
indeed validity these data generated by official statistics, and various other institutions 
and agencies is reliable. The fact that various agencies, such as the Human Sciences 
Research Council, the South African Police Services, and the Department of Home 
Affairs, have published figures of wide variation suggests that they are less than accurate. 
However, the political import of such figures used by the media and politicians without 
questioning their reliability, or indeed their credibility, I suggest, feeds into the rising tide 
of xenophobia. I do show that the only reliable figures on foreigners in South Africa are 
those collected at the various points of entry - border posts and airports. These do 
provide a breakdown of the foreigners by country, and show the changes in immigration 
patterns over a IS-year period spanning the last years of apartheid, and the first few years 
of the post-apartheid era. They show in particular the rise in African continental 
migration to South Africa. Thirdly, I review and analyse a number of studies of foreign 
migrants and refugees in South Africa, to show what problems they experience in South 
Africa (such as xenophobia and constraints on pursuing their livelihood strategies), what 
such people actually do to make a living, and whether this is a real or perceived drain on 
the resources and employment prospects of local South Africans. 
4.2 DEFINING IMMIGRANTS, MIGRANTS, FOREIGNERS, ALIENS AND 
ILLEGALS 
If one assumes that generally a migrant is any person who leaves his or her country of 
origin to live for an extended period of time, or temporarily resides without official 
residency status or citizenship in another country, then enumerating such persons in 
South Africa is a very difficult exercise. In a piece of research such as this enumeration is 
difficult because such persons, which I shall collectively call foreign migrants for now, 
have no interest in participating in such a census exercise precisely because their status 
legal, or illegal, is a precarious one (Reitzes, 1998: 21). Furthermore official statistics on 
cross-border transitions from other parts of Africa into South Africa is either incomplete, 
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or extremely difficult to rely on because of the variety of terms used to designate who is a 
visitor, immigrant, migrant, undocumented migrant, refugee, asylum seeker, alien, and 
undocumented immigrant / migrant. Indeed a host of scholars have called into question 
official statistics (Wilmot, et. al, 1997; Bernstein, et. al. 1997; Bouillon, 2001: 20-21). 
A number of terms are in current use to designate someone who is not South African. For 
example, 'foreigner' , 'alien', 'immigrant' , ' illegal' are used loosely and interchangeably 
in public discourse, in the media and in political circles. Danso and McDonald make the 
point that media coverage of immigration is ' largely anti-immigrant and unanalytical, 
often reproducing racial and national stereotypes' (2001: 1-2). An alien is not a foreigner, 
and in tum is not the same thing as an immigrant or migrant (Reitzes, 1998: 20-21). Some 
foreigners are immigrants, but many foreigners in South Africa have no desire to live 
here permanently, or even for extended periods of time that may qualify them as 
' immigrants' . Indeed some foreigners may not qualify as immigrants given the strict 
limitations in law as to who is an immigrant and who is not. There is also the issue that 
some immigrants become naturalised citizens, but at the same time do not give up their 
previous nationality, or passports (or in many of such cases carry two different 
passports). This last category of person may more accurately be described as 'foreign 
nationals ' . 
However for the purposes of this thesis, the major consideration is who is an immigrant 
and who is a migrant. Later I shall make finer distinctions about refugees and asylum 
seekers, and how best, for the purposes of this research should they be conceptualised in 
terms of the immigrant/migrant dichotomy. 
An ' immigrant' in South African legal terms is a foreign resident who is not naturalised, 
but can become a South African, remain a foreigner, or combine both options (as 
suggested above). An immigrant is generally considered a person who intends to live 
permanently in the country, and assimilate into the general popUlation. During the years 
prior to 1994 assimilation implied a white person of good standing and health. (For an 
analysis of the legislation relating to immigration and its changing racial configurations 
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see Peberdy and Crush, 1998). Although the cruder aspects of race have been repealed 
from the legislation of the new South Africa, an immigrant aspiring to be a permanent 
resident must have 'a good reputation' and be 'desirable'. In addition the immigrant is 
subject to the Aliens Control Act (No 96, 1991, as amended, Act no 76, 1995), which 
apart from its surveillance intent, stipulates that such immigrants must satisfy the needs 
of the country. In other words they must not compete with nationals for employment if 
there is already an abundance of similar skilled people. 
Historically, a migrant in South African terms meant a person who was temporarily in the 
country to serve specific needs usually in terms of a labour contract. The term 'migrant' 
in South Africa is closely associated with the apartheid system of internal migration from 
rural areas to serve the needs of the mining or manufacturing sectors of the urban 
economy, or the contracts for mine workers from neighbouring countries such as Malawi, 
Mozambique, Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho. In these terms migrants were always 
temporary sojourners, working on fixed contracts, usually of 12 months duration without 
any rights to family life, permanent residence or access to property, and enjoying no other 
rights save those which were minimally granted to them in terms of their contract, or 
negotiated by their trade union, while living in hostels and compounds. It should also be 
noted for many rural migrants, it was argued by the apartheid regime, could exercise their 
citizenship rights in the so-called independent homelands, but not in white South Africa. 
However if they wished to travel abroad they could do so on South African passports. 
(The independent homelands were not recognised internationally.) In short in the decades 
prior to 1994 both local rural migrants and migrants from other countries working in 
South Africa enjoyed no basic rights associated with citizenship. One should add that 
while an immigrant, usually white and from Europe, could, in a short space of time 
became a citizen of South Africa, a migrant (usually black) could never legally attain 
that status. To add to the confusion, it was possible under apartheid for urban black South 
African residents to attain citizenship, but no associated rights such as the vote, freedom 
of movement or association. However, the idea of temporary or transient workers is 
probably what best describes contemporary migrants from other parts of Africa in South 
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Africa, whether they are here voluntarily, that is, they came here of their own volition, or 
as refugees and asylum seekers. 
This perverse set of binary opposites, immigrant and migrant, white and black, citizens 
and non-citizens, still resonates through the public discourse on foreigners in South 
Africa. There is a widespread tendency to label all immigrants coming from Africa as 
'illegal' , 'aliens' or 'illegal aliens' . This indiscriminate use ofterms does not distinguish 
among legal immigrants, foreign Africans who legally enter the country, refugees and 
asylum seekers, those that enter the county clandestinely or illegally and those that enter 
legally but outstay their visa conditions. The last two categories of migrants may be 
termed, in less emotional and more neutral language, undocumented workers or migrants. 
Nor does this usage of terms distinguish between immigrants who intend to settle or 
reside permanently in the country, and migrants who are here temporarily. This lack of 
clarity between immigrant and migrant is also echoed in the Aliens Control Act, which is 
silent on policy towards temporary migrant workers, but nevertheless currently renders 
them all illegal (Reitzes, 1998: 20-21). Further confusion is added when displaced people 
like the civilian refugees from the decades-long armed struggle in Mozambique (in which 
the former South Africa regime instigated and provided assistance to RENAMO) were 
not, until recently, recognised under international conventions as refugees, which 
curtailed their freedom of movement and ability to find work in South Africa. (They did, 
however, enjoy the concession that they could work for white farmers near the borders at 
lower rates of pay.) This added to the image of Mozambique 's displaced people in South 
Africa as quintessentially legal vagabonds, thieves and a drain on the country' s resources. 
This image is easily transferred to migrants from other African countries. 
Furthermore, from the point of view of African migrants themselves, having a passport is 
not necessarily an indication of their place of origins. In a continent with large 
movements of people, many forced because of wars, coups, and massacres, others 
because of their own volitional movements, nationality becomes arbitrary and 
ambiguous. In these cases nationality and citizenship depend on situational 
circumstances and how place of origin, parents' nationality, permanent residency, land 
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ownership (or lack of it), religion and language becomes an ensemble of elements in 
constructing one's identity. Other factors that have to do with the presentation of identity 
to enter a country are associated both with the perception and reality of how difficult or 
simple it is to enter into a country. These become consideration as people make decisions 
what migration route to take, and changes both to the route taken and the identity adopted 
en route. Thus as Bouillon points out (2001: 23), migratory movements may be one or 
more of several possibilities depending on circumstances and possible alternatives: 
'irreversible' movements (a single change of residence); 'reversible' movements of long 
duration (organised work migration); renewed reversibility (daily and seasonal 
movements); sporadic reversibility (movements depending on opportunities and 
situations to respond to) and movements with uncertain reversibility. 
Given these considerations about the public and legal understanding or misunderstanding 
of who is a foreign migrant, immigrant, refugee or asylum seeker, and various situations 
and circumstances such people fmd themselves in, it is very difficult to know what 
exactly that is being measured in terms of the current nomenclature that is being used by 
the South African state, and what exactly is being debated in public. 
However that has not stopped people - researchers, cabinet ministers, politicians, the 
media and the public - from estimating what is inaccurately and clumsily described as 
'foreigners', 'illegals', and ' immigrants'. These terms are used interchangeably or as 
compound nouns (illegal foreigners, illegal immigrants). Bouillon (2001: 23-24) has 
summarised these pronouncements on the number of illegal immigrants for the period 
1989 to 1994 thus: 
In less than a decade the estimated number of illegal immigrants according to 
government and other influential sources increased from approximately 1 
million to 5 million and then to 9.5 million. In 1988/9 the South African 
Yearbook estimated - on the basis of unspecified sources - that there were 
1.2 million illegal black immigrants; in 1992 the estimate increased to 2.5 
million; in 1993 to 3 million and in 1994 to 5 million. 
Politicians did not query these figures. Danie Schutte, the Minister of Home Affairs in 
1993, stated that according to the census of 1991 (which is regarded as a flawed census) 
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there were 906 000 foreigners in South Africa, including 245 000 illegal aliens. His 
successor in the new democratic government of 1994, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, said in 
parliament that there were two million illegal foreigners. He followed this claim with a 
statement in January 1995 that 'either we chase the foreigners out of the country, or it's 
the end of the RDP'. He later conceded that it is not possible to get an exact number of 
undocumented immigrants, but they, the Department Home Affairs, had to rely on 
estimates and projections to fonnulate policy (Parliamentary Media Briefmg, February, 
1998, p5, quoted in Reitzes 1998: 7). It is precisely this need to quantify, in whatever 
fonn, that is critiqued as a misplaced focus of policy attention (Reitzes, 1995; 1997, 
1998; Crush andPeberdy, 1998; Bouillon, 2001). 
One might excuse the excesses of politicians when it comes to inflating immigrant 
figures, but the South African Police Services released a press statement in June 1995 
claiming that there were 8.5 million 'illegals' in the country, a figure that is 
approximately 20% of the total South African population. The International Labour 
Organisation'S office in Pretoria called the latter figure 'astounding", and the National 
Labour Market Commission stated the figures were unreasonable (1997: 1). One might 
have thought this would spur a debate on South Africa as a nation of immigrants, but in 
fact the very opposite took place, of a nation swamped and infested with immigrants. 
Adding to the notion of being swamped by 'illegals' was perhaps the worst estimate of 
the number of foreigners and illegals in the country. This was by the Human Sciences 
Research Council (HSRC) researchers Minnaar and Hough. They estimated, on the basis 
of very dubious methods, a sub-set of statistics culled from four surveys conducted 
between December 1994 and October 1995, that there were between 5.1 and 9.5 million 
illegal immigrants in South Africa. Taking the higher figure of 9.5 million people, this 
would mean that the numbers of immigrants are roughly a quarter of the country's 
population, which at face value seems grossly exaggerated. Minnaar's and Hough's 
methods, based on perception and a technique called 'spotting' have already been 
repudiated (see Crush, 1997; Bouillon, 2001; Orkin, 2002; De Klerk, 2002). But this 
kind of research is problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, the HSRC is the premier 
social science research institute in the country, whose research methods are expected to 
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be flawless. The research results therefore lend an aura of authority to the conclusions 
reached, and are therefore believed by many from government ministers, to bureaucrats 
and the pUblic. Secondly, the stamp of authority associated with HSRC means that their 
research may be used for policy formulation, and implementation of those policies by the 
state. Although this research was subsequently repudiated by the HSRC, it is surprising 
is that it took almost 6 years for such a repudiation. Indeed the release of such statistics, 
real, imagined or halfbaked did have social and political consequences. These are briefly 
summarised below. 
The context and consequences of releasing such figures in a climate of increasing 
xenophobia and racism served only to increase tension, and create a climate of hostility 
and in many cases unwarranted harassment of African foreigners by both those in 
authority, such as the South African Police Services and officials of the Department of 
Home Affairs, and by the public, particularly local street traders and the unemployed. 
Given the Minister of Home Affairs position on 'foreigners' (as quoted above), it is not 
surprising that there has been an attempt at greater surveillance and control of illegal 
immigrants. This is evidenced by the greater control given Home Affairs officials in 
terms of the Aliens Control Act, and the greater efforts made at deporting 'illegals' (and 
it might be argued with less parliamentary accountability and oversight). Officials at 
border posts took a stronger interest in African arrivals and departures, particularly after 
1993/4. This increased control over foreign migration and immigration is evidenced in 
the increasing number of repatriations taking place, the building of the famous, or now 
infamous, Lindela Holding Centre, and debate over how to patrol the very porous South 
African borderl. It has been reported that 180 000 illegal immigrants are deported every 
year (15000 every month or 500 a day) to about 92 countries world-wide. Most of these 
are from Mozambique and Zimbabwe, and that in 1999 approximately 87% of the 120 
000 undocumented immigrants in the Lindela Holding Centre were from these two 
countries (Guyevu, 2002: 2). It should be noted that very few illegal immigrants are 
I There are 350 registered airports but thereare police at only a few of them. There are official border 
crossing ~o.sts with all neighbouring countries (Lesotho, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Mozambique, 
and Namibia), but many more unofficial crossing points. 
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deported to other African countries (Bouillon, 2001: 32). The 200km electric fence 
bordering Mozambique has been extended (there was a debate within ANC circles as to 
whether it should be switched on or not). An agreement with the Mozambican 
government made allowances for the South African anny to pursue and track down drug 
traffickers and illegal immigrants. 
Increased control has not stopped the arrival of immigrants and migrants from many 
African countries. Such migration occurs, much to the surprise of newly arrived foreign 
migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, in a social climate of xenophobia, hostility and 
outright racism from many South Africans towards their northern neighbours. And while 
the new immigrants and migrants go about re-establishing their lives as best they can, 
particularly as no assistance is offered by the state to asylum seekers and refugees, there 
is a constant stream of daily harassment by the police force. In indication of this is seen in 
a number of incidents of police raids, and the problems immigrants face trying to obtain 
the correct 'papers' from officials in the Department of Home Affairs. The media has 
also participated in this xenophobia by constantly publishing letters from readers who 
make accusations that foreigners take away jobs, and business opportunities from street 
traders, abuse social services such as health and education, and steal local women, 
without much rebuttal or editorial columns challenging this point of view (see Bouillon, 
2001: 25-26, for discussion on this point). In this chapter, and in the thesis as a whole, 
some of these accusations will be shown be less than credible. 
What is clear from the above analysis is that it is impossible to produce reliable statistics 
on migrants, and in particular illegal immigrants. As Mike de Klerk, Executive Director 
of the HSRC's research programme on Integrated Rural and Regional Development, 
noted, 
Precisely because undocumented immigrants have an interest in 
concealing or misrepresenting their status in surveys or official enquiries, 
there cannot be a reliable method for estimating their extent. (25 April 
2002, press release). 
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Repudiation of the HSRC's discredited statistics has not stopped government officials 
and newspapers from continuing to cite them (Crush and Peberdy, n.d.: 10). What is clear 
is that the production of 'statistics' is done by those agencies of the state that have the 
most interest in inflating such numbers such as the police, security forces, and 
government departments such as the Department of Home Affairs who are responsible 
for producing and implementing immigration policy. Terms such as 'aliens' and 'illegal 
immigrants' are then used as negative conceptual categories which in turn feed into the 
decades-long racial consciousness of the public, thus contributing to and feeding off 
intolerance and outright hostility to anyone who is remotely not considered one of 'us' , 
and thus a threat. Such people so designated, and sometimes quite mistakenly including 
South Africans who are a few shades darker than the local black African population, are 
all aliens and by definition 'illegals'. In this sense it is possible to present caricatures of 
'foreigners', forestalling any meaningful analysis and discussion of why and how such 
people arrive in South African, and what such foreigners do to assimilate or insert 
themselves into the economy and society. (For an analysis of the media role in 
perpetuating these images, see Danso and McDonald, 2001) 
This thesis will focus attention on issues why, how and what foreign migrants from 
Africa do in practice, specifically migrants from Malawi living in Durban. A further issue 
will be what implications this has for policy, and more importantly citizenship. Cognisant 
of the pitfalls of using rigid quantitative methods, data was collected by combining both 
qualitative techniques such as long-term participant observation and the use of in-depth 
key informant interviews, and a limited and careful use of a survey by using a 
snowballing technique. The data produced in this way will not give any absolute 
enumeration of foreign migrants, but endorses the point of view expressed by Mike de 
Klerk that: 
Prospective policy can rather seek to attend flexibly to the reasons for such 
immigration, how immigrants are treated, what immigrants do when they 
are here, and the implications (25 April 2002, press release). 
The point really is that foreign migrants are here anyway. As a highly developed 
economy, relative to other African countries, and perceived as having greater 
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opportunities, combined with the attraction of democracy and the rule of law, migrants 
from other countries are more than likely to be attracted here (see also Guyevu, 2002, 
160-6; 182-83, for a similar argument about the 'pull' factors that exert such a powerful 
attraction to South Africa). 
This study can be seen as part of a slow but growing literature on foreign migrants in 
South Africa. The rest of this chapter will focus on official data on legal foreigners, and 
refugees and asylum seekers for the 1990s. This will provide additional context in which 
to locate the Malawians and other African migrants in Durban. The review will then 
focus on those studies undertaken, mainly, though not exclusively, in Johannesburg. This 
study, located in relation to those studies in Gauteng, should also be seen as part of 
widening our understanding of foreign migrants, particularly in another major South 
African urban centre, namely Durban. 
4.3 STATISTICS ON LEGAL IMMIGRANTS 
Since the Second World War there has been wide fluctuations in documented migration 
to South Africa. In 1945 there were 2949 immigrants, reaching a peak in the 1940s of36 
734 in 1948, the year the Nationalist party took control of the country and introduced 
apartheid. There after there were periodic peaks in 1964 (40 896 immigrants); 1966 (48 
051); 1970 (41, 523) and in 1975 (50 464) immigrants. This last figure according to 
Statistics South Africa was 'largely due to a doubling of the number of immigrants from 
the UK between 1973 and 1975, and to some extent immigration into South African from 
Mozambique after that country gained independence in that year' (Report Number 03-
51-03, iv). This dropped, but picked up again in 1982 when 45 784 immigrants arrived 
which was 'largely due to immigration from the UK, China and Portugal'. After this there 
has been a steady drop in immigration. However immigration to South Africa in the 
1990s is nowhere near the levels of the mid 1970s, or early 1980s. 
Very clearly immigration from the highs of the 1970s and early 1980s has dropped 
dramatically. The bias of immigration policy in the past was that it encouraged white 
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immigration during the years of apartheid, and as we shall see immigrants arrive in 
smaller numbers from a wide range of countries, including the African continent and 
Asia. However by the early 1990s documented immigrants dropped below the 10 000 
persons per annum, and between 1997 to 2001 to below 5000 per annum (see table 4.1 
below). 
The table below gives the figures of documented immigrants from 1985 to 2001. 



















It is interesting to note the inflow of immigrants from the Asian continent beginning in 
the mid 1980s (STATSSA Documented Immigrants, Report Number 03-51-03, iv) which 
from the point of view of apartheid policy was something to avoid at all costs. But as 
noted by Hart (2002: 144-161) that during the 1980s various towns, cities and 
manufacturing centres such as Newcastle and Ladysmith in the province of Kwazulu-
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Natal began to restructure their local economies into functional regions. The bureaucrats 
of this restructuring exercise sought to bring in Asian, particularly Taiwanese, capital to 
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In the table below the details of immigration are given on a continental basis, with 
specific reference to countries from Africa for the year 2001. 
77 
Table 4.2: Documented Immigrants By Continent and Permanent Residence, Birth 
Place and Citizenship: 2001 
Continent Previous Permanent Birth Place Citizenship 
Residence 
Europe 1714 1717 1753 
North America 172 169 185 
Central and South America 41 42 40 
Australasia 51 49 60 
Middle East 109 111 107 
Asia 1289 1290 1281 
Indian Ocean Islands 31 31 32 
Africa 1419 1422 1374 
Unspecified 6 1 0 
Total 4832 4832 4832 
Source: STATSSA Documented ImmIgrants, Report Number 03-51-03 
It is very clear from table 4. 2 and the pie graph below that while Europe still represents a 
significant source of immigrants (36%) (although today Europe includes Central and 
Eastern European countries, which was not always the case between 1948 until the mid-
1980s). Africa accounts for 28% of official documented migrants. However, Africa and 
Asia together accounts for 55% of total immigration for 2001, which represents a 
significant shift away from receiving the bulk of immigrants from Europe. In table three 
the breakdown by country is given for Africa. 
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Figure 4.2 
















Table 4.3: African Immigrants by Previous Pennanent Residence, Birth Place and Citizenship: 2001 
Country Previous Pennanent Residence Birth Place Citizenship % 
Algeria 23 23 23 1.6 
Angola 14 14 14 1 
Benin 2 2 2 0.1 
Botswana 21 21 22 1.6 
Bukina Faso 1 0 1 0.07 
Burundi 3 3 3 0.2 
Cameroon 29 28 28 2 
Comoros 2 2 2 0.1 
Congo 49 50 50 3.6 
Cote d'ivore 11 11 11 0.80 
Dem Rep of Congo 18 17 18 1.3 
Egypt 44 43 41 2.9 
Ethiopia 5 5 5 0.36 
Gabon 1 1 1 0.07 
Ghana 125 126 126 9 
Guinea 1 1 1 0.07 
Kenya 60 60 58 4.2 
Lesotho 118 115 112 8.15 
Uberia 2 2 2 0.1 
Ubya 12 12 12 .87 
Malawi 33 33 33 2.4 
Mali 3 3 2 0.1 
Morocco 45 45 42 3 
Mozambique 40 39 33 2.4 
Nambia 2 1 1 0.07 
Nigeria 198 198 191 13.9 
Rwanda 1 1 1 0.07 
St Helena 1 1 1 0.07 
Senegal 5 5 5 0.36 
Somalia 9 9 9 0.6 
Sudan 3 3 3 0.2 
Swaziland 31 31 31 2.2 
Togo 1 1 1 0.07 
Tunisa 2 2 2 0.1 
Uganda 79 79 79 5.7 
Tanzania 13 13 13 0.9 
Zaire 18 17 18 1.3 
Zambia 86 89 78 5.7 
Zimbabwe 326 326 315 23 
Unspecified 6 1 0 0 
Total 1419 1422 1374 +1-100 
Source: ST A TSSA Documented Immigrants, Report Number 03-51-03 
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The countries from which the largest documented immigrants (with citizenship) that 
came to South Africa in 2001 were Zimbabwe (23%), Nigeria (14%), Lesotho (8%), 
Zambia (6%) and Uganda (6%). As a whole these numbers add up to 775 or 56% of the 
total immigrants from Africa. One may note that the number of documented Malawians is 
only 33 or 2.4% of the total. 
4.4 REFUGEES AND ASYLUM SEEKERS 
General international practice is that asylum seekers and refugees are allowed into a 
country for humanitarian reasons. Although refugees and asylum seekers they have a 
measure of protection under various United Nation protocols, they have very limited 
rights in the country of refuge. Such a situation opens the way for their exploitation by 
employers, agencies of the state and others. 
Historically, the largest refugee population in South African has been from Mozambique. 
These are refugees as a direct consequence of the civil war in Mozambique that raged 
between RENAMO and the FRELIMO government from the late 1970s to the early 
1990s. The apartheid regime during those years supported the RENAMO movement in 
opposition to the Mozambican government, and in so doing created a refugee crisis. 
Acknowledgement of this fact by the South African government led the UN High 
Commission to implement between March 1993 and March 1995, together with the South 
African government, a voluntary repatriation scheme which saw 32 000 refugees return 
to Mozambique. However it was estimated that about 90 000 decided to remain in South 
Africa (Bouillon, 2001:29) 
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Table 4.4: Application for Asylum September 1993-1996* 
Country Application Processed In Process 
Angola 3477 3015 462 
Zaire/ORC 2282 1 855 528 
Nigeria 1849 266 1623 
Somalia 1667 933 734 
Pakistan 1 513 1 093 420 
India 1 141 514 627 
Senegal 669 41 628 
Ethiopia 592 465 127 
Rwanda 495 200 295 
China 404 151 253 
Burundi 338 47 291 
Ghana 334 71 263 
Other 2945 729 2216 
Total 17807 9340 8467 
* Adopted from Bouillon, 2001: 29 
It is very obvious from the table 4.4 that, firstly, during the period 1993-1996, the 
greatest number of refugees came from Angola and Democratic Republic of Congo, 
rather than any other African country. This is not surprising seeing that civil wars ranged 
in both countries. Secondly, refugee status is obtained with some difficulty. For the 
period 1993-96, just over 52% obtained their official refugee status (48% was still 
outstanding). For the period 1994-1996, as reported by the Department of Home Affairs, 
26000 people applied for asylum, of these only 10 600 (or 41%) were processed, and 5 
200 (20%) were rejected and 3 300 (less than 13%) were accepted (Bouillon, 2001: 29-
30). Refugee status is usually granted indefinitely, for two years or for periods up to six 
months. Those that have 2 year or six month refugee permits need to renew them 
continuously. Asylum seekers are usually allowed into countries on humanitarian 
grounds, but whose legal status is in constant limbo, and whose rights are non-existent, 
and are therefore open to exploitation by employers with little or not protection under the 
labour laws of the land. 
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Added to the unprocessed asylum seekers are those whose visas expire, and stay on in the 
county illegally. These are the over-stayers, on which Bouillon comments (2001: 30) are 
perhaps the only precise figure of the 'illegals' or 'irregulars'. 
Clearly official documented data on immigrants does not adequately reflect the changes 
that are taking place in tenns of the number of foreign African people in country. 
However, the argument that is being presented here is not that better counting of 
undocumented foreigners needs to be done, but rather that given that it is unlikely that 
counting, official or otherwise will yield any significantly accurate results, it is far better 
to begin to understand what it is that foreign migrants do in South Africa, and what 
implications this holds in tenns of the ways in which foreign migrants and/or immigrants, 
including refugees and asylum seekers, insert themselves into the society and economy, 
social interaction between locals and foreigners, and what kinds of contribution such 
people make in tenns of employment and trading opportunities. And thus what needs to 
be done in policy tenns. In the next section I shall review literature on foreign migrants 
in South Africa. This literature will distinguish between legal categories of migrants and 
immigrants, and between linguistic categories of francophone and anglophone foreign 
migrants, between regional origins of non-SADC and SADC migrants, and the types of 
work, occupation and fonns of employment that they become involved to make a living 
in South Africa. Some discussion on social relations between South African and 
foreigners will also take place. The main focus is on how, what and why they become 
involved in certain kinds of economic activities, and what implications this might have in 
tenns oftheir contributions to economy and society, and for their rights as local residents, 
economic actors and therefore as citizens. 
4.5 AFRICAN CONTINENTAL IMMIGRATION INTO SOUTH AFRICA, WITH 
SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO FRANCOPHONES IN JOHANNESBURG. 
While immigration policy and practice, according to Peberdy and Crush (1998) and 
Bouillon (2001) has not changed significantly, despite the sweeping political and social 
changes in South African society as a whole, the movement of African continental people 
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into South Africa has changed the way infonnal business is conducted on the city streets, 
and the social and ethnic composition of many an inner city neighbourhood. As noted 
above, a key shift in immigration to South Africa has been the immigrants coming from 
Africa. But this is not just a rush from continental Africa to the borders of South Africa 
en masse. As we shall show through a number of studies undertaken in primarily in 
Johannesburg, but in other areas as well, there are differences in the kinds of people 
emigrating to South Africa, and the beginnings are not to be found in post-1994 period. 
An important publication dealing with immigration of continental Africans into South 
Africa is African Immigration to South Africa: Francophone migration of the 1990s by 
Morris and Bouillon (2001). The book gives a fmely textured analysis of who are the 
francophone immigrants and migrants are, why they came to South Africa, their first 
encounters with the xenophobic attitudes of South Africans, and the ways in which they 
have strategised to fmd accommodation and the means to make a living, and deal with the 
immense hostility from local people and the agencies of the state that they encounter 
daily, namely the police and the officials of the Department of Home Affairs. The book 
also deals with issues related to their evolving relationship with South Africans, 
particularly black South Africans2• 
As a key category of people coming to South Africa, the francophone Africans have in 
certain respects changed the character of certain suburbs of Johannesburg such as 
Hillbrow, Berea, Yeoville, Bertrams (Morris, 2001: 13). Immigrants, refugees and 
asylum seekers have also come from Senegal, Nigeria, Mali, Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, 
Cameroon, Mozambique, and Malawi to name but a few of the other major emigre 
countries. Bouillon has argued that the francophone African immigrants came in a series 
of waves beginning in the mid-1980s, and represented a very different kind of grouping 
to that of the those coming from South Africa's immediate neighbours, Mozambique, 
2, Black' as a social and political category has become ambiguous. During the anti-apartheid struggle black 
referred to all oppressed people regardless of ethnic status. That is, 'black' referred to black Africans. 
Indians and Coloureds. Today this category has little relevance, and legislation condoning affirmativ~ 
action specifically categories people into various hierarchical categories of disadvantage, including that of 
gender. In this context 'black' retains its former meaning, but also specifies, for example in chapters 7 and 
~, the social cat~go~ ofIndian.' an~ further, religious groups such as Muslim. These new usages are 
Integral to new IdentIty formation In the post-apartheid period. 
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Swaziland, Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Botswana and Malawi. South Africa's immediate 
neighbours all form part of the Southern African Development Community. Generally the 
francophone Africans represented a well educated, urban, and initially middle to upper 
income group of people. In the mid-late 1990s more working class and people with a 
peasant backgrounds arrived. 
There are different periodisations of these waves of immigrants and migrants from Africa 
to South Africa. Kadima (2001: 92-98) argues that in the case of the waves of Congolese 
immigrants arriving in South Africa can be divided up into five periods. These periods 
are intimately related to the political and economic instability in the Congo from the late 
1980s onwards. The periods are: (1) 1988/89' - a trickle of Zairians came into South 
Africa; (2) 1990 - the ending of one party rule in Zaire, but political instability and the 
Massacre of Lubumbashi prompts a number of students to flee to South Africa. Some of 
the middle-class business and professionals begin to arrive; (3) 1991 - widespread 
political turmoil precipitated a socio-economic meltdown. Business companies closed 
and European and American embassies stopped issuing visas to Zairians. This signalled 
the first real wave of Zairians to South Africa; (4) 1992 - a lull in emigration to South 
Africa, while the outcome of the election of Etienne Tshisekedi as Prime Minster takes 
shape. (5) 1993 - Zaire plunges into chaos and a flood of Zairians/Congolese arrives in 
South Africa. However, this concerns only the Congolese immigrants, and has less 
relevance in trying to understand the waves of migration as a whole, than specifically 
with the Congolese. Bouillon (2001) takes a different perspective, and focussing on 
francophone Africa as a whole, argues that there were three waves or periods of 
emigration to South Africa from the francophone countries. The first wave was 
dominated by former Zairian political elites, businessmen and professionals such as 
engineers, medical doctors, academics, teachers and other professionals. Other such 
professionals also came from anglophone countries such as Uganda and Nigeria Many 
found jobs in business corporations and universities. Soon they were joined by a similar 
groupings of people from Rwanda, Ivory Coast and Gabon. Although there was a policy 
of academic boycotts and sanctions against the apartheid regime, these elites were 
welcomed and were muted in their criticism of government policies at the time. 
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The second wave began as soon as the transition to democracy was established in South 
Africa. It also occurred at a time when other African countries tried to institute 
democratic reforms. However, worsening economic conditions, and massive political 
instability soon saw many of the middle classes migrating towards South Africa. While 
many saw South Africa as a beacon of hope and stability, it was also the case that many 
found it increasingly difficult to gain access to European countries because of the 
tightening of immigration laws. This period was also dominated by the elite and middle 
class of former Zaire. Nigerians were also part of this wave, initially mainly academics, 
and later other professionals and entrepreneurs arrived. In the late 1980s and early 1990s 
it was easier for Nigerians and Zaireans (now DRC Congolese) to enter South Africa 
(Morris, 2001: 71). The South African government in order to stem the tide of Zaireans 
began to increase the visa application payments from $1 000 in 1993 to $2 000 in 1996. 
However, the lucrative diamond, cobalt and copper trade ensured that there were always 
some Zairians who could afford such hefty visa payments. As political and economic 
conditions began to worsen in countries such as Rwanda, Burundi, Somalia, Ivory Coast, 
and others countries the first waves of refugees and asylum seekers began to filter 
through. This represented the third wave of African continental immigration into South 
Africa. This third wave also found another grouping: those working class or peasant 
background, with modest incomes, many of them informal traders who saw in South 
Africa a possible land of greater or new economic opportunities. 
What then were the reasons for this migration? Bouillon (2001: 45-46) offers five 
reasons: (1) to pursue their studies, which in their own countries had been disrupted, or 
could not be furthered due to disruptions and civil war; (2) to escape the political and 
economic instability, particularly in countries such as Burundi, Rwanda and the former 
Zaire; (3) to seek employment or better trading opportunities - professionals sought 
employment, and the less educated and entrepreneurial types sought trading 
opportunities; (4) to explore new opportunities - as part of a globalised economy many 
saw South Africa as part of a widening scope of opportunities; and fmally (5) others left 
to follow their families, or were forced to leave by their families to join husbands, or 
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siblings or other kin. In the case of Nigerians, three major reasons are given for coming to 
South Africa. These are lack of job opportunities in their home country, the desire to 
continue or pursue additional studies, and their fear of political persecution (Morris, 
2001: 71 ) 
The choice of South Africa for francophones ' migration is, at first, surprising, given the 
language difficulties. According to Guyevu (2002: 183), language differences did not 
deter migration from francophone countries. However a number of reasons have been 
offered for this francophone immigration and migration to South Africa. For many it was 
not their first, but rather a second or third choice of destination. Kadima's research shows 
that for more than three quarters of the Congolese, Europe or America would have been 
their first choice but they were unable to emigrate because of the difficulties in getting 
entry, or being refused entry, or that it was fmancially impossible (2001: 96). South 
Africa was closer and cheaper, and its border were much more open than ' fortress 
Europe' . Others made a conscious choice of South Africa, in part because of the 
opportunities it represented, and as part of a solidarity exercise. South Africa was, and in 
many respects is still held as the example of the way out of Africa's quagmire of despotic 
regimes and economic mismanagement. A third reason for choosing South Africa is 
because it represents the land of opportunity - the 'new Eldorado' as Bouillon puts it 
(2002: 47) - for economic and trading opportunities, as well as education and 
employment opportunities for the middle class professionals and businessmen. Some saw 
it as a land to which to extend their continental and global trade networks, both legal and 
illegal. 
While these choices were being made, very few knew what the real South Africa was 
like, and although many, especially refugees, are grateful for the chance to re-build their 
lives or expand their opportunities professionally and economically, most would probably 
not want to reside permanently in this country. Unlike other countries, refugees and 
asylum seekers are not confmed to camps, but are free to fmd employment or work for 
themselves. While this does give them a sense of freedom of movement, in reality it is 
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very difficult to do so because they do not have a thirteen-digit identity number to enable 
them to be registered as a work seeker, or take up any employment offered. 
Although I have outlined above the tough social and political context in South Africa in 
which these francophone migrants inserted themselves, as well as the difficult economic 
conditions that prevails in South African economy, the kinds of work that many of these 
migrants engage in must also be distinguished: the elite and upper middle class 
migrants/immigrants, the middle class and working class/peasant migrants (see Bouillon 
2001: 36-44) for a discussion on the class components of continental immigration to 
South Africa). This is necessary because the strategies for making a living are different, 
and the focus of this thesis is more on those from working class and peasant backgrounds, 
than the elite and middle classes. Nevertheless it is important to describe and analyse the 
range of economic activities related to both the circumstances and income and class 
position that these immigrants came from or found themselves in. 
Kadima (2001:99-100) has shown that a group of professional managers and business 
men from Zaire were able to fmd work easily in South Africa as the link between South 
African businesses and their counter-parts in the francophone world. Thus they were able 
to assist South African companies' entry into African markets, and according to him, 
assist 'with the aim of investing and/or opening up new markets' in Southern, Central and 
East Africa within which 250 million people live. These francophones were able in tum 
later to work as export consultants on their own or set up their own import-export 
companies (Kadima, 2001: 100). While the well connected political elite and upper 
middle classes that fled places like Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo) were able 
to easily insert themselves into the South African economy by setting up businesses or as 
professionals, including buying upmarket lUXUry apartments and residences in the 
suburbs (Bouillon, 2001: 48-50), others such as the refugees from the Great Lakes area 
and places such as Somalia
3
, did not have these options. For many of them, even though 
well educated and professionals such as teachers, nurses, administrators, economists etc, 
hadlhave a more difficult time in finding employment. For many of them they have had 
3 Somalia is not a francophone country, but is mentioned here because, like in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, a civil war produced a flood of refugees. 
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to resort to street trading, trading in t1eamarkets, and for the more entrepreneurial import-
export businesses linked to their country of origin. 
Those that were more entrepreneurial found that they could act as informal middle men 
between Angolan or Congolese business men and South African business leaders, acting 
as translators, interpreters and purchasing and sales managers. This necessitated in many 
instances developing a network of friends in the business world. A point worth noting, in 
the light of the critique above of attempts to enumerate immigrants, legal or otherwise, is 
that the researcher Kadima, himself a Congolese, found it difficult to obtain information 
relating to issues of profitability of Congolese businesses, or the precise details of 
business transactions. As he states: 
The entrepreneurs became suspicious when asked questions relating to the 
profitability of their businesses. Some suspected that the interviewer was 
undertaking preliminary research to enter the same business, whereas others 
feared that the information given could be used against them" (2001: 102). 
This is to be expected, but it did indicate not only the fearfulness of immigrants about 
what information is given, how it may be used, and against whom, but that business 
transactions with the rest of Africa are more than likely to be undocumented and under-
reported. 
Those who engaged in street trading, or the informal sector, out of necessity did not fmd 
it difficult to adapt. Kadima reports that 70% of the Congo economy already was 
informal, and therefore was familiar to the Congolese in South Africa (2001: 100). But 
the informal sector in Congo is probably qualitatively different from South Africa. 
However, what is necessary to understand is that there are different categories of people 
involved in these activities. Firstly, there are those involved in the import-export 
business, but who carry out their market selling activities on the streets and t1eamarkets 
of Johannesburg. Many of these people were not traders per se, but through 
circumstances became street traders. They come, according to Kadima, from a number of 
different professional fields such as mathematics, engineering, accountancy, and pilots 
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(2001: 102). The type of goods they import and sell on the streets are malachite, wooden 
crafts, curios, and Congolese clothing, all of which is obtained by 'wholesalers' who 
import directly by air-freighting the goods which necessitates customs duties and ground 
transport. These are then sold to retailers, for cash or credit, before being sold on the 
street. There are also those who import cloth, West African textiles and clothes. This 
often means partnerships with other francophone immigrants from Senegal, Cote 
d'Ivoire, Mali or Ghana, and the designers in those respective countries. These Congolese 
also export South African manufactured goods such as cosmetics, textiles, electronic and 
food products to the Congo, as well as other central African countries. The second 
category of street traders are asylum seekers and students who during and after the civil 
war in the Congo ran into financial difficulties. Congolese students whose income from 
the DRC had been cut off have come to depend on these very informal economic 
activities to pay their university fees, and sustain their families (Kadima, 2001: 103). For 
asylum seekers and refugees working in the informal economy is their only means of 
earning a livelihood. However it did necessitate developing a network of traders, often 
through friends and relatives, to provide the initial advice and start-up capital. The type of 
goods sold range from imported artefacts from Congo or West Africa, such as malachite, 
curios and textiles, made up West African garments to hand bags, belts, and shoes. There 
is also a growing number who import clothing from south-east Asia and sell them in 
fleamarkets, neighbouring townships and smaller towns outside Johannesburg. However, 
unlike the Congolese elite, their residential and living conditions were/are confined to the 
densely populated inner cities, partly to find protection and security from the hostility of 
locals and officials, and partly because of easy access to their trading places in the city. In 
Johannesburg this means living in places such as Hillbrow, Bertrams, Berea and to a 
lesser extent Yeoville. For many in this strata of migrants such conditions represented a 
downward mobility. Yet Kadima's work shows that many Congolese who start modestly 
become successful at their business, and provide employment for at least two additional 
persons (2001: 107). But at the same time their success, despite the lack of state support 
for small, micro and medium enterprises of immigrants, attracts the hostility of local 
traders who accuse them of using unfair and illegal practices (2001: 105). 
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Yet not every Congolese informal trader or immigrant is a success story. For some this 
downward mobility (compared to their status in the DRC) means that survival translates 
into dependence and sharing of resources with family and friends, and living in cramped 
conditions at subsistence levels of comfort. This point of sharing resources shall be 
examined in detail as it applies to the Malawians who are the main group of migrants 
researched for the purposes in this thesis. The third broad category of immigration has 
been from the working and peasant classes of countries such as Senegal, Mali and 
Malawi. Here one needs to distinguish between the professional traders, whose informal 
trading is a network based on import-export business across the continent and globally, 
and those who are small traders but who sell goods on the street and fleamarkets, reliant 
on local wholesalers to purchase the goods they sell, in order to make a living. Both 
groups remit money in dollars, or euros (in the past, francs) to their families back home. 
As far as educational levels are concerned, this can range from university graduates and 
professionals to illiterate peasants who are sent by their families to earn money. Both 
these groupings are represented by the Senegalese, and to lesser extent the Malawians. 
For the 'professional' international street traders among the Senegalese they have an 
extended global network based on the Muslim Mouride brotherhood. These traders have 
a double status of being traders and international migrants (Bredeloup, 1995 :21). The 
Senegalese single subsistence trader on the street also has access to the Mouride 
brotherhood, expressed through a community network known as the dahira, (or di 'ira) 
and which in its local context, such as in Durban, Johannesburg, or Cape Town provides 
a place to meet, for prayer and the collections of funds to provide for emergency 
assistance to any member. For the Malawians, the distinction between professional 
international traders and the subsistence trader is less clear, but nevertheless there are 
these basic categories. There is also an additional category that includes those who seek 
and find formal employment in South Africa in vast range of occupations ranging from 
gardening to factory floor worker, from shop assistants to tailors and mechanics. These 
are foreign migrants who seek and find employment (as employees in many cases), rather 
than as entrepreneurs as was described above for the Congolese and Senegalese. A case 
study of foreign migrants in the construction, hotel, catering, retail and domestic sectors 
will be described later. 
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However there are Malawian and Senegalese traders' and entrepreneurs' economIC 
activities which would be classified as informal, e.g. street and fleamarket traders, 
informal retailers, wholesalers, motor mechanics and tailors. The range of educational 
levels among the Malawians tends to be less or lower than the Senegalese. In the 
following chapters greater details on the Malawians will be outlined. In both the cases of 
the Senegalese and Malawians there are those, who despite the problems of xenophobia, 
hostility and intolerance, and associated problems of fmding employment and living 
spaces, are beginning to see their stay in South Africa as more long term, perhaps even 
permanent rather than transitory, short term, or temporary and is evidenced in the case of 
the Senegalese by the purchase of a house to establish a permanent base for the dihira, 
the beginning of establishing formal business premises. Some have began to marry local 
women. In the case of the Malawians setting up businesses, acquiring property and 
marrying local women are indicators that migrancy can turn out to be permanent 
residency. In short, rather than seeing the hostility as an insurmountable problem, for 
some immigrants/ migrants, ways have been found to overcome such problems and still 
make a more than comfortable living (though this is not to underplay their problems of 
racism, xenophobia and outright hostility from South Africans towards them, and their 
associated problems of insertion and assimilation into South African society). 
For all African immigrant! migrant groups in Johannesburg the importance of trading 
cannot be underestimated. In a study done by Rogerson of immigrant entrepreneurs in 
Johannesburg in 1996-67 it was found that they contributed 'to the revitalisation of the 
declining economy of the city centre' and consider Johannesburg a city 'full of 
opportunities and appropriate for doing business' (Rogerson, 1997: 9). Between 
November 1996 and February 1997 seventy immigrants involved in informal trade in 
central Johannesburg were interviewed. They came from the following countries: Mali, 
DRC (Zaire), Senegal, Guinea, Congo, Cameroon, Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, Gambia and 
Uganda, and their main trading or business activities centre around 'the production or 
retailing of clothes and curios, motor-car repairs and panel beating, the selling of 
specialist foods [usually to their own national or ethnic groups] running restaurants, 
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hairdressing salons and import-export enterprises' (1997: 19). The following points are 
worthy of consideration, especially in the light of accusations that they take away jobs 
and are a drain on the social services of the county. 
1. They have a high level of education - 50% of the sample have tertiary education 
(1997: 7, 11). 
2. They are connected and are inserted in a widespread international network, which 
assists in starting and maintaining their businesses and shapes their business 
strategies both in Africa and beyond (1997: 13). 
3. 60% of them brought their initial capital with them, and some from working as 
employees within South Africa (1997: 12). 
4. Some were already established entrepreneurs, both in their own countries and in 
South Africa (1997: 2). 
5. They exploit niche markets, including their own ethnic markets (main markets 
being black and white South African markets and tourists) (1997: 11). 
6. They employ on average 4 persons, half of whom are South African (1997: 14-15) 
7. Most of their profits are re-invested with only about a quarter being remitted. 
(1997: 17). 
Rogerson makes the point that the study also highlights differences in those that come 
from the SADC countries and those from the non-SADC countries. The differences he 
notes are: 
1. Businesses operated by non-SADC migrants are integrated into and supported by 
an international migrant network. In this they mimic multi-national corporations. 
SADC migrants tend to operate independently. 
2. SADC migrants have smaller, less well capitalised operations compared to their 
non-SADC counterparts 
3. The non-SADC businesses, particularly francophones, capitalise on 'ethnic 
business' - i.e. trading in goods that are targeted to specific national or ethnic 
groups. 
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4. The non-SADC entrepreneurs have higher educational qualifications than those 
from the SADC countries, and considerably 'wider horizons' in their business 
development strategies. (1997: 10-11). 
The question of differences in terms of place of employment and the type or sector that 
foreign migrant workers find themselves in is explored in two studies as reported below, 
that of Reitzes (1998) and Geyevu (2001). 
4.6 FOREIGN MIGRANTS AND FORMAL WORK 
Reitzes (1998) has undertaken an industrial sectoral study of migrants and immigrant 
workers namely in the construction, hotel, restaurant, domestic and retail sectors in North 
West province and Gauteng provinces. This study is important for a number of reasons: 
• Firstly, it investigates foreign immigrants and migrants beyond the urban 
metropolitan city centres, and in sectors where foreign African immigrants tend to 
be employees, rather than the self-employed urban entrepreneurs as is the case in 
many of the studies presented above in Morris' and Bouillon's book (2001) and 
that of Rogerson (1997) These are also sectors that migrants, immigrants and 
guest workers are likely to enter in many of the countries in Europe. 
• Secondly, it was undertaken to 'shed light on foreign migrants" reasons for 
choosing particular economic activities, and the extent to which such 'choices 
were determined by their skills and experience and their ability to manage 
particular work environments' (Reitzes, 1998: 5). 
• Thirdly, the study tests the of ease of entry into these sectors. 
• Fourthly, it investigates the kind of workplace relations that might exist between 
locals and the foreign migrants and immigrants. 
It should be noted that the kind of economic activities that immigrants /migrants are 
involved in the city centre of Johannesburg, and those that Reitzes investigates are not the 
only sectors where foreign immigrants and migrants may be found. But as Reitzes' study 
is not a scientific sampling of the selected industrial sectors, it cannot be claimed as a 
representative sample of all industrial sectors, or of these specific sectors. However it 
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must be noted that such qualitative studies such as Reitzes' and others are important 
because they illustrate the issues that face migrants, albeit, in different contexts and 
sectors of the economy which cannot be gained from sampling procedures for the same 
reasons already outlined in chapter two and above. 
In Reitzes' study 83 migrants were interviewed, 50 in Gauteng and 33 in North West. 
They came from a wide range of countries in Africa: Mozambique (32), Lesotho (6), 
Ethiopia (5), Botswana (11), Zimbabwe (8), Togo (3), Zambia (3), Zaire (DRC) (2), 
Malawi (5), Comoros (1), Liberia (1), Nigeria (1), Ghana (1), Swaziland (1), Cote 
d'Ivoire (3). Clearly the largest group comes from Mozambique, and their views and 
perspectives dominate the study (1998: 11). My review here will concentrate on the 
construction and hotel and catering sectors. The retail sectors seems to reflect very much 
the same trends and issues covered by Morris and Bouillon (2001) and Rogerson (1997), 
that many are self-employed entrepreneurs. The domestic sector is reviewed briefly 
below in the context of women migrants. 
The profiles of the migrants indicate that they mostly men and are aged between 20 and 
40 (1998: 12). Although most of the respondents arrived in the 1990s, Reitzes comments 
that a closer examination of the patterns of arrival indicate some differences. 
• Firstly, three quarters of those who are in Gauteng arrived after 1990, with a little 
over half in the North West province. This indicates a longer historical and 
significant cross-border migration in the North West province, largely because of 
the mines employing foreign migrants. (Reitzes, 1998: 15) 
• Secondly, when separated between the SADC countries and non-SADC countries, 
most migrants from the latter countries arrived after 1995, which confirms 
Rogerson's earlier findings for foreign immigrant entrepreneurs in Johannesburg 
(1998: 12). 
• A third observation is the presence of women migrants. There often appear to be 
few or no women migrants from the African continent, which suggests 
confirmation of Revenstein's hypothesis that women rarely migrate over long 
distances. There are in fact women migrants, but in Reitzes study these are few 
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and tend to be in the domestic sector (1998: 48; 50). While their status as 
foreigners and women may have been factors in their ease of access to 
employment, it appears that for many of these women this was a conscious choice 
because of the potential free accommodation and food, which predisposed them to 
choosing this sector. This issue of migrants and immigrants choosing a particular 
sector for employment will also be covered in the construction and hotel sectors. 
The construction industry seems to be relatively easy to enter for migrants, and tends to 
be dominated by Mozambicans, although there were also migrants from Botswana, 
Malawi, Zimbabwe and Togo (Reitzes, 1998: 35 and 42). The sector is dominated by 
SADC migrants. Although their educational qualifications ranged widely from illiterate 
to degrees and diplomas in engineering and building science, most tend to have lower 
qualifications such as primary and high school. This finding is not dissimilar from 
Malawians as will be seen in the next chapter. In short "levels of education did not 
correlate with skills". For example a 42 year-old Mozambican, although illiterate, works 
in the informal sector as a self-trained builder, while on the other end of the scale there is 
a chemical engineer trained in Germany who plies his building and construction skills in 
South Africa because there is steady supply of work earning a mere Rl 000 per month. 
(1998: 36). They have multiple skills learnt on the job, and perform a variety of tasks 
such as plastering, roofing, paving, rough-casting, painting, and bricklaying. Some 
perform specialised tasks such as electrical work, welding and plumbing. (1998: 36). 
Many claim that they are taxed, although some say they have no deductions from their 
salaries. A few contribute to a pension fund, but by far the most common complaint is 
that they do not know if they are taxed or what benefits they enjoy, if any at all. 
The reasons offered for being in this sector is that it offers a range of advantages, some of 
which relates to them being undocumented migrants and illegal workers. 
• There are low entry requirements: basically unskilled labour is needed for work 
such as sweeping, passing bricks, mixing cement, but additional skills can be 
learnt on the jobs. 
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• Accommodation is usually provided free on building sites in toolsheds, or semi-
completed buildings (1998: 37). 
• Such accommodation also 
o Provides a measure of protection because they do not have to interact with 
local citizens, or contend with harassment from state officials (1998: 37). 
o They feel protected from the rampant crime. (1998: 37). 
o As many are employed by the same contractor, they can speak in their 
own language, thus avoiding detection by locals as foreigners (1998: 37). 
• There is a network of contacts to inform about jobs and to recruit new employees. 
This applies particularly among Mozambicans, whose network of contacts 
provides a stream of information on employment prospects (1998: 38). 
• For those in the informal sectors of the construction industry, they have learnt to 
manipulate rules and loopholes in the construction industry regulations to 
undertake a variety of small but productive building related jobs because of the 
housing shortages and the ability to give lower quotations. (1998: 38). 
• There are opportunities for self-employment once the necessary skills have been 
learnt. At the very least, especially for those in formal employment, there is the 
opportunity to be informally employed doing odd jobs on weekends and holidays. 
• The short-term nature of the building contracts enabled them to return home more 
often than if it was a 12 month contract with a mining company. 
Given these reasons for entry into the construction industry, Reitzes (1998: 42) comments 
that foreign workers have a relative advantage over local workers in the construction 
industry, because of their more vulnerable status, and the perception that they are more 
hardworking (or exploitable). However it is precisely the difficulty to regulate short-term 
contract work in the construction industry that makes it insecure and exploitative for all 
workers. The presence of foreign workers precipitates a downward spiral on wages: 'their 
wages further depresses already poor conditions and wages, resulting in ever-increasing 
low wage competition'. Thus employers can draw from an ever widening pool of 
unemployed and undocumented workers who are prepared to accept the low wages and 
poor working conditions. While South Africans may not accept such conditions, it does 
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not displace them from jobs in the construction industry. This particular set of 
circumstance also places in context the foreign-migrant interaction. A close reading of 
Reitzes work shows the interaction to be varied, from outright hostility to friendly and 
co-operative relations. However, much of the employment in this sector appears to 
depend on two contrasting images. One is that South African employees are 'arrogrant, 
lazy and pompous' in contrast to Mozambicans who are perceived by employers (and to 
an extent by Mozambicans themselves) to have a better work ethic than the locals (1998: 
39; 41). Secondly, South African employers are in general harsh, abusive to all, 
foreigners and local labourers alike, but especially to immigrants. A common complaint 
seems to be that they do not pay wages on time, and not always the correct amount. This 
unfair treatment is sometimes deflected by locals towards the foreign migrant workers as 
if it is, or was their fault that employers do not pay wages on time. However foreign 
workers are willing to do almost any work for some money, and hence have easier access 
to jobs in construction industry. 
In the hotel, restaurant and catering sector the entry level skills are low, which is the 
reason many of the foreign workers gave for joining this sector. Some claimed that the 
free meals and tips were also an incentive to enter the industry. Another reason given was 
that many had experience of this sector in their own country which predisposed them to 
enter this industry (1998: 44-5, 47). Again, in terms of the sample of respondents, it is 
dominated by foreign migrant workers from the SADC countries (1998; 44, 46). Those 
who came from non-SADC countries were better educated and at least one person, an 
Ethiopian women with a teacher's diploma entered the sector for entrepreneurial reasons, 
claiming to make a gross earning ofR14 000 per month (1998: 45; 48). However skills 
and training varied from having a diploma in teaching to having no education. The varied 
educational backgrounds did not correspond to their mUltiple jobs as waiters, cooks, 
dishwashers and barmen in the formal sector (1998: 45). Very few of Reitzes' 
respondents ran their own catering businesses (1998: 45). As with the construction 
industry foreigners, particularly Mozambicans, tend to be recruited via networks (1998: 
45). 
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It seems that those formally employed in this sector had greater security as far as regular 
payment of salaries and wages is concerned, and were taxed. From their earnings they 
remitted as little as R300 to as much as Rl 000 a month. Most claimed that the social 
relationships with South Africans were cordial, although any hostility seemed more racist 
than xenophobic (1998: 46, 48). However there was the often repeated comment that 
South African are not as dedicated to their work in comparison to foreign workers. 
Reitzes' study is important for it gives an important insight into the kind of skills that 
foreign migrants have, their reasons for entering specific industrial sectors, and the 
implications this might have for the industry. It also makes important distinctions 
between SADC and Non-SADC foreign migrants. The following points are important to 
note: 
1. Non-SADC migrants seem to have higher educational levels than migrants from 
SADC countries. 
2. The construction, hotel, catering and domestic sectors where most SADC 
migrants are found to have a low skill entry requirement. 
3. Experience and acquiring of skills is an attractive incentive to enter these sectors 
of the economy. 
4. Acquiring skills means that migrants have flexibility in finding work, and can 
work in both formal and informal sectors. 
5. Although poorly paid, there is remittance of a portion of wages or profits of all 
foreign migrants to their home countries. This contradicts the commonly held 
notion that all revenue is remitted, thus draining the local economy. 
6. Recruitment through networks is prevalent in the construction, hotel, catering and 
restaurant sectors. 
7. Some respondents have deliberately chosen these sectors either because they have 
the skills, or acquired the skills, or feel that they can exploit a niche market. 
8. Many, especially those from non-SADC countries seem to be overqualified for 
the jobs that they do. 
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9. Non-SADC migrants tend to want to invest in entrepreneurial activities, rather 
than simply work as employees. Such investments may create employment for 
local people, or least, much needed economic activity. 
10. Not all foreign migrants are low skilled, low wage workers. Some are highly 
qualified but fail to find jobs. 
11. The presence of foreign migrant workers in industries such as construction does 
tend to depress wages, but is probably a consequence of the way the industry is 
organised to accept low skilled, poor educated exploitable workers. (Reitzes, 
1998: 55-6). 
Geyevu (2001) has undertaken research on migrants in four urban areas, namely Umtata, 
Durban, Johannesburg and Cape Town. This research was based on interviewing 20 
migrants from Mozambique and Zimbabwe, and 10 each from Ghana, Nigeria, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Swaziland and Senegal. (n=100). Although his main 
focus was on questions of push-pull factors, xenophobia, and policy implications, it 
contains useful information on what migrants actually do when they arrive and take steps 
to meet their subsistence needs. 
The basic profile of the immigrants and migrants in Geyevu's sample is as follows: 
1. Most of the migrants, some 85%, are between the ages of 15 and 34 years, and are 
mostly male (85%) (2002: 152). 
2. There is more or less equal distribution of those with a matric and below 
qualification (53%, although 8% have not complete their high school education), 
and those with a technical diploma (47%). (It is not clear whether this is a post-
high school diploma). No one in the sample has a university degree. Geyevu does 
indicate that West African migrants had a higher level of education than those 
from Southern Africa. However he includes Congolese in his Southern African 
subset, which as shown above have not only different economic or political 
reasons for being in South Africa, but also higher levels of education than those 
from other SADC countries. (2001: 154-156; 181-182) 
"T 0 5 ~J 2 5 4 
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3. 49% arrived in the post 1994 period, while others (51 %) arrived in South Africa 
at varying dates in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
4. Most of the respondents (60%) arrived by road through Zimbabwe, Mozambique 
and Botswana. (2001: 149), with up to 75% travelling in groups, while the 
balance (25%) making individual journeys. Other modes of transport to South 
Africa were by air and sea (2001: 158-9). 
5. Local associations of their country folk do assist in finding jobs, providing 
financial assistance to start businesses, and ways of protecting themselves from 
arrest by police (2001: 156). 
6. The main reasons for migrating to South Africa were given as follows: 60% 
economic, 22% political, 10% economic and political and having a tourist visa, 
8%. The exact kind of economic or political reasons are not given by Guyevu. 
7. 75% of the respondents indicated that they do not wish to stay in South Africa 
41 % indicated that they would prefer to be in some other place in Europe or 
America (2001: 161). This confirms the fmdings of Kadima that for many 
Congolese South Africa is a staging post to other countries, especially Europe and 
America. 
8. As far as employment is concerned, Geyevu reports that 83% of them are self-
employed, while the remaining 17% are employed in the security industry as 
security guards or officers (2001: 166). The following are the types of self-
employed occupations they are involved in: trading in leather goods - watch 
straps, belts, leather shoes (25%); cobbler - shoe repairs (18%); hawking fruit and 
vegetables (15%); barbering (13%); trading in artefacts (10%); sewing (7%) and 
hairdressing (4%). Guyevu makes the point that these are not occupations in 
which most self-employed South African informal traders are involved, [except 
hawking and trade in various kinds of artefacts] and are those for which 
immigrants nor migrants are quite likely to have been (2001: 167). 
Guyevu's work is useful in that it underscores many of the points made by other cases 
studies reviewed in this chapter. However the presentation of his data does not often 
distinguish between SADC and non-SADC countries, or between francophones and 
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anglophones, points which are highlighted in both Morris' and Bouillon's collection on 
francophone immigrants, and in Reitzes' work on migrants in the different sectors of the 
economy. He also does not distinguish between the category of migrant and immigrant. 
These differences and distinction are important because it informs the movements, 
strategies and practices adopted by migrants and immigrants to make a living in South 
Africa. 
4.7 CONCLUSION 
This chapter began with a critical review of the value of quantifying undocumented 
immigrants and migrants. The historical meaning of a migrant as a rural based eleven-
month contract worker in the mining or manufacturing sector with few or no rights was 
shown to be inadequate to describe the new patterns of migration from African countries 
to South Africa. Attempts to quantify the 'problem', it was argued, are misplaced, and 
accentuate a misleading debate on who is legally or illegally in the country, without 
attempting to understand the underlining reasons for migration from African countries to 
South Africa Indeed the debate exacerbates racism and xenophobia, rather than 
contributing to an understanding of the problem. It was shown that there is a huge gap 
between estimates of undocumented immigrants and official statistics on legal 
immigrants, and that it is impossible to bridge this gap by technically dubious research 
techniques at quantifying the problem. Rather, it has been argued, the focus should be on 
why, how and what migrants and immigrants do when they come to themselves in the 
economy and South African society. 
It was also shown that foreign African immigrants and migrants are not a homogenous 
category of people. Not only do they come from different countries, but may also be 
distinguished by income, language, and region of origin such as francophone, 
anglophone, non-SADC, SADC, West African, Southern African, as well as by their 
occupational training, educational levels and actual work experiences, and place of work. 
Foreign migrants are traders (global and local), entrepreneurs, professionals, students, 
and employees in formal and informal businesses, and are found in a variety of different 
sectors of the economy. An obvious distinction had to be made between legal 
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immigrants who come to work with a view to permanent residency in South Africa and 
migrants who find work in South Africa as a necessity, or as part of a contract of 
employment for specific period of time. These differences also inform the kind of 
strategies and practices employed by immigrants and migrants. It should be noted that for 
some the choice of survival strategy or occupation is largely 'structured' in terms of 
networks bringing into the market friends and relatives, as well limitations on possible 
jobs that are available, some migrants making deliberate choices as to which sector to 
fmd employment. This is not just for income reasons, but also to learn and train for a 
variety of skills, which give greater flexibility to their future options within South Africa, 
in their own country, or other countries. 
While these differences are important to consider in terms of why, how and what 
migrants do in South Africa, it is also important to outline what are their general 
characteristics. Most of the migrants are within the age category of 15 to 35 years and are 
(or desire to be) economically active. Many have found their jobs, or initial work, 
through a network of family and friends, or through their local associations. These 
networks and associations also provide the initial start-up capital, when necessary, for a 
migrant to enter into street trading. Many foreign migrants are well educated, although 
non-SADC migrants and immigrants tend to be better educated than SADC migrants. 
However, education levels range from university degrees to illiteracy. Furthermore, in 
practice their training and professional occupational status may not match actual work or 
occupation. 
Depending on their work situation and income earned nearly all migrants send 
remittances back home. Contrary to popular perception this is not a removal of a 
substantial portion of income and hence vast sums of foreign exchange from the 
economy. One main reason for sending remittances is to support a family back home, but 
other reasons are to raise sufficient capital to start their own enterprises in their own 
countries. Working and learning different skills also enables them put into practice these 
skills in their own country. Also contrary to popular belief, most migrants are not a drain 
on society. They support themselves, and indeed many a foreign migrant trader or 
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entrepreneur on the street actually employs some local people. However, in those sectors 
such as construction where they are employees, rather than self-employed, they are easily 
exploited, and do push down wages. As it was shown, this is a result of the way the 
construction industry is structured, rather than simply an issue of super-exploitable 
foreign migrants who will work for any kind of money. 
In general it was shown through a review of the literature that foreign migrants make a 
contribution by their participation in the economy and society of South Africa, and in fact 
are not a drain on the resources of the country. Yet it is clear that the immigration system 
discriminates not just against those with few skills and educational qualifications but also 
those who have advanced skills. But many migrants, such as the Mozambicans in the 
construction industry, have been able through a variety of means to acquire the 
experience and skills to apply in niche markets, and in the process support both 
themselves and their families. Although many face the problems of xenophobia, and 
constraints to operating a formal business, or being employed formally, they have not 
allowed it to become a deterrent to making a livelihood. However it is clear that as 
refugees and as undocumented migrants many would not qualify for permanent 
residence, and eventually formal citizenship. 
In the next chapter many of these characteristics will be explored more fully with 
reference to a Southern African Development Community of migrants, namely 
Malawians. While these Malawians, as it will be seen, have many similarities with the 
migrants studied by Reitzes, Geyevu, Bouillon, Rogerson and others, there are also 
differences. Malawians have a longer history of contact with South Africa, and their 
networks are more deeply rooted, or have become resuscitated in a more active way since 
the early 19908 in the wake of the transition and easier entry into the country. In the main 
they are not to be found in the construction industry, and very few trade visibly on the 
street as informal traders. They do, however, work in the retail and services industry 
either as employees, or as entrepreneurs. As they are not refugees, asylum seekers, or 
immigrants, a central platform of their livelihood strategies is to be unobtrusive, to 
remain hidden, but to engage at an economic level and participate through their local 
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connections with local communities and associations in projects of mutual concern. One 
of those associations is with local Muslims. This ambiguity, of being hidden, yet 
connected to public civil society associations, as well as other issues will be explored in 
chapters five and six through a detailed statistically based account of the Malawians, 
providing information on their places of origin, biographical details, their movement and 
insertion into Durban's economy and society, the creation of their livelihood strategies 
through networks and their own efforts, and continuing contacts with Malawi. It will 
illustrate the new pattern of migration that is emerging, that is, transnationalism, but will 
also show some of the differentiation within Malawian migrants. Chapter five and six 
will form the baseline for subsequent chapters which give a richer textured account of the 
way Malawians arrived, insert and participate in Durban and raising important issues 




MIGRATING TO DURBAN: 
A STATISTICAL DESCRIPTION 
Malawians have a long history of migration to South Africa and have contributed 
significantly to its economic and political development. Since the discovery of diamonds, 
Malawians along with other Southern African peoples would walk to find work on the 
diamond mines. One of the more famous of the early Malawian migrant workers was 
Clements Kadalie who started the first mass based African trade union, the Industrial and 
Commercial Workers Union in the 1920s. Later, in the 1960s and 1970s, migrant workers 
from Malawi formed a significant segment of South Africa's mining contract labour 
force, although from 1974 this began to drop, and had virtually ceased by 1988. During 
the years of apartheid the South African state had a very open and friendly relationship 
with Malawi. This long history of association at various levels forms the backdrop for a 
different wave of migration of Malawians into South Africa. Malawians, by their own 
testimony, have easier entry into South Africa than other people from the African 
continent. The other context that forms the backdrop to this migration is the efforts to 
restructure the Malawian economy through structural adjustments programmes through 
the 1980s and 1990s and their effects on the agricultural basis of the economy and 
employment (see Cromwell, 1992; Cromwell and Winpenny, 1993; Ahmed and Lipton, 
1997, New Agriculturalist On-Line, and SARPN). Yet this new wave of migration from 
Malawi is more often hidden than apparent, and it is the specificity of this paradoxical, 
quasi-legal migration, rather than those who are legal immigrants, or who claim asylum 
or refugee status that is the focus in this chapter and in chapter six. 
This chapter will describe these new migrants in one city in South Africa, that is, Durban, 
and highlight some of the important social and economic characteristics of this group. 
Indeed as will become apparent it is a specific group of Malawians, mostly from southern 
106 
Malawi, and from the district of Mangochi in particular. The chapter provides a detailed, 
statistically based account of the Malawians, providing information on their places of 
origin, biographical details, their movements from the villages and towns of Malawi, 
through various other Southern African countries, to Durban. It is interesting that many, 
once they leave Malawi, come to Durban, rather than attempt to settle in the industrial 
heartland of South Africa, Gauteng, where presumably the economic opportunities might 
be greater. The chapter then describes their insertion into Durban's economy and society 
through the creation of livelihood strategies using both their networks and their own 
efforts, finding employment and working as informal traders and entrepreneurs. The 
chapter also gives some indications of the problems they face, and their perspectives on 
continuing contacts with and possibilities of returning to Malawi. It will illustrate the new 
patterns of migration that are emerging, and form the baseline for the subsequent chapters 
giving a more textured account of Malawian participation in Durban's economy and 
society, including that of citizenship identity. 
This research cannot claim that the statistics that are presented here are a representative 
sample of all Malawian migrants. As hinted above, much of this migration is hidden, or if 
not hidden, then at the very least quiet and unobtrusive. This survey of 119 respondents, 
is, as mentioned in chapter two, based on a snowball technique, with respondents located 
spatially. By spatially I mean that interviewing of the migrants was carried out in three 
different locations within the metropolitan boundaries of Durban between December 
1999 and October 2001. These were Mariannhill, the city centre, and Overport. It should 
be noted that as the laws regarding migration were and still are very vigorously 
implemented, and with high levels of xenophobia, it is not surprising that Malawians 
were not keen to be interviewed. The problem of xenophobia has already been illustrated 
in chapter four, and will be alluded to in this, and subsequent chapters. It is mentioned 
here as a problem in obtaining data, requiring the building of trust before the survey 
could be undertaken. For these reasons strict sampling techniques were not possible to 
implement. Although a hundred and nineteen Malawians were interviewed, which apart 
from being spatially dispersed in various parts of the city, yielded results showing a 
variety of characteristics in terms of age, income, educational levels, skills, and 
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occupations. While attempts were made to include as many women as possible, there is a 
preponderance of males, 111, and only 8 women. This may have a built-in male bias, but 
would not be inconsistent with the tendency in patriarchal societies for the males to act as 
household head spokespersons. However from my own observations and interviews I 
conducted, it is also clear that there is a preponderance of male Malawians. 1 Conceived 
as a minimum sample size the survey yields a sufficient basis to limit what Mehan calls 
'the anecdotal quality offield reports' (quoted in Silverman, 1985: 12). The presentation 
of the data in tables and illustrated in graphs in this chapter thus retains the basic material 
on which the analysis proceeds, and avoids what Silverman calls 'the temptation to use 
merely supportive gobbets of information to support the researchers interpretation' 
(1985:17). The interviewing was done face to face in order to achieve a high quality of 
information as opposed to quantity. Thus the survey tried to achieve a degree of 
randomness that would ensure representivity. 
The substance of the chapter has two main sections. Section one begins with a social 
profile of the Malawians, giving details of their place of origins and proceeds to examine 
their biographical details, including their arrival and accommodation strategies. The next 
section proceeds to examine their migratory movements from Malawi to Durban, and 
illustrates the number of migratory moves before arrival in Durban in terms of the 
reasons for each move, and the employment and accommodation practices at each place 
of destination en route to Durban. A distinction is drawn between those who come 
straight to Durban and those who make a number of stops before arriving in Durban. This 
is often referred to as step migration (pamwell, 1993: 13), where a mover arrives at a 
destination after a series of short-term moves to other locations, often moving from 
village to urban centres. However the emphasis here is not just on the moves that are 
made, but the experience this involves, the construction and use of networks, and return 
migration. This experience informs their ability to construct livelihood strategies in 
Durban. In the following chapter (six) the construction of livelihoods, the strategies that 
are pursued, their continued contact and their perspectives on returning to Malawi are 
analysed. 
1 For an analysis of gender and women's migration to South Africa see Dodson, B. (1998) 
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5.2. THE SOCIAL PROFILE OF MALAWIANS 
The social profile of the Malawians is described in tenns of the place of origins, their 
ages, gender (predominantly male), their reasons for migration, how they travelled and if 
they had any travelling companions, their current residence patterns, particularly whether 
they share accommodation with family, relatives and friends. This begins to build a 
picture of the Malawians in tenns of their social networks, and their work activities. In 
the next section the social context of their movements from Malawi to Durban is 
described, showing how current social networks and work activities have been 
influenced, extended, or amended. 
5.2.1. Places of Origin 
The table (5.1) below gives a list of towns and villages from where the 119 respondents 
came from in Malawi. It is very clear that the majority of the migrants interviewed, 66%, 
come from the town and surrounding areas of Mangochi. Mangochi is in the southern 
part of Malawi, on the edge of Lake Malawi. It is not absolutely clear why there is this 
preponderance of people from this area, but it does indicate a probable and significant 
thick and dense network of friends and relatives stretching from Durban to the villages 
and towns of Malawi. Even the next highest numbers of migrants (10%) originates from 
the nearby town of Machinga. There is one other important characteristic that needs to be 
mentioned. People from the Mangochi district, who are mostly from the Yao ethnic 
group, tend to be mostly Muslim. In following the Islamic faith, their religious identity as 
a resource becomes important when unpacked in the context of Durban. This will be 
analysed in chapters seven and eight. For the moment, it is important to note that this is a 
factor in explaining the preponderance of Malawians from southern Malawi in certain 
areas of Durban, and the social networks that evolved. 
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!Table 5.1: Places of Origin 
Place Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Mangochi 79 66.4 66.4 
Machinga 13 10.9 77.3 
Dedza 5 4.2 81.5 
Ntcheu 4 3.4 84.9 
Balaka 4 3.4 88.2 
!Salima 3 2.5 90.8 
Blantyre 3 2.5 93.3 
1Z0mba 2 1.7 95.0 
IChipoka 1 .8 95.8 
Chilipa 1 .8 96.6 
Unknown 1 .8 97.5 
Lilongwe 1 .8 98.3 
Nkhotakota 1 .8 99.2 
Mwanza 1 .8 100.0 
tratal 119 100.0 
In terms of age the greatest number of people who come to South Africa are in the 25-34 
age group (55.5%). 
Table 5.2: Age of MIgrants 
Age Categories in Years Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
15-24 32 26.9 26.9 
25-34 66 55.5 82.4 
35-44 18 15.1 97.5 
45-55 3 2.5 100.0 
Total 119 100.0 
Together with those in the 15-24 age category, this gives the migrants a distinctively 
youthful appearance (82% under the age of 34). This confIrms reports of other 
researchers (e.g. Reitzes, 1998: 10, 12; Peberdy, & Crush, 1998: 15; Geyevu, 2001: 152). 
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5.2.2. Educational Levels 
The educational levels (table 5.3) show that that not one of the migrants has reached 
university entrance level qualification, although 74% have a high school education of 
some sort. 
lTable 5.3: Education Levels 
IStandard/grade Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
~a 1 .S .S 
iNo education 16 13.4 14.3 
jStdO/grade 1/2 1 .S 15.1 
jStd1/grade 3 1 .S 16.0 
~td2lgrade 4 6 5.0 21.0 
jStd3/grade 5 6 5.0 26.1 
~td4/grade 6 S 6.7 32.S 
jStd5/grade 7 S 6.7 39.5 
jStd6/grade S 14 11.S 51 .3 
jStd7grade 9 12 10.1 61.3 
jStdS/grade 10 46 3S.7 100.0 
rrotal 119 100.0 
Basically it means that, barring those with no education and a basic standard 1-2 (grades 
1-4) education, they can all read and write in English. It also means that for a large 
number of them it is possible, and indeed probable, that they have the ability to do some 
kind of post-high school diploma, or basic technical training. 
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Figure 5.1. Levels of Education 
50 ~ ______________________ ~~-; . n/a 
.no edu 
o stdO/grade 1 
Dstd1/grade 3 
• std2lgrade 4 
o std3/grade 5 
• std4lgrade 6 
o std5/grade 7 
• std6/grade S 
• std7grade 9 
o stdS/grade 10 
What clearly dominates this bar graph (figure 5.1) is the high percentage of those with 
standard 8 or grade 10 high school education, which means that they are more than 
simply or barely literate and numerate, indicating a grasp of abstract concepts. It should 
be noted however that 13.4% of this sample do not have any education. Lack of 
education is not necessarily an impediment to migration, but quite clearly in this case 
those with less than adequate reading and writing skills are not a dominant feature of this 
sample of respondents. 
5.2.3 Arrival and Insertion in Durban 
The years of arrival for the Malawian migrants reflects the distinctive shift in politics in 
the sub-continent. Malawi begins to experience the effects of structural adjustment, such 
as unemployment, while South Africa moves towards liberation and democracy. 
Table 5.4 below clearly indicates that the majority of Malawian migrants arrived in the 
post-1994 period, the period when 'they came for Mandela'. In the period up to the 
release of former President Nelson Mandela and the beginning of the negotiations only 5 
percent of the respondents had arrived. 
112 
frable 5.4: Year of Arrival 
Years Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
I< - 1989 6 5.0 5.0 
1990-1994 23 19.3 24.4 
1995-1999 77 64.7 89.1 
12000- > 13 10.9 100.0 
lTotal 119 100.0 
This picks up rapidly in the period 1990 to 1994 when 19% arrive, and the following five 
years when 64% of the respondents undertake the long migration route from Malawi to 
Durban. It is interesting to note that official immigration from Malawi to South Africa in 
2001 was 33 persons (see table 4.3, chapter 4: 82), or just over 2% of all continental 
African immigration. Contrast this with my research data: 13 migrants (10% of the 
sample) arrived in 2000, and 77 (65%) between 1995 and 1999 - approximately 13 for 
each year. 
Table 5.5: Transport to Durban 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Bus 35 29.4 29.4 
Bus, taxi 27 22.7 52.1 
Bus, taxi, private car 1 .8 52.9 
Bus, taxi, train 2 1.7 54.6 
Bus, train 1 .8 55.5 
Private car 50 42.0 97.5 
Taxi 1 .8 98.3 
Truck 1 .8 99.2 
Truck, taxi 1 .8 100.0 
Total 119 100.0 
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The most used forms of transport between Malawi and South Africa are the hire of 
private cars, the bus, or taxi, or in some cases a combination of these. There are number 
of points to bear in mind about these figures. Firstly, 42% of the respondents hired a 
private car - an informal taxi - to transport them from Malawi to Durban. This is the 
most efficient way to travel. Unfortunately, it was difficult to obtain information on how 
direct such a trip was, and how much such a trip would cost. However, one informant 
said that between R500 and R600 was the usual charge. Each private car would take four 
or five people. Secondly, given the demand for transport to Durban, this was a business 
enterprise for some of the drivers/car owners, albeit an informal one. Thirdly, the use ofa 
bus, or buses is a second favourite. Many said they use a bus. In truth there is no direct 
bus from Durban to Malawi. There is a bus that connects Johannesburg to Malawi. For 
some the trip consists of a car ride to Johannesburg, and then a bus to Durban. Public 
transport such as trains are not favoured, especially since the xenophobic murder of 
Senegalese on trains in Johannesburg in 1999. While the murder of the Senegalese was 
not raised specifically in the social survey, at least two key informants mentioned this 
incident in my informal conversations with them as a reason for not using the trains. It is 
not certain how widespread this incident was among the consciousness of the Malawians 
interviewed here. 
Table 5.6: Reasons for Migration 
Reasons Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Business 3 2.5 2.5 
IEmployment 101 84.9 87.4 
!FOllow husband 7 5.9 93.3 
~isit 3 2.5 95.8 
~isit, employment 2 1.6 97.5 
Work, capital to 3 2.5 100.0 
start business 
Total 119 100.0 
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Most Malawians came to Durban for economic reasons, such as to seek work, or work to 
accumulate capital to start their own businesses in Malawi (90%) (see table 5.6 above). 
A few, seven women, migrated because their husbands were already here. This is 
probably an indication that they were going to stay pennanently. As an indicator this is 
only 6%. 
5.2.3.1 Travelling Companions 
Given the high number of people travelling from the same district or town of origin, such 
as Mangochi, it is surprising that most migrants, nearly 77% travelled alone (see table 5.7 
below). 
Table 5.7: Traveling Companions (a) 
Frequency Percent ~umulative Percent 
With companion 27 22.7 22.7 
pther 1 .8 23.5 
Without Companion 91 76.5 100.0 
trotal 119 100.0 
Only 23% travelled with someone they knew. There are a few explanations for this. Some 
of them have already made this trip before, and so it is not an unknown journey for them. 
rrable 5.8: Traveling Companions (b): Friends and Family 
Category of Companion Frequency Percent 
arother 6 21.4 
~ousin 1 3.5 
Father 1 3.5 
Husband 6 21.4 
!Mother 1 3.5 
~ister 1 3.5 
Uncle 1 3.5 
Other family 1 3.5 
lSub-total: Family 18 64.2 
Friends 10 35.7 
Total 28 100 
115 
For others, when questioned closely about the journey, not only were they involved in a 
step migration process, it would seem they received detailed instructions as to how to 
proceed, an indication of the link between migrants in Durban and their families or 
business associates in Malawi. Yet others, while they may not have consciously decided 
on who should be their travelling partners, the other passengers were not unknown, given 
that they were more than likely to be travelling with people from the same district. That 
is, even if they did not know their travelling companions personally, the knowledge of 
family, kinship and friendship links made them less than unknown. For those that did 
travel with some one they knew, the most frequent travelling partner was a family 
relative (64%), followed by friends (35%). (See table 8 above). These represent only 25% 
of the 119 migrants interviewed. 
5.2.3.2 Accommodation Strategies 
Migration from one country to another produces anxiety about a large number of issues: 
crossing borders, obtaining visa or permits, and acceptance into the host society, amongst 
others. One of the most pressing issues that immediately confronts economic migrants is 
not so much whether they will fmd employment, but rather accommodation. Given the 
extensive networks that already exist, this, in theory, should not pose a serious problem 
for the Malawians. It might even be suggested that family and kinship connections playa 
prominent part in securing accommodation. But in table 5.9 below the figures suggest 
that accommodation with friends and kin was only marginally less than 50% (47%) of the 
total sample. It suggests that there is a more or less equal division between being 
accommodated by family and friends and fmding alternative forms of accommodation. 
trable 5.9: Accommodation with Family and Kin 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
iOther (not with friends & relatives) 60 50.4 50.4 
Friends and Relatives 56 47.1 97.5 
nla 3 2.5 100 
Total 119 100.0 
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Malawians seem to have found other ways of accommodating themselves. Qualitative 
evidence does not necessarily contradict this but suggests that initially, in the first few 
days, new arrivals are indeed accommodated by friends, relatives, or someone from the 
district of origin. However, it is very clear that because an additional person who does not 
have an income has to be housed and fed, this can produce a strain on resources, and that 
alternative arrangements have to be made. Accommodation patterns then might vary 
according to when one arrived, and the choices of how to make a living, and hence where 
one eventually decides to stay, as well as whether children or spouses are left behind in 
Malawi. In the next section some of this variability in the process of migrating to Durban 
is presented. Further examples will be presented in chapter seven. 
In table 5.10 below, accommodation with friends and relatives shows a wide variety of 
circumstances and suggests individual combinations of people at a household level and 
family structures in order to maximise resources and sharing of accommodation costs. 
The nuclear family mode accounts for 31 %. Sharing accommodation with members of 
the extended family, including siblings, accounts of 11 % of the sample, and this is 
followed by other arrangements, such as with friends and girl friends (10.8%). 
It should be noted that sharing with a girl friend is almost the same as the co-operative 
nature of a nuclear family. Since I have not investigated the strength of these bonds I 
have treated it separately, and not included it as part of the nuclear family type situation. 
A significant number of 44 migrants, or 37%, did not answer this question. 
For a slim majority of the migrants, their network of family and friends (53%) enabled 
them to find accommodation: 42.5% with family (nuclear and extended) while a further 
10.8% make arrangements with friends and girlfriends. Approximately 47% either live on 
their own, or preferred not to answer the question. This may be because they were fearful 
of divulging information of a confidential and sensitive nature. 
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ifable 5.10. Accommodation with family and friends in Households 
Type of Family and Friends Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Wife 12 10.1 10.1 
~fe, children 17 14.3 24.4 
Husband 3 2.5 26.9 
Husband, children 3 2.5 29.4 
Father 2 1.7 31.1 
[Nuclear family 37 31.1 
iBrother's family 1 .8 31.9 
Brother 6 5.0 36.9 
iBrother, cousin 1 .8 37.7 
!Sister 1 .8 38.5 
!Sister, brother 1 .8 39.3 
~ister, cousin 1 .8 40.1 
~ousin 1 .8 40.9 
Uncle 1 .8 41 .7 
Uncle, aunt, cousins 1 .8 42.5 
Extended family 14 11.4 
Girlfriend, children 1 .8 43.3 
Friends 8 6.7 50 
!Girlfriend 3 2.5 52.5 
pthers 1 .8 53.3 
pther arrangements 13 10.8 
N/a 44 37.0 90.3 
None 11 9.2 99.5 
!fotal 119 100.0 
This is not to say that Malawians do not share accommodation. When asked about 
sharing accommodation almost 60% said they do, and 40% did not (see table 5.11 
below). Sharing accommodation, whether in a family type situation, or with friends is a 
strategy of survival in that the costs of accommodation are brought down. All families 
(husband, wife, children and close kin) do not necessarily consider living in the same 
household as necessarily sharing, so much as an obligation or responsibility. However 
one should caution against the interpretation that living alone implies a physical 
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separation. Living alone must be contextualised. In a place such as Mariannhill, living 
alone means living in a one-room rented accommodation, among a group of other 
Malawians, but in Overport or the city centre it means living as a single person among a 
group of other Malawians or foreign migrants in an apartment. All probably contribute to 
the rented accommodation, but usually have to fmd their own food. 
Table 5.11. Sharing Accommodation 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
N/a 1 .8 .8 
~haring 71 59.7 60.5 
Not sharing 47 39.5 100.0 
trotal 119 100.0 
Although one of the first acts of any migrant is to fmd accommodation, as the migrant 
becomes more familiar with his surroundings and finds a job, residence patterns are 
expected to change. This evidence, at face value, suggests that living with family and 
friends increases rather than decreases. Living alone does not dominate, and further 
emphasizes the fact of the necessity of sharing accommodation as a means of sharing the 
burden of rent and the possibility of maximising household resources and income which 
can be remitted to Malawi, or invested as savings before returning home. 
To emphasize the nature of migrants' life as temporary and transitory, table 5.12 clearly 
indicates that the majority of migrants are tenants. Very few are owners of land or homes, 
and those that are occupants are usually there because they are dependent on family and 
friends for a place to stay. In other words they do not pay rent. 
fTable 5.12: Tenancy 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
pccupy 11 9.2 9.2 
Owner 6 5.0 14.3 
Tenant 101 84.9 99.2 
Unclear 1 .8 100.0 
trotal 119 100.0 
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5.3 MIGRATORY MOVEMENTS FROM MALAWI TO DURBAN 
What was outlined above is a profile of the Malawians, as they currently exist in Durban. 
In this section I suggest that there is a relationship that exists between migratory moves, 
work or occupations, and accommodation practices. I demonstrate that not all Malawian 
migrants come directly to South Africa, or Durban in particular. I want to detail how 
they came to arrive in Durban, and if they made a number of stopovers en route to 
Durban, and whether this entailed any work, or livelihood experience. The focus on 
residence and accommodation is to indicate the social context, particularly the networks 
of family and friends that operate in the migratory movements. The number of migratory 
moves before reaching Durban is important to understand as it gives an insight into the 
type of experiences that such migrants have before coming to Durban. I suggest that this 
experience is valuable when they begin to create livelihood strategies because, fIrstly, 
they already have been exposed to the rigours of making a living as migrants elsewhere. 
The anxiety of being exposed to a new and untested environment is lessened. I am not 
suggesting that the environment of Durban is exactly the same as other places, but simply 
that for majority of them relocating is not an entirely new phenomenon. Secondly, the 
constraints and problems they encounter, for example, whether imposed by the state or by 
being exposed to xenophobia or exploitation, are conceived as hurdles to be overcome, 
not insurmountable limitations. Thirdly, the experience of living and working in places 
other than their home towns and villages, equips them with skills. This last point takes up 
the issue that migrants arrive with few or no skills, take up largely unskilled work in 
direct competition with local people, accept lower wages, and in effect push local people 
out of jobs. I suggest that in fact a large portion of Malawians migrants arrive with skills 
and experience. (By contrast local rural-urban migrants have difficulty adjusting to 
conditions in the city, particularly in times of fInancial constraints on social and welfare 
services, and to build up a bank of reliable knowledge of working the system to their 
advantage. (See Vawda, S. 2002 on this point.) It is likely that foreign migrants may 
undercut the wage rates, or may be employed illegally, but they provide a very attractive 
option for many employers. However, their numbers may not warrant policies and 
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strategies that target them as illegal aliens, and reduce them to even greater desperation to 
fmd any job, which in turn further militates against them by pushing down their wages in 
proportion to their desperation for employment, and further undercutting local people 
from finding employment. 
5.3.1 The number of migratory movements 
In presenting the data on migratory movements of the Malawians to Durban I shall, 
firstly, analyse all those that made their first migratory move, and then, secondly, analyse 
those who came directly to Durban. I shall proceed in a similar fashion in analysing three 
subsequent migratory moves. The purpose of this is to link the movements of the 
migrants to their destination in Durban, not in a linear deterministic fashion, but to show 
how the movements occurred, and how it has influenced their settlement and working in 
Durban. 
I have already indicated above, in table 5.1 , the places of origin for the migrants. In the 
table below I illustrate the number of migratory moves that the Malawians made in the 
period under discussion. This is a static representation of moves, including direct moves 
to Durban from Malawi, as well as those Malawians that migrated from other Southern 
African countries and within South Africa. Those who made one move to Durban and 
remained without making another move, voluntarily or forced, constitute 16% of the 
sample (see table 5.14 below). Those that made two migratory moves 37%, and three 
migratory moves 27%. Those who made four moves before fmally coming to Durban 
accounted for 11.8% of the sample. Only 7.5% made 5 or 6 migratory moves. The vast 
majority of migrants made between two and four moves. 
The following table and graph confirms that the vast majority of the respondents, 92.4%, 
arrive within four moves from their places of origin. 
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rrable 5.13: Number of migratory moves 
Moves Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
1.00 19 16.0 16.0 
~.OO 44 37.0 52.9 
~.OO 33 27.7 80.7 
~.OO 14 11.8 92.4 
~.OO 6 5.0 97.5 
~.OO 3 2.5 100.0 
rrotal 119 100.0 
Figure 5. 2: Number of migratory moves: Number and Percentage 
Frequency Percent 
These particular statistics above do not necessarily capture the flow and movement of 
migrants. In the next section an attempt is made to capture this fluidity in terms of four 
different destinations and stopover points that migrants make between Malawi, Durban, 
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and elsewhere. There are some migrants who made up to six moves, but they do not 
differ significantly, and will not be analysed here. In the following section the number of 
movers that are analysed include those who are deported and return, those who return to 
Malawi, visitors, taxi and informal cross-border traders, and a few who move within 
cities of South Africa and other Southern African countries. Hence the numbers of moves 
do not necessarily occur in a time specific period, nor are they a linear progression from 
Malawi to Durban. It is precisely the opposite, and that the fluidity - part of transnational 
migration - that I wish to illustrate in the context of pursuing livelihood strategies in 
Durban. 
5.3.2. Making the first move 
The majority of the Malawians, approximately 61 %, made their first move because they 
wanted in one way or another to find employment, or economic opportunities (table 
5.14). A closer examination of the reasons offered for migration, while dominated by 
prospects of employment also show a complex set of reasons, with people offering a 
combination of reasons for migrating to Durban, which include education, employment 
and further training (18.5%), business opportunities (60.5%), visiting (12%), as well as 
following spouses (6%) and parents (2%). 
rrable 5.14: Reasons for first move 
Reasons Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Education, emDlovment 1 .8 .8 
~ducation, further training 21 17.6 18.5 
~mplovment, work, business opportunities 72 60.5 79.0 
~nd of visit 1 .8 79.8 
Follow husband 2 1.7 81.5 
Follow Darents 6 5.0 86.6 
Unknown 4 3.4 89.9 
To Visit 12 10.1 100.0 
Total 119 100.0 
From a glance at table 5.15 it would appear that most migrants, except for a handful, do 
not appear to be gainfully employed in their places of origin. They appear to be living 
with the parents at home (56%), and most are either in school or in some form of training 
or apprenticeship (34%). Less than 1 % appear to be in any kind of full-time employment 
or work. Hence it is not surprising that close to 80% offered a combination of various 
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kinds of economic opportunities as the main reason for migrating. It should be noted that 
most of the migrants are young, 55% being under the age of 35 years (see table 5.2 
above). Levels of education for these potential migrants (at this stage - pre-migration 
decision making) are also barely high school level (see table above). Most have a high 
school education between standard 6 - 8 (grades 8-10). No one has completed his or her 
high school career. 
lTable 5.15: Work Activities at Place of Origin. 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Education 30 25.2 25.2 
Education/Work 4 3.4 28.6 
Home 66 55.5 84.0 
Home/Work 4 3.4 87.4 
Visit 4 3.4 90.8 
't{ork 1 .8 91.6 
Nla 10 8.4 100 
Iotal 119 100.0 
In the table (5.16) below we can see that almost all migrants, that is, 97%, resided with 
their family or extended family in their place of origin. 
trable 5.16. Residence/place of accommodation Before First Migration Move 
Residence Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
lBoarding school 1 .8 .8 
Family, extended family 115 96.6 97.4 
N/a 3 2.5 100 
trotal 119 100.0 
Being accommodated by family or kin is a trend that continues through out the migratory 
process. Given that most have a high school education, low levels of skill, and 
consequently low levels of employment potential, the following sections which detail 
their migratory progress will show what changes occur. I shall also show how networks 
of family and friends assist, particularly in providing accommodation at virtually no 
rental cost, and that this provides the basis from which to seek and secure work. 
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5.3.3 The First Place of Destination 
The first choice for slightly less than 75% of the respondents is to move within their own 
country (72.3%), or to other countries in Southern Africa, other than South Africa (see 
table 5.17). Approximately 25% make South Africa their first choice. 
lTable 5.17: First Place of Destination 
Place Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
lTown/city in Malawi 86 72.3 72.3 
~outhern Africa Country 3 2.5 74.8 
Durban 29 24.4 99.2 
K>ther South African City 1 .8 100.0 
trotal 119 100.0 
Of the 119 informants, only 29 came directly to Durban (approximately 24%). The rest 
migrate to places in Malawi, the vast majority going to Blantyre (29%) and Lilongwe 
(26%). Significantly Blantyre and Lilongwe are the country's two largest cities. As noted 
above, the reasons for this migration are mainly economic. And this is demonstrated in 
the working activities that they engage in wherever they settle down. This can be seen in 
table 5.18 below. 
tTable 5.18: Work Activities: First Place of Destination 
~ctivities Freauency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Education, living with parents 16 13.4 13.4 
/Education 3 2.5 16.0 
/Employed by others 34 28.6 44.5 
Business - retail and service industries 30 25.2 69.7 
ausiness - production 14 11.8 81.5 
IVisiting 11 9.2 90.8 
Unknown 11 9.2 100.0 
iTotal 119 100.0 
From a situation were very few of the respondents were employed or involved in any 
kind of self-employment or business in their places of origin, after their first move, 78% 
are now, as they reported, either in some one's employ (34%), or involved in business 
related activities such as in the retail and services sector (25%), or in their own 
production capacity, such as tailoring or sewing (11.8%). A significant proportion are 
still being educated and living with their parents. It appears that the parents migrated and 
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the children followed. Those who are visiting (11 %) may decide to remain, rather than 
return to wherever they came from. 
For over 68% of these migrants their first place of destination could not detain them for 
longer than five years. Of those who stayed longer, 19% stayed in their first place of 
destination for between 6 and 10 years, 8% for between 11 and 15 years, and less than 
5% for longer than 16 years (see table 5.19 below). 
Table 5.19: Duration of StaxAfter First Migratory Move 
Time In Years Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
<1-5 years 81 68.1 68.1 
~-10 years 23 19.3 87.4 
11-15 years 10 8.4 95.8 
16-20 years 1 .8 96.6 
~O+ years 4 3.4 100.0 
ITotal 119 100.0 
Being accommodated, or having some fonn of residence is an important aspect of any 
migratory move. In table 5.20, 66% of respondents lived with parents or some member of 
the family (family being defined very broadly to include parents, siblings, uncles, aunts, 
cousins). Significantly 20% lived alone, while 8% lived with friends. Excluding those 
living alone, almost 76% lived with friends, family or an employer. These people, 
particularly friends and family, provide the first set of networks, which provided the 
social base that assisted in the initial migratory move. 
table 5.20: Accommodation in First Place of Destination 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
~one 24 20.2 20.2 
~oarding school 5 4.2 24.4 
Employer 1 .8 25.2 
IFriends 10 8.4 33.6 
lParents family 79 66.4 100.0 
ITotal 119 100.0 
These accommodation strategies are further broken down by city and country in the next 
sub-section, and specific attention is given to Durban as a place of destination. 
126 
5.3.3.1 Direct Migratory Move to Durban 
Table 5.21 breaks down the accommodation into the various places of destination, 
namely towns and cities in Malawi, other Southern African countries, Durban and other 
South African cities. 
trable 5. 21: Accommodation Strategy in First Place of Destination 
Destination Total 
Reside Town/city in Southern Durban Other South 
With Malawi Africa Country African City 
% % % % 
~Ione 18 20.9 6 20.7 24 20.2 
lBoarding 5 5.8 5 4.2 
Ischool 
Employer 1 3.4 1 .8 
Friends 1 1.2 8 27.6 1 100 10 8.4 
Parents, 62 72 3 100 14 48.3 79 66.4 
!family 
trotal 86 100 3 100 29 100 1 100 119 100 
The meaningful comparison is between cities and towns in Malawi with Durban. Those 
who made a town or city in Malawi their first destination constitute 86 (72%) of the total 
number of respondents, while 29 (24%) people moved directly to Durban. In terms of 
accommodation practices, as an index of their social networks, some 73% resided with 
friends and family, while in Durban 76% engaged in a similar practice. Significantly a 
higher number lived with friends in Durban, 28% compared to 1% in Malawi. In both 
places those who lived alone was very similar at approximately 21 %. 
A further comparison may be made between the time spent in a city or town in Malawi, 
and that of Durban (see table 5.22). While 67% of migrants spent between a year and five 
years in Malawi before committing themselves to a second move, 72% of those that 
moved to Durban resided for less than five years. Those who have lived for between six 
and ten years in a Malawian town or city, 19%, brought a wealth of experience with them 
as they migrated towards Durban. It should be noted however that already in Durban 
there are people who form the bridgehead for the wave of Malawian migrants to follow. 
Some 24% of the 29 people who came directly to Durban had already been here for 
between 6 and 10 years. However it is the accumulated experience of being migrants that 
is broUght to Durban that is important to highlight here. 
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Table 5.22: Duration of Stay in First Place of Destination 
Destination 
Duration of Town/city Southern Durban Other Total 
stay: Years: in Malawi Africa South 
First Place Country African City 
Woo % No. % No % !fo % No % 
<1-5 years 58 67.4 1 33.3 21 72.4 1 100 81 68 
6-10 years 16 18.6 7 24.1 23 19.3 
11-15 years 8 9.3 1 33.3 1 3.4 10 8.4 
16-20 years · 1 33.3 1 0.8 
20+ years 4 4.7 4 3.36 
ITotal 86 100 3 100 29 100 1 100 119 100 
In table 5.23 below this subset of 29 migrants that moved directly to Durban is analysed 
in terms of their actual working activities. 
!Table 5.23: Work Activity and Length of Employment in Durban. First Destination 
1VY0rk Activity Years frotal 
10·10 10·20 10·30 10·50 1.00 1.50 12·00 13·00 15·00 6.00 7.00 12.0C 
iAuto-electrician 1 1 
iBaker 1 1 
iCasuallabourer 1 1 ~ 
Employed 1 ~ 1 f4 
!Seeking 1 1 ~ 
employment 
Gardener 1 1 
Housewife 2 2 
Mechanic 1 1 
Painting 1 1 
Sales assistant 1 1 1 1 1 ~ 
~elf-employed 1 1 
~ervice 1 1 
~ewing 1 1 
Tailoring 1 2 ~ 
Welder 1 1 
Unknown 1 1 2 
[Total 1 1 1 ~ ~ 1 ~ 14 1 ~ ~ 1 ~9 
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Of the 29 people who made Durban their first destination, 23 (79%) are in some kind of 
employment, in the formal and informal economy. There are others who are either 
housewives (2), seeking employment (2) or it is unclear what they do (2). Two important 
observations need to be made. The first is that the vast majority of them (23) are actually 
in some form of work activity, for example, sewing, tailoring, sales assistant, baker, or 
some kind of self-employed business. The second observation is that most of them found 
and sustained their employment status. 
Economic migration and using friends and relatives in assisting with accommodation 
clearly dominates the first migratory move. It is important to note the shift to a greater 
reliance on friends in Durban to provide accommodation than was the case in Malawi. 
The central theme of migration for economic reasons continues for those that made 
second and subsequent moves. 
5.3.4 The Second Migratory Move 
Of the 119 respondents, 98 or 82% made a second move (see table 5.24 below). Ofthese 
69% of the migrants made the move primarily to find better or different kinds of 
employment, work or business opportunities. A further 12% moved to improve their 
education standards and/or skills by engaging in further training. 
trable 5.24: Reasons for Second Move 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
IEducation, further training 12 12.24 12.24 
Emplovment, work, business 68 69.38 81 .62 
!Visit familv and friends 4 4.08 85.70 
Follow husband 4 4.08 89.78 
Return home 2 2.04 91.82 
!Too exoensive 2 2.04 93.86 
DeDorted 2 2.04 95.90 
Iro be free 1 1.02 96.92 
iEvicted 1 1.02 97.94 
IUnknown 2 1.02 98.96 
trotal 98 98.96 
It should also be noted that 2% were deported, another 4% that they wanted to return to 
Malawi or found living in Durban too expensive. Some were evicted from their 
accommodation, and one person, curiously said that he wanted 'to be free'. Others 
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followed their husbands from Malawi, or were visiting family and friends. Those who 
visit may change their minds about returning, preferring to stay in the country and look 
for jobs or follow up economic opportunities, and thereby invalidate their visa 
obligations. They become over-stayers. 
Of the 98 respondents who made a decision to make a second migratory move, 
approximately 46% decided to come to Durban (see table 5.25). The majority had 
decided to move to another town in Malawi. 
ITable 5.25: Second Place of Destination 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
rr own/city in Malawi 52 53.06 53.06 
!Southern Africa Country 1 1.02 54.08 
Durban 45 45.9 99.98 
Total 98 99.98 
Most migrants spend less than five years in the second place of destination. Table 5.26 
indicates that almost 85% spent a period of less than five years in their choice of second 
destination. The percentage of those who stay longer is reduced. Those who live in their 
second place of destination for between six and ten years is 12%, and those who stay 
longer are only 3% of the total, compared to the 19% and 12% for the first move. 
!Table 5.26: Duration of Stay in Second Place of Destination 
Years: F~~~luency Percent Cumulative Percent 
1-5 years 83 84.7 84.7 
6-10 years 12 12.2 96.9 
11-15 years 2 2.0 99.0 
16-20 years 1 1.0 100.0 
Total 98 100.0 
Although 6% did not respond to the question of the accommodation choices (table 5.27), 
what is significant is that 41% live alone, whereas 53% rely on friends, parents and 
family for their accommodation needs. Thus living alone increases over the first move. 
This would suggest that family and friendship networks are not as strong as in the first 
destination. 
130 
Table 5.27: Accommodation in Second Place of Destination 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Alone 40 40.8 40.8 
Friends 7 7.1 47.9 
Parents, familv 45 45.9 93.8 
Not Available 6 6.1 100 
trotal 98 100 
The accommodation strategy is further broken down when compared with the actual 
places of destination (see table 5.28), particularly in relation to Durban. Table 5.28 shows 
work activities and length of employment in the second place of destination. The kinds of 
work related activities show that 24 or approximately 25% are self-employed in informal 
retail and services business, (13.3%) and production activities (11.2%), while 38.8% are 
employed by other businesses. Significantly 5.1 % of migrants report themselves as 
unemployed, although it should be noted that the majority are in some form of education, 
training and employment (76%). Those people that report themselves as visiting (7.1 %) 
can easily to being employed if the opportunity arises. In relation to the length of time in 
the second place of destination, the majority have spent less than five years. I shall pick 
up these issues as the analysis proceeds through the migratory moves. 
trable 5.28: Work Activities in Second Place of Destination 
Work Activities Frequency Percentage Cumulative Percent 
Home, education, living with parents 5 5.1 5.1 
Education 8 8.2 13.3 
Employed by others 38 38.8 52.1 
~elf employed business - retail and 13 13.3 65.4 
iservice industries 
Self employed business -production 11 11.2 76.6 
Visiting 7 7.1 83.7 
No data reported 11 11.2 94.9 
Unemployed 5 5.1 100 
Total 98 100 
5.3.4.1 Durban as the Second Destination 
Forty five of the 98 migrants making a second move make Durban their destination. The 
accommodation options are depicted in table 5.29. While residing with family and friends 
is still the overall dominant accommodation strategy in making the second migratory 
move (46%), when it is broken down into its components parts of Durban and Malawi, a 
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new feature emerges, and that is that living alone takes prominence among approximately 
39% of the migrants. 
rrable 5.29: Accommodation Strategy in Second Place Destination 
iAccommodation 
Destination 
Town/city Southern Durban Total 
Istrategy in Malawi Africa Country 
No % No % No % No % 
IAlone 22 42.3 1 100 17 37.8 40 40.8 
IFriends 7 15.6 7 7.1 
Parents, family 29 55.8 16 35.6 45 45.9 
Not available 1 1.9 5 11.1 6 6.1 
Total 52 100 1 100 45 100 98 100 
Being accommodated by parents and family accounts for 35.6% and friends 15.6% of 
migrants. If the categories friends and family are combined then this amounts to over 
51 %. While clearly living on one' s own has emerged as an accommodation option, the 
social networks of family and friends in the lives of migrants still dominates. However, 
living alone should not imply lack of sharing accommodation, or the splendid isolation of 
the individual migrant. As mentioned above this should be contextualised in that migrants 
might share the rent of an apartment in the Overport or city centre areas, but eat 
separately, or live as an individual in a rented room in Mariannhill, in a community of 
their fellow migrants. I shall touch on this point again later in this analysis. 
Table 5.30 shows that the duration of living in the second place of destination tips 
marginally towards Durban (89%), rather than Malawi (82%). Those who have settled for 
between six and ten years are more or less equally balanced at 11.1 % (Durban) and 11.5 
% (Malawi). One person lived in Malawi in the second place of destination for between 
sixteen and twenty years before migrating. 
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trable 5.30: Duration of Stay in Second Place of Destination by Town, City, and 
1C0untry 
Destination 
/Years Town/city in Southern Africa Durban Total 
Malawi Country 
No. % No % No % No % 
1<1-5 years 43 82.7 40 88.9 83 84,7 
6-10 years 6 11.5 1 100 5 11.1 12 12.2 
11-15 years 2 3.8 2 2.04 
16-20years 1 1.9 1 1.02 
Total 52 100 1 100 45 98 100 
This second move, especially as it concerns Durban needs to be further analysed in terms 
of work activities (table 5.31). The actual work activities that these migrants fmd is as 
follows: 39% are employees (employed by some else), 25% are self-employed in the 
informal sectors of the economy, mainly in retail and services and production of 
commodities, mainly clothes. 13.3% are living with parents or family and are still in the 
education system. What is significant in this table is that approximately 11 % report being 
unemployed in Durban. 
Table 5.31: Work Activities and Second Place of Destination 
Work Activities Town/city in Southern Durban Tota 
Malaw' Africa Countrv 
No % No % No % No % 
Home, education, living with 5 11 5 5.1 
parents 
Education 8 15.4 8 8.2 
!Employed by others 21 140.4 1 100 16 135.6 38 138.8 
Business - retail and service 8 15.4 5 11 13 13.3 
ndustries 
Business - production 4 17.7 7 15.6 11 11.2 
!Visiting 6 11.5 1 12.2 7 17.1 
No data reported 5 ~.6 6 13.3 11 11.2 
Unemployed 5 11 5 15.1 
Total 52 100 1 100 45 100 98 /99.9 
The most important points that emerged from this second migratory move are that, firstly, 
there is a marginal shift toward Durban as the preferred place of migratory destination; 
and, secondly, this shift is related to the main reason given for migrating, that is to fmd 
better economic opportunities either to trade or find employment. Thirdly, in making the 
migratory move social networks of family and friends are important, particularly as it 
concerns accommodation options. Fourthly, that living on one's own is an option, but as 
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was mentioned in the case of Durban, it is needs to be contextualised within the enclaves 
of Malawian migrants found in various parts of the city. Fifthly, not all migrants find that 
arriving and finding work in Durban is as they expected. A few have indicated that they 
wanted to return to Malawi, while a number have found they are unemployed. 
In the next section I shall analyse the third move, and these points will be taken up 
further. 
5.3.5 The Third Move 
There are 59 migrant individuals who made a third move. In contemplating this move, the 
dominant economic reasons for the initial and subsequent moves repeat themselves here. 
(See table 5.32). Approximately 73% of the migrants moved to a third destination for 
greater employment, work or business opportunities. The reasons previously given such 
as education and training drop. Only 5% said they moved for further educational or 
training. Approximately 7% indicated that they were visiting, but as mentioned above this 
needs to be treated with caution as a visitor may take up opportunities which invalidate 
their visitor status in terms of immigration regulations. These were the major reasons for 
making the third move. 
trable 5.32: Reason for Third Move 
Frequenc~ Percen Cumulative Percen1 
EmDlovment, work, business 43 72.9 72.9 
IEducation, further traininll 3 5.0 77.9 
lVisitinll 4 6.8 84.7 
1F01l0w husband 1 1.7 86.4 
Deported (later returned) 1 1.7 88.1 
~ome 1 1.7 89.8 
III health 1 1.7 91 .5 
Parents moved 1 1.7 93.2 
Rent expensive· 1 1.7 94.9 
Return home 1 1.7 96.6 
tro join friends 1 1.7 98.3 
tr 00 far from city*· 1 1.7 100 
rrotal 59 100 
• . . . . :n1.S IDdlvl~a1 wanted to ~ove from the cen~l City area to the pe~phery because the rent for the apartment was too expensive . 
!!IS ~s not ~ ml~~ ~ove m the sense of movl~g from ?ne country CI~, town or village to another . 
. This particular IDdl~ldual was not <:<>ntemplatmg a mlgrato,?, move m the sense of moving to another country, city or town or 
village, but ~ther movmg from the penphery of Durban to the City centre as he had a job as a sales assistant in a clothing retail store 
and felt the Journey to and from the city tiring. ' 
134 
Following this were a clutch of idiosyncratic reasons, including the desire to return home, 
following parents or spouses, joining friends, ill-health, to escape the high cost of rent, 
travel to the city and being deported. Some of the reasons included here illustrate the 
often diametrically opposed reasons for making a move, and to indicate the pressures 
under which migrants operate, and that returning home or another city or town is an 
option. 
The emergence of a shift in migration to Durban (and other South African cities) picked 
up in the previous migratory move becomes clear and unequivocal in this third move. 
(See table 5.33). 
Table 5.33: Third Place of Destination 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Town/city in Malawi 18 30.5 30.5 
Southern Africa Country 3 5 35.5 
Durban 35 59.3 94.8 
Other South African City 3 5 100 
Total 59 100 
Approximately 59% of the 59 migrants making the third move chose to come to Durban. 
A small number of3 people (5%) move to other South African cities. Another 5% move 
to other Southern African countries, and close to 31 % migrate within Malawi to other 
cities and towns. 
Almost 92% reside for 5 or less years in this third place of destination. (See table 5.34). 
There is a small number, four people (6.8%), who have lived for between six and ten 
years in one of the towns and cities of Southern Africa. Only one person has lived for 
over 10 years in the third place of destination. 
lTable 5.34: Duration of Stay: Third Place of Destination 
Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
1-5 years 54 91 .5 91.5 
6-10 years 4 6.8 98.3 
11-15 years 1 1.7 100 
rrotal 59 100 
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Table 5.35, below, gives a breakdown of the accommodation strategies. Those residing in 
the third place of destination are evenly distributed between those living alone and those 
living with parents and family: 37% respectively. Only 11 % live with friends. Eight 
people did not report on where they were accommodated. This information will be cross-
tabulated with exact locations below (table 5.37). 
trable 5.35: Accommodation Strategy: Third ~ace of Destination 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
iAlone 22 37.3 37.3 
IFriends 7 11.9 49.2 
lParents, family 22 37.3 86.5 
Unknown 8 13.6 100 
trotal 59 100 
In table 5.36, below, the dominant forms of work activities are being employees (45.8%), 
followed by self-employed people in the retail and services, 17%, and 11.9% of self-
employed entrepreneurs are in the production of commodities. There is an increase in 
those who report that they are unemployed. Later in this chapter, in a separate section, 
work or employment prospects are analysed. By the third move that in education or living 
with parents becomes nearly negligible (3.4%). There are still people who are visiting 
(6.85%). 
trable 5.36: Work Activities in Third Place of Destination 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Home, education, living with . parents 1 1.7 1.7 
Education 1 1.7 3.4 
Employed by others 27 45.8 49.2 
Self employed business - retail and 10 17 66.2 
service industries 
Self employed business - production 7 11.9 78.1 
!Visiting 4 6.8 84.9 
Unemployed 9 15.2 100 
trotal 59 100 
There is an unmistakable shift in the migration to Durban by the third move. Some of 
these characteristics are explored below. 
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5.3.5.1 Durban as the third place of destination 
Table 5.3 7, below, shows the third move that migrants made in terms of accommodation 
and actual place. Those who continue to make a Malawian town their destination rely less 
on family and parents for accommodation. In Durban reliance on family and parents still 
dominates accommodation strategies (36%), followed by living alone (27.8%). Being 
accommodated with friends constitutes 19%. However, if friends, family and parents are 
taken together, this forms a substantial 55% who rely on this network for their 
accommodation needs. 
Table 5.37: Accommodation Strategies and Third Place of Destination Town, City and 
Country 
Accommodation Town/city in Southern Durban Other South Total 
Strategy Malawi Africa Country African City 
No % No % No % No % No % 
Alone 11 61.1 10 27.8 1 33.3 22 37.3 
Friends 7 19.4 7 11.8 
Parents. Family 6 33.3 3 100 13 36.1 22 37.3 
No data 1 5 16.7 2 66.6 8 13.6 
Total 18 100 3 100 35 100 3 100 59 100 
Table 5.35 above showed the duration of the stay in the third place of destination. In the 
table 5.38 below this duration is cross-tabulated with the actual places of settlement in 
various towns and cities. The majority of migrants (91.5%) have lived for five or less 
year, in the cities and towns of Malawi and Durban, and other South African cities. In 
both the towns and cities of Malawi and Durban this segment of the migrants is 89% and 
91 % respectively. Considerably fewer people have settled in these towns and cities for 
between six to ten years (6.8%), and even fewer for longer than that (1.7%). 
Table 5.38: Duration In Third Place of Destination by Town City, and Country 
Town/city in Southern Durban Other South Total 
puration Malawi Africa African City 
Country 
No % No % No % No % No % 
<1-5 years 16 89 3 100 32 91.4 3 100 54 91.5 
6-10 years 1 5.5 3 8.6 4 6.8 
11-15 years 
No response 1 5.5 1 1.7 
Total 18 100 3 100 35 100 3 100 59 100 
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In tenns of work activities in these various towns and cities the dominant fonn was to be 
employed by someone else: 38.9% in Malawian towns and cities, and 51 % in Durban, 
confinning a trend emerging from the second move of working for others (table 5.39). 
This would also apply to migrating to other South African cities. In tenns of self-
employment there is little difference between Malawi and Durban. For those in the self-
employed infonnal retail and services sector, the percentages for Malawian towns and 
cities and Durban are respectively 16.7% and 17%. Those who engage in small scale 
production, such as sewing, the percentages are respectively 16.7% and 11 %. However, 
most Malawian migrants still find work as employees rather than being self-employed. 
rrable 5.39: Work Activities and Third Place Destination: Towns, Cities and Country 
rt'own/city in !Southern purban jOther South 
~ork Activities "'alawi Africa IAfrican City rt'otal 
Country 
No % No % No % No % No % 
Home, education, 1 33.3 1 1.7 
iving with parents 
Education 1 33.3 1 1.7 
Employed 7 38.9 18 51 .4 1 33.3 26 44. 
~elf employed 3 16.7 1 33.3 6 17.1 10 16.9 
~usiness - retail 
and service 
ndustries 
Self employed 3 16.7 4 11.4 7 11.9 
business -
production 
Visiting 4 22.2 4 6.8 
Unknown 1 5.5 1 1.7 
Unemployed 7 20 2 66.6 9 15.2 
Total 18 100 3 100 35 3 100 59 100 
Interestingly, no one reported being unemployed in Malawi, but unemployment is a 
feature in South African cities. For example in table 5.39, above, 20% of the migrants 
reported being unemployed. 
The most important points that emerged from this third migratory move are that, firstly, 
there is a decisive shift to Durban as the place of destination for migrants, for much the 
same economic reasons given above, that is, better employment and business 
opportunities. Thirdly, in making the migratory move social networks of family and 
friends continue to be important, particularly as concerns accommodation options. 
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Fourthly the gap between living on one's own, or being responsible for oneself, takes on 
a greater prominence. Fifthly, the majority of the migrants are employed by other people 
(44%), although 28% are self-employed. Fifthly, more than 90% of the migrants that 
make this third move have resided in their chosen areas for five or less years, an 
indication of how recent the move was, particularly to Durban. Sixthly, there is an 
increase in reporting unemployment status. 
5.3.6 The Fourth Move 
Table 5.40 shows the reasons offered for the fourth move. Again, those who make the 
fourth move, twenty nine migrants, do so mainly for employment and economic 
opportunities (75.9%). Other reasons offered were to follow their parents, wanting to 
return home, fmding that the cost of living, particularly rent, too high (and preswnably 
unsustainable), and to visit. These account for the other 24% of the respondents. 
trable 5.40: Reason for Forth Move 
Frequencv Percent Cumulative Percent 
Employment, work, 22 75.9 75.9 
J:>usiness 
!Follow parents 2 6.9 82.8 
Return home 1 3.4 86.2 
lRent expensive 2 6.9 93.1 
Msiting 1 6.9 100 
trotal 29 100 
The dominance of Durban as a destination is clearly visible from table 5.41, below. Eight 
two percent of the migrants that wanted to move chose Durban as their next destination, 
instead of remaining in their country, or moving to another country. 
Table 5.41: Fourth Place of Destination: Towns and Cities 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percen 
Town/city in Malawi 8 27.6 27.6 
Durban 16 55.1 82.7 
Unknown 5 17.2 100 
trotal 29 100 
However this dominance of Durban as a place of destination is a fairly recent 
phenomenon, as can be seen in the table 5.42 below. Table 5.42 indicates that the 
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majority of the migrants from this fourth wave, 69% have spent five or less years in the 
place of the fourth migratory destination. 
lTable 5. 42: Duration of Stav in Fourth Place of Destination 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
1-5 years 20 69 69 
6-10 years 1 3.4 72.4 
11-15 years 1 3.4 75.8 
Unknown 7 24.1 100 
Total 29 100 
In terms of accommodation strategies there does not appear to be a dominant preference 
(see table 5.43). Being responsible for oneself and living alone accounts for 34% of the 
respondents (albeit contextualised as already mentioned) now dominates the fourth move. 
Yet using networks of friends (10.3%) and family (27.5%) still accounts for a large 
number of accommodation strategies. Combining both family and friendship networks 
accounts for 37.8%. A little more than a quarter of respondents did not provide 
information. 
Table 5.43: Accommodation strategies in Fourth Place of Destination 
Accommodation Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
strategy 
Alone 10 34.5 34.5 
Friends 3 10.3 44.8 
Parents, family 8 27.5 73.4 
IUnknown 8 27.5 100 
rTotal 29 100 
Unlike those who made the previous moves, self-employment seems to have been less of 
a livelihood strategy. This is depicted in table 5.44. Almost 45% of the migrants are 
employed by someone else and less than 25% are self-employed. A large percentage 
obviously did not report on their economic status (27.6%). 
rTable 5.44: Work Activities in Fourth Place of Destination 
Work Activities Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
l:mploved 13 44.8 44.8 
Business - retail and service industries 4 14.2 59 
Business production 3 10.3 69.3 
Visiting 1 3.4 72.7 
Unknown 8 27.6 100 
Total 29 100 
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However data on work activities need to be disaggregated for the different locations that 
the migrants moved to. This is depicted in the next section on Durban as a destination for 
the fourth move. 
5.3.6.1 Durban as the Fourth Place of Destination 
By the fourth move Durban dominates as the preferred place of destination. (See table 
5.45 below.) Of the 29 migrants making this fourth journey, 16 or 55% arrive in Durban, 
and 28% migrate within Malawi. There are no migrants that either go to another Southern 
African country, or another South African city or town. The split in terms of work 
activities in the different towns and cities of Malawi and Durban mirror the global figures 
given in Table 5.43. Most are employed by other people; 75% in Malawi and 43.8% in 
Durban. This might reflect that there are migrants who think that being self-employed 
entrepreneurs in Durban has better chances of success than in Malawi. Indeed there is 
only one self-employed person in Malawi after this fourth move, compared to 6 in 
Durban. 
Table 5.45: Work Activities in Fourth Place of Destination by Town, City and Country 
Destination 
Work Activities Town/ci~ in Malawi Durban unknown Total 
No % No % No % No % 
Employed 6 75 7 43.8 13 44.8 
Self employed 4 25 4 14.2 
~usiness - retail and 
iselVice industries 
!Self-employed 1 12.5 2 12.5 3 10.3 
business - production 
lVisiting 1 12.5 1 3.4 
Unknown 3 18.8 5 100 8 27.6 
rrotal 8 100 16 100 5 100 29 100 
The accommodation strategies of these migrants are depicted in table 5.46 below. Those 
finding their own accommodation in Malawi amount to 62.5% of the migrants making 
the fourth move, where as in Durban this is 31.3% of the migrants arriving in Durban. In 
Durban living with parents dominates the Malawian migrant popUlation (37.5%). If this is 
added to living with friends, the percentage figures amounts to 50% of the migrants in the 
fourth move. It can be seen quite clearly that social networks of friends and relatives 
continue to provide an important asset in the accommodation strategies of the migrants. 
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rrable 5.46: Accommodation Strategies In Fourth Place of Destination 
Destination 
Accommodation Town/cit in Malawi Durban Unknown frotal 
~trategy No % No % No % No % 
~Ione 5 62.5 5 31 .3 10 34.5 
Friends 1 12.5 2 12.5 3 10.3 
Parents, family 2 25 6 37.5 8 27.6 
Unknown 3 18.8 5 100 8 27.6 
frotal 8 100 16 100 5 100 29 100 
In summarising the most important points of this fourth move, the importance of 
economic factors as the primary reason for migrating is underlined. This is reflected in 
the type of employment sought and obtained, either as employees or as self-employed 
entrepreneurs. What is significant is that as more migrants arrive there is an increase in 
reporting unemployment. It is curious that this is not reported in terms of work activities 
in Malawi. This may be because they did not want to appear as desperate or in dire 
straits. But it may also be that only a select few can in fact migrate - those who can 
afford to and those who receive assistance from their networks of friends and relatives. 
Earlier it was mentioned that one-way travel between Malawi and Durban can cost as 
much as R600, a sum which may be beyond the reach of most poor people in Malawi. A 
reflection of this cost is in the accommodation strategies. Residing alone or living with 
friends and relatives are more or less evenly distributed as accommodation strategies. 
5.3.7 Summary: Migratory Movements to Durban2 
The primary reason for moving from place to place, en route to Durban, has been for 
better employment prospects and business or other economic opportunities. This has 
remained consistent throughout this analysis of the movements and destinations of the 
Malawian migrants. This aspect as it pertains to their livelihood activities in Durban is 
given detailed analysis in the next section. A second important feature of the migratory 
movement has been the reliance on networks of friends and relatives, especially for 
2 There were a few people who made a fifth move, but these will not be analysed as the numbers are very 
smaJl and not statistically interesting. They migrate for much the same reasons as outlined above and 
provide no new insights. ' 
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accommodation. In the next and subsequent chapters I shall show the importance of 
networks in the job situation. However, there is also a significant number who live alone, 
that is, they are not dependent on anyone for accommodation. As noted, this does not 
mean they live in isolation from other Malawians, or friends and relatives as they live in 
enclaves or in groups in various parts of the city, and indeed for many of the self 
employed entrepreneurs who occupy themselves within these areas as well. A third 
aspect of this analysis that is important to note is that the majority of the Malawian 
migrants are employees, but that there is an equally significant number who are small 
scale entrepreneurs. In the first move the majority of the migrants were self-employed 
entrepreneurs, but as they migrate more of them seek and take on jobs as employees. In 
some cases they are both, as I shall show in chapter seven. There is also some reporting 
'of unemployment as an indication of social problems. Some Malawians migrants have 
indicated a need to return to Malawi because of these problems. I shall deal with the 
social problems that they encounter in chapter seven. In the next chapter the analysis 
proceeds to their employment, unemployment and return migration, and in which their 
experience and skills gained are put to use in a new country, and different social and 
economic environment. 
5.4. CONCLUSION 
Most of the migrants arrived in the post-1994 period, although there appears to be a drop 
in migrants coming from Malawi to Durban after 1999. The context for these waves of 
migration was the consequences of a restructuring Malawian economy (structural 
adjustment programmes taking effect on employment prospects) and the opening up of 
South Africa in the post-1994 period. These waves of migrants to Durban may be 
accounted for in terms of these push and pull factors. 
Most migrants are young men between the ages of 20 and 35 years of age, and have a 
reasonably good high school education. Most tend to be single, and migrate from their 
parents home, often in a series of steps from village to small town before moving to other 
urban centres before making the journey to Durban. However, about a third of them 
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arrived in Durban directly from their place of origin. Female migrants are not a 
significant part of the migration pattern, but those that do migrate tend to be married in 
the first instance, and hence migrate to join their families. Some of these characteristics 
are not dissimilar to other continental African migrants to Europe or America. 
The largest number of migrants arrive in a step migration process from southern Malawi, 
with a substantial proportion coming from Mangochi district. It is not clear why such a 
high percentage of these migrants come from southern Malawi, rather than anywhere 
else. However it clearly indicates that there is a network of social ties that extend from 
Mangochi, and other surrounding districts, to Durban. The step migration coincides with 
the emergence of a chain or linkage between the points of origin in Malawi and their 
destination in Durban, with the initial settlement by new migrants coming to Durban in 
the first half of the 1990s. This initial wave provided the hidden bridge for subsequent 
waves through out the 1990s. This linkage suggests that an initial core of friends and 
relatives in Durban provide newly arrived migrants, and those still intending to migrate 
from Malawi, with information about Durban, places to stay or assistance in finding 
accommodation and jobs, as well as the necessary social support for adjustment to local 
conditions. Continuation of this linkage between specific places and identifiable groups 
of people between southern Malawi and Durban suggests a particular field or stream of 
migratory movement with specific aims of providing accommodation and information on 
employment prospects. Thus, for example, upon arrival the first major hurdle to over 
come was finding accommodation. Malawian migrants seem to be more or less equally 
divided in finding accommodation through their own means (which in most 
circumstances means living on their own, but within the context of other Malawians in 
apartments in the inner city, in a high density suburb, or on the outskirts of the city), or 
living, initially at least, with friends and relatives. Having settled the issue of fmding 
accommodation, their attention is directed towards making a living. Although their 
educational levels seem low (very few having post secondary school qualifications), the 
ability to speak: English is an important asset in seeking and securing jobs. This contrasts 
with French speaking West and Central African migrants whose distinctive language and 
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appearance sets them apart from local and other foreign migrants, and immediately puts 
them at a disadvantage in securing employment. 
Language and appearance are issues which confront Malawian migrants as well, but they 
tend to assimilate themselves to local conditions, but, as I shall show in chapter seven and 
eight, without undermining their own sense of identity. There is a suggestion that religion 
as an identification tag plays role in the emergence and establishment of these networks. 
In chapter seven I shall, though an analysis of some of the individual biographies of 
migrants, show the extent of these connections extending to migrants that came to 
Durban a number of decades ago. 
Almost all migrants are economic migrants seeking work, formal or informal, or the 
opportunities to be self-employed. A few arrive to advance their education careers or 
obtain further training or skills, while others followed their spouses or parents. Except for 
approximately a third of the sample, most migrants arrived in Durban after making two or 
three stops at different points in their migration to the coast. The importance of this is that 
it provided a learning experience in the world of work, and hence accustomed them to 
cope better with the rigours of a continental African migrant's life: their arrival and 
insertion in Durban's society and economy. This is confirmed when it seen that for the 
vast majority of the Malawians some form of work experience was acquired prior to 
migrating to Durban. Acquisition of work experience, formal or informal, is not to under 
play the issue of dire economic circumstances or poverty as the force driving the 
migration process. It is this very issue of finding employment, and sustaining it for a 
period of time, thus substantially achieving the aims of their migration and returning to 
Malawi that is the subject of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
WORK, UNEMPLOYMENT AND RETURN MIGRATION 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter I expand on some of the ideas encountered in the previous chapter, namely 
employment in the formal and informal sectors of the economy, and unemployment. This 
section will also touch on the kinds of occupations that many of the Malawians took up in 
Durban. Finally we shall assess the ideas that they have about return migration. I link the 
kind of success they have as economic migrants to the desire to return and make some 
assessment of it. 
6.2 FORMAL EMPLOYMENT 
In table 6.1 below the percentage of those employed in formal employment is 51 %, 
whereas those without formal employment is 40%. (Approximately 8% did not answer 
the question adequately.) 
rrable 6.1: Formal Employment 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
No 48 40.3 40.3 
N/a 10 8.4 48.7 
lYes 61 51.3 100.0 
[rota I 119 100.0 
That a little more than half of the respondents are formally employed is consistent with 
the analysis made above. I shall detail the occupations below. Before that there is a need 
to understand where these Malawians worked. 
Initially it seemed to this researcher that they were either confined to the outskirts of the 
city centre, which given their immigration status, provided the prefect opportunity to be 
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invisible from the prying eyes of the police and the Department of Home Affairs 
officials. However a perusal of the widespread areas in which they fmdjobs suggests that 
this initial observation needed to be amended. However, a closer examination of these 
widespread places of occupation suggests that the principle of being less visible still 
holds in some instances. This is indicated by the close to half of respondents not 
responding to the question. However, more than half did respond, and shows that 
Malawian migrants have found employment in the areas to the north, south and west of 
Durban. 
trable 6.2: Places of Employment 
Frequency Percent 
Durban City Center 33 51 
Morningside 1 2 
iOverport North Durban 1 2 
Verulam 2 3 
Chatsworth 3 5 
Clairwood South Durban 4 6 
Isipingo 2 3 
Hillcrest 1 2 
Mariannhill 8 12 
Pinetown West Durban 7 10 
IShalicross 1 2 
~estville 1 2 
[Total 64 100 
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Figure 6.1: Places of Employment 























It is clear that most Malawian migrants work all over the city (table 6.2), but are 
concentrated in central Durban (51 %). They also work in a number of different parts of 
the city: Chatsworth, Clairwood, Isipingo in the southern part of the city, Hillcrest, 
Mariannhill, Pinetown, Shallcross and Westville in the west, and Overport, Morningside, 
and Verulam in the north. (Overport and Morningside being closer to the Durban city 
centre than any of the other northern suburbs.) (See pie graph, figure 6.1, above for 
detailed breakdown by percentage.) It should be noted that these are also areas that were 
formerly designated Indian or white group areas, and dominated by people of these 
designated racial categories. The spread of Malawian migrants is very different from 
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other foreign migrants who tend to be concentrated in the city centre. It may even suggest 
that enclaves of Malawians are not a pronounced phenomenon as in cities of Europe or 
America. While enclaves often suggest dense networks of support, with a fair proportion 
of social capital formation among such national groupings, it would seem that this is not a 
significant issue. However, the qualitative evidence suggests that networks do exist and 
operate, but perhaps not in a dense and totally supportive and institutionalised way as in 
the case of the Senegalese (Vawda, 2000: 112). 
[Table 6.3: Occupations 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Accountant 1 .8 .8 .8 
Baker 1 .8 .8 1.7 
Bricklayer 3 2.5 2.5 4.2 
~ashier 1 .8 .8 5.0 
Casual 1 .8 .8 5.9 
Delivery 1 .8 .8 6.7 
Domestic servant 2 1.7 1.7 8.4 
Gardener 2 1.7 1.7 10.1 
Labourer 1 .8 .8 10.9 
Machine operator 6 5.0 5.0 16.0 
Mechanic 3 2.5 2.5 18.5 
Mechanic assist 1 .8 .8 19.3 
N/a 54 45.4 45.4 64.7 
Packer 1 .8 .8 65.5 
Painter 1 .8 .8 66.4 
Sales/marketing 1 .8 .8 67.2 
Shop assistant 16 13.4 13.4 80.7 
Stock clerk 1 .8 .8 81.5 
Tailoring 20 16.8 16.8 98.3 
Technician 2 1.7 1.7 100.0 
Total 119 100.0 100.0 
Furthermore there is a wide range of occupations, from accountants/book-keepers to 
domestic servants (see table 6.3, 'Occupations' above). This wide range of occupations 
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suggests that Malawians have a wide base of skills, level of education (including the 
ability to speak fluent English) and experience to draw on in order to secure jobs. While 
this table suggests that many of the Malawians have a job, or access to a job based on 
their skills and experience, the issue of whether they find such jobs within relatively short 
spaces of time was tested. A question on how long they were unemployed was asked. 
However given the sensitive nature of such information, with its implications of how they 
obtain jobs, under what conditions they work, and the time they spend in South Africa in 
relation to their visa conditions has made it difficult to obtain accurate information. Very 
few respondents were willing to divulge such information. Those who did answer the 
question seem to indicate that while it seems clear that the ability to fmd work, and being 
more than accommodating and compliant of employer demands ensures to a very great 
extent their access to jobs, it by no means guarantees 'full' employment. Not all 
Malawians obtain jobs. In the table 6.4, below, approximately 33% are unable to fmd 
work within 6 months of their arrival, and some as long two years. 
Table 6.4: Length of Unemployment in SA 
Frequenc~ Percen 
1 month 1 11 
2 months 2 22 
3 months 1 11 
4 months 1 11 
6 months 3 33 
2 years 1 11 
Total 9 100· 
·Percentage rounded off. 
However, given the analysis in chapter 5 above of the number of migratory moves made 
before arrival in Durban there is a strong suggestion that most Malawians fmd jobs within 
6 months to a year. 
This notion is further supported by the fact that for many Malawians previous 
employment in Durban is not a strong feature of their work biography. For many 
Malawians previous employment in Durban (or South Africa) exists only on a very 
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limited scale, either because they have recently arrived and have not had the opportunity 
to have another job, or because they are ' loyal' employees knowing that jobs are scarce 
and cannot easily expect to get another job as economic migrants, especially where there 
is high unemployment. (The caveats that apply to obtaining answers to the question of 
unemployment would apply in this case as well.) Table 6.5 gives the previous 
employment for 15 of the respondents. 
trable 6.5: Previous Employment/Occupation 
Frequency Percent 
~ccountant 1 6.6 
Bricklayer 2 13.3 
lCasual labourer 1 6.6 
iCleaner 1 6.6 
Delivery 1 6.6 
Factory 1 6.6 
pardener, delivery 1 6.6 
Machinist 1 6.6 
Mechanic 1 6.6 
Painter 1 6.6 
~ales clerk 2 13.3 
[Sewing 1 6.6 
IShop assistant 1 6.6 
rrotal 15 100.0 
Previous employment (table 6.5) again covers a wide spectrum of occupations, but 
excludes those who are self-employed. Interpretation of these figures must be cautionary, 
but must be seen in the context of the length of previous employment. 
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rTable 6.6: Length of Previous Employment 
Frequency Percent 
1.5 months 1 11 
1.5 years 1 11 
~ months 1 11 
1 year 1 11 
2 years 1 11 
~ years 1 11 
~ years 1 11 
\8 years 1 11 
~ years 1 11 
trotal 9 99 
It is important to note that people have worked for as little as 1 month to as much as 9 
years (table 6.6). This range gives some indication of the time and commitment of 
Malawians to the jobs they have either undertaken or accepted. Implicit in these lengths 
of employment is the fact that as foreign migrant workers they are willing to work for 
less than local people with all the vulnerability it implies: vulnerable to the threat of 
exposure to the authorities, vulnerable to threats of xenophobic attacks on their person, 
and to continuing earning lower wages than their South African colleagues. However this 
is not to suggest that they would like to continue to live in South Africa on a permanent 
basis. The issue of return migration is analysed in the next section. 
6.3 RETURN MIGRATION 
When asked if they would return to Malawi, 49% indicated that would be a goal, while 
41 % indicated that they have no desire to return. 10% were not committed to any 
particular option (table 6.7, see also figure 6.2)). 
lTable 6.7: Return to Malawi 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
No return 49 41.2 41.2 
Uncommitted 12 10.1 51.3 
Yes, return 58 48.7 100.0 
Total 119 100.0 
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Figure 6.2: Return Migration 
Uncommitted 
10% 
When probed as to whether they would return if given the choice and what reasons they 
advance for such a choice, it became clear that in practical terms not many wanted to 
return. Reasons advanced for not returning were fmancial constraints, no money to travel, 
not achieved their goals, not ready to leave, or if they did return to Malawi it would be 
simply to visit family and friends (see table 6.8). However some were keen to leave to 
start their own businesses in the land of their birth, while others were deported. 
The reasons advanced for either returning or not returning are illustrated in table 6.8. In 
tenus of the reasons given, 48% would return, but of that 39% indicated that it would to 
visit family and friends. Returning to Durban would be a priority. Others, approximately 
36%, indicated that they were unsure because they just arrived, or had not achieved what 
they set out to do, were not ready to leave or did not have enough cash to make the return 
trip. This means a large number will probably return, but continue to engage in target and 
circular migration. If those that indicated they would return are added to those who intend 
to return once their goals are achieved, then at least 33% will probably return. (There was 
a 16% no response to the question). 
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trable 6.8: Return Migration: Reasons For, and Against Returning to 
Malawi 
Reasons for Frequency lPercent Cumulative Percent 
Returning to Malawi 
Return home 3 2.5 2.5 
iStart own business 6 5.0 7.5 
Visit family and friends 46 38.7 46.2 
Work/visit family 1 .8 47 
Financial 1 .8 47.8 
~ub-total 57 47.8 
lReasons for not 
!Returning to Malawi 
Just arrived 10 8.4 56.2 
No money to travel 1 .8 57 
~ot achieved goal 3 2.5 59.5 
Not ready to leave 26 21.8 81.3 
Undecided 1 .8 82.1 
Deported 2 1.7 83.8 
Sub-total 43 36.1 
N/a 19 16.0 100 
Total 119 100.0 
6.4 INFORMAL TRADING 
One of the options for migrants and refugees to make a living is to engage in informal 
trading. For some migrants this is a serious option. However, among the Malawian 
migrants this option is exercised only by a small number, 22, or 18% of the sample (see 
table 6.9 below). The others 82% thought of themselves either as formally employed (as 
indicated above), or more rarely unemployed. (Note that a number of traders refused to 
answer the question on when they began as informal traders.) Most of the informal 
traders began trading in the period 1994-2001, although one person began in 1987. It can 
be seen that the post-apartheid period was seen as an opportunity to engage in economic 
activity. In table 6.10 the number of actual traders is given, and their places of trade. 
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Table 6.9: Informal trading: start date 
~requency Percent 
1987 1 5.5 
1994 2 11.1 
1995 3 16.6 
1997 2 11 .1 
1998 5 27.7 
1999 2 11.1 
~001 3 16.6 
rt'otal 18 100.0 
The first places that these Malawians migrants used for the purposes of engaging in 
informal trade were the centre of Durban, and other places nearby: the beachfront, central 
Durban flea markets, outside Durban shops and on the streets. This accounted for 54% of 
the traders. A further 36% (8 people) traded in places such as Chatsworth, Effingham, 
Overport, Sydenham and the Umgeni Night Market. 
Table 6.10: First Trading Place 
Places Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Durban beach front 1 4.5 4.5 
Durban flea markets Gity Centre 2 9 13.5 
Durban outside shops 1 4.5 18 
Durban streets 8 36.3 54.3 
Umgeni Night Market 1 4.5 58.8 
Chatsworth 1 4.5 63.3 
Overport 4 18.1 81.4 
Sydenham 1 4.5 85.9 
Effingham 1 4.5 90.4 
Pietermaritzburg 1 4.5 94.9 
Malawi 1 4.5 99.4 
Total 22 99.4 
The first places of trade confirm their widespread use of the city. There is also an 
indication of going beyond the boundaries of the city. One of these traders carried out 
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international trade between South Africa and Malawi, while another traded m 
Pietermaritzburg. In their second and third places of trade we see this trend continue. 
Once again the streets of Durban dominate as the second and third places (tables 6.11 and 
6.12) of choice for trading, except the weekly market at Mandeni and the middle-class 
suburbs of Clare Estate and Parlock are added. Also one of these entrepreneurs has 
attempted to expand to Johannesburg. 
tTable 6.11: Second Trading Place 
Place Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
purban streets 3 33.3 33.3 
iClare Estate 1 11.1 44.4 
Mandeni 4 44.4 88.8 
Mansel Road 1 11.1 99.9 
Total 9 99.9 
Table 6.12: Third Trading Place 
Place Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Alice Street 1 20 20 
Durban flea markets 1 20 40 
Jo'burg 1 20 60 
Mansel Road 1 20 80 
Parlock 1 20 100 
tTotal 5 100 
The type of commodities that they trade in (table 6.13) is mostly retail services ranging 
from selling clothes (including brand new and second-hand clothing) to offering services 
such as car repairs, panel beating. Some are involved in the production of wooden 
commodities because of their carpentry skills, and clothes as tailors. 
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!Table 6.13: Goods and Production Services Provided 
Frequency Percent pumulative Percentage 
Auto-electrical 1 4.5 4.5 
Carpentry 1 4.5 9 
~Iothes 12 54.5 63.5 
Mechanic 2 9 72.5 
Panel beating 3 13.6 86.1 
tT'aiioring 1 4.5 90.6 
!Various goods 2 9 99.6 
trotal 22 99.6 
Most of the purchases for these goods (table 6.14) that the Malawians traders provided 
are obtained from local Durban shops, wholesalers, flea-markets, and for a few of the 
traders further afield from the adjacent suburbs and industrial estates at Phoenix, 
Verulam, and the inland industrial town of Newcastle. 
[Table 6.14: Purchase of Commodities 
!Frequency Percent pumulative Percentage 
Durban shops, wholesalers 16 72.7 72.7 
Phoenix, Pinetown 1 4.5 77.2 
,-ocal tailors, flea market 1 4.5 81.7 
Newcastle 1 4.5 86.2 
Phoenix, Verulam 1 4.5 90.7 
N/a 2 9 99.7 
Total 22 99.7 
Most of the Malawians traders denied that they employed anyone, less still employ a 
local South Africa, or 'Zulu', as they would put it (see table 6.15). But at least 10 of the 
22 Malawians traders say that that employ someone, more or less permanently, but most 
refused to elaborate on this issue beyond a mere acknowledgement of the fact that some 
people are employed. 
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lTable 6.15: Providing Employment 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percentage 
No employment 11 50 50 
pccasional 1 4.5 54.5 
IV es employment 9 40.9 95.4 
N/a 1 4.5 99.9 
trotal 22 99.9 
However my qualitative data and observations suggest that there are considerable 
amounts of employment, and/or sharing of resources with locals, especially local women 
street traders. (A few Malawians traders refused to answer the question). Given the 
complexity of labour law in the country, and the fact that they are foreign migrants and 
traders, it is not surprising that many refused to elaborate on the employment and/or co-
operation that exist amongst them. Of course if they do not employ anyone, then they 
cannot say how many they employ. The answer to that question was a total 'not 
applicable'. However in the next two chapters, using the qualitative data I shall unpack 
the relationship between Malawian traders and their South Africa employees. I shall now 
turn to the issue of their remuneration for their work activities. 
6.5. INCOME AND REMITTANCES 
Income ranges from no earnings (zero) to over R6000 per month. But, according to my 
informants, earnings are highly variable, and change from month to month depending on 
business, and various other factors such as time spent on the streets, police and Home 
Affairs monitoring of their movements which inhibit their earning capacity. The average 
or mean income is R2 924. The median is R3000 (see table 6.16). In terms of income 
brackets (table 6.17), most of these Malawian migrants earn between R501-1000 (50%), 
followed by 17% who earn between RI-500, 10% who earn between RlOOI-RI500, 4% 
who earn between RI501-2000. A small number earn above R2000. Interestingly 7% of 
the sample earn well above R3000 per month. It should be noted that 28% do not have an 
income and rely on family and friends to make ends meet. Differentiation on the basis of 
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income exists, and is visible In the Slze and quality of houses In places such as 
Mariannhill. 
Table 6.16: Income: Mean, Median, Mode 





trable 6.17: Income 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
RO.OO 28 23.5 23.5 
R1-500 17 14.3 37.8 
~501-1000 50 42.0 79.8 
R1001-1500 10 8.4 88.2 
R1501-2000 4 3.4 91.6 
R2001-2500 1 .8 92.4 
~2501-3000 2 1.7 94.1 
iR3001 + 7 5.9 100.0 
trotal 119 100.0 
A central theme in much of the migration literature is the remittances that migrants make 
to their families, homes, villages, and towns of origin. The Malawians under discussion 
here are not an exception. However not all of them remit monies back home: 39% do not 
remit any money while 50% do. There is also no response from about 12% of the 
respondents (table 6.18). 
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lTable 6.18: Remittances 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
No remittances 46 38.7 38.7 
N/a 14 11 .8 50.4 
j(es. remittance 59 49.6 100.0 
lTotal 119 100.0 
Further interrogation of the data on remittances reveals interesting insights in who 
engages in remittances and who does not, and for what reasons (see table 6.19 below). 
lTable 6.19: Income and Remittances 
REMITTANCES 
NCOME ,,",umber % lNo remittances 'fila Yes, remittances 
RO.OO 28 23.5 11 (9%) 12 (10%) 5 (4%) 
R1-500 17 14.3 9 (7.5%) 8 (8%) 
!R501-1000 50 42.0 20 (17%) 2 (1 .6%) 28 (23%) 
!R1001-1500 10 8.4 4 (3.3%) 6 (5%) 
!R1501-2000 4 3.4 1 (0.8%) 3 (2.5%) 
!R2001-2500 1 .8 1 (0.8%) 
R2501-3000 2 1.7 1 (0.8%) 1 (0.8%) 
R3001 + 7 5.9 7 (5.8%) 
trotal 119 100.0 46 (38.8%) 14 (12%) 59 (50%) 
Table 6.19 reveals the following: 
1. Those who did not reply to the question or for which there is no data available are 
unlikely to remit any monies because the categories of people involved are those 
who either earn no income, or very low incomes (RI-I000). 
2. Those in lower income categories are the largest numbers of people who remit a 
portion of their income (40% = (RO - RI000)). At the same time 46% do not 
remit any income to Malawi. 
3. Approximately 15% of people in the higher income categories (RI000- +R3000) 
remit some income to Malawi. Only 6% of people in these income categories do 
not remit income. 
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It has been difficult to elicit information on how much is remitted, especially on a 
monthly basis. This makes it difficult to gauge if this is done on a regular basis, and in 
fixed amounts. What is very clear is that no fixed regular amounts are sent back to 
Malawi. Most informants said that they accumulate certain amounts of money and then 
send it back home at irregular intervals. Furthermore, contrary to the table above that 
indicates that 50% of the people are sending back money to Malawi, table 6.20, below, 
indicates that the actual number is only about 48%. There is some gap between the 
intention and the actual remittances. 
rt"able 6.20: Amounts Remitted 
Amount Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
p 74 62.2 62.2 
100 1 .8 63.0 
150 1 .8 63.9 
1200 2 1.7 65.5 
1210 1 .8 66.4 
1300 3 2.5 68.9 
1400 4 3.4 72.3 
~50 2 1.7 73.9 
500 6 5.0 79.0 
550 1 .8 79.8 
1700 3 2.5 82.4 
~OO 1 .8 83.2 
1000 6 5.0 88.2 
1200 2 1.7 89.9 
1500 4 3.4 93.3 
2000 3 2.5 95.8 
13000 3 2.5 98.3 
14400 1 .8 99.2 
15000 1 .8 100.0 
rt"otal 119 100.0 
In the table 6.20, above, it can be seen that the amounts remitted vary enormously from a 
hundred to thousands of rands per month. Taking these figures at face value, and 
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assuming there are monthly remittances, the average remittance would be R416 per 
month per person. 
There is an enonnous gap in this analysis on remittances. To understand it in its context 
requires an analysis of the current household or individual income and expenditure to be 
able to say something sensible about the remittances. For example, what proportion is 
being spent on living in Durban, and what proportion of income is remitted? For this 
analysis the social survey did not obtain the required data. 
6.6 CONCLUSION 
Malawian migrants work and live in a wide variety of places within the Durban Metro. 
While their living spaces might be little enclaves of Malawians, their work places are 
spread widely over the Durban Metro area. There is, however, a concentration of 
Malawians working in the Durban city centre. 
Given their quasi-legal (they have visa preferences coming from an SADC country), and 
in some cases illegal status, their ability to fmd work may be related to the lesser 
resistance they offer with regard to less than satisfactory wages and working conditions. 
Ability to find work is also related to other important factors such as the ability to speak 
English, educational levels suitable for skilled and semi-skilled work, and a willingness 
to work harder and longer hours, and exploit opportunities as they arise. Most migrants 
find some kind of work within 6 months to 2 years. 
Malawians tend to fill a wide variety of occupations ranging from cleaner to factory 
worker, from bookkeeper to self-employed entrepreneur. Income levels range from less 
than RIOO per month to over R3 000 per month. Unemployment does not appear to be 
significant, although some have reported this as part of their problems. However they 
have the option of migrating elsewhere or returning home in order to secure better 
economic or employment prospects. 
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Surprisingly fewer than expected by this researcher are self-employed entrepreneurs in 
the infonnal sector. Yet I would argue that they make an important contribution as 
entrepreneurs. It is an issue that is analysed at greater length in chapter seven. Those that 
are self-employed entrepreneurs engage in economic activities which generates some 
level of employment for local people, but whose economic activities also act as a low 
level multiplier in the purchase and sale of goods and services. 
It is not clear how much of the income earned is remitted to Malawi, although the sketchy 
evidence points to it being important for families in Malawi. Migrancy routes are also 
conduits for transferring savings as capital to start businesses or to make investments in 
family homes (in Malawi). Those who wish to return after meeting their initial objectives 
(e.g. obtaining the start-up capital etc.) may be tenned target migrants, that is, they may 
return to migrancy as the means to obtain or reach new objectives in support of activities 
back home. Others who return to Durban regularly with no precise or fixed agenda may 
be called circular migrants. Their migration is not just a means to an end. There appears 
to be a minority who have began to make their life in Durban, and have no intention of 
returning to Malawi, except as visitors. 
What the actions and responses of migrants suggest - whether target and circular 
migrants, or pennanent residents - are ongoing migratory processes between what is 
effectively a centre (Durban, South Africa) and a periphery (Malawi, southern Malawi, 
Mangochi district). Such a perspective, as suggested in chapter three, can incorporate the 
multiple ways in which transmigration is beginning to occur. It suggests the elaboration 
and construction of multiple social relationships through migration and construction of 
identities between places of origin and destination, the movements of people, artefacts, 
and money, and its reciprocal, albeit uneven impacts and influences across national, 
social and cultural boundaries. Structurally, at the level of the state, these transnational 
relationships occur in a highly skewed relationship between a struggling developing third 
world country, Malawi, one the poorest countries in the world, and South Africa, a 
middle income developing country, whose status in this context is that of a metropole in a 
centre-periphery relationship. However, as the evidence has shown, there is a very 
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specific and direct field of migratory relations between southern Malawi (Mangochi 
district in particular) and Durban, in which nation-state boundaries and regulations are 
simply barriers to overcome. It is between Durban and southern Malawi that centre-
periphery relationships are further enmeshed with issues of identity and participation in 
its economy and society. These issues are further explored in the context of individual 




VULNERABILITY, OPPORTUNITIES AND INCLUSION: 
A MALAWIAN COMMUNITY IN THE CITY OF DURBAN 
7.1. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter I take up a number of the issues raised in the conclusion of the last 
chapter, particularly those related to how their resources, or livelihood strategies, are used 
to construct a living for themselves in Durban. In chapters five and six I outlined the 
transnational migratory patterns between Malawi and Durban, their insertion into an 
urban environment, their strategies to defend themselves against their vulnerability, seek 
opportunities, build a resource or livelihood base to sustain themselves, and for the 
majority of them to remit monies back horne, accumulate capital and goods for 
reinvestment in Malawi, or in some other country. In this chapter I principally want to 
explore through the use of qualitative and some quantitative data the following: 
1. The existence of long-term established networks of information and contact with 
Durban, or other long-established migrants, as important to why many Malawians 
chose Durban as a place of destination. 
2. Whether their particular identities, as Malawians, as ethnic Yao (and people from 
southern Malawi), and as Muslims, provide an additional set of resources to 
enable to pursue their aims of being traders and workers in a different country. 
3. The effect and affect as migrant entrepreneurs and/or workers on their proclaimed 
status as permanent, circular, or target migrants. 
4. How do they see their activities, as entrepreneurs and/or employees as 
contributing to, and/or taking advantage of the development of the city? 
In making this contribution, or taking advantage of the city's resources, the idea of 
citizenship for migrants, as illustrated by the Malawians, as an agonistic practical 
participation in an economy interpolated by work, whether legal, illegal, formal or 
informal, will be introduced. This notion of citizenship as a societal participative 
contribution from below (rather than a set of state-sponsored rights and obligations from 
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above), contributing to the development of the city through work, albeit currently 
contested on a number of levels, is explored in the following chapter. 
Following the theme of work for a moment, previous sociological analyses which made 
sharp and often rigid analytical or theoretical division between different groups of social 
actors involved in the production process, principally as workers and capitalists, will have 
limited applicability in this analysis. This suggests a need for revision of these conceptual 
categories in the context of developing economies and urban expansion. However, in this 
analysis the issue of work is related to the theme of livelihoods, which includes not just 
the provision of life's necessities such as food and shelter, but also other resources which 
both structure and influence the way livelihood strategies are pursued. These include the 
way in which people are included in local development issues, principally around the 
benefits derived from municipal services (roads, water, electricity), and access to 
resources such as housing/shelter/accommodation and the use of identity or identities, 
particularly as constructed and used by those who are from the Yao ethnic group and 
Muslim Malawians. This issue of identity will be explored again in the following chapter 
through the prism of citizenship. 
I also will show that Malawian migration to Durban, although it demonstrates many of 
the central characteristics of continental African migration to South Africa, as suggested 
in chapter 4, has specific features that distinguishes it them from, say, francophone or 
West African migrants. In the next section I outline some of the principal features that 
distinguish the different groupings of continental African migrants in the city of Durban. 
In locating the specificity of the Malawian experience of migration, I return to review 
some of the theoretical insights developed in chapter three, principally that there is a need 
to focus on the micro level decision making that prompts people to migrate thousands of 
kilometres away from their homes to make a living for themselves, their families, or to 
start a new life altogether. 
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7.2. COMPARING CONTINENTAL AFRICAN MIGRATION STRATEGIES. 
Continental African migrants do not see themselves as simply one kind of immigrant. 
Their arrival at a border post is often simplified to satisfy the one-dimensional criterion 
for the purposes of entry (business, study, work, tourist, asylum seeker, refugee). Many 
continental African migrants are here as economic refugees because of the economic 
circumstances in their respective countries, often exacerbated by political instability. In 
other words their situation is a complex intertwining of political, economic and 
sometimes personal reasons for leaving their countries of origin and fleeing thousands of 
kilometres to the southern tip of Africa. Thus many Senegalese migrants said that they 
are political asylum seekers because of their oppositional role in politics to the previous 
regime in their home country, but also they cannot fmd work. Asylum seekers may claim 
to be victims of their political activities, but they also seek refuge from the constraints of 
a less than robust economy. Others such as the Malawians are forthright in their reasons 
for coming to South Africa: they come to seek work. What are the options for livelihood 
generation by foreign migrants in South Africa? Often denied access to jobs that they 
have been trained for in their countries of origin such as teachers, medical personnel, 
engineers, economists, and technicians of various kinds, most have turned to working for 
themselves in the informal sector as street traders, car guards, street hair salons, tailors 
and security guards. This is not to deny that many migrants come to the country without 
any apparent skills at all, such as some of the Malawians. Unskilled or barely skilled 
migrants are vulnerable to unscrupulous employers, who make them work under onerous 
conditions illegally. 
The range of occupations listed above is not a menu of options. Often the choice of 
livelihood depends, at least in the initial stages of their stay, on the country of origin, 
what networks of friends and relatives that they connect with in South Africa, and how 
long they are prepared to persevere in fmding the kind of work they are comfortable with, 
or prepared to do. Thus one finds that many of the street traders are Senegalese and 
Somalis, whereas the Congolese, Burundians and Rwandese tend towards being car 
guards on the streets of Durban and security guards for homes, offices, factories and 
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various institutions. Some of them run street hair salons, and engage in tailoring, as do 
some of the Ghanaians and Cameroonians. Malawians, because of the longer ties that 
they have with South Africa tend to be able to connect with a well-established network of 
their own nationals. These networks provide them with advice on employment 
opportunities, or access to South African employers mainly in various retailing, tailoring, 
dressmaking and clothing manufacturing sectors. Some Malawians have subsequently 
branched out to work on their own, and create employment. 
Although asylum seekers and refugees are generally grateful to be accepted into the 
country, it has been a difficult experience for the first few of them to find accommodation 
and establish a means of livelihood. Given the paucity of State assistance, they have had 
to rely on a number of strategies to finding accommodation, various means of survival 
and employment or self-employment. These strategies are: 
1. Identifying their own countrymen, as in the case of francophones - French 
speaking immigrants, such as the Congolese. 
2. Arriving with an address of a friend or relative, which many do, particularly the 
Congolese, Senegalese and Malawians. 
3. Locking into an established network, good examples being the Senegalese and 
Malawians. 
4. Finding their way to church sponsored-refugee centres, such as the Jesuit Refugee 
Services. This service is for all refugees, but particularly those affected by the 
genocide and continuing conflict in the Great Lakes region of Central Africa 
(Congo, Burundi, Rwanda), and in East Africa (Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan). 
Malawians to my knowledge do not use these services. 
5. In the case of Muslims immigrants such as the Malawians from the Mangochi 
district (where the Yao Muslims predominate), connecting and seeking assistance 
from Islamic charitable organizations or mosques has been a major consideration 
in starting to develop a new life. This also applies to some extent to the early 
Somali arrivals. 
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Using one or a combination of these strategies to settle the pnmary requisites of 
accommodation and their visa conditions (usually with the assistance of one or more of 
the above mentioned groups, friends or institutions), they are now in a position to seek 
employment or to become self-employed. It is at this point that the ability to exercise 
their economic right to employment becomes severely limited. Unable to fmd 
employment (as formal employees) because of legal constraints and prevailing prejudices 
in the host society many of the migrants resort to one or more broad strategic options. 
One option is the refugee centre, a church-funded project based in the Durban 
Ecumenical Centre. Those who have sought assistance from organizations such as the 
Jesuit Refugee Services JRS) and the Japanese Voluntary Committee (NC) have been 
mainly, though not exclusively, people from Central Africa, particularly Congolese, 
Rwandans, and Burundians. Others such as Ethiopians, and Somalis have also sought 
their assistance. No doubt the traumatic experience of their war-torn countries, their flight 
to safety, and their lack of resources means continued reliance on these welfare 
organizations. Whereas in the past the Red Cross provided financial assistance, the 
services provided by the JRS and the NC have been structured so as to encourage 
refugees to engage in self-help projects. Training, seed money and advice is provided to 
encourage them to undertake projects that will lead to establishing their own means of 
livelihood. However, in the interim some level of fmancial assistance is provided for 
accommodation and the nutritional and educational requirements of children. The NC is 
an application-based educational fund for adults who want to obtain diplomas and other 
advanced certification to be able to enter the local job market with marketable skills, and 
provide for their own livelihoods in the medium to long term. Those refugees and 
migrants who make use of the refugee centre have been organised into a group called the 
Refugee Forum, which ostensibly has representation from every national group in 
Durban. However groups like the Senegalese and Malawians (and even some Congolese) 
have never heard of, or if they have, can claim only some vague knowledge of the 
Refugee Forum. 
The Senegalese and the Malawians illustrate very different options for survival. Virtually 
from the moment they arrive, they rely on their own networks and entrepreneurial 
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experience to fend for themselves. While the Senegalese (and the Congolese) have opted 
to live and work in the city centre, the high cost of living in the city centre meant that 
many Malawians exercised the option of moving their residence (and in some cases their 
enterprises) out of the city centre to the margins of the Durban Metro region such as in 
Mariannhill. (For an account of the Senegalese, see Vawda, 2000: 113-115.) This chapter 
shall focus on the Malawians rather than any other group of foreign immigrants. 
Malawian migrants are not refugees, or political asylum seekers, and because of their 
circumstances do not openly or publicly state their immigration status. 
7.3 REVIEWING THEORETICAL INSIGHTS 
In the chapters reviewing the international and local literature it was argued that macro 
theories of migration (neo-classical theories such as Todaro 1969, Harris and Todaro, 
1970, and Marxist approaches such as Shrestha, 1988, Portes, 1978, and world system 
theorists such as Wallerstein, among others) tended to treat migrants and immigrants as a 
homogenous amorphous category of people who have little choice but to migrate. That is, 
what is suggested by these theories is that in general terms migrants move from a 
economically depressed area to an urban centre of economic activity, or in labour terms, 
where labour moves from an areas of under-utilised abundance, to areas where there are 
labour shortages, particularly in the unskilled and semi-skilled categories of work. In 
general this was from rural areas to urban areas, and it was often assumed to be a one-
way movement from place of origin to place of destination. In that chapter it was argued 
that these theories do not explain why, particularly in developing countries, where in 
structural terms all people face the same circumstances, some people move, and not 
others, and why migration does not occur in the same direction, that is to the most 
economically advanced areas. Indeed as shown in the chapter five the direction of 
movement of Malawian migrants is mUlti-pronged before arriving in Durban. 
Furthermore Durban is not the largest or economically most advanced of the South 
African cities. There are other factors than the mere pull of the prospects of higher wages 
or better employment prospects that contribute towards the movement of people to their 
chosen destination. 
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Lee's model of origin and destination with intervening factors sought to identify those 
factors that affect the decision to migrate in the place of origin and the place of 
destination, and intervening factors which are obstacles to migration (1966). Drawing its 
inspiration from Ravenstein's laws of migration, Lee's model points to some of the main 
factors that influence the decision to migrate. Although the model tends to simplify 
various complex processes of decision making (and is cast in a structurally deterministic 
mode), the merit of Lee's work is that it points to sets of factors that influences the 
decision either to stay or to migrate. In general terms Lee argues that the decision to 
migrate usually takes place when the negative conditions in the place of origin makes life 
so uncomfortable that the promise, or anticipated improved conditions that might prevail 
once migration is undertaken to a new place (of destination) are seen in a very positive 
way. In other words migration is seen as a better alternative than enduring the present 
conditions in the current place of residence. It is not difficult to cast the factors in a push-
pull framework, and provides a list of the factors. However it is the complex interplay of 
these factors and individual decision-making and personal circumstances that eventually 
'determines' the decision and actual migration. For example, in the 1950s and 1960s 
popUlation pressure or population growth in rural areas was often cited as a push factor in 
migration from rural to urban areas (pamwell, 1993: 79). However, it is not the 
population growth per se, but this in combination with a number of other factors that 
influences the decision to migrate. It was thought following the neo-classical model that 
surplus population or labour, as a result of demographic changes would migrate to areas 
where labour was scarce. However, other factors in rural areas also affect migration. 
While population may increase, there is also the pressure on land resources (portes, 
1978). Where land resources are no longer sufficient to absorb the increase in population 
by providing a sufficient level of livelihood, then migration will more than likely take 
place. Lack of land resources in tum may have to do with one or more factors such as 
lack of secure land tenure, fertility or quality of the land, environmental conditions, 
patterns of land inheritance, land reform policies in newly developing countries, 
partiCUlarly those imposed through structural adjustment policies, technological change 
and agricultural productivity, In the case of Malawi, Ahmed and Lipton (1997: 23) report 
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on the impact structural adjustment programmes have had on the use of marginal land, 
and lower rates of productivity of the soil. The complexity of factors may also be 
illustrated with reference to circular migration. In such circumstances, migrants retain a 
plot of land in order to retain their stake in their home community, communal or family 
land. In such a case, as in Qwa Qwa or among the Mabwe (Zambia), quoted above 
(chapter 3), permanent migration does not take place, but rather circular migration. 
Alternatively, if there is permanent migration, then an individual loses rights of access to 
land held communally or within a family. This influences not only the type of migration, 
but also permanence of movement from the place of origin. 
While there are these 'push' factors, there are 'pull' factors operating simultaneously, the 
decision to migrate to an urban centre is underpinned by economic reasons such as to 
earn more money for a variety of reasons such as to build a house in the place of origin, 
to earn money to assist the family or individual family members, to repay a debt, to earn 
money to pay for marriage ceremonies, bridal wealth, or to pay for education, or to learn 
new skills, to explore other job opportunities among others. But there are other factors 
which prompt migration. These may take place against the structural context, but 
highlight the particular reasons relating to individuals, family or households migrating. In 
part the decision to migrate relies on imperfect information about the place of destination 
(Sjaastad, quoted in Boyle, Halfacree and Robinson, 1998: 62), which is unlike their 
knowledge of the place of origin. Even though potential migrants do not have perfect or 
good knowledge of the possible opportunities available, it has been shown that migration 
increases their chances of better livelihood resources significantly, even if they are 
unemployed for extended periods of time (parnwell, 1993: 86-87). Indeed migrants do 
spend their first few weeks or months unemployed, relying on networks of support, or 
begging. The point, as Todaro points out, is that migrants would rather endure the short-
term deprivations such as unemployment, no income and reliance on others, in order to 
enhance their long-term prospects. Thus even through knowledge or awareness of the 
tough economic conditions in urban centres may not be perfect, the long-term view 
coincides substantially with reports they receive from earlier waves of returning migrants, 
and/or the media images seen and heard about the city. In short their prospects may 
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improve significantly. On the other hand many people do not move precisely because 
they do not have the information to decide on whether a move is good or bad as they do 
not know anyone or know sufficient people to confirm for them that to migrate will result 
in increasing their life's chances at a better standard of living. But it precisely this set of 
contacts, or network of contacts, that is important in making decisions to migrate. This 
aspect is explored in more detail in this chapter. 
As already demonstrated, migration is not uniform, but consists of two basic types of 
people: those who wish to take advantage of potential new prospects, and those who are 
forced to ~ove, such as refugees either from conflict or environmental disasters, or 
because of a clear and distinct lack of usable assets and access to resources such as land. I 
do not want to suggest that people simply move because they face insurmountable 
problems at home, or in a place of origin. Indeed most people do not migrate, and for 
some action is taken in situ over the problems they face such as land shortages, 
prompting political action such as land invasions, occupations, strikes, marches, or 
resorting to guerrilla warfare rather than migration. However, whatever the exact 
permutations inspired by wider global forces, these push and pull factors in the literature 
still assume a certain homogeneity of migration from mainly rural to urban areas, and 
underline a certain inevitability of movement, suggesting that people merely respond to 
the stimuli generating in the place of destination, and then pushed by events or 
circumstances at home. 
However, it is at the level of the individual or family or household that a decision to 
migrate is taken. If social and economic differentiation of the areas from which migration 
takes place is taken into account, then it suggests that no two people face exactly the 
same problems, although they might all be responding to the general structural conditions 
as outlined above. Such differentiation may relate to income levels, size of land holding, 
cohesiveness of family, networks and contacts in urban areas, stage of life cycle, cultural 
factors such as role of male and females in providing for the family or household. Thus 
many other variables have to be taken into account as to why people migrate, and what 
they do once they arrive in the place of destination. Following this brief recap of the 
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literature, I now want to turn to explore in greater detail than the previous chapter the 
move to Durban by Malawians, and the ways in which they go about creating a new set 
of livelihoods for themselves. The previous chapter covered a broad range of issues that 
affect and are affected by Malawian migrants. The issues covered, broadly, were the 
places of origin, their levels of education, the reasons for migration, the routes of 
migration and means of travelling and the number of stops made on the way, their 
accommodation strategies, and how this relates to work and saving or remittances, the 
types of employment, both formal and informal, that they fmd. The previous chapter also 
identified a number of problems that they encounter, particularly xenophobia and racism, 
while pursuing their objectives. The chapter also pointed to the temporary nature of their 
stay in Durban, and their eventual return to Malawi. That analysis was based on survey 
data, and did not go into some of the ethnographic details such as the existence of 
networks, the reasons why some people seek trading or employment opportunities, and 
how they see or identify themselves with the city, and what they think they contribute 
towards its development. 
7.4 MIGRANTS: MARGINALISATION AND OPPORTUNITIES 
Constant change, Moser (1996: 23-24) suggests, as applied to the marginalized and 
vulnerable poor living in working class communities, often generates increasing risk and 
uncertainty, leading to 'declining self respect'. But there is the probability that changes 
also generate opportunities, or at least the 'resilience' to take the possibilities offered to 
resist and/or recover from the perceived negative changes (1996:19). However, such 
resilience depends on the kinds of resources or 'assets' that are available. The more the 
resources or assets, the greater the chance of survival, persistence, resistance and 
recovery from poverty. One set of those resources is the socio-economic characteristics 
of the respective communities presented here are incomes, age, household size, and the 
main sources of income. Included in these characteristics of the community concerned 
are their networks of mutual assistance provided by such communities to those in need, 
as well as the limits of that assistance. These networks are self-defined. The second set of 
resources or other assets is basic public infrastructure provided by the local state in which 
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both the living and working conditions of Malawian migrants prevails. A third set of 
resources are their identities which are closely tied up to the way the state recognises 
them, and the associated rights, or lack of such rights, and their reception and perceptions 
of themselves based in large measure on public notions of 'illegal' foreign migrants, race, 
and xenophobia. 
Often migrants are perceived as marginalized groups of people, and within a changing 
urban environment as vulnerable victims of processes beyond their control. Yet changes 
also represent new opportunities, resistance to threats of undermining livelihoods and 
self-respect, and new hope. These different dimensions are explored both in terms of the 
households and individuals from the foreign migrant communities of Mariannhill. The 
construction of livelihoods will also highlight the contribution that such migrants make to 
the local economy, picking up on the points of entrepreneurship and employment. This 
contribution will show both the exploitative nature of migrancy, particularly for those 
that are undocumented migrants, but also how Malawian migrants exploit the 
opportunities that are available. This chapter focuses more on the opportunities and 
chances of recovery from the impact of economic crises experienced in Durban and in 
their country of origin. Although the chapter generally addresses the issue of the 
survivalist or coping strategies of foreign migrants, which by conventional terms can be 
seen as the most marginalized and vulnerable in an urban society, this chapter paints an 
image of Malawian migrants as strategising agents who refuse to accept an ascribed 
position as marginalized poor by taking up opportunities offered in a changing 
environment, as workers and entrepreneurs. While acknowledging that vulnerable 
individuals and households within this community are generally susceptible to the 
economic afflictions of a modest developing country suffering a general crisis of 
insufficient or sustained growth, they do benefit substantially from a country, and more 
directly a city, which has far more opportunities, in their view, than their village, town or 
city or country of origin. Durban represents for them hope and opportunities beyond mere 
survival. 
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This chapter shall have a more ethnographic feel because it relies on fieldwork in a 
particular locality, Mariannhill, and used traditional research techniques associated with 
the discipline of anthropology, such as participant observation and in-depth interviewing 
of respondents. It is based on 13 in-depth interviews, as well as a sub-sample from the 
statistical survey of the previous two chapters. The 13 in-depth interviews were 
conducted through the use of a snowballing technique. This was necessary as each 
interview depended on the personal contacts and knowledge that other people known to 
the potential interviewee were also interviewed. All interviews were conducted without 
tape recorders. Hand written notes were made of the interviews based on a set of issues, 
problems and questions that were used as a guide for the interview. This set of interviews 
together with the sub-set of statistical data offer a sufficient basis to explore the 
similarities and differences in perceptions and actions of the respondents regarding their 
daily life and experiences of Durban. Whereas in the previous chapter, the data analysed 
was obtained using a survey technique, the data used to explore the above mentioned 
issues were obtained from key informants and limited participant observation in a 
particular area. Some of the data obtained through the survey will be analysed to provide 
a context for the more qualitative data analysis. 
7.5 MARlANNHILL AND MALAWIAN STRATEGIES: LIVING AND 
WORKING ON A URBAN PERIPHERY 
Mariannhill is a township located on the urban periphery, some 35 km from the centre of 
Durban. Most of my Malawian informants live in a neighbourhood known as 
Mamtakaqzi. There are other areas within Mariannhill, such as a place commonly known 
as Desai where other Malawians live. Some fifteen to twenty years ago Mariannhill was a 
peri-urban settlement (more rural than urban) of mixed races. Although some Indians 
moved out just prior to the 1994 elections, the area remains racially mixed with Indians, 
Zulu-speakers and Malawians living together. During the late 1970s and 1980s it was an 
area where the really poor working class who could not afford a house in the urban 
townships lived alongside small-scale rural farmers, and, consequently, it was a very 
underdeveloped area where many did not have basic essentials such as running water and 
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electricity. A vivid description of the areas prior to 1994 was given by one of the 
interviewees: 
The area was, and still is very poor. Most people lived in tin houses. There 
was no running water. People had to travel to the IDM centre [a nearby 
business and retail centre] to get water, [or] to get water from the mosque. 
There was no electricity and telephones. (Interview 8 July 1999). 
He could have added that apart from the main road, there were no properly constructed 
roads to the residences, particularly up the steep ridges. The area has since 1994 benefited 
from the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) of the first post-apartheid 
government where land was bought from landlords, developed and given with freehold 
title to the occupants. While the RDP may have conferred certain assets, such as land and 
cement block houses, as well as access to services such as roads, water and electricity, 
this is still an area populated by indigent people of either working class origin or rural 
migrants. This is the area that Malawians have begun to populate and live in since at least 
the early 1990s, and for some even earlier. The advantages or limitations of the RDP for 
some foreign migrants will be analysed later in this chapter. A cursory glance at the 
levels of income and age of the Malawians indicate that they do not differ much from the 
socio-economic profile described in this paragraph. Most migrants are 29 years of age 
and sustain themselves through earning an income. For the majority of Malawian 
migrants in Mariannhill this income is less than R2 000.00 per month either working in 
the formal or informal sectors, and for many their income is less than the theoretical 
subsistence level of Rl 500, 00 per month. However, rather than present a set of basic 
statistics, this chapter will analyse of the production of income, and other assets and 
resources used as part of their livelihood strategies, as it occurs in a set of social 
relationships defined from the very beginning by their entry into the Malawian 
community in Durban through their social networks and located structurally within the 
economy and society of Durban. It is these social networks and social and economic 
factors that condition and influences the way individuals react, grapple and interact to 
make a living and fulfil their objectives as migrants that is the focus of the chapter. 
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7.5.1 Use of networks. 
One of the striking aspects of the results of the survey, as analysed in the previous 
chapter, is that these Malawian migrants have a long-established network of people that 
they can connect with when they arrive in Durban. This network of social relations that 
connects migrating people between the multiple places of origin (bearing in mind that a 
large proportion of Malawian migrants make up to an average of four stops en route to 
Durban, where each stopover becomes a new place of origin, while at the same time it 
once was a place of destination) and destination has been described variously as a 
'spider's web' (Eades, 1987:8), a veritable collection of connected people. Portes and 
Walton have described this circulation or network of migrants as a response to capitalist 
development as "tie-in groups distributed across different places maximising their 
economic opportunities through mutual aid and multiple displacements" (1981: 60) (my 
emphasis). Basch, Schiller and Szanton-Blanc have argued that there is need to locate the 
networks, or social relations beyond mere description, as a 'social field' which sees 
migrants as active agents in which such linkages are maintained, renewed and 
reconstituted, whether through social ties and/or the passing of material goods from one 
locality in a nation state to another, and in which identities are constructed and 
reappropriated through their daily practices to maximise their specific strategic 
intentions, whether these be in the context of families, organisations, economic activities, 
or business and financial investments (1994: 28-30). In applying this insight to the 
networks that Malawians have built up over the decades within South Africa, and Durban 
in particular, migrants' networks should be seen as part of a process which constructs, 
reconstructs and appropriates different aspects of their social relations, in order to insert 
themselves into the new local economy and society, and simultaneously retain contact 
with one or more places of origin. It shall be seen that the social tie-ins do not imply that 
migrants actually have to move physically between two or more nation states, but that it 
can involve migrants who have made Durban their home, but retain various kinds of ties 
or levels of social relations with people in their country of origin. In other words they 
make the space for simultaneous living in two or more worlds in which the practices, 
social relations and multiple identities are embedded. One of the obvious outcomes of 
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these networks or spider web connections is the bi-directional flow of ideas, information 
and events. 
The ties that bind Malawians to South Africa, and Durban in particular, are various and 
multiple. In this first part of this section a brief outline of the types of connections and 
intersections with South Africa will be described. This provides the platform to describe 
and analyse some of the individual case studies that follow. 
7.5.2 Malawian historical connections with South Africa 
One of the more famous trade union and political leaders in South Africa, Clements 
Kadalie, was from Malawi. Kadalie, the descendent of Chief Chiweyu, was born some 
time in the 1890s, in the village of Chi fir a on the western shores of Lake Malawi (or Lake 
Nyasa as it was then known) (Kadalie, 1970: 31). Upon arrival in South Africa, Clements 
Kadalie inaugurated during the early 1920s one of the most extensive and influential 
national trade union movements. In the first half of the century people from Nyasaland 
obviously came as workers or seeking economic opportunities in the mining and the early 
manufacturing economy of South Africa. Indeed Clements Kadalie mentions that all his 
brothers ended up in South Africa, so powerful was the economic attraction of South 
Africa a little less than century ago. It still retains that powerful attraction as has been 
demonstrated in the previous chapter. In more contemporary times there is the 
internationally acclaimed musician, Ray Chikapa Phiri, the son of a Malawian immigrant. 
Ray Phiri worked a succession of jobs, including being a mine policeman, before making 
a name for himself as a musician in the 1970s and 1980s, playing with amongst others, 
Paul Simon, Laurie Anderson, Joan Baez, Willie Nelson, Mory Kante and Miriam 
Makeba. Apart from the famous such as Kadalie and Phiri, there are other links, 
significant but less spectacular, including contact between Indian traders in Malawi and 
Durban (Dhupelia-Mesthrie, 2003: 30). Malawians have, and continue to contribute 
significantly to South Africa in a number of ways. 
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7.5.3 Making the Connection 
The familiarity with Indians and the seeking of work opportunities, other than mining, 
resonates in the story by Adama Mosal, a Malawian who came to South Africa in 1952. 
Adama Mosal claimed that he came to South Africa from the village of Dowa, and 
worked in a succession of jobs in the Eastern Transvaal, and then in Durban. He lived in 
Clairwood, a mixed, but predominantly Indian residential and commercial suburb, before 
ending up in retirement in Mariannhill. 
Interviewer: What did you do when you came to South Africa? 
Mosal: I worked in the Eastern Transvaal first in one of the sugar mills for 
about 20 years. I arrived in Durban in 1972. I first stayed in Clairwood at 93 
Pine Road. I had relatives in Clairwood. From Clairwood I moved to 
Mariannhill. I first stayed in Desai, and then I moved here. 
Interviewer: How long have you been here? 
Mosal: I have been here 7 years. I arrived in 1992. 
Interviewer: What work did you do in Durban? 
Mosal: I worked in a factory in Jacobs called Beddings. I worked for 6 years 
from 1972 to 1978. Then I worked at the Protea factory for three years in the 
workshop. I then lost my job in 1980. I have been unemployed ever since. I 
left Clairwood in about 1980 to come to Desai [a suburb of Mariannhill] 
because Clairwood became Indian .... 
Interviewer: How did you know, when you came from the Eastern Transvaal, 
to fmd your relatives in Clairwood? 
Mosal: I did not have an address. I just found them there. I had no idea how 
to fmd them. I was working for a white guy, Mr F. Gillio. We were on a 
contract doing temporary jobs. I did not know there were Malawians living in 
Clairwood, but he said that there were people that looked like Malawians. So 
I went with him and spoke to them in Yao and Chewa, and they replied. 
That's how I found them. They invited me to come live with them. They were 
from different districts in Malawi. 
Interviewer: You moved with your family from Clairwood to Desai? 
Mosal: The whole family moved from Clairwood to Desai. I only got married 
in 1972 [to a Zulu woman]. I stayed alone for almost 26 years. I have two 
children, a boy 13 years old, and a daughter 25 years old. I had one child in 
Clairwood and one here. He goes to the local school. 
Interviewer: How did local people respond to you? 
Mosal: Local people responded well. There were no problems. I even learnt 
to speak Zulu. 
(Interview, 13 July 1999) 
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This story of Adama Mosal encapsulates some of the central themes of this chapter. The 
powerful attraction to fmd work in South Africa, the construction of multiple identities -
national and ethnic, and its connection to locality or place, and the incorporation or 
assimilation into the local population through work, language and marriage. It also hints 
at the perverse nature of apartheid (the Group Areas Act as it applied to Clairwood, and 
subsequent removals), and the vagaries of the economy in early 1980s when he was 
retrenched, and then unable to find employment. Although Adama Mosal was formally 
unemployed, he was among the first in the area to start up and run a successful 'spaza' 
shop. This entrepreneurial theme, a consideration in Malawian livelihood strategies, is 
also a feature of this chapter. There is a major difference in that today's migrants tend to 
be temporary sojourners, transnational migrants living between two or more countries, 
whereas Adama Mosal was once an immigrant, and now a permanent resident with no 
intention of returning to Malawi. But as he says, 'I think of myself as South African, 
although I still speak Chewa ... I am not regarded as a 'Muntu"[a South African person, 
or Zulu person, depending on the context]. Nevertheless his story illustrates the 
beginnings of the Malawian community in Mariannhill in a period of South Africa 
transition and reconstruction, and the multiple connections that provide the enduring 
quality of the ties and networks that flourish today for migrants. 
Clearly there has been a lesser-known flow of Malawian migrants and immigrants to 
South Africa over a long period of time. In a period a little earlier than Kadalie' s 
explosive entry into South Africa's politics, or that of Adama Mosal's epic journey from 
Malawi to Mariannhill, there was an example of early forced migration. A shipload of 
slaves, allegedly from somewhere in East Africa, was rescued by a British naval vessel 
near the island of Zanzibar. They could have been from the then Nyasaland (now 
Malawi), but what is important to note is that they were Muslim and became known as 
Zanzibaris. Although continental Africans, they were allowed to reside, first on the Bluff, 
near Clairwood (a residential area of poor Indian working class people), and later under 
apartheid, in Chatsworth, an Indian-only township created in the early 1960s. Although 
an enclave within a Indian township, many of these Zanzibaris integrated themselves 
within the Indian community, particularly the Muslim sector, as well as maintaining 
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contact with the wider black population, thus establishing the dual identity of 
black! African Muslims. They worked among Indian people, and some became Islamic 
religious leaders, officiating in mosques and Muslim rituals throughout Durban, a 
historical role among African Muslims which can be traced back to the first black 
converts during the time of the Prophet Mohammad in Arabia. 
The link between Malawians and Islam religious practices can also be seen in the 
proselytising activities of one Malawian migrant, Sheikh Abbas Phiri, who in the 1940s 
came to work on the coal mines of KwaZulu-Natal. He also worked on the sugar 
plantations and on a fishing trawler. When he retired from his formal occupation in the 
early 1970s, he began his proselytising activities in the township of Inanda, north of 
Durban. Phiri had received a formal Islamic education in Malawi, that is, his father 
forbade him to receive a modem western education on the grounds that it would make 
him lose his Islamic faith, or worse tum him into a Christian. When he came to South 
Africa, Phiri married a local woman, but unlike the Zanzibaris with whom he lived for a 
while on the Bluff (at King's Rest), he set up home in Inanda. It was from his home that 
he began to convert the local population to Islam with the assistance of the mainly Indian, 
though politically left leaning, Muslim Youth Movement. Although there is a close 
identification of Islam with Indians, these proselytising activities began to shift the 
identifiers, eventually resulting in Sheikh Phiri's son becoming the Imam (religious 
leader) of the small black Muslim community in another nearby black township of 
KwaMashu (Vawda, 1994). The missionary connection takes a particularly ironic twist in 
the 1990s as illustrated in two cases. The first case is when one of the few woman 
Malawian migrants, Kiri Banda, said that one of the reasons she was able to come to 
Durban was because she had the address of a Muslim Indian woman who had engaged in 
Islamic missionary work in Malawi and was able to stay with her until she was able to 
fend for herself. The missionary apparently had worked for Islamic Propagation Centre 1. 
She also had the address of her brother, but did not reside with him initially (interview, 
27 July 1999). The second case is when a Sudanese-trained Islamic scholar, Said 
I The Islamic Propagation Centre is based in Durban and apparently carries out missionary work in various 
parts of Southern Africa. 
182 
Muhammad, comes to Durban to minister to the needs of Malawian Muslims in 
Mariannhill. He was employed by the International Dawah Movement, also based in 
Durban, as a religious teacher and leader among the Malawians of Mariannhill on the 
grounds, as stated by Said Muhammad, that "Malawians [in Durban] had limited 
knowledge of Islam. The response was very good. Malawians began to learn new aspects 
oflslam." He then began to convert many of the 'Zulu' in Mariannhill (Interview 8 July 
1999). But Said Muhammad, as we shall learn shortly, was not just a consummate 
religious leader and teacher, but a man of considerable entrepreneurial flair. What is 
important here is to highlight his initial contact and the expansion of his network of 
connections with Durban based Malawian migrants. His employment as a religious 
teacher was prompted by the intervention of another Malawian who had migrated to 
South Africa in 1945, Moses Chindu, and who had close a relationship with Dr Dadoo, an 
official of the International Dawah Movement. This served as the basis of his 
considerable community involvement, and network of friends and contacts, not only in 
religious matters, but also in community matters such as providing literacy classes for the 
youth and the translation of religious texts from English to Zulu (a language which he 
also leant very quickly to enable him to proselytise among the Zulu speakers of the 
community). 
While religion, as practised in missionary activities, provides a basis of contact for a 
number of migrants, there is the more mundane traditional bipolar flow and exchange of 
information between long-settled Malawian migrants in Durban, and their family and 
friends in their places of origin. For example, Said Muhammad's original contact with 
Moses Chindu, was based on the latter's visit to his family to Salima in Malawi 'every 
now and then' since 1945. He was able to get the address, and reside for one and half 
months with Chindu before he was employed officially by the International Dawah 
Movement, and able to find his own accommodation. 
There were others who followed similar means of using friendship and kin ties as the 
initial means of entry into Durban. They would not ordinarily have left Malawi to come 
to Durban if they did not know already someone, and had some idea of what conditions 
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were like. For example Kiri Banda, a woman migrant, felt very at ease coming to Durban 
because she had the addresses of her brother Sheikh Banda, and that of the Indian 
missionary befriended in Malawi. She is unusual, as not many women migrants travel 
alone, and she did so for much the same reasons as men - to find employment or 
economic opportunities in Durban. On the basis of being accommodated rent free, 
initially with her missionary friend (see above) and later with her brother, she was able to 
set up a hairdressing salon in the city centre from which she made a living for several 
years. Others, such as Jamie Mdala, travelled directly to Durban by hired car, passing 
through Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Upon his arrival, he made contact with his brother 
Dawood Mdala in Mariannhill. Aslaam Kadalie came to tend to his sick uncle in 
Johannesburg, before coming to Durban. When his uncle passed on he returned to 
Malawi, but could not further his post-high school education because of lack of family 
finance. Unable to find a job or obtain a scholarship or funds to enter university, he 
arrived in Durban to live with a friend in Overport and to find work. Later they both 
found cheaper accommodation in Mariannhill. While all of the above individuals are in 
the age group 25 to 35 years of age, there is the occasional exception. Tayoob Manyele 
arrived in Durban in 1994, already past his retirement age. His choice of coming to 
Durban seemed to be spurred on by the fact that his family was already or nearly all 
dispersed. He said "I came from Malawi alone. I left my family in Malawi, I was married 
in Malawi with a wife and nine children ... My children are all big. They can look after 
themselves. My daughters are all married." He came to Durban because he knew a friend 
of his, Abdul, whom he telephoned when he arrived. Abdul, he said, provided him with 'a 
place to sleep, food and clothing'. He stayed with Abdul for a year, while they both found 
work as trouser makers, first in Victoria Street and later in Ajmeri Arcade making 
uniforms and trousers. Both places of work are in the Grey Street complex, an area 
dominated by Indian businesses. He only worked for a year, but then retired for a second 
time. He married a local woman and set up a small sewing business in Mariannhill, which 
he said provides a modest means of a livelihood. He does not intend to return to Malawi , 
although his son did once come to Durban. His son worked for a year then returned to 
Malawi. 
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Not everyone travelled with a clear understanding of whom they would connect with in 
Durban. Others relied on the fact that they knew someone, or that there was a community 
of Malawians on whom they could call on for assistance. This is especially the case for 
many from the Yao ethnic group from the Mangochi district in Malawi. As Jamie Mdala 
says: "Many people from my district [Mangochi] come to Durban. There is always 
someone we know in Durban, so we come" (Interview, 27 July 1999). Similarly, EB 
Malazi, already living and working in Durban for two years, had travelled with his friend 
Hossan without any clear knowledge of whom he will connect with in Durban, fmd 
accommodation or work. But he knew that he would be able to connect with someone 
from his district. He said: "I came with a friend who knows the place [Mariannhill]. He is 
from Malawi and has already visited the place. He travels up and down from Malawi to 
Durban all the time". But EB Malazi already was connected to someone, Hossan, a 
regular traveller and trader between Mangochi district in Malawi and Durban, who 
consequently knew the ropes of entry, finding accommodation and work. He lived with 
Hossan while looking for a job, and then rented accommodation from Sheikh Banda, 
another Malawian. (Interview, 3 August 1999). Thus imperfect knowledge of the actual 
conditions in Durban is not a fundamental deterrent to migration. Rather knowledge of a 
community of individuals in sufficient numbers from the place of origin, whether these 
be friends or family on whom to call, becomes an asset - a resource - to rely on, at least 
during the initial shock of arrival, finding accommodation, and explore what possibilities 
exist from talking to one's compatriots, and begin the process of fmding work or 
economic opportunities - the main reason for migration. 
What the interviews with Mosal, Ndala, Malazi, Kiri Banda, Said Muhammad, and the 
associated contacts of Hossan, Banda and others, highlight is the reliance on a place, 
Mangochi, or even an invented one as in the case of Adama Mosal, in Malawi, and 
Mariannhill in Durban as well as identities, such as Malawian, Yao, Muslim as markers 
for the provision of assistance to recently arrived migrants. This applies particularly in 
the first instance of finding accommodation and later with work opportunities. However 
these networks are not guarantors of accommodation or jobs. While it is possible that 
similar national or ethnic background may give one access to jobs, this is not always the 
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case. Thus, for example, Shoponda, although a bookkeeper by training was able, through 
a network of information only, to find a job as unskilled packer in a chemical factory in 
Jacobs. Malawians are subject to the same vagaries of the economy as any other person. 
The edge they have is that they have a reputation for honesty, working harder, and being 
less demanding when it comes to wages. It is this reputation, based on employers' own 
bias and prejudices, in combination with a network of information passed on by various 
Malawian migrants within the . community of Mariannhill, that enabled a range of 
informants to fmd employment in small sweatshops, factories, and with building 
contractors and shop owners. Of course being an immigrant or a migrant from another 
country, does limit the options as to the kinds of wages (or work, but that is not a primary 
consideration for many Malawians) one is prepared to accept. 
The next section will elaborate on the way these networks of connections and contacts, 
marked as they are by national, ethnic, and religious identities, assist in finding 
accommodation and jobs. It is in this context that income or earnings will be discussed. I 
shall present some of the statistical findings, before discussing, by way of three 
individual cases, the ways in which Malawians have been able to find jobs, or exploit 
economic opportunities for trade. 
7.6 NETWORKS AND EARNING A LMNG 
In order to place in context the networks and case studies, and the capacity to earn a 
living, or pursue livelihood strategies, this section will provide a social profile of the 
Malawians in terms of the following: income, employment and unemployment, 
occupations, educational levels. The household structures as they inform their capacity to 
accumulate various resources including savings will also be briefly examined. 
7.6.1 A Social Profile of Malawians in Mariannhill. 
7.6.1.1 Income 
What strikes one when analysing the levels of income (see table 7.1 below) is that these 
are mostly well below the theoretical subsistence level of approximately Rl 500, 00 for 
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black families in the Durban area. In Mariannhill 22% of Malawians living there appear 
to have no formal income, while the majority, 37% earned between Rl and R999; 11% 
between Rl 000 and Rl 999, and 3% between R2 000 and R4 000. In short 78% of the 
foreign migrant households had someone employed earning an income. 
Table 7.1 Formal Household Income Categories 
Income category Mariannhill % 
0 13 21.66 
1~999 37 61.66 
1000-1999 7 11.66 
2000-4000 3 5.0 
Total 60 100 
The small number of people in the upper income brackets illustrates that over 90% of 
Malawians households in the settlement earn between zero and R2000.00 a month. 
Within the settlement there is the obvious difference between the poorest of the poor, i.e. 
unemployed, and those who are employed either in the formal economy or occupy 
themselves in the informal economy. Lack of formal money income, as shall be shown 
later, and as explained by Todaro above, does not mean that migrants are on the threshold 
of sustenance disaster. Rather it is an indication of the postponement of immediate 
income with a long-term view that at some point in the future they will find employment 
or some means of economic sustenance. It also means that they will have to rely on 
mutual aid and support of family and friends until such time that they can support 
themselves (and of course return the favour later). It is also possible that they can, at 
some point in the future, depending on the circumstances of their hosts, exhaust friends' 
and relatives' patience and generosity. 
The point is not really about the low level of income earned, but the belief that they will 
fmd economic opportunities that are better than in their place of origin, or their last place 
of settlement, and attempts are made to save some portion as remittances, or invest in 
some economic opportunity or material asset for future benefit to themselves and their 
families. Thus as Sheikh Banda commented: 
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Malawians can stay in town [or anywhere]. They will suit any conditions. 
They have no complaints with the conditions. All they need is beans, salt and 
water to cook and eat. Whatever Allah provided they will accept. We are a 
simple people (Interview 13 July 1999). 
Indeed it was difficult to elicit information on the expenditure patterns of the Malawians 
in Mariannhill, although attempts were made. It is a sensitive matter, and suspicions as to 
what use may be made of such information is fairly widespread. Although the survey did 
record that a number of them remit some of their income to Malawi, the survey did not 
record their household assets other than the house they occupied. From my observations 
while conducting interviews it appears that they own very few durable assets. In many 
cases the very poor barely had anything except a place to sleep, store their clothes and 
some cooking utensils, although such a judgement should be tempered by the fact that as 
circular or target migrants, durable goods such as stoves and fridges, including assets 
such as vehicles, are a liability in that the costs and logistics of transport would make it 
difficult and probably prohibitively expensive to take them to Malawi. However, there 
were migrants who had radios, beds, tables, stoves, and the occasional fridge. Some had 
televisions, and very few, if any, owned cars. Taxis and busses are the major modes of 
transport. For the large durable items such as stoves and fridges it would make sense for 
migrants to own such goods only if they intend long-term residence in the county, or to 
use the assets as a means of storing value to be sold to raise cash before returning home. 
Whatever income they do earn depends on what employment prospects there are for them 
to exploit. In the next section the issue employment and unemployment is briefly 
analysed. 
7.6.1.2 Employment and Unemployment 
It would be anticipated that foreign migrants must have greater obstacles to overcome in 
trying to obtain jobs in an economy that has shed jobs rapidly since 1994. They faced the 
further difficulty of having to find and retain jobs, or intensify their earning capacity by 
other means, such as additional jobs or informal trading, in an increasing climate of 
general xenophobia. I shall have occasion later to distinguish between the general climate 
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of xenophobia and the specifics of working with local South Africans, which tempers the 
reaction of Malawians to xenophobic comments and physical attacks. All this would 
suggest that it is difficult to find and retain jobs, that economic opportunities are few and 
far between and that life is indeed very precarious for them. Yet a perusal of the table on 
employed and unemployed reveals a very different picture (table 7.2 below). 
Table 7.2: Mariannhill: Employed/Unemployed Malawians 
Number % 
Employed 35 58.3 
Unemployed 23 38.3 
N/a 2 3.3 
Total 60 100 
7.6.1.3 Occupations 
The majority of foreign migrants (58%) living among the Mariannhill community find 
themselves in one or other form of employment located in a variety of traditional 
Table 7. 3: Type of Occupations In Metro Durban: Malawians 
No. % 
Tailoring (some are self-employed) 15 43 
Shop assistant 7 20 
Salesman 3 9 
Stock clerk 1 3 
Clothing factory worker 1 3 
Bricklayer 1 3 
Casual 1 3 
Domestic 1 3 
Checkout operator 1 3 
Mechanic 2 6 
Machine operator (factory) 1 3 
Gardener 1 3 
Total 35 102* 
* Percentages rounded to nearest whole number. 
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industrial and commercial zones in the Durban area: Pinetown, Durban Central, Mobeni, 
and Jacobs. Furthermore the kinds of jobs that these Malawians have are very different 
from mere casual employment. Their occupations are wide ranging: tailoring, shop 
assistants, salesman, stock clerk, mechanic and checkout operator in a supermarket (see 
table 7.3 above). These jobs suggest a different level of education and skill from basic 
primary school education. 
7.6.1.4 Educational Levels 
Among the Malawians 22% have a lack of basic formal education (table 7.4 below) 
Table 7.4: Malawians in Mariannhill: Education Levels 
No % 
No education 13 22 
Std 1/grade 3 0 0 
Std 21 grade 4 3 5 
Std 31 grade 5 2 3 
Std 41 grade 6 5 8 
Std 51 grade 7 7 12 
Std 61 grade 8 9 15 
Std 71 grade 9 2 3 
Std 8 I grade 10 18 30 
"0" Levels 1 2 
60 100 
Some interviewees explained that in southern Malawi, where most of them originate, they 
were not always encouraged to go to school. However 48% of respondents have some 
form of high school education. 
However the focus of this chapter is not so much on the relationship between skill, 
education levels and work opportunities (as employees or self-employed). Instead the 
focus is on the embedded nature of finding work through a network of friends and 
relatives, especially in the first instance. Although accommodation/shelter is an important 
190 
pre-requisite before work can be found, the structure of households is an important 
consideration in any migrant's view. It does determine the level at which a migrant will 
spend and save money. 
7.6.2 Individuals, Households and Family Among the Malawians 
In Mariannhill half of the people interviewed lived alone, i.e. without any family or 
friends. These tended to be single rooms rented from various people, both local and their 
own country folk. Significantly the rest, slightly less than 50%, live with family, that is, 
spouse, brother, sister, or other family. Very few live with friends. (See table 7.5) 
Table 7.5: Malawians in Mariannhill: Accommodation 
No. % 
Alone 30 50 
Wife Ihusband 7 12 
Family 13 22 
Brother {Sister 7 12 
Friends 3 5 
Total 60 101 
The 60 households consist of only 126 individuals, 95 adults and 31 children. The 
average size of the household is 2. However, this ranges from 1 to 7 persons per 
household. Most commonly there are two persons per household. While there are 6 who 
claim they own the house, 52 households claim to be tenants. (There are a few who did 
not answer the question.) 
Of those interviewed 42 (70%) said that they were married, and 18 (30%) claimed to be 
unmarried. However, only 7 of the 42 married individuals said that they lived with their 
spouses and children in Mariannhill. In other words most of them are classic single 
migrant workers who have come to the urban centre to earn money and send remittances 
home. There are two important implications that arise from this set of data. The first is 
that as single migrant workers whose intention is to work and send back remittances or to 
purchase goods and take it back home, they may change their minds through a set of 
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circumstances and become permanent residents or permanent circular migrants rather 
than simple target migrants whose working prospects in Durban are restricted to this 
single one-off migrancy encounter. The second important point is that as a number of 
households are made up of single men or two persons; there is very little opportunity to 
exploit members of the household as cheap unpaid labour. This is not to suggest that it 
does not occur or that it will not occur in the future, but at the moment this is not a 
serious option for any of the households. 
While household structures may not be important as a resource for the majority of the 
Malawians living in Mariannhill, the network of contacts between friends and relatives 
that does exist is crucial as an information stream as to where there are vacancies and 
possibilities of jobs, as well as learning from these connections new skills in order to 
survive. Finding employment and learning new skills will be illustrated with three case 
studies. In the following section we shall by way of case studies or apt illustration 
highlight the different aspects of individuals involved in the decisions to migrate and the 
ways in which they have gone about strategising to make a living. 
7.7. CASE STUDIES OF INDIVIDUAL MALAWIAN MIGRANTS 
7.7.1. Case Study One: Sheikh Bwana Banda Relying on the Umah (a community or 
brotherhood of Muslims). 
In the above stress was placed on the fact that there is a long and tangible link that 
Malawians enjoy with South Africa, and Durban in particular, with their home country, 
district, town or Village. In the following case of Sheikh Bwana Banda, the prior 
existence of a contact to whom he could connect with once in Durban was not there. 
Instead he relied on an innate belief in Muslim brotherhood to see him through the 
anxious moments of arrival, finding accommodation and beginning the process of finding 
a job. He arrived literally a few years after the formal contracts of labour organised by 
TEBA for the mining industry came to an end. However, it was not ending of the TEBA 
contracts that directly affected him. Although a native of Mangochi district, he lived and 
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worked in Blantyre, working as a professional tailor. But he could not survive, so he felt 
he had to leave to find a way to support himself. As he says: 
I did not want to leave Malawi, but because of financial problems I had to 
leave. I lived in Blantyre. I sew. I am a tailor. I was renting a shop and a 
house. I was married and had to put food on the table. Financially it was very 
bad and could not make it. I came to South Africa. (Interview May 1999) 
While the TEBA contracts were a formally organised means of getting employment, it 
was specifically designed for the mining industry. But as shown by Chirwa, it did not 
prevent miners from engaging in other entrepreneurial activities (1997: 633-636). Chirwa 
calls them 'investing labour migrants' who contributed through both their remittances 
and income from other trading activities that they engaged in on weekends towards their 
rural households, creating and in some cases entrenching a rural elite in Malawi. Sheikh 
Banda, although originally from the rural district of Mangochi, was making a living in 
Blantyre, did not have this option. As quoted above he had to leave for financial reasons 
and came to Durban. Once he made the decision to migrate, he, and his travelling 
companion, had to find his own way, and rely on his wits and belief that Muslims would 
assist him. 
I had no plan to come to any person. I am a Muslim and I was going to rely 
on other Muslims to assist me. After I got off the taxi at Umgeni Road, I saw 
a Mosque [the May Street Mosque]. It was Esha time [the evening prayer]. I 
saw some people coming out of the Mosque. I simply went to them and greet 
them 'As salaam wa alakum '. They had to respond. I asked them to tell where 
155 Grey Street was [the Grey Street Mosque]. Someone took me there . 
... This was the only address I had. I met an old man there who was from 
Malawi. He worked in the Mosque. He helped the two of us. (Interview, May 
1999) 
It was from the Grey Street Mosque that he began his exploration of the city, and his first 
foray into fmding a job. He first meal was at the Islamic Propagation Centre International 
opposite the Mosque he was given tea while watching Islamic videos. However, his first 
job was not the result of any contact, but rather because of his skill. Banda recounts 
fmding his first job and accommodation: 
.. .1 walked down Queen Street, passed Valbro Chambers. I went inside, into 
the building. On the 6
th 
floor I heard machines. I saw small shops. A crippled 
lady asked me something in Zulu. I did not understand. I said I was a tailor. 
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She offered me coffee. That was my second cup for free for the day. This was 
not the owner. She said I should wait for the owner. When the owner came-
her name was Leigh - an African woman. I explained to her that I was a 
tailor. She gave me a piece of material and told me to make a shirt. I made it 
and she offered me a job at R600 a month. But I did not have a place to stay. 
She offered me to stay in the workshop. She said there were water, a stove, 
and electricity. I stayed there for three months. Then I met Hussain [another 
Malawian] and asked him if he knew a place I could stay. He introduced me 
to Dawood. That is his house over there [points to a white brick and mortar 
house above his galvanised iron constructed tailor shop in Mariannhill]. I 
rented a room from him for R45 a month. I shared [the room] with a man 
called Malume. I left the job after 6 months. (Interview, May 1999) 
The reasons he left were because he wanted to specialise in making men's clothes, and 
ultimately start his own business. As he stated his reasons: 
I wanted to specialise. I was sewing women's clothing. I specialise in men's 
clothing. That's what I do. I found a job at the new Durban Station at a shop 
called Garment Outfitters in Umgeni Road. They paid me R120 a week. This 
was less than the R600 at Leigh's workshop. But I got R100 allowance for 
bus fare. This job did not last long. I went to work for Reddy's tailors in 
Victoria Street. I worked there until 1998. 
Banda also wanted to start his own business, which meant he needed to also accumulate 
capital to buy a sewing machine, pay the initial rent for a space and the electricity. For six 
years he worked accumulating experience, building his reputation as a good tailor, and 
generally familiarising himself with the business of tailoring in Durban, and extending 
his contacts, as well as trying to accumulate enough capital to set himself up as an 
independent tailor. This period enabled him to make a number of contacts in the tailoring 
and clothing manufacturing business that stood him in good stead when he finally took 
the plunge on his own. One of his former employers often gave him contract work. 
Initially he had thought that he would set up a shop in the Grey Street complex, but 
another series of events were unfolding in Mariannhill, particularly in the neighbourhood 
known locally as Mamtakaqzi. 
What is important to note here is that Banda's initial decision to migrate was on the basis 
that he needed to work in order to generate finances to support his family in Malawi. 
However, after six years of working and living in South Africa he begins to take a longer 
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tenn view which essentially means he saw himself making a living in South Africa. 
Eventually he decides he no longer wants to return to Malawi, marries a local woman, 
and begins to build a new life for himself. Banda was philosophical about his 
abandonment of his Malawian family. He argued that it is one of dilemmas of a migrant: 
to bring the family or not? Can he afford to bring his family from Malawi? On the other 
hand she may refuse to come. However, he said, "this is where I can make a living, not in 
Malawi Eventually a decision has to be made: to divorce or abandon the Malawi family. 
On the other hand the waiting wife may get tired of waiting and finds another man". 
(Interview 27 July 1999). Of course he added that as a Muslim he could marry up to four 
wives, if he could afford it. But this was not the solution. To all intents and purposes he 
has divorced his wife in Malawi. However, marrying a local woman and having two 
young children enabled him to gain access to South African residency and eventually 
citizenship. He has a South African identity document which shows him to be a citizen of 
Malawi, but a pennanent resident of South Africa. While not undennining the integrity 
of his new marriage, this act is of some strategic importance as will be shown shortly. 
The piece of land known as Mamtakaqzi belonged to a Mr Moola, who sold it to the then 
Inner West Municipal Council of the Durban Metro in the post-1994 period. In that 
period there was a drive by the Municipality, with the assistance of the Provincial and 
National Governments to develop the previous disadvantaged or neglected urban black 
areas. This land was then developed by parcelling up the land into plots big enough to 
build two-roomed houses with funds from the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RDP) and the Department of Housing. The council provided infrastructure-
roads, electricity and water, the last two items having to be paid for by the new 
landowners and house owners. Access to such housing, facilities and services are 
restricted to South Africans, that is, apart from the income qualification (earning less than 
Rl 500 per month), an applicant for a house had to have a South African identity 
document. Given that Banda had decided to stay on in South Africa, and obtain his 
identity document, together with his marriage to a local woman, he qualified for access 
and benefited from the Reconstruction and Development Programme's housing 
programme as it was implemented by the local council. This gave him access to 
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electricity, and he was able to set up shop in Mariannhill, instead of the city centre, where 
he initially wanted to set up his tailoring business. Setting up a shop in the city centre 
would have incurred the additional burden of paying rent and electricity, travel costs from 
Mariannhill, and run a separate family household. Instead he was able to construct a 
corrugated iron room at the foot of his plot of land to use as his shop, and live in his new 
house giving him a substantial saving on the running costs of his business. Having roads 
and street lighting also meant that his clients from outside the Mariannhill, area were also 
able to easily have access to him. In addition, he has subsequently been able to expand 
his dwelling and rent out rooms to other Malawians, thus earning additional income. This 
also enabled him to build up a client base in Mariannhill, consisting of local people living 
in Mariannhill, Indians, Zulu speakers and Malawians. 
It might be argued that the municipality's decision to develop the area and his marriage 
(and obtaining a South African identity document) coinciding with his decision to be an 
independent entrepreneur was serendipitous. But while circumstances might have 
conspired fortuitously for Banda to establish his first business enterprise on his own land 
(not his original intention), he was able to take an opportunity, through a combination of 
historically developing his own local contacts and using information supplied by other 
Malawians to pursue the objective of becoming an independent tailor. Furthermore he 
was able to exploit a migrant/immigrant enclave - a captive set of clientele, in 
combination with local South Africans as his customer base. While not strictly an ethnic 
entrepreneur, (that is, reliant on a particular ethnic group for his main business) his initial 
clients were the people in the area, of whom many were Malawian migrants. 
While I have sought to emphasize the sustained network of contacts and conduits of 
information that Sheikh Banda used at every stage of his livelihood strategies, there is 
also the fact that he did not sustain his full family links to Malawi. Apart from his sister 
who came to him from Malawi, his initial reasons for leaving Malawi, to provide for his 
wife and family did not in the end materialise. Indeed his marriage and family life in 
Malawi broke down. We shall see in the next case that Said Muhammad in fact retained 
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his family links to the extent of bringing his family and children to live with him in 
Durban, and strengthening his links with his extended family in Malawi. 
7.7.2 Case study two: Said Muhammad: From religious teacher to business 
entrepreneur. 
This case study concerns Said Muhammad, of whom we have already come across (see 
above pI83). Arriving alone in 1992 desperate to fmd ajob and accumulate some capital 
to return to Malawi, Said Muhammad was able, as shown above, to use a combination of 
his network contacts from his town of Salima and friends living in Durban to flrstly fmd 
and secure accommodation in Durban, and with these contacts and his credentials as a 
Muslim scholar and teacher to secure himself a job with the International Da'wah 
Movement. A few months later when he had secured appropriate accommodation he 
brought his wife and children from Malawi to live with him. His dedication to his work 
as a religious instructor and leader, as shown above was not in question, but was not a 
sufflcient reason for coming to South Africa. Despite his success as a religious instructor, 
this kind of employment did not advance his other reasons for coming to Durban, that is, 
to secure sufflcient capital to invest in property in Malawi. 
Said Muhammad: I have plots in Malawi, one in Blantyre and one in 
Lilongwe. 
Interviewer: What do you mean you have two plots? 
Said Muhammad: I want to build on the plots. In Blantyre I started to build, 
but I need to continue. I have to see what has been done. I just bought a plot 
in Lilongwe. I gave my younger brother money to buy a plot for 8000 
quachas [approximately RI000]. Land is cheaper in Malawi than in South 
Africa. I need to go and see the land and continue to build on the one and start 
on the other. 
What are you going to build? 
Said Muhammad: I am going to build rooms and rent it to people 
(Interview, 29 July 2000) 
Clearly he needed additional income to accomplish his property acquisition plans and 
building projects. Indeed from early on he said he needed to learn a new and practical 
skill. He commented ironically: 'One thing, our people are not interested in money. Like 
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Mugabe we are getting degrees, but that is not the end. We have to do manual work. 
Today people here [referring to the Malawians] know many skills like carpentry'. He 
could have added sewing, or dressmaking. In order to raise the capital he needed he learnt 
to sew from Sheikh Bwana Banda. 
I am an Islamic teacher by profession. I learnt dress making here. I had to 
learn a skill to survive. Banda assisted me, [taught him to sew, a point made 
by Banda separately]. I am now a part-time dressmaker. (Interview 8 July 
1999) 
Said Muhammad also rationalised his part time work as part of his duties as a religious 
instructor, by claiming that he needed to show people, by setting an example, the dignity 
of work. He said: "Sometimes people look to you for an example. I had to show people 
about self-employment. I had to show by example. Islam does not allow you to beg when 
you are physically fit". 
While initially survival and ideological influences directed him to find additional means 
of livelihood, in order to fulfil his long-term ambitions of raising capital for future 
investments in Malawi, he, unlike Banda the tailor, saw his long-term prospects in both 
Malawi and South Africa. Speaking as a religious instructor and part-time tailor he said 
in an interview in 1999: 
I have been back to Malawi in June 1995. Then again in December 1997. My 
intention is to go in December. I wish I could make an arrangement to be in 
both places. My people need me in Malawi. But also my work here is going 
very well. Maybe I should go two times a year, or even once a year. Malawi 
is very poor; you cannot really make a living. But my heart is still that side. 
His desire to be committed to have a presence in two places simultaneously clearly makes 
him a circular migrant. However, his initial success as a dressmaker with entrepreneurial 
flair saw him expand his clothing making business. His initial modus operandi, while 
living and working in Mariannhill, was that he would sew dresses and pinafores in the 
evening when he returned home from his obligations as a religious instructor. He would 
then leave it to his wife to sell them at the local shopping centre in Mariannhill. He also 
has an arrangement with a local woman street trader to sell his products in Prince Edward 
Street and Mansell Road in the city centre. While this did bring in the extra income he 
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wanted, he expanded his business in a very entrepreneurial way by making the most of 
the opportunities that present themselves. During the course of the year 2000 he was 
transferred from Mariannhill to Isipingo Rail to continue his religious instruction and 
proselytising activities. He used the opportunity to expand his business activities. 
Isipingo Rail is a railway junction, taxi and bus rank and business centre for a number of 
townships to the south of Durban. As transport node and business centre a large volume 
of people pass through it providing an ideal opportunity to sell his dresses and pinafores. 
He engaged another woman to sell his products. He now had three places in which he 
sold his products. 
The basic way in which his clothes were sold to customers was that he would find a 
woman who was willing to sell his clothes. They would set the price, for example, R35 
for pinafores. The woman street trader would take a cut from this and he would get the 
balance. While there might be some negotiation over the price of the garment, this is 
largely determined by the market conditions. Thus for example, Said Muhammad said 
that he could sell a pinafore for R40 or R45 in Isipingo, but not in the Durban city centre 
where the price seems to be uniform R35. As he said: "People in town will not pay more 
than R35. Also it is the unanimous price for pinafores all over town. Nobody will pay 
more. But it is possible to sell for more outside the town". Having established the terms 
of reference for trading, he would then collect his share from the sale of the garments 
from the women street traders every third or forth day. 
The selection of a woman street trader to sell his products was not a haphazard choice. 
Such women are carefully chosen. Usually this is done through a network of Malawians, 
one or several of whom already knew the women concerned and could vouch for them, 
either because they have had similar dealings with them and can therefore make an 
accurate assessment of their trustworthiness and entrepreneurial skills, or because these 
local women were the marriage partners of the Malawians. In most cases when the local 
women married Muslim Malawians, they had to convert to Islam, thus further inscribing 
their loyalty and trustworthiness within a closed network of known street traders that 
Malawians could use as outlets for their products. However, this should not be 
199 
constructed as providing employment, as this was not an employer-employee 
relationship, but rather one of mutual benefit - a symbiotic trading partnership. It did 
nevertheless provide the local women with additional incentive for income generation 
and increased product turnover at their street stalls, and more generally to the informal 
sector. According to the Deputy Mayor Logie Naidoo, in 1998 there are 20 000 street 
traders of whom 60% are women, at whose stalls R500 million is spent annually (Naidoo, 
2002: 1). In the words of a city official and iTrump leader Richard Dobson: 'The 
informal sector contributes significantly to the economy of the city, providing an income 
for many unemployed people' (Metro Beat: 15 May - 15 June, 2003: 17). It is to this 
sector that Malawian informal traders, such as Said Muhammad, contribute. 
But Said Muhammad made his choices of women retail sellers not just on the basis of 
what his co-religionists and countrymen advised, but also strategically. His first place of 
trade was in Mariannhill business and shopping centre, where his wife was the initial 
street trader. The streets chosen in the city centre, Victoria and Prince Edward and 
Mansell Road, are major thoroughfares and intersections for workers coming into and 
leaving the city via the transport node of the Warwick Triangle (bus, taxis and trains). His 
third place of trading in many ways duplicates the city centre, in that it is also a major 
transport node with light and heavy industry nearby, and hence substantial numbers of 
workers passing through. Capturing the passing trade potential was precisely what made 
him successful in his business ventures. 
7.7.3 Case study three: Aslaam Kadalie: Beyond Networks. 
Networks and family contacts often provide crucial support and information that makes a 
newly arrived migrant's life much more bearable in a new environment. However is it 
also the case that such networks of friends and relatives may limit a migrant to a closed 
circle of contacts. This should not imply that such a network operates like a closed shop. 
While this may be true in some cases, several interviewees said that they had to apply for 
jobs themselves or make their own way with very little or no support from their migrant 
compatriots. This case study will illustrate variance in relying on networks: at some point 
a migrant has to eventually rely on his own initiatives to make his own living. 
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Aslaam Kadalie comes from Mangochi district in Malawi. He first came to South Africa 
in about 1995 at the request of his uncle who lived in Azaadville, a former Indian 
township near Johannesburg. His uncle had been in South Africa for 20 years and had 
made regular visits to his village in Mangochi and when he fell ill he requested his 
favourite nephew to look after him during his illness. After looking after his uncle for 
about two months, he returned to Malawi to complete his' A' level university entrance 
examinations, and was looking forward to obtaining a scholarship to read for a degree in 
law either in Malawi or in Singapore. But a series of setbacks prevented the realisation of 
his goals. 
His father, a businessman, suddenly fell ill and died. This prevented him from going to 
university in Malawi, as there was no one to fmance his studies. His application for a 
scholarship was turned down. In addition, soon after his father's death, his uncle in 
Azaadville (Johannesburg, South Africa) also passed on. Left with very little, he was 
urged by his family to take his chances in South Africa. As he explained: 
Interviewer: Why did you come back [to South Africa]? 
Aslaam: Well, there was some pressure at home. They said: "Maybe there is a 
chance in South Africa". So I left. I said I know how to do some sewing, so 
maybe I can do that. I stayed a few days - three or four days- in Jo'burg. 
Then I came down to Durban because I got some friends who were doing 
sewing. I was going to join them. (Interview, 28 July 1999) 
Here is a case of the decision to migrate being made by the family, rather than by the 
potential migrant himself. Aslaam Kadalie leaves home with the consent of his family, 
travelling alone by bus and train to Johannesburg and then on to Durban. He comes to 
Durban because of his network of friends, and immediately links up with one for whom 
he has an address in Overport. His friend who goes by the adopted name ofDumisani has 
already been living in Durban for five years. Aslaam becomes part of Dumisani' s sewing 
circle. They soon move to Mariannhill because of the high cost of living in Overport, and 
the ever-present danger of police raids. Initially he did not know why Dumisani wanted 
to move, but this became apparent later, especially when Dumisani decided that 'things 
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were not working out very well' and returned to Malawi. Aslaam was now left to fend for 
himself without his friend's support. Indeed he finds it difficult to make a living on just 
selling pinafores as his main product. He explains: 
Interviewer: So you are sewing on your own now? 
Aslaam: Sometimes I still do sewing, sometimes I do nothing. If I got 
material, then I sew. If the money is there, then I can buy the material to sew. 
Otherwise I cannot sew. 
Interviewer: What do you sew? Where do you sell it? Do you take orders? 
Aslaam: I sew pinafores. I sew and sell. People in town buy them from me. I 
sew and give it to a girl to sell on the streets. 
He went on further to say that the streets are 'crammed with them. They are everywhere, 
so I cannot sew and pack them. If they are going fast, then I sew. But they are going 
slowly, and then we wait [the street trader and himself]. I just cannot pack them'. He also 
added that the street trader, Zandele, also sold pinafores for two other people, which 
made making a living from sewing very difficult. It is because of this situation, that 
Aslaam Kadalie sought alternative sources of income. He has worked as a sales assistant 
to a retail-clothing outlet in the Grey Street area and as a petrol pump attendant at a petrol 
garage in Chatsworth. He explains the decision to fmd a job a petrol pump attendant: 
Once I went bankrupt, then I worked in Chatsworth, Unit 11, as a petrol 
attendant in a garage for one and half months. I got R180 per week. I needed 
the capital to pay debts and buy more material. If I go bankrupt again, I will 
have to do this again. 
Indeed he had to find alternatives to sewing as a means of livelihood survival several 
times. While he did not give up the possibility of being an independent small-scale 
entrepreneur operating from the small room that he rents in Mariannhill, he also realised 
that the market for pinafores was flooded. He had to have an alternative. Clearly he had 
to find formal employment as a means to settling debts and accumulating capital to 
continue his self-employed activity as a small manufacturer of pinafores. Such a strategy 
was not dissimilar to Sheikh Banda and Said Muhammad when they first started to find 
the means to survival in Durban, except in Aslaam's case it was a second choice of 
livelihood strategy While working as an employee gave him access to a steady income, it 
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left him less in control of his material livelihood production. Another alternative trading 
activity that he explored was selling cosmetics door to door. This is a trading activity that 
gave greater control of his time and a sense of independence. He observed that a 
Malawian friend and neighbour, who had a formal job in a factory, made an additional 
income from selling cosmetics over the weekend. He learnt from his neighbour about a 
cosmetic manufacturer in Phoenix Industrial Park, north of Durban's city centre, who 
sells slightly damaged, but perfectly usable cosmetics to street traders. Aslaam visited the 
factory, and after convincing the management that he was a bona fide informal trader, he 
was allowed to purchase for cash a range of deodorants, creams and other items. This was 
a new venture for him and soon realised that his target market are mainly women who 
stayed at home during the week and who lived further away from the business centre in 
Mariannhill. There were several reasons for targeting such women: Firstly, because they 
were not always allowed outside the home, and had considerable distances to travel (or 
walk if they had no access to a taxi or bus) they were glad to have a cosmetics salesman 
come to them. Secondly, men, Aslaam said, did not want to buy deodorants or any 
cosmetics. At most they would buy underarm sprays or roll on deodorants. Thirdly, he 
realised that because women stayed at home, they did not always have an independent 
source of income, he would have to supply cosmetics 'on account', that is, on credit. He 
discounted the idea that this was dangerous practice, as most informal traders would fmd 
it difficult to sustain a credit system with customers. He said because he was selling his 
cosmetics so cheaply, he found that the women were always able to pay their debts. 
Furthermore he realised that timing his visits was crucial. He could approach them during 
the mornings without the suspicions of the husbands or partners being aroused, and that 
they were willing to purchase cosmetics. 
This business, according to Aslaam Kadalie, has become his main source of income 
because in a week he can earn the same amount that he would in a month of sewing and 
selling pinafores. It meant that he had to walk and travel more, but he felt it was worth his 
while to earn the additional income. Aslaam Kadalie had discovered a niche market that 
had not been tapped into. Unlike Said Muhammad who intensified his labour and 
expanded his outlets for his goods, Aslaam Kadalie shifted to a completely different 
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market, retailing a different product for a market that is not easy to reach through 
conventional retail outlets such as shops (including the ubiquitous spaza shops) and 
supermarkets. 
Aslaam Kadalie represents those Malawians who live alone, without relying heavily on 
an extended network of friends and relatives to make his way in the world, yet benefiting 
from the close camaraderie that comes from living in an ethnic enclave. He does not rely 
on the benefits of sharing accommodation to reduce the burden of rent, and increase the 
possibility of capital accumulation, having solved that problem in his own way. But he 
does rely on the information that circulates among the Malawian inhabitants of 
Mari annhill , and between close friends. Yet he is exceptional in that he has attempted 
different strategies of survival, and is currently enjoying success. Will this enable him in 
the future to return to Malawi? On this issue he is ambiguous: 
Yes, I want to go back to Malawi. I prefer to stay in Malawi. Sometimes I see 
advantages [to stay] here. Sometimes I see advantages in Malawi. It is a 
competition. I am not sure what the future will be. If I get bankrupt, I will 
have to stay here. Maybe forever and forever. 
Kadalie's experiences have either made him cautious, and probably a bit cynically about 
future prospects. Unlike Sheikh Banda, or Said Muhammad, he has no basic resource to 
rely on such as ownership of a house, a skill, or a qualification. Yet he picks himself up 
every time he gets dealt a blow, and starts again. His gift is his entrepreneurship, his 
ability to read the market situation for himself fairly accurately and dogged persistence to 
make a living. 
7.8 Commentary 
7.8.1 Place and identity 
There are different aspects to the notion of place. In the context of pursuing livelihood 
strategies place of origin, place of destination and use of identity and networks in these 
places are important to consider. Like most continental Africans such as the Congolese, 
Nigerians, or Senegalese, they rely on their national identity to enter the country, the 
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difference being that they, the Malawians, are treated with less suspicion than other 
African nationals. Secondly, unlike many Congolese, Senegalese2 and Nigerians3 they do 
not claim to be refugees. Refugees have a certain ease of entry and unlike in other 
African countries have freedom of movement to find work because they are not confined 
to refugee camps (whatever the horrors of their experiences in their countries of origin 
and in transit to South Africa). Malawians on the other hand did not, and could not make 
these claims. They are aware that a declaration to immigration official that they are 
seeking work in South Africa would be a tactical mistake. Thus obtaining a tourist visa is 
the least problematic means of entry because they can easily satisfy the test of a name and 
an address of a relative or friend in South Africa given the long-term contact between the 
two countries. These are not fictional addresses because that is exactly where they head 
once they arrive. In any event Malawians are entitled to this, in terms of recent policy 
changes (not legislative) to admit people from within the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) with greater ease of access and residential rights to their respective 
countries. As Said Muhammad stated in recounting his experience at the Zimbabwe-
South Africa border: 
The treatment at the border was very good. There is only one condition: do 
not say you are coming to look for work. Say you are visiting. You see, in 
the SADC non-citizens like Malawians have special permission to live 
here. You can even get an identity book, but you are a non-citizen. (July 
1999) 
Another informant, Banda confirmed the residency regulation by showing me his resident 
permit and passport, which was stamped: "Malawian citizen, resident in South Africa". 
Thus Malawians enter South Africa as nationals without prejudice or special status in 
terms of refugee legislation. Yet this relative freedom to enter the country on a tourist 
visa is in reality a means of obtaining access to jobs or economic opportunities. As 
Sheikh Banda states: 
The general reason why Malawians come here is because South Africa is 
rich. It is financially good. One can make money here compared to other 
2 Se~e~alese have also claimed refugee status, as political opponents of the previous regime under the 
S?clahst Party ?f Sengor an~ later Abdou Diouf. The 1988 election results, which gave the Socialist Party 
jlCtOry, were .dls~uted and no~s ensued. There was also conflict with the southern Casamache region. 
There are Nlgenans who claim refugee status, especially as opponents of the Abacha regime. See Morris 
A (2001: 72) , 
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southern African countries. This is better than Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
Although they have good economies, South Africa has a better economy. It 
also has strong rules. 
What is clear is that migrants, whatever their own or other southern African countries 
currently offer in the form of livelihood possibilities, still see South Africa as the best 
possible destination. Yet entry as a national of another country does not imply that every 
migrant wants to settle here permanently. Clearly some do, but retain their ties to their 
places of origin, and intend, at some future and unspecified time, return to their home -
the village, town or city of their country of origin. But they still hold the option of 
coming back as migrants to seek work for specific purposes - accumulate capital, buy 
goods for trading or to support a family or business enterprise in Malawi. Official 
national status, the country of origin, becomes another means to access other livelihood 
possibilities in other SADC countries, but principally South Africa. These Malawian 
migrants are transnational migrants. 
Upon entry the Malawians adopt different identities in relation to the place of 
accommodation and work. The fact of nationality is important for entry (the long-term 
relationships between the two countries and membership of the SADC), but once inside 
the country, religious affiliation, village or town of origin, work skills, length of stay, and 
marriage to locals are important considerations in their survivalist strategies. 
Consideration shall be given to these other identities, especially religion and skills as part 
of their livelihood strategies below. What is important to highlight here is the fact that 
many Malawians opt to live in a relatively underdeveloped part of the city. Unlike the 
studies of Congolese and Nigerians reviewed in Chapter 4 whose livelihoods are 
integrally bound to the centre of the city, the Malawians who live in Mariannhill do not 
just occupy a different physical space in the city, but pursue a different way of 
participating and making a living in the city. Being physically far from the city centre 
gives them a level of protection from constant raids from the police and home affairs 
officials, as well as enabling a most modest standard of living. Furthermore there is a 
sense of community that has developed among the Malawians, as is evidenced by the 
building of two mosques and a madressa (an Islamic school) to educate children and 
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adults about Islam, and a network of contacts allowing for a flow of information that 
enables Malawians to access jobs and economic opportunities. However, unlike the 
Senegalese who rely heavily on their own internal network, the Dahira, for support, and 
to which they contribute financially (see chapter 4: pp91-92) the Malawian networks are 
less formally organised. They do rely on their networks, particularly as points of contact 
when they first enter the country and to access their first jobs, but they also pursue 
livelihood strategies without their networks. However it should be noted that not all 
Malawians pursue this strategy of place and identity, such as Mariannhill, national of 
Malawi, native of Mango chi district, and lor Muslim, or friend and relative from town of 
village of origin, as the only means of entry and survival as foreign migrants. A 
significant number do live in areas such as Overport, a high-density residential area of 
mainly high-rise apartment blocks. It was previously under apartheid an Indian Group 
Area. There are also Malawians who live in the city centre. Whereas Senegalese and 
Congolese are conspicuous, at least initially, by their inability to communicate in either 
English or one of the local indigenous languages, Malawians speak English, and make 
the effort to learn Zulu, which allows for a level of integration within the community or 
residential area of occupation, and easier working relationships with local people. 
7.S.2 Income, skills and education 
The major source of income is from earnmgs, either as wage labourers or as 
entrepreneurs from self-employment or wages in the formal or informal sectors. The 
majority of adults claimed that they were workers or casual labourers. In Mariannhill 
most individuals claimed to be in some form of formal employment, although such 
employment is seen as precarious in that they are employed in jobs from which they 
could easily be retrenched, or fired without recourse to any legal protection, as they are 
not legal contract migrant workers. In short many of them are undocumented foreign 
migrant workers. However, Malawians seem to enjoy certain advantages in the job 
market, being a reasonably amenable labour force to the delight of local employers. In 
short, they work harder, and offer less resistance to employers. 
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While not all the Malawians are highly skilled to enable them to become employed or 
become self-employed immediately, such as Sheikh the tailor, (see case study above) 
many have been able to re-skill themselves. For example, many have said they are tailors. 
In fact it is a skill that they have acquired in Durban, not from Malawi. Furthennore it is 
not so much tailoring, as being able to cut and sew accurately a set of particular patterns 
into dresses (pinafores), trousers and shirts. In other words while a few of them, such as 
Sheikh Banda and Tayoob Mayele, are certified tailors from Malawi, many of them learnt 
from their compatriots how to cut and sew simple designs for dresses, shirts and trousers. 
This skill is then either offered to local tailors or sweat shops in the Durban central 
business district for particular kinds of piece work, or they engage in infonnal trade by 
making basic dresses to be sold on the streets of Durban by infonnal traders as is the case 
for Said Muhammad and Aslaam Kadalie. In the case of the fonner by combining his 
fonnal employment as a religious instructor with his infonnal dress making business by 
expanding his places of trade and increasing the volume of his products. In the case of the 
latter, not only did he learn to sew, but also re-skilled himself when his dress making 
business was under threat, and applied his knowledge of salesmanship by selling 
cosmetics door to door. Kadalie exploited a niche market in an area where supennarkets 
are few, and was in his viewable to offer a 'cheaper' product. 
What these examples illustrated are three important aspects of migrants living and 
working in Durban's outer suburb ofMariannhill: First, through their network of friends 
and relatives they acquired work opportunities and skills. This has been critical to their 
success. Secondly, they provided in the fonn of partnerships with local women street 
traders the means for retailing the clothes they made, thereby creating local employment, 
albeit in the cases of Aslaam Kadalie and Said Muhammad the oversupply of pinafores, 
thus flooding the market. Thirdly, those who came as single migrants were, and in some 
cases still are, able to satisfy their own individual needs either by sharing accommodation 
and food, and/or frugal living, thus putting a premium on remitting funds to Malawi, to 
purchase the necessary goods to take back home. 
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7.S.3 Households and Work 
The sharing of accommodation is not a prominent feature of Malawians living in 
Mariannhill. For those who are employees earning an income (formal or informal) such a 
situation is desirable. Apart from the constant risk of deportation which substantially 
alters the perception of their earning capacity, the Malawians living in Mariannhill do not 
all have the benefit of an extended family or network of household members to draw on 
to intensify earning capacity. There is some evidence to suggest it is beginning to occur 
in the densely populated suburb of Overport. This is evident in the statistical analysis of 
the previous chapter. In Mariannhill the average household size is two persons, with the 
most frequently occurring size being one. Indeed as many of them are single migrants, or 
have very small and young families, it is not possible for them to extract extra labour 
capacity from the household. This reflects the fact that many are either here as single 
male migrants who intend to return to Malawi at some indeterminate time in the future. 
F or some the time spent in South Africa is determined by how quickly they can 
accumulate the resources they require - finance and various commodities such as 
electrical equipment - before returning. This is not to suggest that the household 
members, friends and relatives play no role. As seen in table 7.5, 34 per percent of those 
surveyed claimed they were occupants in the house which belonged to a family member -
an uncle, a brother, or some other family relative. This suggests that a network of 
assistance to friends and relatives. Nevertheless sharing accommodation spreads the 
burden of rent and subsistence needs in order to save more money. 
However for those who are self-employed sharing accommodation and being able to use 
the labour of the household can become a distinct advantage, particularly iffamily labour 
is used as a cheap resource. Said Muhammad who while being paid to undertake the 
duties and responsibilities of a religious teacher, also learnt to cut and sew and intensify 
his family labour. His sewing skill earned him an extra income, which enabled him to 
have his family from Malawi with him. In the meantime his sewing business expanded, 
and he needed additional help. At fust he resorted to using his wife's labour to sell the 
products he made, but soon needed more assistance and employed an additional 
Malawian tailor, a distant relative, who also shared the same house. In addition he went 
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into partnership with two local South African women to sell clothes for him on the street. 
Not only was he earning an income to meet the needs of his family, but also able through 
the recruitment of a kinsman, meet his additional labour requirements, increase his 
turnover and to remit money to his family in Malawi. Some of that money, he said, is to 
buy property in one of the towns in Malawi. This, he said, was where he saw his long-
term future: renting property for accommodation and business in Malawi's towns and 
cities. He has no long-term intentions to stay in South Africa, but admitted that the 
possibility always existed of being a future target migrant should the need arise. 
But this raises another point. As seen already, most of the Malawians living in 
Mariannhill are Muslim. It suggests that the network of friends and relatives are people 
from the same religious background to secure jobs, or rather make use of their knowledge 
of certain job opportunities for people principally from the same religious persuasion. It 
is a moot point whether religious values play any role in the work ethics of Malawians. 
As many interviewers testified one social characteristic, which enables many of them to 
find jobs among the Muslim and Indian merchants of Grey Street, is that many of the 
Malawians are their co-religionists. However a similar religious background may pre-
dispose Muslim merchants to employ Malawians, but does not necessarily guarantee 
employment opportunities. Ultimately employment opportunities for the Malawians rest 
on skill, flexibility, their vulnerability, language and reliability. 
But religious identity is important. Religious affiliation operates in a number of ways. 
Firstly, those Malawians living in Mariannhill are all Muslims, mostly Yao. They have 
been able to settle here well before the 1994 elections because as Muslims they were 
allowed to live among Indians. In Mariannhill, there was a predominance of Indians, and 
using the warped logic of apartheid ethnos theory, Islam was an Indian religion, so 
therefore it was appropriate for Malawian Muslims to settle among Indians. This 
community of Malawian Muslims in Mariannhill ' now has its own Sheikh, mosque and 
madressa or Quranic School. Secondly, there is a sense of co-operation and responsibility 
among the inhabitants, collectively known as the Greyvillea Muslim Association for 
receiving migrants from Malawi into their community. But primary responsibility lies 
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with the migrant and his or her hosts to accommodate, provide initial sustenance, and 
direct the migrant to those who might assist in finding work. Thirdly, Muslims in Malawi 
have established long-term relationships with various local South African Islamic charity 
and welfare organisations that have been operating in Malawi. In the main these 
organisations are mostly based in Durban, such as the International Dawa Movement and 
the International Islamic Propagation Centre, which are supported by local Indian South 
African Muslims. These contacts are reciprocated when Malawians come to Durban. It is 
in the context of these contacts that the Malawian immigrants are able to fmd work from 
among the local Muslim community. Work opportunities range from casual unskilled 
jobs to regular fixed salary work as machinists, tailors, shop assistants and domestic 
servants. As Shafee, a Malawian Muslim said 'As Muslims they give us work, but they 
also don't pay well. We must thank Allah they give us the chance to get some money, but 
it is too little.' However another Malawian, Sarah, qualified this by stating that even if 
wages are low by South African standards, it is much more than they would earn in 
Malawi. For example, a recent migrant of three weeks, Jim, said that it took him three 
months to earn enough money, $75 (R750), just to enable him to travel from Malawi to 
South Africa. Even under exploitative conditions such as for domestic workers, it would 
take less than two months to earn that amount in South Africa. 
7.8.4 Housing as an asset for migrants 
New houses provided a variety of new means to making a living. A house could now be 
conceived as a permanent asset and used in a number of ways, for example, as a base for 
starting or extending an enterprise from home such as a 'spaza' (informal) shop. It could 
also be made available for renting accommodation space or sold to raise cash to offset 
debts. As a home it could provide the base for incorporating new family members, 
extending social relationships, thereby investing in social capital. Not all of these options 
have been, or are fully exercised, nor are any of them widespread. In the case studies 
above, aspects of these 'asset' options are referred to in the context of discussing 
household social relationships. In the case of Mariannhill land was sold to the Inner West 
local council that made it available to residents of the area. The infrastructure was put in 
place by the local authority. Water and electricity was provided, as well as a road 
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network, replacing foot pathways and roughly made dirt roads. Those who were able to 
obtain their residence permits or South African citizenship (as a result of being part of the 
SADC or other creative ways) were entitled to benefit from the housing grants and 
subsidies made available in the immediate post 1994 period. Some informants, such as 
Sheikh Banda, who married a local woman and has two children, benefited from the 
housing policy. While he was able to make ends meet on the basis of his tailoring 
business, the prospect of finding additional fmances to pay for the education of his 
children has led him to renting out a room to Malawian migrants. Extra income is being 
earned from ownership of land and home. Sheikh Banda's option was to exploit his 
security of tenure. 
While many Malawians are target migrants, some begin to see their stay less as interim, 
rather more long term. This does not mean that they will never return to Malawi, but it 
means that they have developed a more long-term perspective on their stay in South 
Africa. They become circular migrants, such as Said Muhammad, or permanent residents, 
legally or illegally. 
It is the possibility of living in the urban periphery, with lower accommodation and 
subsistence costs and with a community support system that enables them to survive on 
very low wages. But for them it is not just another poverty trap. Like the refugee 
Congolese or Senegalese street traders who are able to survive on very small profit 
margins because they live communally in run down city centre apartments, surviving in 
the semi-urban area of Mariannhill (or rapidly urbanising area) enables them to 
accumulate some surplus funds by working in poorly paid jobs. It was noted that for a 
large portion of the Malawian migrants, their earnings are well below the theoretical 
subsistence level. Even so, Malawians have been able to survive, and many succeed. 
Income levels as an indicator are useful, but have to be understood as embedded in a 
wider set of social relationships of community and household, as well as networks and 
links between the place of origin and the migrants' destination, encumbered by a range of 
issues from place, identity and skills, to exploiting economic opportunities as they arise 
on a day to day level. In the case of one of my key informants Sheikh Banda, he was able 
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to set up his own tailoring business in Mariannhill, after many years of working in a 
clothing factory and various tailoring establishments. Working from home he was able to 
accept contract work from some of the Indian owned clothing factories and retailers, as 
well as casual everyday business. Others such as Aslaam Kadalie and Said Muhammad 
manufacture pinafores, shirts and trousers for sale on the streets of the city centre. The 
local street sellers are in partnership with these Malawians. Other Malawian migrants, it 
seems, buy various goods that are scarce in Malawi: clothes, electronic equipment, 
household equipment, cosmetics, trinkets, etc. for re-sale in Malawi. Others, such as the 
recent migrant, Jamie Mdala, are here as target workers. They have in their minds what 
they want to pursue as their main subsistence or livelihood activities in Malawi, but need 
to obtain the necessary start up capital or commodities by working in South Africa, and 
then returning. Thus for some the whole process of migration, work, accumulation and 
return could be repeated as need arises leading to a pattern of oscillating international 
migration between their countries of origin and South Africa. 
The Malawians present a picture of industrious petty entrepreneurs and workers engaged 
in a diverse set of occupations removed from the everyday contestation of physical space 
in the city centre both with other street traders, city officials and the police. The three 
case studies tend to suggest an almost unproblematic entry, through the use of their 
networks, into the local economy, and depending on the opportunities presented, making 
good their original objectives in migrating to Durban, albeit making the necessary tactical 
changes in the situations they find themselves. But as seen in the last chapter a number of 
problems that the Malawian face were noted, among the most important being 
xenophobia and racism. These prejudices directed at them do impact on the way they 
operate in securing for themselves accommodation and livelihoods. Constructing their 
livelihood strategies and coping with prejudices is the subject of the next section. 
7.S.S. Coping with Prejudice 
It has been well documented that continental Africans are often surprised at the 
xenophobic and racist vitriol directed at them by South Africans, particularly black 
people. The most common term used by black South African for continental Africans is 
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'amakwerekwere' - reference to the apparently unintelligible languages that they speak 
(see Bouillon, 2001, for an expansion on the issue of language and its relationship to 
African immigration to South Africa). An African person who cannot speak one of the 
indigenous languages is clearly a foreigner, and often seen as a threat. Furthermore they 
are marked as different by their physical appearance, bearing, clothing and general 
demeanour. To say that continental Africans have a difficult relationship with South 
African, particularly with black people (and especially men) is an understatement. Apart 
from verbal abuse, they are often accused of stealing jobs and taking the local women, as 
well as being involved in crime and drugs. The last two aspects are particularly applied to 
Nigerians and Congolese, who as Morris points are numerically the least significant of 
the total number of immigrants, refugees or migrants in the country (Morris, 2001: 68), 
but occupy a significant spot in the media, and mind-set of political leaders and ordinary 
South Africans, both black and white (Morris, 2001: 77). The Congolese and Nigerians 
have reacted to such prejudices by defending their national identity, thus reinforcing a 
cycle of boundary maintenance, stereotyping, and promoting scapegoating among South 
Africans in a context of sluggish economic growth and high unemployment (Morris, 
2001: 75-8). However, unlike Congolese and Nigerians, the Malawians in Mariannhill, 
while they do experience xenophobia and racism, have developed a different approach to 
dealing with such prejudices. In the main it has been less openly hostile, and more 
cautious. Said Muhammad, a man of measured words, had this to say of South Africans: 
I will never forget this country when I go. Generally the people in South 
Africa are good people. But sometimes they call us kwerekwere. But mostly 
they are good people (29 July 2001). 
Adama Mosal echoed these sentiments in much fuller terms: 
I have lived with both Zulus and Malawians. I stayed with Indians in 
Clairwood. I have been treated well - I stayed very nicely with them. I have 
no problems here in Mariannhill. I have played soccer with Indian and 
Zanzibaris. But I am not regarded as a Muntu. 
Yet this measured assessment of South Africans, as generally good people, did not hide 
the perception that there exist below the surface tense race relations in the county. Sheikh 
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Banda commented on how in any dispute between individuals from different race groups 
one can pick out the difference in approaches: 
... when there is a dispute a Zulu will go for this knife or gun to kill, an Indian 
will go to the police, the English will call a conference to discuss the 
problem, and the Afrikaner will get his gun and threaten to kill you. 
Malawians, he argued have a different approach: 
The Malawians will say, "If you think you are better, then you are". Then 
walk away. Later they will discuss and resolve the problem. 
While such an approach makes for good conflict management, and allows for negotiation 
and resolution over whatever problem exists, it does not hide the fact they, the 
Malawians, like the Nigerians and Congolese, have an antipathy for black male South 
Africans. Sheikh Banda in commenting on relations with local black men and women 
made this observation, barely disguising his sarcasm: 
Ninety percent of the ladies [local women] treat Malawians well. The 
response is very good. But the males - that is the problem. They think they 
are different. They make mountains out of molehills. For example if there is a 
small accusation of some wrongdoing, they make a big issue of it. But they 
are the Muntus. 
Indeed the relationship with women operates on at least two levels for Malawian 
migrants. Firstly, as the street sellers of their clothing products. Secondly, as marriage 
partners. In both the cases of the dressmakers, Said Muhammad and Aslaam Kadalie, the 
relationship with women street traders is a purely business partnership. Yet this may 
prompt the violent reaction by black men that they are stealing their women. But as 
pointed out by many a migrant that they tend to treat women with greater respect, but no 
less chauvinism. Women are there to serve the needs of men. Nevertheless the 
underlining fear of violent reaction of black males has prompted Malawian traders to opt 
for women street traders as the means to sell their products. Furthermore, as shown in 
case of Said Muhammad the choosing of a woman street trader is not arbitrary, but one of 
close scrutiny, with the assistance and advice of local women marriage partners of the 
Malawians. 
215 
As marriage partners, local women enable a certain leverage with the Department of 
Home Affairs to grant residency permits, and also allow for some level of integration into 
South African society and access to various resources such as housing and greater rights 
to social service. However this integration should not be exaggerated as the woman is 
often treated badly by her own people. As Howa Mosal, wife of Adama Mosal explained 
she was treated as half-Muntu. Although born here, because she married a Malawian 
Muslim, she is not treated as one of them, that is, a Zulu. She said that she does not blame 
them for their views because they don't know. Zulus, she said, confuse culture and 
religion, and that Islam does not deny them their culture.4 
What is interesting about the Malawian responses to xenophobic and racist verbal abuse 
is that it has not led to an intensification of Malawian nationalism, as is the case with the 
Nigerians and Congolese, but rather placing the accent on religious, ethnic and gender 
identities. What seems clear is that Malawians treated the xenophobic and racist verbal 
attacks, not so much as an attack on their nationality, but as an obstacle to be overcome 
situationally. Their response has been largely to live among the local population, learn 
the language, even adopt local names, and marry local women. This has blunted the 
vitriol, though not overcome it. For the Malawians the more serious problem is crime and 
police harassment. 
Specifically, with regard to the Malawians it should be noted that: 
1. The xenophobic and racist abuse has not dented the self-image of the Malawians. 
It has put obstacles, but not stopped them from pursuing their intentions and 
objectives. 
2. The situational responses of learning to speak Zulu, marrying local women, and 
living in a mixed area have greatly assisted their integration to the local 
community and neighbourhood. 
In concluding this section, one may note that generally 
4 One should note in passing that in Kwazulu-Natal, according to official 1996 census statistics there are 
more women (4 466 million) than men (3 951 million) (Stats In Brief 2002, STA TSSA, Pretori~ 2002) 
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1. Being a black foreigner is no guarantee that prejudice in the fonn of xenophobia 
and racism will be in abeyance. Instead continental Africans can expect the same 
or greater levels of prejudice and discrimination found in other parts ofthe world 
against black people. 
2. Although unemployment and a barely growing economy combined with effects of 
isolation from the rest of the continent have contributed to a less than adequate 
response by local people to the problems of other Africans, it has prompted a 
different basis of solidarity for continental Africans around religious, ethnic, and 
national identities, as well as issues of crime and police harassment. Blackness is 
not an option for solidarity. Interestingly poverty has not been an issue around 
which solidarity is built. 
7.S. CONCLUSION 
Foreign migrant identities are shaped from the moment they arrive at border entry points. 
From the perspectives of a migrant, state power is most visibly apparent in the whole 
apparatus of border and passport controls, issuing of visas, residency and work penn its, 
and the rights and obligations attached to it, which officially stamps a migrant with an 
exclusionary subjected identity and the constant threat of deportation. For foreign 
migrants there is the additional burden of hostility and xenophobia. This plays a 
significant role in determining their responses to wages and working conditions, and their 
social interaction with local people. Malawians are reticent about making claims on the 
state or engaging in active demands for appropriate wage rates. 
The Malawians living in Mariannhill have pursued a strategy of less overt visibility to the 
authorities, settling among a multi-racial community in Durban with ease and generally 
benefit from state development of infrastructure. That they are less visible does not mean 
that they are not subject to the same treatment as the highly visible foreign migrants in 
the city centre. However, being at some distance from the urban centre, they invite less 
interference from state authorities in their daily lives and in the pursuance of their 
livelihoods. 
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On the other hand local authorities such as Durban have largely reacted to foreign 
migrants, usually in hostile and negative ways, often on the assumption that foreigners 
are to blame for a range of inner city problems. Thus, by extension, foreign migrants are 
an irritant to be ignored and excluded from developmental plans of the local state and can 
therefore be marginalized. In their several other identities as Muslims, traders, 
employers, employees and residents they play profoundly different roles as they begin to 
contest their all-consuming subjected identity. 
However inappropriate the local state authorities responses might be presently, it cannot 
be assumed that in the future such authorities would want to exclude migrants in some 
kind of formal local enfranchisement process. There are three reasons why this is an 
important consideration. Firstly, migrants such as the Malawians, particularly those who 
have married locally and can claim residential rights are not necessarily marginalized, 
and have benefited from development initiatives. They cannot simply be excluded from 
local decision-making processes. Secondly, the Muslim Malawians have also benefited 
from their close associations with other powerful segments of the local population such 
as the local Muslim welfare agencies and business elites to access employment 
opportunities, and as benefactors for mosques built in Mariannhill. The building of the 
mosques and the provision of a religious instructor have led to greater stability within the 
Malawian community. Although the price to be paid for this may be dependency on 
patronage of the Muslim elites in the city centre in the future, the process of entwining 
Malawian migrants to the local business sector cannot simply be undone or ignored. 
Thirdly, all Malawians in Durban, who have some stake in the economy, either as 
employees or as self-employed small scale entrepreneurs, might wish to be included in 
some form of local representation as to their economic rights. Employees might wish to 
have their exploited status reviewed, whereas entrepreneurs would want to look to how 
their interests are better served such as with access to trading sites on streets, or market 
places, and the mutual protection of partnerships between local South African street 
traders and themselves. Given that we are living in a globally competitive environment, 
the networks and contacts of trading established by the migrants are a resource to be 
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cultivated, rather than restricted. Furthermore, there are the trade networks that extend 
into Africa, albeit small by comparison with large multi-national companies, but 
nevertheless a point of departure for a port city to extend its trade networks into an 
undertapped market. But a wider vision of developing trade networks through small scale 
enterprises assumes that foreign migrants would want to be included in some form of 
representation, particularly as to their economic rights to work either as employees or as 
self-employed small-scale entrepreneurs. The point is that Malawians generate 
employment, and spend their wages and salaries locally, but also trade between two or 
more countries. For the city to acknowledge the growth and development potential that 
lies locked by discriminatory practices against foreign small-scale entrepreneurs means to 
confront the question of rights of foreign migrants, and their incorporation in the 
governance of the city. In part this depends also on how foreign migrants see themselves 
in the city. The choices that the Malawian migrant makes in relation to economic rights 
will raise questions about the wider context of rights in relation to governance and 
development, an aspect that will receive some greater attention in the chapter to follow. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
MIGRATION, IDENTITIES AND CITIZENSHIP: MALAWIANS 
AND THE LOCALITY OF CITIZENSHIP 
Immigrants embody a fundamental empirical, normative and 
conceptual challenge to the exclusive notions of territorially 
bounded state sovereignty and citizenship 
Maxine Reitzes, 1997 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
The United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) has recently 
argued for an expansion of the notion of citizenship in the context of globalisation: 
Elements of citizenship are being created at many levels of society, from 
the most local through to the most global; and it is increasingly necessary 
to consider how these different layers of identity and experience are related 
(1997: 2). 
The previous two chapters looked at these experiences and the multiple layers of identity 
invoked by the migrants in pursuance of mUltiple livelihood strategies within a locality. 
Locality here would not be defmed as a fixed physical space, or space within defmed 
territorial boundaries but a space filled with a dense set of social and economic relations 
acknowledged and at times contested by the various participants, including the state, 
which perforce also fixes boundaries for its own purposes. (Appadurai, A.1995: 205-07). 
More specifically those chapters considered the Malawian foreign migrants as part of 
transnational networks as well as part of local host communities in which they live and 
work, and in which they are more or less active in affairs of the locality. Reflection on the 
impact that immigration policies have on migrants' accommodative and livelihood 
practices within a locality was also highlighted. In this chapter consideration is given to 
what elements of citizenship practices and presence of Malawian migrants raise beyond 
the convenient overlapping expression of citizenship rights within defined territorial 
boundaries of the state. In other words what citizenship issues are raised within a locality 
beyond the formal constitutional definitions of citizenship. 
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The aims of this chapter are as follows: 
1. A theoretical review of the conceptions of globalisation, civil society and 
migration and of post-national citizenship 
2. An overview of citizenship issues in the context of immigration policy in South 
Africa 
3. The elements that the Malawian experience in Durban brings to the issues of 
citizenship. 
This chapter investigates at an empirical level a case study of Malawians in Durban and 
the implications for a notion of citizenship beyond the coincidence of rights and 
territorial boundaries. This is not to suggest that formal constitutional definitions are 
irrelevant, or that the state is a passe institution, but rather that the Malawian migrants' 
experience of the negative and positive aspects of citizenship proceeds on the basis of 
experiences in entering the country, fmding accommodation and the means of survival, 
and beyond that, in accumulating capital for their entrepreneurial activities in both South 
Africa and Malawi. In this perspective Malawian migrants in Durban are active agents 
within locally defined relationships within civil society. While there is an 
acknowledgement of the global context, or more specifically the regional context of 
Southern Africa, the focus of this chapter is very much at the level of the local. 
8.2 CITIZENSmp: A BRIEF THEORETICAL REVIEW 
8.2.1 Citizenship and the State 
The introduction of liberal constitutional democracy into formerly authoritarian regimes 
has given new impetus to debates around the issues of citizenship and democracy CUrry, 
1998, Assies, W. and Salman, T. 2000). One way in which to approach the problem of 
conceptualising citizenship is to locate it within debates about constitutional rights and 
safeguards and of people's responsibilities towards state and society (Held, D 1987: pp36-
40; 51-55; 97-96). A central issue in this approach would be to defme who is or is not a 
citizen of a territorially defined state through the lens of legally defined rights and 
procedural criteria, and any responsibilities they might have to discharge. Such a 
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perspective posits a contractual relationship between state and individuals as members of 
civil society. Briefly stated the contract between state and individual may be summarised 
in the following way. Human rights, in its most pristine classical terms transcend state 
boundaries. They are inalienable. These also called are natural rights, such as the right to 
life, freedom of movement, freedom of association, habeas corpus, freedom of speech, 
and freedom to own property. In other words these rights exist a priori (to the state). 
They are not granted by the state but are recognised, protected and guaranteed by the 
state. In theory then, individuals have the right to resist any agent, including the state, if 
these rights are violated. These human rights also exist along side civil and political 
liberties such as the right to vote, form political parties, contest elections etc. The state as 
a social organisation is based on the use of power, and for the most part monopolises the 
use of legitimate physical force. Hence the relationship between the state and individuals 
in the implementation, protection and guarantee of these first generation rights, or its 
violation, is always an unequal one, whose outcome tends to favour the state if there is no 
countervailing pressure. There are, as noted by Marshall (and outlined in chapter 3: pp57-
58), a second generation of social and welfare rights, based on the notion of protecting 
citizens from the vagaries of unchecked capitalism. These rights are usually entitlements 
to social services (water, electricity, garbage removal etc), housing, health care and 
education. These rights, more than the first generation rights, are granted by the state, and 
can be withdrawn, albeit contested by various groups and classes whose interests might 
be at stake (for a critique see chapter 3: pp59-61). There is also a debate concerning post-
colonial states and the rights of citizens, not only about the theory and application of the 
unalienable rights and entitlements in contexts very different from Europe and America, 
but also the right to development (Kabeer, 2002). The right to development, as a right to 
claim from the state is a highly contested one, and has had very uneven and highly 
ambiguous outcomes in Africa. Post-apartheid South Africa is one of the most ambitious 
attempts in Africa to provide both constitutional and legislative guidelines and concrete 
policies for people's participation in community development. 
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Much of this debate on citizenship hinges on formal constitutional definitions of who is a 
citizen, and therefore who is included and excluded from the provisions of many of these 
rights within national state boundaries. As Urry expresses this idea: 
The concept of citizenship has been based upon the notion of a bounded 
society. Societies are typically sovereign entities, with a state at their centre 
that organises the rights and duties of each member ... in a set of relations 
constitut[ing] the social structure in terms of which life-chances of each 
member of that society are organised and regulated. (1999: 311). 
It is this idea that underpins Marshall's idea of social citizenship (1999: 312). But Urry 
argues this notion is challenged by globalisation, or rather the transformations in 
economic, social and political relationships on a world scale. The concept of globalisation 
is the subject of some intense debates (see the reader by Held and McGrew, 2000). 
However there are two important ideas that need to be emphasised here. Firstly, 
globalisation as the 'compression of the world and the Intensification of consciousness of 
the world as a whole' (Robertson, 1992: 8). The second point, made by Giddens, 
concerns the contradictory and uneven process of globalisation. While Robertson 
emphasizes consciousness of the relative smallness of the world as a place, Giddens shifts 
attention to globalisation as a process which affects people in their everyday lives 
wherein "larger and larger numbers of people live in circumstances in which disembodied 
institutions, linking local practices with globalised social relations, organise major 
aspects of day to day lives" (1990:79). Giddens also emphasizes that it affects ordinary 
people in their everyday lives, quite often in negative ways, but also provides 
opportunities for those who are formerly marginalized to take advantage of new 
possibilities (1990: 76). This poses dilemmas for people everywhere, whether it is a 
peasant sitting in a village in Malawi, pondering the merits of migration to South Africa 
to provide a means of livelihood for his family or the capital resources for a small 
business venture, or a stock broker sitting at a computer in Johannesburg manipulating 
market shares on the Hong Kong stock exchange. The fact that individuals confront their 
lives in this way beyond the immediate reach of the state or enclosed society implies 
relatively unrestricted global flows of information and people. To confront new dilemmas 
of making livelihoods, rather than rely on the state to provide the means for their social 
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and economic lives, impacts on the way a state or society can respond. As Urry makes 
clear, "Global flows across societal borders make it less easy for states to mobilise clearly 
separate and coherent nations in pursuit of societal goals" (1999:312). The result is, 
according to Urry, new tendencies that undermine the coherence of the Marshallian 
project on social citizenship within a state. 
Firstly, on a large scale globalisation is characterised by the growmg power of 
international finance capital, and the corresponding lack of power that national 
governments have to influence the welfare of their citizens. In effect the economies of 
states are more likely to be subjected to external interventions by both multi-national 
corporations as well as supra-national institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF and 
the United Nations (and its various agencies). Also the growing trend towards concluding 
international treaties, not just between nation states, but also between blocks of nation 
states or regional blocks of economies, affects a state's sovereignty. The effect of this can 
be seen when states regulate, rather than direct national economies (the 'commanding 
heights of the economy' in its Leninist version), thus playing down the use of national, or 
nationalised economic institutions to achieve broad societal and welfare goals for their 
citizens. Conversely, this means that the duties and responsibilities people have towards a 
state, which now plays a less distributive role, becomes increasingly ambiguous. In the 
case of many African states that served a narrow set of elite, comprador bourgeoisie and 
ethnic interests, this not only compromised good governance, but also meant fewer 
resources were available to engage their citizens for reciprocal and mutually accepted 
societal goals and projects (Kabeer, 2002: 13; 20-24). 
Secondly, globalisation has led to an increase in international migration and movement of 
people. Large numbers of unskilled and semi skilled workers and peasants leave their 
developing countries, to live and work in developed economies of the North, and rapidly 
emerging industrial economies of the South, such as in metropolitan Durban. This 
movement of people has largely imploded the notion of a unified, more or less 
homogenous bounded society protected by the state. For the purposes of elucidating the 
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implications for citizenship for foreign migrants, four consequences may be highlighted 
below: 
1. Often these immigrant and migrant workers, whether legal or undocumented in a 
host society, live in 'ethnic enclaves', neighbourhoods or areas of urban 
settlements made up people of their own nationality, ethnic or religious 
background. 
2. The movement of foreign migrants and immigrants into societies that were 
formerly thought of as unified national cultures, is now subjected to a 
proliferation of minority cultures and religions. This raises two issues. First it 
raises questions about the acceptance and tolerance of new cultures and religion, 
and the emergence of new social phenomena, the hybridisation of cultures. 
Second, the institutionalisation and assimilation of other cultures into a dominant 
culture of a society, generating over time a multi-cultural, rather than mono-
cultural dispensation. 
3. The disassociation of accommodation practices, a dwelling, with a fixed place or 
permanent residence. This applies not only to movement across state boundaries, 
but also within a host society. 
4. Other phenomenon such as refugees, forced migration, travelling cultures and the 
growth of commodified culture and tourism, diasporas of various kinds, have also 
proliferated. 
This movement of people has shifted from an older conception of linear immigration and 
migration as moving from a place of origin to a place of destination to one of a 
multiplicity of movements across states with greater frequency and intensity. It implies a 
constant contact between places of origin and places of destination. This has been termed 
transnational migration. Frequency of travel and various places of migratory settlement 
have been noted of some Malawians in the previous chapters. More specifically 
migration that occurs at greater speed and intensity than ever before is also a reflection of 
the process of globalisation, and in which people sustain, resuscitate and reinvent social 
relations between places of origin and one of more places of destination. Such is this 
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international and regional migration, often involving networks and alliances of people in 
both places of origin and destination, and in between the two ends, creating a virtual 
circle of transnational networks and alliances. It is out of such a vortex that warrants the 
UNRISD to raise the issue of citizenship and migration within regional and wider global 
contexts. This has given rise to reflections on the notion of post-national citizenship. 
8.2.2 Notions of Post-National Citizenship, Human Rights and Migration 
In this respect sociologists such as Soysal (1994), Reitzes (1997), Hindness (2002) and 
Urry (1999), among others have argued for a post-national vision of citizenship based on 
notions of human rights which are not confined to specific territorial boundaries, but as 
civic rights which migrants have, and can access as the basis on which to take advantage 
of the economic opportunities presented by the host societies to rebuild their lives. Such a 
perspective does not, or rather should not, necessarily imply granting formal citizenship 
as a constitutional right of the host country. Rather it implies the recognition of mobility 
(Urry 1998), of transnational migration, and the forces that lie behind it, and that within 
this set of conditions, the practice of civil and human rights within a locality which make 
it possible for livelihoods to be pursued without undue hindrance. 
In Soysal's view post-national citizenship comes about through world-level pressures to 
adhere to the international protocols sanctioning respect for human rights, refugees, 
immigrants and migrants. She argues for post-national belonging based on universal 
human rights (UN protocols, conventions, constitutions etc) as universal entitlements. 
But these universal entitlements mean nothing if not implemented. There are three 
problems with such a contention as it might apply to developing countries. 
First, as we have seen in South Africa, while there is the symbolic and rhetorical 
adherence to such protocols, international or world pressures do not necessarily apply in 
practice. Indeed, recent evidence shows, as with the registration of domestic servants as 
contributors to the Unemployment Insurance Funds, that those African foreigners 
working as domestic servants will not be accorded any benefits. In fact it was argued that 
they should give up their jobs for South Africans or face prosecution for being in the 
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country illegally, and being employed illegally - a somewhat bizarre interpretation of the 
right to work and freedom of movement (Cape Times, 2 April 2003). While the 
International Labour Organisation has hailed the progressive nature of the South African 
legislation to protect domestic workers, it is not entirely clear whether its xenophobic 
application meets with its approval. 
Secondly, human rights are paid scant attention by authoritarian regimes, especially in 
Africa. One of the misunderstandings in the South African government's immigration 
policy is a lack of appreciation of Bayart's characterisation of African civil society's 
relationship to the state as the 'politics of the belly'. Authoritarian regimes run by elites 
in Africa are better known for their lack of responsiveness to the social and economic 
responsibilities and obligations to the majority of their population. While acknowledging 
that African states have far fewer resources than their European or American counter 
parts for redistribution on a more or less equitable basis, structural adjustment and 
inadequate economic management programmes have exacerbated and forced people to 
fend for themselves relying on their own meagre resources, usually in the first instance 
that of family, kinship, friendship and ethnic networks. These connections and networks 
are within the realm of the private, and operate outside state regulatory frameworks. As I 
have already noted in previous chapters, migration from African countries is a complex 
phenomenon of push and pull factors, and is often a function of particular social, 
economic and political relations which often results in people's lack of confidence that 
the state they live in is able to provide the means by which they can construct a beneficial 
livelihood and a sense of solidarity and belonging. Indeed, as has been noted by Simone 
(2001: 46) globalisation and its impact on African societies provided new opportunities to 
disengage from the formal political and economic spheres of government which have 
steadily provided the populous with less in the way of reliable services and respected 
governance. The growth of what Mbembe (2000) calls 'private indirect government', has 
forced people, with little or no allegiance to the post-colonial state to resort to alternative 
modes of production ranging from domestic subsistence within families and villages to 
participation in infonnal economies, both locally and internationally. Migration is just 
one expression, not only of the failure of the post-colonial state project to produce a 
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coherent and accommodative framework for national solidarity since independence from 
colonial rule, but of simply forcing people to move away to re-start, re-build, restore and 
restructure their lives. In this view state regulations, albeit in whatever form or content 
that they exist, are simply there to negotiate around - a hurdle, a useful instrument, and as 
a means of extraction to cope with rather than any sense of emanating from within a 
legitimate contractual citizenship-state relationship. Foreign migrants also operate within, 
between and outside the laws, policies and regulations of governments. It is this 'betwixt 
and between' approach of migrants that leads to the third problem with Soyal's view. 
Soysal's perspective pays little attention to the pressures on and from migrant and 
immigrant groups to carve out the space for the preservation, or indeed the construction 
(and re-construction) of their livelihoods and to advance their interests within, between 
and outside of the capillaries of the state's administrative, regulatory and surveillance 
frameworks. 
8.2.3 Civil Society and Migration 
Reitzes (1997) adopts a different view in that she argues for the recognition of global 
civil society in which a set of human rights - freedom of movement, habeas corpus, 
freedom of association, freedom of speech, freedom to own property - and as enshrined 
in the bill of rights in the South African constitution - provides a relationship to exist, the 
means of engagement for individuals and voluntary organisation as separate but linked to 
the state. As she argues: 
All citizens are necessarily part of the state, as they elect representatives to 
state governments and civil society, in which they engage in a range of claims 
against the state, but do not claim the state, including economic production 
and the exchange. (1997: 6). 
She suggests that it is here, in the economic transactions of people that the state is 
'superseded' (1997: 6). In part the state is already superseded in the way in which 
international agencies intervene in nation states as the World Trade Organisation imposes 
trade requirements, in the imposition of structural adjustment programmes, and the way 
in which global capital flows already operate within and across national economies. For 
international business corporations and multi-lateral international organisation such as the 
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World Trade Organisation, the World Bank and IMF operate rules of engagements that 
are about 'a never-ending series of exchanges in terms of the rules of contract and private 
property' on a world scale. This is a noted part of the global capitalist economy. But the 
counterpart to this global capitalist economy is that labour is severely restricted. As has 
been noted by the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development with regard 
to migrant labour that 
In a world of falling borders, where capital, goods and aspirations for a better 
life float free of borders, the regimes of nationality and citizenship puts 
labour at great disadvantage. The structures of solidarity on which national 
citizenship rests are often neither congruent with temporary or impermanent 
residence [of foreign migrant labour] or easily adapted to cultural difference. 
(unrisd.org: Globalisation and Citizenship, document, 1997: 1). 
In essence the argument is for the notion of a global citizen with certain rights and duties 
in the economic sphere, and which is beyond the restrictions and limitations imposed by 
nation states. As these are universal rights, they precede management of those rights by 
states, and are thus 'as portable as a suitcase'. 
The problem with such an approach is that while it accords a bigger and more active role 
to individuals and non-governmental organisations within the realm of civil society, 
ultimately the burden of making sure such rights and entitlements are delivered rests with 
the state. (The state is dead, long live the state!) 
Rather than locating the issue of citizenship exclusively in a state-civil society 
conjuncture, another approach might to be to analyse citizenship to the degree that it is an 
active or passive ingredient in people's everyday social relations in the context of wide 
ranging experiences of social, cultural and economic differentiation and responses of the 
state. In other words locating citizenship in the practicalities of overcoming the 
disjunctures in their everyday life. In a society such as South Africa, (or Brazil for 
example) wide social and economic differentiation and associated asymmetries of power 
may have fundamental implications for the way people emerge, become, assert and 
maintain themselves as citizens. Differentiation and power based on a range of factors 
such as income, place of residence or work, mobility, or identities such as migrant, 
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immigrant, refugee, race or ethnic group, contrast sharply with constitutional approaches 
which assume an equality of individuals (i.e. all are equal before the law) and neutrality 
of the state (or local state) in the administration and defence of their rights (Kabeer, 
2002). Social movements or groups of individuals engaged in activities that seek to 
transcend the limits of their social and economic situations or their potential 
disenfranchisement as configured by social differentiation and inequalities suggest new 
notions of active citizenship (Dagnino, 1994: 89; Assies, and Salman, 2000: 294-298). 
Such active engagement over the issue of citizenship also raises broader issues of what 
constitutes and defines social or community participation and social integration within 
society (Turner, 1990: 189; Rose, 1996: 333-4; 337). The passive images of citizenship 
embedded in the legal framework (the constitution, laws, policies and administrative 
procedures) and its relationship with the lived experiences of people needs to be 
explored. It is these lived experiences that Tilly (1996) argues for construing citizenship 
as a relational, rather than purely a legal or constitutional issue. James Tully (1999) sees 
citizenship issues arising out of concrete agonistic relationships in their public and hidden 
forms, rather than open legal contestation about who is or is not a citizen and therefore 
entitled to enjoy such rights. 
Tilly's point about relational view of citizenship rights being conditioned by their 
participation, their sense of locality and belonging to particular areas in which their 
daily routines are exercised becomes relevant here. Migrants arrive and they begin 
their engagement within the city through the networks they encounter and construct. 
They seek access to resources of various kinds from a variety of sources, and begin a 
new life (1996, 1-7). This implies, as Tilly argues, 'multiple categories and forms of 
citizenship', including those which Reitzes identifies as economic transactional 
forms. Although foreign migrants' presence cannot be wished away, Tilly's relational 
view still relies on a conception of rights as centred on state practices and state-
citizen interactions, and as already argued this has the propensity to exclude, rather 
than include, and therefore renders what migrants do as, at best, immaterial, or at 
worst, illegal from the state's perspective. Being illegal is a short step from any 
foreign migrant's activities being criminalized. From the point of view of being 
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inclusive, any denial of a right is a denial of the mutual acceptance of these rights that 
exist prior to a state. At a basic level, this is about how the rules of the game are 
played out in defining who is, or not entitled to this or that right. But as we have seen 
with the Malawians, they don't play that game. They simply ignore those rules. 
However, migrants establishing their presence are not without problems, or indeed 
contestation. James Tully's (1999, 161-182) conception of agonic citizenship can be 
invoked in this context. What migrants do, and the context in which they make or 
create the means of survival, whether this is within the realm of the permissible by 
the local state, or not (its regulations, procedures, licenses, permits etc) or a challenge 
to the local state or other stake holder's institutional expression of powers, makes 
citizenship a contested arena. But for Tully what is important is his conception of 
agonistic citizenship. Drawing from Hannah Arendt's theory of action and Foucault's 
concept of governmentality, citizenship is conceived as an 'agonic game'. It is 
ceaseless 'struggle of and for more democratic participation in the games in which 
people are governed'. He defmes this as 'a relationship which is at the same time 
reciprocal incitation and struggle, less face to face confrontation which paralyses both 
sides than a permanent provocation'. The stakeholders (in South African parlance), 
whether these be the state, local inhabitants, migrants, 'modify rules by what they say 
and do as they carry on with their lives, modifying their identities as players, that is, 
the games of freedom within and against the rules of the game of governance' (1999: 
168). For Tully what shapes and holds individual and groups together as citizens and 
peoples is not this or that agreement, but the agonic activities of participation. This 
participation may be for recognition, to negotiate the prevailing and biased ethos of 
citizen participation, they may be about struggles against current structures which 
relegate some people to non-democratic forms of identity (as in criminalizing foreign 
migrants); they maybe about how informal practices render new forms of 
incorporation, changing the structure of power, and rules that govern that structure. 
Citizenship thus becomes not a site of struggle over the possession of rights, duties 
and obligations, but the very activity that constantly modifies, through dialogue, 
negotiation and actual practice how power is exercised, and holds out the possibility 
of the power to act in ways that brings something into existence that did not exist 
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before. What migrants do in order to survive, and the articulation of this within and 
against the practice and discourse of governance is a central theme of the thesis. 
Both Tilly and Tully do not obscure the lack of visible legal or open contestation, as an 
absence of rights or indeed the passive enjoyment of civil and human rights. It is this 
contrast between the passive and active ideas of participation and construction of 
citizenship that is explored and analysed in this chapter and is explored through the 
experience of Malawians living and working in Durban. Phrased differently it may be 
asked, given the context of Durban, what opportunities exist for people to assert their 
capacity as citizens and migrants, to participate in the determination of the conditions of 
their own existence, as individuals, in groups, associations or communities. The chapter 
illustrates the dynamic between passive and active citizenship by drawing on the 
experiences of Malawian migrants located in the city. The question that is being 
addressed might be framed thus: to what extent has the passive or active participation of 
social actors individually, or as groups, associations and communities from the Malawian 
migrant community engaged and contribute to new conceptions of citizenship? 
8.3 DEFINING FORMAL CITIZENSHIP AND P ARTICIP A TION IN SOUTH 
AFRICA 
In South Africa formal citizenship as defmed in the constitution asserts that citizens have 
'rights, privileges and the benefits of citizenship'. The possession of rights such as 
equality, life, dignity and freedom, is further enhanced with reference to social and 
economic rights (work, shelter [housing, accommodation], health, security, education and 
culture). Such rights are 'equally subject to the duties and responsibilities of citizenship'. 
But the constitution is not precise about who is a citizen, although it proclaims in its 
preamble that South African 'belongs to all those who live in it'. l In short then rights, 
duties and responsibilities are foregrounded (S.A. Constitution 1996: Cl, s3). In other 
words citizenship involves reciprocity of rights against a community or state, and duties 
and obligations towards it. The principle of rights or their mere possession has to be 
I Issues of birth, kin and blood ties are not considered in the constitution. 
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validated by the obligation on citizens to practice these rights with due regard to their 
duties and responsibilities. This shifts the emphasis from mere possession of rights to the 
practice of citizenship, or the participation within a community or state. It is a question of 
who participates in, against and with the state that defines the context for the exercise of 
those fundamental rights. 
While for South African local migrants these rights endow a large measure of potential 
rights, and a degree of protection, the imprecision of who is a citizen, or potential citizen, 
in relation to foreign migrants needs to be elucidated. The following sections will briefly 
outline the legislative basis of citizenship in the periods 1949 to 1995, and the post-1995 
constitutional approach to citizenship. I will summarise Jonathan Klaaren's analysis of 
citizenship in South Africa from 1949 to 1995 (Klaaren, 1999). Following this section on 
formal citizenship is a brief outline of the Aliens Control Act, and with its implicit 
abrogation of human rights and limitations on achieving formal citizenship for foreign 
migrants. 
8.3.1 Immigration policy and citizenship in South Africa 
In South Africa the debate around immigration policy illustrates aspects of the debate 
around citizenship, rights, obligations, responsibilities and the social and economic 
entitlements of citizens. Indeed, immigration, and more specifically the influx of 
foreigners from other parts of Africa has become a highly controversial issue in 
South Africa. It is alleged, among other things, that foreign migrants and immigrants 
are entering the country illegally, swamping the cities and towns, taking away jobs, 
and have become a drain on the country's resources and social services. Employment 
and social services, which are increasingly limited, it is implied, are the preserve of 
South African citizens, not foreigners. Not being able to blame an authoritarian 
unrepresentative regime any longer for the shortcomings of the government and 
economy, the poor and dispossessed have turned their anger towards foreigners 
blaming them for the ills they suffer. Accompanying this anger and combined with 
the perception of massive influx of African migrants is the rise in xenophobia, often 
expressed in attacks on those assumed to be non-citizens of the country. The response 
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of government to African continental migration and the rise of xenophobia have been 
inconsistent and at odds with its commitment to human rights. Indeed some may 
argue the legislative regime devoted to immigration is discordant with its own 
constitution and bill of rights (Reitzes, and others). A seemingly majority view from 
government, or at least represented by the Department of Home Affairs, is to adopt 
the position of keeping foreigners out. It would have been expected that a more 
progressive stand, or at least a more moderate immigration policy would have 
resulted in keeping with the broad vision of freedom enshrined in the constitution and 
bill of rights. Rather the response by the Department of Home Affairs has been to 
amend the apartheid era Aliens Control Act of 1991, and a much debated and delayed 
Immigration Bill which imposes severe constraints on immigration into South Africa. 
The legislative regime, as shown in chapter 4, does not take into account foreign 
migrant workers, as indeed many of the Malawians, Zimbabweans, and 
Mozambicans are, nor their past (as super-exploited migrant workers on the mines, 
contributing to the economic growth of the country), nor their present contribution. 
They are a particular category of migrants, as undocumented migrants seeking 
temporary work and for whom there is no official category (see Reitzes, 1998: 22; 
Crush, 1997: 2). The net result, as far as the law is concerned, is that they are 
criminalized, and when apprehended are subjected to harassment, imprisonment 
without trail, confiscation of their material goods, corrupt practices, and eventual 
deportation by state officials and police under the Aliens Control Act. The regime of 
criminalizing and deportation does not stop the foreign migrants from coming back, 
or new migrants to making the journey to South Africa, perceived as the land of 
opportunities, second or third to Europe or America. 
Although the debate focuses on managing immigration and migration, much of the 
underlying theoretical concepts have, as shown by Reitzes, developed out of notions 
of state sovereignty, and associated legal and political conceptions of territoriality, 
boundaries, citizenship and rights within a perspective of real politik (1997: 3). All 
these conceptions impose various ways of including and excluding people on the 
basis of normative prescriptions, and implemented by the state through its legislative 
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and judicial mechanisms and procedures. Thus for South Africa legally defined 
notions of citizenship as embedded in the constitution become the immediate basis 
around which rights enjoyed by citizens such as the freedoms of movement, 
expression and the right to vote etc are conveyed by the state and can be accessed 
within the boundaries of the country. (The constitutionally defined concept of 
citizenship in South Africa is analysed below.) Regardless of how useful such legal 
definitions might be in officially categorizing people within a defined territory, the 
problem with such an approach is that it presumes a passivity of citizens to accept the 
roles so defined for them by the state, and removes the activity of members of a 
society from challenging state defined notions and the assertion of their own notions 
of citizenship. It especially dis-empowers undocumented foreign migrants for whom 
no category exists for their official or legal representation. In Chapter 4 I have 
illustrated how the immigration legislative regime does not cater for the category for 
temporary foreign undocumented migrant seeking only to work for limited periods 
before returning home. Such a legislative and policy regime serves not only to exploit 
them, but also to silence and of necessity force them to act in pursuance of their 
temporary livelihoods in South Africa in less visible ways. For Malawian migrants 
this of necessity forces a hidden form of migration. 
The debate about the legislative regime, without the active voice of undocumented 
migrants, is in fact one sided. It is a situation where the state determines the terms of 
debate, and by doing so excludes the very people it determines policy for, that is, 
undocumented foreign workers. The terms of the debate within South Africa, in so 
far as it a public debate that affects foreign migrants, suggest that the government 
lacks an understanding of the problem or reasons for African continental migration to 
South Africa, or does not have adequate information about the problems of Africa 
that prompt migration. Alternatively, or in conjunction with its lack of understanding 
of the problems of migration on the African continent, there is the new government's 
continued adherence to outmoded concepts of territorial integrity in the face of 
globalisation. The narrowness of debate within and between state agencies and its 
limited exposure in the public domain seem to be fundamentally based on the 
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proposition of keeping foreigners out. It therefore reinforces the perceptions of 
xenophobia that prevail. This is not to suggest that the state agencies actually support 
xenophobia. In fact the state does not support xenophobia, but inadvertently 
encourages it by default. But as we have already seen throughout the thesis, 
migration, or in this case its specific type, transnational migration, is a significant 
phenomenon in many societies both for the advanced countries, as well as more 
developed societies of the third world. Indeed the new waves of migration signify 
part of the process of globalisation (see US Global Trends Report, 2015: 8). 
This debate has reached a stalemate in terms of appropriate government responses to 
African continental migration to South Africa. This has occurred despite the best 
intentions of the green paper on international migration that adopted a 
developmentalist perspective on migration for the whole Southern African region. 
Such a position would imply the recognition of migration, at least within the SADC 
countries, and with it certain rights that migrants would have in the host countries. 
However, the Department of Home Affairs, as the state agency responsible for 
migration, has not appeared to shift its fundamental position of attempting to keep 
foreigners out. Thus the question of migration, migrants and citizenship cannot be 
addressed adequately as part of the engagement with the states of Southern Africa. 
The alternative is to engender further debate through a critique in the best traditions 
of universal normative expectations and respect for human rights and through the 
elaboration of empirically verifiable theoretical models of what constitutes civil 
society, the state and sovereignty in a post-colonial globalised world. In this 
perspective greater weight is accorded human rights as recorded in various 
international protocols, sanctioned and built into the constitutions of countries. 
8.3.2 Historical Outline of Formal (Legal) Citizenship 
Prior to 1949 there was no legislation that defmed a South African citizen. There were 
only British subjects and Union nationals. Aliens were those not defmed as British 
SUbjects. In 1949 the passing of the South African Citizenship Act made all Union 
nationals South African citizens. A British subject could be a South African citizen, or a 
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citizen of another country or the Commonwealth. This provision was abolished when 
South Africa became a Republic in 1961. The 1949 Citizenship Act was also one of the 
first pieces of apartheid legislation where being a South African citizen was a condition 
for the franchise, though not the only condition. In other words the franchise was race 
based. Citizenship was common, but not all citizens were equal. This position lasted until 
1970. 
In 1970 the Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act was passed which ensured that every black 
person was made a citizen of a homeland, without his or her consent. They became a 
citizen of a particular homeland on the basis of language, culture, or race. At first this did 
not diminish their South African citizenship. Thus a black person from Ciskei could 
retain his South African citizenship, even though he was a citizen of Ciskei. However 
when Ciskei became an independent homeland he lost his South African citizenship to 
the extent that he should have been treated as if he was a foreigner. The logical 
conclusion of such a policy was, as C.P.Mulder pointed out, 'there will be not one black 
man with South African citizenship ... every black man in South Africa will eventually be 
accommodated in some independent new state in this honourable way and will no longer 
be a moral obligation on this Parliament to accommodate these people politically' .At the 
same time the demands on white South Africa citizens increased, with the extended role 
they had to play in the defence force and police to defend the apartheid state. 
The third phase of formal citizenship (1986-1995) saw the passage of three pieces of 
significant legislation: the passing of the Restoration of South African Citizenship Act of 
1986, the Restoration and Extension of South African Citizenship Act of 1993 and the 
1993 Interim Constitution. 
The Restoration of South African Citizenship Act (1986) did not restore citizenship to all 
those who lost their citizenship as a result of the homelands policy of the apartheid state. 
Indeed it restored citizenship only to those who were nominally citizens of independent 
homelands, but permanently resident in South Africa. The Restoration and Extension of 
South African Citizenship Act of 1993, as part of the interim arrangements in drafting the 
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interim constitution, restored citizenship to those who lost their South African national 
citizenship as a result of apartheid policies. All those who had independent homelands 
(TBVC) citizenship automatically had their South African citizenship restored, and which 
then enabled them to vote in the 1994 elections. One could argue that a common South 
African citizenship with a common franchise existed from 1 January 1994. However the 
legislative regimes on citizenship of the TBVC states remained, until the passing of the 
1995 South African Citizenship Act. 
8.3.3 The 1995 South African Citizenship Act. 
The 1995 South African Citizenship Act made five main changes to citizenship law. 
These were: 
• The repeal of old citizenship laws, including the homelands citizenships acts, and 
application of the law nationally. 
• A policy of tolerance towards dual citizenship. 
• Adjustments to the naturalization policy. 
• The declaration of allegiance was amended. 
• Citizenship by birth for stateless children was introduced. 
All apartheid legislation pertaining to citizenship was abolished, including the automatic 
citizenship to whites who resided in the Republic for five years. Other features of the 
new legislation was the adoption of citizenship for stateless children born in South 
Africa, affirmation of judicial review of ministerial decision, and continued toleration of 
dual citizenship (not least because many in the liberation movement had acquired 
citizenship of other countries during exile). 
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8.3.4 The Current Legal Position on Citizenship and Permanent Residence 
There are three ways in which citizenship and permanent residence can be granted: birth, 
descent and by naturalisation. 
The acquiring of South African citizenship is a mixture of jus soli (birth) and jus 
sanguinis (by descent). In terms of jus soli citizenship can only be granted if a parent is a 
citizen or both parents are permanent residents. This rule is relaxed if at least one parent 
is a permanent resident. Children born of temporary residents are not usually granted 
citizenship. Descent can apply to children born to South African citizens living abroad. 
Most South African citizens acquire their status under the principle of jus soli. 
However for the purposes of investigating the rights of migrants to formal citizenship, the 
question of permanent residence and naturalisation is of some importance. The 
legislative bar against a large number of people acquiring citizenship means that 
naturalisation is the only legal option, and therefore of some importance to consider 
(although for many it was not the formal citizenship, but acquiring an identity document 
that will make their lives easier). There are eight conditions that have to be met to 
become a naturalised citizen. These are: 
• A person must be over 21 years 
• Must be admitted for permanent residence 
• Must have lived continuously for at least one year in the Republic before applying 
for permanent residence 
• Must ordinarily have lived for four of the last eight years as a resident preceding 
the application 
• Must be of good character 
• Be able to communicate in one of the official languages 
• Must have knowledge of the responsibilities and duties of a citizen 
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In short, naturalization depends on permanent residence. The Aliens Control Act guides 
permanent residence. A permit for permanent residence is available to a person who is of 
good character, who will be a desirable resident of the Republic, who will not harm the 
welfare of the Republic and who does not and is not likely to pursue an occupation where 
there are already sufficient numbers of people available. Immediate permanent residence 
may be granted to the destitute, aged, infirm or for spouses and dependent children of 
permanent residents and citizens. Applicants usually have to apply for permanent 
residence from outside the country, although those with temporary residence, a work 
permit, the aged, the infirm and destitute can apply from within the country. Persons who 
are married to citizens or permanent residents can also apply from within the country. 
The question that might be asked is whether the citizenship status would make any 
difference to ordinary people living in the republic. Two issues might be noted here. 
Firstly, the legal and bureaucratic procedural requirements for citizenship and permanent 
residence. Attempts at acquiring either citizenship or permanent residence may be less 
than encouraging because of the following factors: 
• The administrative challenge faced by the Department of Home Affairs given the 
previous lack of clarity over citizenship, and its ambiguous extension to people within 
homelands during the many years of apartheid. 
• The growth in corruption in the application of the rules and procedures over 
citizenship, the issuing of identity documents, permanent and temporary residence 
and refugee and political asylum seekers. 
Secondly, formal citizenship is probably less important than the acquisition of an identity 
document. For practical purposes an identity document is far more important in that it is 
the requirement for employment applications, opening bank accounts, access to trading 
permits and a range of other services. Acquisition of an identity document is a primary 
requisite in South Africa, one that foreign migrants quickly realise. And it is a document 
that is highly sought after by them. To have an identity document does not necessarily 
imply acquisition of citizenship. 
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8.3.5 Rights, Citizenship and the Aliens Control Act 
The Bill of Rights, as contained in the South African Constitution, provides that almost 
all rights are to benefit everyone, including 'aliens'. Except for the rights to trade, 
occupation, profession, citizenship and certain restrictions on movement and residence, 
everyone who lives in the republic has rights under the new constitution. These are rights 
for 'everyone' not just for citizens. While formal legal changes to the jus soli and 
naturalization rules were made to accommodate the changed constitutional status of the 
Republic, the general effect of the new Act was non-racial and inclusive in so far as the 
South Africans are concerned. The Citizenship Act and Constitution sought to be 
inclusive of all South Africans, in contrast to the fragmentation and divisive regime of the 
past. While the constitution upholds the rights of everyone, (but draws the distinction 
between the all encompassing rights of 'citizens' and 'the people'), there are various acts 
which restrict the rights of foreign migrants. The principal law that covers foreign 
migrants is the Aliens Control Act of 1991, as amended in 1995 (Aliens Control 
Amendment Act). 
The fundamental assumption underlying the Aliens Control Act is that foreigners pose an 
economic and social threat to South Africa. This assumption has its historical precedents 
in the 1913 Immigration Act and the 1937 Aliens Act, both pieces of legislation which 
are racist and anti-Semitic (Perberdy and Crush, 1998). These acts were seemingly non-
racial because they did not mention the actual race or religious group to which they were 
directed. The 1913 Immigration Act was directed against Indian immigration and the 
1937 Aliens Act against Jews, in particular those fleeing from Nazi Germany. Both Acts, 
as Crush points out, "shunned transparency, administrative justice and accountability and 
gave wide discretionary powers to administrators, and allowed politically powerful 
employers such as the mines to devise their own 'immigration policy' " (1998, 2). It 
might be argued that the racial assumptions and administrative procedures of these Acts 
are carried over into the 1991 consolidation of Aliens legislation, and then further into the 
1995 amendments. 
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There are three important issues that arise out of the Constitution and the Aliens Control 
Act which are of concern in relation to the subject of migrants as discussed later in the 
thesis. The first is that there is an assumption of a necessary conflict between the interests 
of migrants/immigrants and South Africans (Reitzes, 1999). There is, in Reitzes' view, no 
concrete evidence of this conflict of interest in South Africa. There is, of course 
xenophobia. But the xenophobia is about South African perceptions of migrants and 
immigrants as a threat, rather than the reality. The existence of xenophobia does not deny 
or justify differential and discriminatory treatment, including attacks on migrants or 
immigrants or indeed on anyone, including South Africans, who are alleged to be foreign 
because they are too dark in complexion, have the wrong vaccination mark, shape of 
nose, or hair texture, or cannot say the word 'elbow' in one of the main official languages. 
It is suggested that the symbolic use of foreign migrants, albeit questionable, is one 
means of uniting South African citizens around a national identity. Although not 
suggestive of a national state strategy, opposition to foreigners to emphasis a South 
African identity may be what lies behind images of foreign migrants as disease-ridden, 
job-grabbing, criminals intent on swamping South Africa in large numbers, rendering life 
as it is known today 'alien'. 
The second issue that can be considered here is the impact of the discourse of human 
rights, as infused in the making of the South African constitution, on the understanding of 
citizenship. Klaaren has argued that large parts of the current Aliens Control Act would 
not stand the test of the constitutional court (1999). According to the Human Rights 
Watch (1998), there are many human rights issues raised by the Aliens Control Act, and 
which may be in violation of the various international and African protocols signed by 
the government. An analysis of the abuse of human rights of undocumented migrants, 
asylum seekers and refugees in South Africa may be found in Manby, (1997) and Human 
Rights Watch (1998). An exploration of these abuses is not directly relevant here, suffice 
to record its existence. However a few important points may be raised as these impact 
directly on subsequent themes in the thesis. 
One of the points raised by the Human Rights Watch is that there is no enabling 
legislation in South Africa providing for public and parliamentary scrutiny of the 
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Department of Home Affairs whose jurisdiction covers foreign migrants, refugees, and 
political asylum seekers. The system by which migrants and immigrants, refugees, and 
political asylum seekers are incorporated into South African society does not exist in any 
systematic or institutional form. Those administrative procedures that do exist are 
internally prescribed and often inconsistently and informally applied by officials in the 
Department of Home Affairs with no consistent oversight by parliament and therefore 
hidden from the public's gaze. Indeed corruption, as mentioned above, is a major problem 
in the Department. However, there are guidelines which the government and its agencies 
are morally obliged to follow by virtue of membership of the United Nations, 
International Labour Organisation and the Organisation of African Unity, and the 
agreements signed with the United Nation's High Commission for Refugees. The Act and 
its various incarnations as a white paper on international migration violate a wide range 
of human rights (Reitzes, 1998, 1999). In Reitzes' view the Act hardly acknowledges 
human rights guarantees in the constitution, and has a highly questionable approach to the 
issue of domicile. We shall return to the issue of human rights and domicile below. 
Reitzes makes the further point that the Aliens Control Act does not seek to assimilate 
people, but rather to contain or expel foreigners, especially illegal or undocumented ones. 
In fact, the Act and the subsequent white paper depart radically from the earlier Green 
Paper that treated migration and immigration as an economic development issue. Flowing 
from the assumption that migrants are a social and economic problem, Reitzes argues that 
there is an emerging position from within the Department of Home Affairs which 
suggests that if people enter the country illegally, or persist in staying after the expiry of 
their visa permits and without any further legal documentation, then they forfeit their 
"rights". At an empirical level there is no formal category for temporary foreign migrant 
workers in the Act, and hence no rights, in particular economic rights; in essence no 
formal rights to forfeit. At a conceptual level this is problematic. The contrast or 
juxtaposition of formal citizenship rights against the rights of non-citizens seems 
contrived, as if these actors bear "rights" that are mutually exclusive. This seems to 
suggest that in South Africa you can have human rights or citizenship rights, but not 
necessarily both. Or at least you can have full human rights only if you are citizen. Such a 
perspective is extremely limited to a position where the state decides what rights people 
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might have, which reinforces a passive acceptance of citizenship status. The state as 
custodian of the rights of citizens becomes opaque, and opens up the space for the abuse 
of state power. In Mann's terms such a state in its approach to citizenship issues might be 
considered, at least, authoritarian. Such a characterisation stands at odds with the fact that 
nine years into its transition South Africa has developed an enviable reputation as having 
re-invented democracy. There exist all the trappings of parliamentary democracy: a 
constitution with a bill of rights, a constitutional court, and a human rights commission, 
and several substantially free national and local government elections and a robust 
parliamentary debate between political parties. 
The third issue is whether rights can be enjoyed only where people are domiciled. It 
should be acknowledged that immigration policy by its very definition (placing 
limitations of where and when people may move) violates the idea of universalist 
assumptions about human rights such as the freedom of movement and association. The 
issue of making rights specific to a geographic place ignores the fact that human rights 
are inalienable (they are portable). Human rights cannot be circumscribed by boundaries, 
so that one can practice human rights in one place, but not in another (see Reitzes, for an 
analysis of the inherent tension between human rights, sovereign rights and citizenship 
rights: 1997: 4-7). As Urry (1998) points out, while formal constitutionally defmed 
citizenship is commonly conceived of as a bundle of rights within a territorially defmed 
national state, with globalisation human rights issues have become entangled with 
citizenship issues. However the practice of the rights within a prescribed area, or place of 
domicile, is a contentious one in legal theory. It is not the intention here to engage with 
that debate directly, although it carries with it shades of apartheid ideology as it is applied 
in South Africa (Mail and Guardian, 24-30/08/01). What is of concern is the limitation it 
implies in terms of mobility and economic opportunity. In the case of migrants who are 
the subject of this thesis, it is precisely their mobility to exploit economic and 
employment opportunities within the Durban Metropolitan region that is crucial to their 
survival. Foreign migrants' success in their enterprises or employment opportunities 
hinges on their mobility. Indeed in some cases success can be measured by their ability to 
extend their economic operations and enterprises by providing further employment 
opportunities to others. The 1999 White Paper on International Migration seeks to 
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liberalise entry conditions while making it difficult for foreigners to obtain employment, 
and seeks to shift the responsibility for policing the employment of foreign migrants to 
actors such as trade unions, employers, local and provincial governments, and service 
providers. But foreign migrants are not found in large or even moderate numbers in the 
formal sector of the economy, but rather in the informal sector. Not having easy legal 
access to formal jobs, and restricted in various activities due to their lack of an identity 
document, most foreign migrants and workers are found in the informal sector, mostly 
self-employed, and constantly under scrutiny from the agencies of the state. There are 
some who fmd work in the formal sectors of the economy such as in the agricultural and 
construction sectors. Examples are Mozambicans working on commercial farms in 
Mphumalanga province, or those working in the construction industry (Reitzes, 1999). In 
both formal and informal working environments, these foreign migrants work under very 
exploitative conditions. 
But there is another dimension to the issue of domicile and territorial boundaries that will 
be raised in the context of the citizenship rights in urban centres such as Durban. 
Metropolitan centres are where municipal government takes on a greater role in the 
provision of employment opportunities, economic and housing infrastructure and services 
in a dense, highly stratified and heterogeneous population. Because migrants, both 
foreign and local, are attracted to such centres, the issue of mobility is of great 
importance in fmding work, or the means of subsistence, and accommodation that will 
suit their apparent indigent circumstances. The question is what rights (human and 
citizenship) can such migrants articulate in their dire need to find the means of survival , 
and in which their freedom of movement is not impeded so as to compromise their 
survival strategies. Clearly, constitutional and legislative devices may not cover these 
issues as a package of bureaucratic procedures and institutional rules. Here we return to 
the theoretical positions outlined above to make sense of these everyday challenges _ 
sometimes hidden, sometimes overt - that are faced by migrants. 
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8.4 MIGRANTS AND CITIZENSHIP IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Given the discussion above, the following points are the most salient for purposes of 
discussing the Malawian case study. These points will be incorporated into the 
discussion. The points are: 
1. The fundamental assumption underlining the Aliens Control Act is that 
foreigners pose an economic and social threat to South Africa, and therefore 
should be kept out. 
2. There is a necessary conflict between the interests of migrants/immigrants and 
South Africans 
3. To prevent this conflict requires a muscular response in the form of 
systematic police raids, deportations, and border patrols, and a system of 
surveillance of foreigners in the form of bureaucratic controls such as the 
payments for issuing of permits, identity documents, reporting to home affairs 
officials etc. 
4. The immigration legislative regime does not cater for the category for 
temporary foreign undocumented migrant seeking to work only for limited 
periods before returning home. This criminalizes foreign migrants. 
5. The regime of criminalizing and deportation does not stop the foreign 
migrants from coming back, or new migrants making the journey to South 
Africa. 
6. The Aliens Control Act does not seek to assimilate people, but rather to 
contain or expel foreigners, especially illegal or undocumented ones. 
7. The constitution is infused with the aura of human rights (follows various 
models and international protocols), yet the legislation on immigration and 
migrants contradicts the spirit and letter of the law. 
8. Formal citizenship is probably less important than the acquisition of an 
identity document. 
9. The issue of domicile and territorial boundaries plays it itself out in 
contradictory ways - while trying to restrict foreign migrants, it also does not 
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place limits on securing employment once granted permission to stay in the 
country. Refugees, in particular are not confined or restricted to refugee 
camps. 
10. Citizenship rights are conditioned by their participation, their sense of locality 
and belonging to particular areas in which the practice their daily routines: 
a. participation in economy - development of informal sector - micro 
enterprises and entrepreneurship 
b. debating their role as entrepreneurs 
c. participating in a metropolitan economy - challenge of services provided 
and consumed. 
d. belonging to a locality. 
8.4.1 Places of Origin and Entering the country 
Many of foreign migrants in Durban come from the countries that comprise the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC), namely, Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana, 
Namibia, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi, Mozambique, and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo. There are also a large number that now coming from outside of the SADC 
countries, particularly from West Africa (Senegal, Mali, Ghana, Nigeria, Cote d'Ivoire), 
Central Africa (Congo, Burundi, Rwanda) and parts of East Africa (Somalia, Ethiopia, 
Kenya). This new and constant in-flow of new migrants, as work seekers, refugees and 
political asylum seekers, is a feature of the new reality and composition of South African 
society. In chapter 4 the reasons for the presence of foreign migrants, immigrants and 
refugees was covered, and discounted the debate on the numbers of foreigners as a threat 
to the economy as of little importance. What was of importance was what they actually 
do in terms of inserting and assimilating themselves into the country and making a living 
(survival). Later in this chapter I shall return to this point of insertion and assimilation 
when discussing the participation of Malawians in the local economy. 
The state's response to African continental migration to South Africa has been, to quote 
Klaaren, 'muscular'. Repatriations and deportations, as well as regular raids in areas 
known to be densely populated with foreign migrants, has been the order of the day. 
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Surveillance through the issuing of permits and migrants having to report and renew 
permits at regular intervals are also mechanisms to reduce the length of stay and 
willingness to either come to the country, and/or settle permanently. Xenophobia, while 
not encouraged by the state, is on the rise, as witnessed in a number of incidents. Yet not 
all foreign migrants and immigrants have the same problems. 
Malawians rely on their national identity to enter the country, the difference being that 
they are treated with less suspicion than other African nationals. Yet they are aware that a 
declaration to immigration official that they are seeking work in South Africa would be a 
tactical mistake. Thus obtaining a tourist visa is the least problematic means of entry 
because they are members of an SADC country, and they can easily satisfy the test of a 
name and an address of a relative or friend in South Africa given the long-term contact 
between the two countries. Although Malawians have easier entry into South Africa, their 
visa does not entitle them to work. Yet that is precisely what many do, search and find 
work once inside the country2. But unlike the Senegalese who rely heavily on their own 
internal network of Senegalese, the Dahira, for an institutional form support (Bouillon, 
2000, 50-54; Vawda, 2000: 113-115), the Malawians rely on a variety of strategies to 
survive once inside the country: religious affiliation, work skills, length of stay and 
marriage to locals are important considerations in their survivalist strategies. 
Malawians have, as we have shown in the previous chapters, longstanding migrant labour 
ties, as well as diplomatic and economic relationships. In concrete terms Malawians in 
Marainnhill and to an extent in the Overport and city centre come from a number of 
villages in southern Malawi, principally the district of Mangochi, but also from other 
towns, villages and cities. Many have come from villages, their primary first migratory 
step is to the towns and cities of Malawi, mainly Lilongwe and Blantyre. While the 
geographic place of origin might give clues as to the reasons for leaving, the intention to 
stay in the cities of Malawi and later Durban, for whatever length of time is decided 
2 G.iven ~he long~tenn migratory history between the two countries, some Malawians do eventually obtain 
~s.ldentlal pennl.ts. Only one Malawian showed me his passport in which it was stamped 'Malawian 
cItIzen, reSIdent In South Africa'. Others may obtain residential pennits because of marriage to local 
people. 
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upon, and the reasons for this length of time is of importance in understanding any 
continued relationship that might exist with the place of origin, and the degree of 
commitment such a migrant might have to belonging in the city. Initial indices of 
belonging, or elements towards constructing a livelihood in the city are the places of 
accommodation, the construction of a household, and the type of work that is sought and 
engaged, and the period of time and if a transient oscillating transnational migrant (or 
rather the option of being one), the number of regular return trips made. The sense of 
belonging in Durban, rather than anywhere else, is, it might be argued, a critical 
component towards any conception of citizenship. 
8.4.2 Survival Strategies: Rights and Work 
The Aliens Control Act, as Reitzes has pointed out, is based on the assumption of a 
conflict of interests between South African and foreign workers. At first glance this might 
appear to be true, and employment for foreign workers needs to be restricted to South 
Africans because of the high unemployment rates in the country. It might be further 
argued that the influx of African continental migrants and refugees occurs at a time of 
transition in the country when the economy is being re-structured, with consequent job 
losses. Here a distinction must be drawn between refugees and asylum seekers, and 
continental African migrant workers. One of the positive features for refugees and 
asylum seekers is that once registered with the Department of Home Affairs they have a 
legitimate right to seek employment or pursue self-sustaining employment options. This 
in turn implies that they should not be denied legitimate access to job opportunities 
and/or resources to pursue various employment prospects. However, this right to engage 
in economic activities is not absolute. It does not mean that the South African state 
undertakes to assist them in securing jobs or access to social services such as shelter, 
health or education. It also does not mean they can register as work seekers with the 
Department of Labour. Furthermore even if an employer wants to employ a foreigner he 
would have to prove that the skills required for the job couldn't be found among the local 
population, particularly amongst blacks. In effect, regardless of the skills of refugees and 
asylum seekers, the Act effectively denies legitimate African foreign immigrants access 
to work opportunities. In effect this means those foreigners who are here for reasons of 
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political asylum or as refugees have to rely on themselves to construct a livelihood in 
order to survive. 
This right to seek economic opportunities does not apply to undocumented foreign 
migrants who seek work, that is, economic refugees. Although they give their reasons for 
entering South Africa as visiting friends, relatives or as tourists, many African migrants, 
such as the Malawians, are here as economic refugees because of the dire economic 
circumstances in their respective countries, often exacerbated by political instability. In 
other words their situation is a complex intertwining of political, economic and 
sometimes personal reasons for leaving their countries of origin and travelling thousands 
of kilometres to the southern tip of Africa. Some might even argue that South Africa has 
a moral obligation to assist Malawian migrant workers as they contributed to the 
development of the mining industry, when very few South Africans were prepared to 
work underground. The Malawians are forthright in their reasons for coming to South 
Africa: they come to seek work. Except for a few their options are limited to being 
workers or self-employed entrepreneurs. But the choice of livelihood depends, at least in 
the initial stages of their stay, on the country of origin, and what networks of friends and 
relatives that they connect with in South Africa. Malawians, because of the longer ties 
that they have with South Africa, tend to be able to connect with a well-established 
network of their own nationals. These networks provide them with advice on 
employment opportunities, or access to South African employers mainly in various 
retailing, tailoring, dressmaking and clothing manufacturing sectors. Some Malawians 
have subsequently branched out to work on their own, and create employment. 
While political refugees are able to access a number of non-governmental organisations 
for their initial support, mainly religious based ones and UNHCR sponsored 
organisations, such as the Refugee Forum, the Malawians, rely almost entirely on their 
own resources and networks to find accommodation and work. In the case of Muslim 
migrants and immigrants, such as the Malawians from the Mangochi district (where the 
Yao Muslims predominate), connecting and seeking assistance from Islamic charitable 
organizations or mosques has also been a consideration in starting to develop a new life. 
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Virtually from the moment they arrlve, they rely on their own networks and 
entrepreneurial experience to fend for themselves, making no overt demands on the state. 
While there might be competition among foreign migrants and local people to find jobs, 
it is difficult to construe such a situation as a case of inimical interests. In an era where 
the state has withdrawn from guaranteeing full employment, or any kind of employment, 
as the Minister of Finance so recently put it in no ambiguous terms, it would be difficult 
to construe finding and securing employment by your own means as a conflict of 
interests. All foreign migrants, whether political or economic refugees, rely on 
themselves and their networks, without any assistance from the state, to find 
employment. Indeed as has been shown in the previous chapter some have created their 
own employment opportunities, started small scale businesses and now provide 
employment for local South Africans. Yet the foreign migrant workers, as employees 
competing with other unemployed South African, as self-employed entrepreneurs and 
providers of employment and tax revenue for the state, do not have the formal right to act 
as if they were citizens. They do however, challenge, by their very economic 
transactional practices, the denial of a right to fend for themselves. 
8.4.3 Spaces to Survive, Places to Assimilate 
While the literature shows that many foreign immigrants/migrants have opted to live and 
work in city centres, the high cost of living in the centre of the city meant that many 
Malawians exercised the option of moving their residence (and in some cases their 
enterprises) out of the city centre to the margins of the Durban Metropolitan region in 
Mariannhill. Malawians also live in densely populated residential areas such as Overport 
in high-rise apartments, and in the city centre, where they benefit from close access to 
their places of employment, access to services and facilities, and share the expenses of 
rental tenancy and other living expenses. Overport also is a predominant Indian 
residential area with a substantial Muslim Indian population with whom Malawians seem 
comfortable to live among, particularly for Malawians from the Yao and Chewa ethnic 
groups who tend to be predominately Muslims. 
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The choice of place to live and work, an essential ingredient of citizenship rights, is in 
this case also exercised because of security concerns. To live in the city centre also makes 
a foreign migrant prone to police raids. As with all undocumented migrants the world 
over, a series of stratagems have been evolved by foreign migrants to circumvent falling 
into the clutches of the police. But choice of residence is significant as it is the base from 
which one makes forays into evolving livelihood strategies. Those Malawians living on 
the periphery argue that not only is it cheaper, but also provides a measure of protection 
from the surveillance of the police and home affairs officials. It is not unusual for foreign 
migrants, particularly those who trade on the street and live in the city centre to 
experience regular police raids and as a consequence to have their property confiscated, 
be taken into custody, and eventually deported at the slightest provocation. Bribes to 
police often assist in making the nightmare disappear. But such police raids raise crucial 
questions about civil society's, local government and parliamentary oversight on the 
actions of state agencies, and the apparent unbridled power such agencies have In 
upholding the protection of life, property, and the principles of habeas corpus. 
It is the possibility of living in the urban periphery, with lower accommodation and 
subsistence costs and with a community support system, which enables them to survive at 
lower costs per individual or household. But for them it is not just another poverty trap. 
Surviving in the semi-urban area of Mariannhill enables them to accumulate some surplus 
funds. The accumulated funds are then used either to start or expand their entrepreneurial 
activities in Durban, or remit surplus funds to Malawi to support their families or set up 
new enterprises. Despite the problems of xenophobia and harassment, Malawians, by 
playing a lower profile, have been able to carve out niches for themselves, and create the 
spaces for themselves to pursue with determination their chosen objectives in migrating 
to Durban. In addition local traders have participated with them in the fast-growing 
informal sector. This issue of small and micro enterprises, as it relates to the issue of 
citizenship is analysed in a separate section below. 
252 
8.4.4 Continental Mrican Migrants in Durban and Small-Micro Enterprises 
In the section above the question was posed as to whether Malawian and South Africa 
interests are inimical. I have tried to provide one answer to this question. Here I develop 
another answer by making an assessment of what they do with their accumulated or 
surplus funds. 
In the previous chapter it was shown that a key informant, Banda, set up his own tailoring 
business in Mariannhill, after many years of working in a clothing factory and various 
tailoring establishments. Working from home he was able to accept contract work from 
some of the Indian owned clothing factories and retailers, as well as casual everyday 
business from both his own ethnic and national compatriots, as well as local people in the 
neighbourhood. His business was not confmed or dependent on an ethnic group. Others, 
such as Aslaam Kadalie and Said Muhammad, sew pinafores, shirts and trousers for sale 
on the streets of the city centre. The street sellers, often women South Africans, are 
involved in contractual obligations to retail the manufactured goods of the Malawians. 
Other Malawian migrants, it seems, buy various goods that are scarce in Malawi: clothes, 
electronic equipment, household equipment, cosmetics, trinkets, etc. for re-sale in 
Malawi. A few remit surplus cash to support family and business enterprises in Malawi. 
Others, such as the recent migrant, Jamie Mdala, are here as target workers. They have in 
their minds what they want to pursue as their main subsistence or livelihood activities in 
Malawi, but need to obtain the necessary start up capital or commodities by working in 
South Africa, and then returning. Thus for some the whole process of migration, work, 
accumulation and return could be repeated as need arises leading to a pattern of 
oscillating international migration between their countries of origin and South Africa. In 
short the Malawians present a picture of industrious petty entrepreneurs and workers 
engaged in diverse set of occupations, but removed from the everyday contestation of 
physical space in the city centre. These would seem to be the ideal citizens: unassuming, 
law abiding people who provide for themselves, and not reliant on the state for welfare or 
unemployment benefits. They fit in with the rules of the free market game. 
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Nevertheless the free-market game is at odds with the expectations that a post-liberation 
government would provide a variety of service and welfare entitlements, including 
employment. This has in part led to the debate about the implications foreign immigration 
and migration has for the South African labour market and a new immigration policy. I 
have already shown that a strategy built on keeping foreigners out, and the need to 
control entry does not address what these new international migrants do in the country, 
particularly for a livelihood, and whether these practices, or participation in the local 
economy, precipitate issues of rights and citizenship. Here I am not referring to specifi-
cally undocumented migrants but to all those who have entered the country and have had 
to fmd the ways and means of survival. One major means of survival is as small petty 
traders, or micro-enterprises, usually as part of the informal sector. Officially this is 
referred to as part of the small, medium and micro-enterprise economy (SMME), that is, 
enterprises employing less than 40 people. In terms of official views on SMME, three 
categories are distinguished: ( a) survival enterprises in the informal economy, (b) 
growing micro-enterprises, and (c) formal small or medium sized enterprises. This shifts 
the debate from control of immigrants to questions of growth and development as 
suggested in the Green Paper on International Migration. Recent studies have shown that 
in Durban it is street traders and hawkers or 'survival enterprises' that are the most visible 
growth points in the regional economy, particularly in the centres of cities and towns, 
selling basic commodities, food and trinkets. The North and South Central Councils 
Integrated Development Plan points out that there are some 20 000 street traders in the 
Durban Metropolitan area.' Although this figure is not broken down by type of 
commodities sold, income earned or by nationality or ethnic group it does argue that 'the 
most buoyant and rapidly expanding component of Durban's industrial sector are firms 
of less than 40 employees. These are more likely to be owned or operated by Indian or 
African entrepreneurs' (1998: 24). Although the further development ofSMME's is seen 
as an essential part of the growth and development of the regional economy, the question 
is what implications does this have for foreign informal traders and entrepreneurs in 
relation to urban governance and development in the city of Durban: in short the 
citizenship rights within a locality of trading. 
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But it has also prompted among themselves a debate about their economic activities in 
SMME sector of the economy, principally around the accusations that they are deviant, 
criminals, take away jobs from locals, and do not integrate with locals. Of course they 
reject these . accusations, citing their religion as prohibiting them from engaging in 
criminals activities, that they are in fact self-employed, and employ locals, and that 
integration is also matter of locals overcoming their ignorance of the world, and in 
particular the circumstances of their respective countries. In this their several other 
identities as Muslims, traders, employers, residents begin to emerge, which are beginning 
to play profoundly different roles as they begin to contest their all-consuming subjected 
identity. 
It is precisely in these transnational contacts that potential benefits to the city may occur 
if a more constructive approach is taken to street trading by foreign nationals. Firstly, 
given that Durban as a regional economic centre exists within in a globally competitive 
environment, the networks and contacts of trading established by the migrants (and 
immigrants) are a resource to be cultivated, rather than restricted. Secondly there are the 
trade networks that extend into Africa, albeit small by comparison with large multi-
national companies, but nevertheless a point of departure for a port city willing to extend 
its trade network to an untapped market. Naturally this requires it to shed its vision of 
trade as primarily connected with Europe and America, and that small or micro 
enterprises are a matter of only an internal and tourist market. A third aspect is the 
revenue generated and revival of the city centre. By not recognizing the potential revenue 
generated by granting migrants the required trading permits, they reduce the revenue 
generated from immigrant street traders who are willing to pay these costs in order to 
secure a stand to support their business enterprises. A fourth aspect is that it is apparent 
that many foreign street traders, including the Malawians, generate employment. For the 
city to acknowledge the growth and development potential that lies locked by 
discriminatory practices against foreign street traders, means to confront the question of 
rights of foreign migrants, and their incorporation in the governance of the city. In part 
this depends on how foreign migrants see themselves in the city. 
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8.4.5 Representation and Local Authority Governance Issues 
Foreign migrant identities are shaped from the moment they arrive at border entry points. 
From the perspectives of a migrant, state power is most visibly apparent in the whole 
apparatus of border and passport controls, issuing of visas, residency and work permits, 
and the rights and obligations attached to it, which officially stamps a migrant with an 
exclusionary subjected identity. 
Local authorities such as Durban have largely followed the lead established by the 
Department of Home Mfairs and reacted to foreign migrants negatively, usually in hos-
tile ways, often on the assumption that foreigners are to blame for a range of inner city 
problems. Thus, by extension, foreign migrants are an irritant to be ignored and excluded 
from developmental plans of the local state, and therefore marginalized. But in fact 
migrants such as the Malawians, have as shown above participated intimately in the 
economic activities of the metropolitan area. Those who have chosen to put down roots, 
and particularly those who have married locally can claim strong residential rights, and 
sense of belonging, and are not necessarily marginalized as foreigners. In some cases 
they have benefited from development initiatives. They have also benefited from their 
close associations with other powerful segments of the local population such as Indian 
merchants and industrialists. However inappropriate the local state authorities responses 
might be presently, it cannot be assumed that in the future such authorities would want to 
exclude migrants in some kind of formal enfranchisement process. But this assumes that 
foreign migrants would want to be included in some form of representation. Given that 
their legal status does not encourage them to be openly challenging to the local and 
national state, it is not surprising that their voices are not heard. But it does not mean that 
for example, they prefer the status quo, especially when it comes to issues such as trading 
permits and municipal services. The choices that the Malawian migrants make in the 
future, possibly in association with Muslim or Islamic organisations, as well as residential 
based civic organisations in relation to economic transactional relationships will raise 
questions about the wider context of their participation in relation to governance and 
development. Assuming wider participation by foreign migrants over the direct issues 
that affect them means an incipient change in a relationship of power over them to one in 
256 
which participation leads to a dispersal of centralised power in a shared, negotiated and 
contested way to more democratic forms of recognition of their identities and 
contributions. 
8.4.6 Assimilation and Insertion into Local Communities 
As noted above in the critique of the Aliens Control Act, there is a view expressed that 
the Act does not provide for any institutionalised mechanisms for assimilating or 
incorporating immigrants into the host society. But this does not mean that assimilation 
does not take place. As noted previously, Islam plays a large role in assimilating 
Malawian Muslims. Other Malawians of different religious persuasion are also 
incorporated into the community of Malawian Muslims if they come from the same 
district in Malawi. While local South African Indian Muslims have accepted Malawian 
Muslims without prejudice, assisting in providing initial poverty relief for the individuals 
and families of migrants, and crucially, employment, there is some criticism of the low 
wages paid. As Sheikh Banda stated: 'As Muslims they give us work, but they also don't 
pay well. We must thank Allah they give us the chance to get some money, but it is too 
little.' On the other hand local Muslims have supplied the public symbols of religious 
identification: mosques and Quranic schools. In other words one sector of South African 
society has fully accepted these migrants, even though it is a religious minority. 
South Africans being predominantly Christian in their religious outlook, have often 
identified Islam and Muslim with Indians - a completely false notion. As the constitution 
accepts religious diversity as acceptable and each religion and its practices as separate 
and equal, the presence of continental Africans as Muslims has engendered a sharp 
learning curve for South Africans. This applies particularly to black South Africans who 
often associate Islam with Indians. Rather than merely genuflect to the notion of freedom 
of religion the practice of Islam by Africans, albeit ' other' Africans, this is a practical 
demonstration of constitutional imperatives. Malawians, living as they do, among other 
racial and ethnic groups in a densely populated neighbourhood and declaring their 
religion openly, without serious objection, clearly inaugurates a tolerance and respect 
beyond the mere words that people have a right to practice whatever religion they wish. It 
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is precisely because this is a religious minority that it touches at one of the crucial aspects 
of citizenship - that of accepting religious diversity and cultural differences. 
But the practice of the religion with the help and assistance of the Muslim bourgeoisie 
comes at a possible cost. Whatever the misconceptions or interpretations by other South 
Africans, clearly the Malawians have used their religious activism and contacts among 
the local Muslim trading population to access employment opportunities, and as bene-
factors for mosques built in Marainnhill. The price to be paid for this may be dependency 
on patronage of Muslim welfare and charity organisations controlled and administered by 
Indian Muslims. Indeed this researcher has been accused of being part and parcel of the 
exploitative domineering Indian merchant class. This in itself is welcome as it prompts a 
debate that touches on questions of structural inequality beyond religious and ethnic 
solidarity in a society dominated by wide expanses of social and economic 
differentiation. 
While religion provides one basis for assimilation and insertion into a sub-sector of local 
society, the long history of contact, and evident networks that have been built up over 
decades, and strengthened in recent times, clearly influences the ways in which 
Malawians insert and assimilate to South African society. Another basis of assimilation is 
that Malawians are not afraid to learn to speak Zulu. Unlike French speakers whose 
language makes them stand out as different, Yao and Chewa speakers from Malawi 
quickly learn to integrate themselves through language. Speaking English, as most 
Malawians do, rather than French, also helps, and probably assisted in augmenting the 
religious ties to a largely English speaking South African Indian Muslim popUlation. But 
those who have thoroughly assimilated into South African society, and have little or no 
intention of returning to Malawi (even though they may maintain contact), have taken on 
South African spouses. Such an action entitles them to at least permanent residence, and 
their children are South African citizens by birth. 
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8.5 CONCLUSION 
Foreign migrants engage with the city as a locality to reconstruct their lives and 
pursue a set of fragile livelihood strands in constant tension with changing policy and 
administrative directions. In the spaces created by the constant definition and 
redefinition of what constitutes council policy and administrative procedures, 
Malawian migrants and immigrants push the boundaries of their claims not through 
overt challenges, but by their everyday practices which have an cumulative effect, for 
example to create an ethnic enclave in Mariannhill in the midst of a multi-racial 
community. Such a change to the character of the area is dramatic even by the 
standards of post-apartheid South Africa (where black townships have remained 
essentially poverty stricken black working class townships). 
Some practices accept the rules of the game, but demand that these rules are tested 
against laws and legally constituted procedures. They act as citizens, participating, 
wittingly or unwittingly, by staking their claim to the city. Although Malawians have 
not used or relied on perspicacious lawyers and the moral weight of international 
protocols to defend their rights, their participation in the local economy precipitates 
issues of rights and citizenship. Thus while the state, and local state, intentionally or 
not, attempts to intimidate (police harassment, denial of justice and denial of permits) 
or alternatively to criminalize refugees, or simply tries to ignore them, their presence 
and practices have to be acknowledged. It seems contradictory for the state to accept 
the notion of an informal sector as "the most buoyant and rapidly expanding 
component of Durban's industrial sector" and then deny a platform for a category of 
people from that sector of society. 
Immigrants and continental African migrants live and work in the city. Their 
presence, both physically and otherwise is unmistakable, and their use and 
contribution to the resources of the city makes it a concern for the city authorities. 
This could be interpreted to mean that access to the city should be cut off or restricted 
for African foreign migrants. That would be myopic as such migrants are unlikely to 
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disappear, given the conditions, both political and economic that exist in other parts 
of Africa, and that South Africa continues to appear as a successful economy and 
society. If indeed the local state deems it fit to cut off access by constant harassment 
of those street traders who seek to engage in legitimate and open informal business, it 
can have the adverse effect of either facing a barrage of law suits, andlalternatively 
driving such businesses underground. This would probably add to the burden of 
crime rather than preventing it. A corollary would be that to deny immigrants the 
right to make a living is tantamount to declaring that local government is willing to 
take on the task of providing shelter, welfare services and some level of gainful 
employment. Thus far the city authorities have largely been reactive, and have left 
the provision of any services and assistance for refugees and political asylum seekers 
to non-governmental, religious organisations and private initiatives. 
Foreign migrants' engagement with the local state has not been direct, but rather by 
occupying some of the capillaries of the local economy. It does not entail 
acknowledgement of universal or internationally accepted protocols, rights, laws and 
moral codes of conduct. Such a small step does not mean that the state will meet its 
obligations. Rather, for many refugees and migrants the minimum that they seek is 
for the state, both local and national, to remove undue obstacles in their path to 
making a living. Ideally foreign migrants would like to be treated as if they were 
normal citizens, having the same freedom of movement enjoyed by locals. In short 
the outsiders would like to be considered as insiders. 
However, from the perspective of the local state, more specifically politicians 
entrusted with development of the marginalized and formerly disadvantaged sectors 
of the population, the intrusion of foreigners, albeit African refugees, asylum seekers 
and migrants, with demands and claims based on moral and humanitarian grounds, 
was not a welcome additional political obligation. Indeed to divert resources to 
people other than their natural constituencies would be to court political suicide. 
Thus, for example, while the local state politicians made plans to regulate and absorb 
the informal economy as part of the economic activities of the city, this was not to be 
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extended to foreign migrants. However, absolving themselves of responsibility for a 
section of the city's inhabitants, whose primary means of survival is the informal 
economy cannot be a long-term solution. 
In the case of foreign African migrants, their citizenship status presupposes a 
framework of state and society. This framework provides the context for their 
political engagement, not always directly with political decision makers, but with the 
regulating mechanisms of the city and the state at the level that affects them directly: 
fmding accommodation in the city and making a living on the street. Their daily 
existence is a constant battle with the Department of Home Affairs, the police, and 
city inspectorate. They are at a distance from the centre of political power both within 
the local state and the national state. Yet their status and economic circumstances 
requires both an acknowledgement and acceptance of a minimal recognition, a 
platform from which to participate and argue for an extension of rights against the 
state already ensured by the protocols recognising universal human rights and the 
moral approbation of the post-apartheid state. What few formal rights refugees and 
political asylum seekers and migrants enjoy are easily ignored, save for when it is 
activated in defence. Yet they are the model citizens whom the neo-liberal state 
wishes to foster, the self-reliant, hardworking, entrepreneurial citizens whose 
dependence on the state is minimal. 
Is it possible that the new forms of negotiations and co-operative governance tum out 
to be old forms of passive citizenship because (a) the 'legitimate' authority of local 
government produced self-regulation among subjects as to their responsibilities, that 
is, Malawian migrants self-regulate themselves to be invisible and hidden, as in the 
bad old days of apartheid when black people were not to be seen on the streets of 
white South Africa; (b) the processes of social learning about democratic rights are 
incomplete; and (c) the resource base of the society has not changed significantly to 





In this final chapter of the thesis I summarise in a paragraph what the thesis was about, 
followed by a discussion of the main elements of the hypotheses put forward in chapter 
one and conclude with an assessment of the main findings in the light of the changing 
nature of migration, and the implication this has for citizenship and current migration and 
immigration policies. 
The essence of this thesis was an investigation into what kinds of livelihood itineraries 
Malawian migrants in Durban are obliged or decide to elaborate and act upon within 
transforming system of governance that affects them as individuals or groups or 
networks when they begin to: 
a. Insert themselves in the city (locating themselves in the city and including finding 
accommodation). 
b. Seek, fmd or create work (fmding employment, being employed, creating self-
employment). 
c. Change, stabilise their work or work related activities and the structure of their 
residential living. 
d. Become part of the city social landscape, i.e. becoming and developing a sense of 
belonging to, and being part of the city. They begin to institutionalise their presence. 
These livelihood itineraries are now discussed below in relation to the various hypothesis 
set out in chapter one. 
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9.2 DISCUSSION OF HYPOTHESES 
The discussion of the hypotheses will deal only with the salient points of each hypothesis. 
1. The presence of undocumented Malawian migrants in Durban displays the 
characteristics of transnational migratory patterns. 
In assessing the fmdings as presented in chapters five, six and seven, I observe, in terms 
of the first hypothesis that Malawian migrant livelihood itineraries have become, or at the 
very least are becoming an institutionalised expression of transnational migratory 
patterns. While these migrants and their livelihood strategies remain opaque to the 
panoptic gaze of the state, they do exist. In their persistence they play and challenge the 
rules of the governance game. I discuss the implications of these new or changing 
patterns of migration in relation to citizenship in greater detail below. 
2. The main push-pull factors in continental African migration to South Africa are 
not only economic, but are a complicated ensemble of economic and political 
circumstances. 
This research project did not undertake to provide a rigorous analysis of the push-pull 
factors in a global context, but rather modestly, through a review of the literature, and 
with reference to the reasons offered by the migrants themselves, point to those economic 
and political factors affecting the decision to migrate. In reviewing the literature on 
international trends in migration, a distinction was made between macro processes that 
provide the global context in which migration takes places, and the meso-level processes 
and micro-level contexts in which decisions are made to migrate. This was in part an 
attempt to separate the structural factors - the vicissitudes of post-colonial economies 
trying to cope with effects of flexible production and globalisation - and human agency in 
the migration process, and identify the different reasons and streams of migration. Apart 
from the very visible ways in which refugees become migrants as a result of overt 
political manoeuvrings and conflict on the continent, there are also the implementation of 
failed economic policies and political patronage of elites which have contributed to the 
demise of many national economies, and hence provide fertile grounds for the movement 
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of people to where they think there might be better opportunities to make a living. With 
reference to the Malawian migrants, their main reason for migrating has been to find 
alternative employment and business opportunities (87%, see table 5.6, chapter five). 
There were some who migrated for business reasons, or a combination of visiting friends, 
business reasons and learning new skills. Others were followers of their spouses or 
parents who had already migrated and settled in their new place of destination. 
Underlining all these decisions to migrate to Durban is that the economy in Malawi is 
currently less than fully able to deliver the possibilities of employment and economic 
opportunities. However, as was suggested by a number of the Malawian migrant 
entrepreneurs, a return to Malawi with their accumulated savings and investments implies 
that not all economic opportunities have evaporated. Indeed it was suggested that there is 
more likely to be a continuing link, either to accumulate more savings, or to engage in 
cross-border trade between the stronger economy of South Africa and that of Malawi as a 
result of their respective investments. 
This review does suggest South Africa has become a metropole, or if viewed on global 
scale, a sub-metropole to the developing countries of the north. It is a reflection of the 
already entrenched migratory patterns between developing countries of the south with the 
developed countries of the north. For the Malawians it must be noted that this is within 
the hidden migratory process, and at an informal level. Such a mode of migrancy 
suggests that a poor marginal post-colonial economy such as Malawi has difficulties in 
providing the infrastructure, and appropriate training and skills to their citizens to 
compete in the formal economy on a world scale to overcome the debilitating effects of 
the poverty. Malawians arrive with skills only marginally better than most black South 
Africans, except that they have better English language skills, and having experienced the 
consequences of structural adjustments earlier than South Africans, are in a better 
position to appreciate the rigours of fmding all manner of idiosyncratic livelihoods. 
Migration is no more than part of the larger embroidery of livelihood itineraries that they 
are obliged or decide to act upon. 
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3. The decision to migrate is often made at an individual and household level with 
the general aim to improve their general welfare (primarily income), accumulate 
savings and return. 
There are two interrelated issues in this hypothesis. Firstly, the decision to migrate, and 
secondly, the decision to return to Malawi. It was difficult to obtain information on the 
actual decision-making process to migrate. But as has already been shown the decision to 
migrate was made because: a) they could not fmd employment or sufficient opportunities 
within their own country to be self employed, b) even if they were self-employed the 
desired income to provide for a family or household was insufficient, and c) in order to 
be self-employed, perhaps as a result of being retrenched, migrating to South Africa to 
accumulate sufficient capital to start an enterprise in Malawi. Usually an individual made 
the journey by himself leaving behind a family, or with friends and relatives, suggesting 
that the decision was not entirely an individual calculating the costs and returns on 
investing in migration. However, as to the second part of the hypothesis as to whether by 
accumulating enough capital, they either remit their surplus, or return with their 
accumulated savings and goods, the results of the survey, and as indicated in some of the 
in-depth interviews show a mixed outcome. Slightly less than half of the respondents 
(49%) indicated that returning to Malawi was still a goal, while 41 % indicated that they 
have no desire to return. (10% were uncommitted to either option). This is confirmed by 
the figures on remittances where approximately 49% remit, 39% do not, and 11% did not 
answer the question. Rather than interpret this result as partial confirmation of the myth 
of return, or that Malawians are really out here only of temporary necessity, it rather 
indicates the changing patterns of migration, and a shift to a transnational model within 
the Southern Africa, in which decisions to return are made as the circumstances either 
within South Africa or Malawi change, and to the extent that their livelihoods are 
evolving, secure, or under threat. Such a perspective fits in with the reasons for either 
returning or staying in South Africa: 33% said they would return once they had achieved 
the goals or wanted to return as soon as they had accumulated their capital. A further 
39% said they would return to Malawi to visit family and friends, but would return to 
their work in Durban (see table 5.4, chapter five). What is required is further research to 
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probe exactly what this 'return' to Malawi means in concrete terms. For example, what 
exactly does visiting mean - are gifts, or commodities taken with for family and friends 
part of the ritual of visiting? What does investments in Malawi mean? Are these in rural 
or urban areas, and what kinds of investments are they? And in the long term how 
successful are they? Are these to be investigated only at a household level? 
4. Foreign migrants, such as Malawians, despite the obstacles they face, find ways to 
create livelihood strategies. 
Very few Malawians find themselves unemployed for very long. Despite the fact that 
current legislation and immigration and migrant policies do not favour the employment of 
foreigners, or the provision of trading permits by the municipality, continental African 
migrants do engage, through proxies or contacts with street sellers, in informal trading on 
the streets and home based industries. Others have found employment, albeit often under 
exploitative conditions. Malawians have found the means to exploit the opportunities that 
they perceive. No one stands still, and by a combination of their own perspicacity and the 
assistance from their networks of friends, relatives and contacts with the Muslim 
community of Durban have carved out the niches in which they operate to create a 
multiple set of livelihood strategies to survive and in some cases prosper. However, the 
social capital mobilised though their networks of friends and relatives and connection 
with various others is not premised on bottomless generosity: migrants have to fmd ways 
of surviving at the very least, or the means to return home if all else fails. 
5. Although migrants see themselves as temporary sojourners, they build up a stake 
in the city. 
I have argued that the migration patterns have changed not only from one which was 
based on fonnal contract labour, but that the idea of temporary sojourn is also likely to 
change to one in which transnational migration becomes the norm, where migrants either 
travel or remain in constant contact between Durban and their villages and towns in 
Malawi, and involve the investment of time and resources across national boundaries 
between places of origin and destination. This implies a greater stake in the city, rather 
than merely a place to rest one's head, accumulate capital and return home permanently. 
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Clearly a number of migrants had this latter option in mind when making the journey. 
However, their itineraries evolved to building a greater stake in the city, and can be seen 
in the indices of accommodation practices and the types of work, length of employment 
and learning to speak the local language, Zulu. Close to 60% are sharing accommodation, 
mainly with family and kin. As long as they are contributing to the household, it is less 
likely that they will be asked to leave and will remain until their goals are achieved or 
change. While a majority, nearly 60% are involved in formal types of employment, the 
length of employment ranges from a few months, for those who have recently arrived, to 
nine years for those who have been here for most of the decade. It might be suggested 
that because they are paid exploitative wages they cannot accumulate enough capital to 
leave. That may be so, but the percentage that reported this as a reason for not returning 
to Malawi is less than 1% (see table 5.54). Others, although a minority, have built up a 
stake through their entrepreneurial activity and as this provides an income of no small 
insignificance to accumulating capital and making further investments either in Durban 
or in Malawi. Such entrepreneurial activity provides employment opportunities for other 
people, both local street traders and Malawians. Such a stake in the city cannot simply be 
dismissed. The investment and income derived from these economic activities is not 
likely to be aborted until there is an equivalent or better opportunity in Malawi or 
elsewhere. 
Another way in which a stake can be claimed is through marriage and acquiring a house. 
While the majority of the migrants come as single male persons, clearly reflected in the 
statistics in chapter five, marrying a local person, either out of convenience or for other 
more appropriate reasons is an active consideration. Marriage to South Africans entitles 
access to rights of residence and eventually formal citizenship, but does not invalidate 
citizenship of Malawi as dual citizenship is permitted under South African immigration 
law. 
Furthermore, the long history of contact between long-settled Malawians in Durban and 
their friends and relatives in the towns and villages of Malawi suggest that over the last 
decade 'porous' borders and relaxed entry for SADC residents, set in place a positive 
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feedback mechanism whereby the initial links become the bridgehead for promoting 
greater levels of migration from the same area, in this case Mangochi (and more 
generally southern Malawi). Thus over time settled migrants are able to sustain greater 
levels of new incoming migrants. This not only expands the enclaves in which they live 
and work, but also entrenches the presence of Malawian migrants. 
It is against the formal rules of the game, and in the regular iterative social practices of 
the migrants, reproduced daily, that their stake in the city is built up, and expressed 
institutionally. They build the social institutions that work for them. 
6. Participation in the social and economic life of the city entitles them to claim 
human and citizenship rights. 
There are two aspects of this hypothesis that needs to be assessed. The fIrst is what is 
their participation and, secondly, what rights are embedded in those practices. This 
assessment is based around the following: the use of state resources, either in fInding 
employment or in social services; their economic status or participation in the economy; 
and the relative freedom to pursue such activities. There is also a moral dimension to this 
argument of entitlements. As Malawian migrants in the past have contributed to the 
economic, political and social development of the country, it might be argued that South 
Africa owes a debt of gratitude, and an concrete demonstration of this would be at the 
very least to afford migrants the same rights to work opportunities and social services as 
any other citizen as guaranteed in the constitution. However, none of the migrants 
interviewed raised this as an issue, perhaps because most are relatively young and the 
experience of formal contracts of labour for the mines is not part of their experiences. 
In chapters four, fIve and six I demonstrated that migrants do not, as a rule, depend on 
any kind of handout from the state whether in the form of employment opportunities, or 
social and welfare services. Those living in apartments in Overport and the city centre 
pay rent and for the services that already exist. However, Mariannhill, a peri-urban zone, 
has benefIted from · infrastructural development, such as water, electricity, and roads. 
Some have been able to access housing because of their status as permanent residents or 
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through their marriage to local people. However, this must be placed in context, in that 
the neighbourhood in which most of the Malawians live in Mariannhill, such 
development was triggered by the sale of the land from a Muslim landowner to the 
municipality. Whether as tenants or as landowners, they now pay for the services and are 
subject to all the regulations regarding the use and payments for such services, and those 
who own property are subject to rates. As hidden migrants their role in these 
developments was not very obvious, or public, but is singularly important from the point 
of view of many settled migrants. Their participation in influencing the transfer of land 
not only gave them a stake in the area, but a sense of belonging and identity as they 
participated unobtrusively in that process. While participation takes place, albeit 
unobtrusively, their right to vote in local elections is severely limited. 
Although Malawian migrants, as investigated in this project, are mostly not educated 
beyond secondary school education, what skills they have, they have used productively 
without making claims on the state to provide jobs or skills training. Where skills had to 
be acquired, such in tailoring or sewing, they did this. They have demonstrated their 
industrious nature in that almost all find some form of work, either in the formal sector, 
or as self-employed entrepreneurs in the informal sector. It is possible that those in 
formal employment are paid exploitative wages and this undermines the wage levels for 
local South Africans. However, the counter argument is that by pursuing a policy of 
discrimination against migrants, such undocumented workers will remained hidden and 
will continue to offer themselves at lower wages, which will further depress wages levels. 
Yet in being employed they pay taxes and contribute to the economic output of the 
region. Furthermore, those who are self-employed entrepreneurs also provide 
employment for both local people as well as their own nationals from Malawi. 
From the perspective of the Malawian migrants, the central issue here is the right to 
work. It is not entitlements to social services provided by the state to its citizens. 
Paradoxically it is about the power of delivery by the state, but not in the sense of the 
state doling out patronage, but about the right to work. Clearly, Malawian migrants do 
not depend on the state to provide the means to employment or accommodation. Rather 
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they depend on their networks, and social capital to access accommodation and 
information to obtain employment, training and self-employment. In pursuing their 
livelihood strategies they are the 'ideal' citizens, that is, they are the classic liberal 'free 
agents' who are self-driven and self-reliant. They fit in as the model citizen and pose no 
drain on the state, except in the provision of conventional infrastructure and services by 
local government. Allied to this is the right to participate openly in the governance of 
their lives, and in particular the denial of trading permits or any representation to change 
this iniquitous practice. The larger issue here is that of the state conferring and 
guaranteeing those fundamental freedoms, such as freedom of movement, association, 
expression and the right to own property, that enable citizens to provide for themselves. I 
shall return to this issue shortly in the discussion below on new forms of citizenship. 
7. Current policies of the state are exclusionary and offer little or no protection to the 
defence of their interests. 
When discussing this hypothesis a distinction needs to be drawn between the local state, 
such as the eThekwini Municipality, and national state. This distinction illustrates a 
disjuncture between local conditions and national state imperatives. In terms of the local 
state the denial of trading permits to foreign migrants for informal trading is not only 
illegal, but also effectively excludes foreign migrants from open participation to defend 
their interests. In a strict following of the legislation regarding immigration, all 
undocumented migrants would be illegal, and by definition excluded from the protection 
of the state. In effect, undocumented Malawian migrants have very little protection 
against the security forces of the state at local or national level. This insecurity is 
compounded by high levels of xenophobia, which have demonstrated that no foreigner, or 
even a local who looks like a foreigner, is safe from xenophobic attacks from the public 
as well as police. This makes the constitutional provisions for personal freedom and 
habeas corpus extremely ambiguous. Consequently continental African migrants go to 
great lengths to avoid being caught, to the extent of accommodating themselves in 
enclaves in apartment buildings in the inner city, and on the periphery of the city, in a bid 
to attract as little attention as possible to themselves, keeping themselves hidden and 
unobtrusive. 
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9.3 CHANGING NATURE OF MIGRATION 
Since the decline of formal recruitment of labourers for the mining industry, new forms 
of migration from other African countries, including Malawi, have emerged. I have 
identified this as transnational migration. Key elements of transnational migration are the 
crossing of two or more national boundaries, in which migrants have a continuing multi-
stranded relationships with their places of origin in terms of contact with family and 
friends, investments and resources that are remitted and exchanged between the places of 
origin and destination, and the influences this has on their migratory itineraries, the stake 
they have in their respective places of settlement, and the sense of belonging through 
their participation in the social and economic environment. 
I have intimated that the restructuring of employment practices in the mining industry in 
South Africa, and the implementation of structural adjustment programmes in Malawi 
during the 1980s, provided the broad macro-structural context for new kinds of 
migration. Malawians began to experience difficulties in maintaining their livelihoods 
prompting a migration that begins to resemble transnational migration, rather than the 
highly controlled contract migration of the past. The results of this research show this 
new migration emanating from southern Malawi, mainly the Mangochi district, with its 
destination point being Durban. A large number of people, mainly males with no more 
than a high school education, between the ages of 15 and 35 years, began seeking better 
economic opportunities through a step migration process from the villages and towns of 
Malawi, southwards towards Durban. This step migration process also begins to coincide 
with an expanding migratory web of links between Durban and Mangochi district in 
Malawi. This web or chain of migratory links creating a field of social relationships 
across national and international boundaries, built through mUltiple identities - family, 
kinship, friendship, religion, ethnicity, and nationality. It is these multi-stranded social 
relationships, which in the case of Durban, provides the basis for receiving, providing 
accommodation and means for finding and securing work in either the fonnal or infonnal 
sectors of the economy. The web of connections, held together by family, kinship and 
friendship ties, as well a sense of identity and belonging, is also the main means by which 
271 
information, remittances, financial transactions, and commodities are passed between 
Durban and Malawi. 
Two kinds of migration patterns have emerged out of the examination of the Malawian 
migrants in Durban. The first is one where they migrate to Durban and as a result of their 
interaction begin to see their place of destination more as a permanent settlement, rather 
than temporary. Some migrants in this category break. all ties with Malawi, while others 
continue to retain contact with family and friends in the villages and towns of Malawi. 
These migrants build a greater stake in Durban and form the basis of a positive feedback 
loop that encourages further migration because of the social capital and networks that are 
built up. These do not necessarily give up their Malawian identity, or that of their ethnic 
or religious status, and indeed use, as all migrants do, such identities as a resource in 
gaining and creating livelihood strategies. A second stream of migrants are those who use 
their social capital and networks to accumulate saving, capital and other resources to 
invest in Malawi. Two subtypes may be identified here. One subtype is made up of those 
migrants who begin to see that their stake in the economy here in association with their 
investments in Malawi, effectively building long-term material and social links that will 
endure over time, for example bringing family or friends to work for them in Durban, and 
sending or personally taking back financial and material resources for further investment 
in Malawi. These may be termed circular migrants. The second subtype includes those 
migrants who see the migratory process in purely instrumental terms. Migrants come to 
work in South Africa to enable the accumulation of savings, and return. They do not 
necessarily envisage a return to Durban or South Africa, but it might be a possibility. 
These are the target migrants. They have very specific goals for migrating, and once 
achieved return home. There is a third stream, but this has not received sustained 
investigation in this thesis. These are those who are the mobile itinerant traders and 
peddlers involved in a constant travel between the two countries transporting goods they 
buy in South Africa to sell in Malawi as well as people between the two countries. This 
third stream are not migrants per se, as they do not settle in Durban, but are an important 
link in the chain of migration. 
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All of these of streams of migrants underline the primarily economic nature of the 
migratory process however it is elaborated and embedded in their everyday social and 
economic practices, within and among the community they live with, and the working 
environment, including dealing with the regulations imposed on them by state. While in 
the past the Malawian migrants contributed most significantly to the mining industry, 
these new migratory streams contribute to the burgeoning informal and services sectors 
of the local economy. They also contribute to their places of origin by making 
investments or supporting their families. While contract migration of the past ensured 
employment in the mining industry (at least for a year), the new migration leaves them 
open to the vagaries of economic instability and business cycles, as well as xenophobic 
attacks. Although many find work, either in the formal or informal sectors, there are 
those who report being unemployed. However, most Malawian migrants find some form 
of work or employment within six months of their arrival in a range of areas in the city, 
including the city centre. As a hidden underclass of workers they are prone to labour 
under exploitative conditions, or as informal traders having to work long hours to achieve 
their income goals. Yet, as suggested in earlier chapters, they are the 'ideal' citizens who 
eschew state assistance, act responsibly to provide for themselves, and are motivated by 
an unflagging work ethic, and the knowledge of there being little or no alternative 
livelihoods, except to migrate elsewhere, or return home. The image projected here is 
that of migrants quietly interested in going about their ingenious methods of material and 
financial acquisition, and disengaged in civic and political matters. Yet the hidden nature 
of their migration, unobtrusive presence and limited integration into the wider social life 
of their communities in which they live (that is, beyond the boundaries of religious 
minority) underlines the very real civic and political problems that weigh upon them. 
9.4 IMPLICATIONS FOR CITIZENSHIP 
What is clear from the perspectives of the Malawian migrants, as well as from the other 
literature reviewed in chapter 4, is that continental African migrants would like to have 
the same work or economic rights that South Africans enjoy. As suggested by the 
analysis on the flow of migrants into South Africa, they would prefer to enjoy greater 
freedom of movement between the two countries, rather than illegality to which they 
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have become accustomed, or the insularity of a fixed location, or limitations on 
movement. They have no need for permanent residence or formal citizenship status, but 
rather the freedom to move. 
In chapter seven I outlined three models of citizenship and its allied concept of rights. 
The first model suggests that a state enjoys sovereignty over a territory in which citizens 
enjoy such rights as are granted or mediated by the state. The South African Constitution 
grants the right to earning a living (not to work), and various other social rights and 
welfare rights to citizens. Since migrants are not citizens, they enjoy no rights. Therefore 
immigration control protects the rights of citizens, including unfair competition for jobs, 
and avoids the drain on social and welfare services that foreigners pose. This is a widely 
held perspective; both by the public and political leaders, suggesting that there are only 
citizenship rights, not human rights. This would invalidate the Bill of Rights in the South 
African Constitution that takes its legitimacy from universal notions of rights, not 
territorial ones. But I outlined other models that challenged this view. 
One such model, the post-colonial citizenship model, argues that there is no intrinsic link 
between a territory and human rights. Its basic argument is that in a world of globalising 
pressures, tendencies and processes, people have human rights and dignity regardless of 
territory, or state boundaries, and should not be limited as such. Such state boundaries in 
Africa are in any case the arbitrary creation of colonial powers. 1 In this view then 
migrants or immigrants have a right to move across state boundaries in pursuit of their 
livelihoods, and therefore should be entitled to whatever rights are available or on offer to 
its citizens. There is a less iconoclastic version which suggests that there be freedom of 
movement to allow people to pursue their livelihoods, or economic activities, but that 
access to social and political rights, such as health care or the right to vote, be limited or 
restricted to citizens only. I have argued that these models of citizenship are based on 
notions of human rights which are fonnal, legal and constitutional, in which the state is 
the ultimate arbiter of which rights it dispenses, and that ultimately such a position 
I In an Africanist perspective all those born in Africa would enjoy human rights regardless of where they 
were born. 
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encourages a passivity in citizens to question the limits of state action in the abrogation of 
those rights. (Alternatively it encourages authoritarian tendencies within governance 
structures of the state.) In consequence, the abrogation and violation of human rights in 
tenns of the Aliens Control Act is not a public debate. And a state's genuflection to 
international protocols to protect human rights and treat people with dignity is more often 
practiced in the breach. 
I have pointed to a third model of citizenship which places the emphasis on the practices 
of individuals and groups of individuals as agonic participatory actors in their respective 
social and economic spaces and in relation to the practices of the state. In this perspective 
I have tried to show that the iterative and accumulative economic actions of Malawian 
migrants as they pursue their itineraries build up a position that both challenges state 
actions and policies and accepts certain ideological positions. For example, the 
Department of Home Affairs maintains that undocumented migrants are illegal, and the 
local state tries to limit their economic activities by refusing to give them trading 
licences. Yet Malawian migrants' livelihood strategies, by their very presence, their 
iterative existence, their ingenious ways of survival through a combination of tapping 
into social capital and internal networks of support, and external connections through 
religious, ethnic and national identities, create the conditions which allow for their 
continued existence without state patronage. Their existence challenges the denial of their 
right to exist. Yet their very presence stands as testimony to the very ideals of an 
entrepreneurial spirit that is actively promoted by the state. The ensemble of migrant 
activities, whether as employees or self-employed entrepreneurs fulfils a central policy of 
the state committed to creating job opportunities by encouraging self-activating 
individuals to participate in the market economy. Such a perspective is usually labelled as 
espousing neo-liberal values. But what is important here is not the sterility of such 
polemical discourse on neo-liberalism, but that such enterprising migrants fit into a 
organising concept that gives life to government policy in the way it shapes, influences 
and constructs a social category in such a way that people consciously or unconsciously 
take on the model of the government's way of doing things. Undocumented migrants 
become the model of rational calculating competitive individuals, who in pursuit of 
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surplus profits create jobs; or for those who are employees, productive workers who are 
prepared to work longer and harder for less. Hidden migration, ironically, produces the 
free self-activating agent, the model citizen of the state without its panoptic gaze. 
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University of Durban-Westville 
Department of Anthropology and Institute of Social and Economic Research: 
Research on Urban Dynamics and Development: Migrants in the City 
Social Survey Among Migrants in Durban: Malawians 
A. Interview Details 2.Time _________ _ 
I.Place ofinterview' __________________________ _ 
3. Date, _________ _ 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. Biographical Details 
1. Name: ___________________________ _ 
2. Village/Town ofOrigin, ______________________ _ 
3. Age, ________ _ 
C. Migration and Residence Details 
1. When did you arrive in Durban? ______________________ _ 
2. With who are you staying now? ______________________ _ 
3. How did you come to Durban? ______________________ _ 
4. Why did you come to Durban? ______________________ _ 
5. Did you come alone or with others? ____________________ _ 
6. Table: Household lnfol1Ilation 















Codes for Economic Status: 
1. Worker - Employed 2. Worker - Unemployed 
3. Self-employed 4. Housewife 
5. Scholar / student 6. RetiredlPensioner 
7. young child 8. No occupation ego diabledlill-health 
7. Are you sharing a residencelhousel? Yes_.No __ .How many of you in house? ___ _ 
8. Are you familylkin members? Yes_No __ 
9. If yes, who are they? _____________________________________ _ 
.., 
10. Previous Places 
Previous places at which household members lived 
Interviewee 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Place!s 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
[number the 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
places and 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
number the rest 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
of the responses 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 correspondingly] 
6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Period of stay 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
6 6 6 6 6 6 6 I 
WorklEmploy 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
I 
I 
mentwhile 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
there 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
With whom 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
did they stay 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Reasons for 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
leaving 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
6 6 6 6 6 6 6 --
') 
D. Formal employment! Unemployment 
1. Are you currently employed? Yes __ No __ . 
2 . If yes, where are you employed? ____________ _ 
3. What work do you do? ________________ _ 
4. If not employed, how long have you been unemployed? ________ _ 
5. If you worked before being unemployed, where were you employed? ____________________ _ 
6. What work did you do? ____________ _ 
7. How long were you employed? _________________________________ _ 
8. Any other previous employment. _________________________________ _ 
E. Return migration 
Return to home/village/town I 
Name Place YIN Reason 
1 Y ...... N . .. .. 
2 Y ...... N . ... . 
3 Y ..... . N . .. .. 
4 Y .. . ... N .... . 
5 Y ...... N ... .. 
6 Y . ... .. N ... .. 
7 Y ... . .. N .. ... 
8 Y .. . ... N . .. .. 
9 Y .. .... N ..... 
10 Y . ... .. N .. ... 
F. Informal Trading 
1. When did you start to selling? _______________ _ 
2. Where did you first start trading? Which streetJplace? ____________ _ 
3 Any other places/streets that you traded? _____________________________ _ 
4 WhmMeyouselling? __ ~-----------------------------------
5 How is the tradingbusmess? ___________________________________ _ 
6 Doyouemployanyone?_~~~---------------------------------
7 Where do you get yom goods from? ________________________________ _ 
8 Problems (eg. police; city officials; local traders; customers; home affairs; accommodation) 
G. Income: 
l. How much income did the household earn last month? 
R100 - 300 
R300 - 500 i I 
RSOO - 1000 
R1000 - 1500 
R1500 - 2000 I 
R2000 - 2500 ! 
R2500 - 3000 
More than R3 000 I 
2. Do you send money back to Malawi? Yes __ No __ . If yes, how much? _________ _ 
